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A Multilevel Perspective for an Energy Transition in the 
Power Generation Sector of the GCC Countries 
by Zoheir Hamedi 
 
ABSTRACT 
As a result of a combination of concerns related to the climate change 
issue, energy security, and the inevitable depletion of fossil fuels, the energy 
system of the world economy is, indeed, at the early stage of a gradual and 
sustained energy transition. 
The future of the energy system of the GCC economies will strongly 
depend on this world tendency, as they are one of the main producers and 
providers of hydrocarbons to the world economy, and their economies rely almost 
entirely on the hydrocarbons on two aspects: first of all, as a source of revenue 
and therefore a core element of their political economy and secondly, 
hydrocarbons constitute the only energy source fuelling the economic engine of 
the GCC countries. Moreover, the economies of the Gulf are under an increased 
pressure to diversify their energy mix for the following reasons: they have one of 
the largest carbon footprint per capita in the world, and the ever-increasing 
domestic consumption of electricity is putting an increasing pressure on the 
available reserves of hydrocarbons to the export market. 
Grounded on this new international energy environment and the 
challenges facing the GCC countries to diversify their energy sources in the long-
term, it is proposed through this study to explore through scenarios the possible 
transition pathway for engaging the GCC economies into an energy transition in 
their power generation sector up to 2050 and how this objective could be shaped 
within the context of a hydrocarbon-rich rentier economic system. The scenario 
methodology will be used within the concept of energy transitions and the multi-
level perspective (MLP) framework of analysis, which will allow for a systemic 
analysis of the energy system of the GCC countries and for identifying the forces 
that will be at work for potential future energy transitions.   
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Introduction 
BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH PROJECT 
When economies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries started 
to emerge from a status of poverty to a status of plenty beginning in the 1930s, but 
more essentially as an aftermath of the oil crisis of the 1970s, the concept of an 
energy transition was not a subject of discussion or of interest among the policy-
makers of the region, the general public at large, or even in the academic circles. 
Despite knowing that oil and gas were finite resources, the general belief was that 
the level of wealth underground was so immense that there was no reason to think 
about introducing new or alternative energy sources to oil and gas in the energy 
mix of the region for many decades ahead or more.  
In the present time, this situation has started to change as a result of a 
number of factors related to the political economy of the region, in addition to the 
indeed slow but steadily growing pressure from the climate change issue on the 
international relations agenda. Indeed, the unsustainable way humanity has been 
producing and consuming its energy is now being questioned, and awareness 
regarding the necessity to engage the world economies into an energy transition 
away from fossil fuels is growing with time, albeit at different levels from one 
country to another and from one region to another.   
Presently, fossil fuels still remain the main energy sources fuelling the 
world economy with a dominant status for oil as a result of its relative low cost of 
production and its liquid nature that makes it easy to process and transport. 
However, never since the introduction of oil as a source of energy has humanity 
been so concerned about two main issues related to the extensive use of oil in the 
world economy; namely, oil depletion and climate change. The problem of oil 
depletion concerns the availability of sufficient levels of energy resources in terms 
of oil reserves needed to sustain the ever-increasing world demand for energy, 
especially in light of the rise of emergent economies including China and India. 
Indeed, one of the main characteristics of fossil fuels, including oil, is that they 
are finite resources, and the current level of their consumption is higher than the 
natural process that has produced them over millions of years. The second, 
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relatively more recent issue is climate change, a process that is related to 
increasing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions resulting from the combustion 
process of hydrocarbons, and viewed by the scientific community as the main 
cause of global warming.  
These two concerns have led humanity to reconsider its relationship to 
nature and its approach to development, and have raised a number of central 
questions, namely: Can we continue consuming finite energy resources without 
serious consideration of transition towards new and clean sources of energy? Can 
we continue following a model of development that is harmful to the 
environment, compromising thereby the future needs of coming generations? 
These questions, and the debate that has followed them, have laid the basis for a 
new approach to economic growth known as ‘sustainable development’. This 
approach was first defined by the World Commission on Environment and 
Development (also known as the Bruntland Commission) as “development that 
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs” (World Commission on Environment and 
Development, 1987, p.15). Undoubtedly, energy stands at the heart of a 
sustainable development approach, one impossible to achieve without reliance on 
clean and renewable energy sources not only safe for the environment but also 
able to meet the needs of future generations. This necessary and inescapable 
relation between clean energy and sustainable development led the United Nations 
to declare 2012 to be “The Year of Sustainable Energy for All”. The 
acknowledgment of this reality was the result of a steady and gradual shift that 
began in the seventies with the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on 
the Human Development in Stockholm in 1972, followed by the Bruntland Report 
in 1987, and culminating in The Earth Summit in Rio in 1992, a shift that placed 
the debate about climate change on the agenda of the international relations once 
and for all.  
Humanity is, indeed, at the early stage of a gradual and sustained transition 
in the energy system of world economy, and the 21
st
 century will witness–at the 
very least–a far higher proportion of energy supplied from clean and renewable 
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sources, which will pave the way to a new economy based on new clean and 
renewable energies away from fossil fuels. 
Indicators of the global energy transition can be found in a number of 
factors. Firstly, although oil and gas still remain dominant fuels, representing in 
2010 32% and 22% (International Energy Association, 2012, p. 53) respectively 
of the world primary energy supply, there has been a steady and continuous 
development of the share of renewable energy sources (RES) in the global energy 
mix, accounting for 19% of the global primary energy consumption in 2011 
(REN21, 2013b, p. 19). Despite the global economic recession that started in 
2008, the installed capacity of RES has continued to expand, with the fastest 
growth occurring in the power generation sector. During the period 2008-2012, 
the installed capacity of solar photovoltaic (PV) grew at an annual average rate of 
60%, installed capacity of concentrating solar power (CSP) grew at an average 
annual rate of 40%, and wind installed capacity grew at an average annual rate of 
25% (REN21, 2013b, p. 19). Most of this increase has taken place in China, the 
United States, Brazil, Canada and Germany, where the BRICS
1
 region alone 
accounted for 36% of the total (with 27% of non-hydro energy), and the EU
2
 44% 
of the total global renewable power capacity (REN21, 2013b, p. 22). In the EU, 
during the period 2000-2012, RES accounted for more than half of the total power 
capacity that was added, primarily solar PV and wind, with around 70% of this 
addition taking place in 2012 alone (REN21, 2013b, p. 22). 
Secondly, the cost of RES, especially solar and wind has been steadily 
declining for the past four decades. This decline has resulted from technological 
developments and governmental policy actions in favour of the rapid deployment 
of RES, economies of scale, and a simultaneous increase in the price of fossil 
fuels and the capital costs related to them (REN21, 2013b, p. 20).  
We are no longer in an environment where conventional energy 
technologies have an absolute economic advantage over renewable energy 
                                                          
1
 A group of emerging economies that include Brazil, Russia, India, China, and 
South Africa. 
 
2
 The 27 countries of the European Union. 
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technologies in every setting. In addition, “monetizing the external costs of energy 
supply would [significantly] improve the relative competitiveness of RE” 
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2012, p. 40). 
Thirdly, notwithstanding the global financial crisis, investments in RES 
have reached a record level of US$ 211 billion in 2010, increasing by 32% from 
US$ 160 billion in 2009 with developing countries investing more than developed 
countries, and China taking the lead with more than a third of the global 
investments (REN21, 2011, p. 35). Investments in renewable energy sources have 
steadily increased since the beginning of this century, moving from US$ 22 billion 
in 2004 (REN21, 2011, p. 35) to more than US$ 285 billion at the end of 2012 
(REN21, 2013b, p. 15). It is true that investments in RES have slowed down in 
the past two years as a result of uncertainties about support policies in a number 
of major developed economies; however, investments in 2012 were still 8% 
higher than the 2010 level, and global investments in renewable power generation 
were higher than the investments in fossil fuel power generation for a third 
consecutive year (REN21, 2013b, p. 15). 
Fourthly, from a policy perspective in 2011, 118 countries adopted 
renewable energy targets at different levels—more than double the 2005 figures of 
55 countries (REN21, 2011, p. 49). By the end of 2012, 138 countries had adopted 
renewable energy goals, and of these, 127 of them had renewable energy support 
policies with more than two-thirds representing emerging economies (REN21, 
2013b, p. 14). Most of the support policies for the development of future energy 
supply are found in the power generation sector, with feed-in tariffs (FIT) and 
renewable portfolio standards (RPS) as the main policy instruments (REN21, 
2013b, p. 15). Even in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
3
 region, a number of 
member countries have recently adopted renewable energy goals in the power 
generation sector. For example, in 2008, the Electricity and Water Authority 
(EWA) in Bahrain set a goal of developing two solar and wind projects in order to 
generate electricity from renewable sources by 2012 (“Bahrain to Use Renewable 
Energy”, 2009). In 2009, Kuwait officially declared its objective of producing 5% 
of its electricity from renewables by 2020 (Bachellerie, 2012, p. 63). In Saudi 
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 By the GCC, we mean the Gulf Cooperation Council that includes Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Oman, Qatar, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).  
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Arabia, the Electricity and Cogeneration Regulatory Authority (ECRA) has set a 
target of generating 10% of its electricity from RES by 2020 (Goulding & Bush, 
2009, p. 15). The UAE is considered the leading country in developing RES with 
very ambitious targets. Abu Dhabi, for instance, projects to produce 7% of its 
electricity from RES by 2030 and has launched a US $2 billion project for the 
construction of Masdar City, a zero carbon city that would produce all of its 
electricity from RES. The Dubai Supreme Energy Council has set the target of 
producing 22% of its electricity from RES by 2030 and 11% of its electricity from 
nuclear energy (Dubai Global Energy Forum, 2013). These figures are given as 
examples of policy targets for the development of RES by a number of GCC 
countries. However, this issue will be discussed in more detail in chapter 4, 
including the latest policy support policies and targets for the deployment of 
renewable and nuclear energies in the power generation sector of the GCC 
countries. 
Fifthly, as far as the energy mix is concerned, when looking at the energy 
outlook produced by research institutions, organizations and energy companies, a 
general consensus suggests that in the mid- to long-term future, the energy mix 
will be much more diversified, with an increasing share for renewable and 
alternative clean energies—even if there are variations in that share from one 
study to another. 
According to the long-term scenarios developed by the IPCC, “a 
significant increase in the deployment of RES by 2030, 2050 and beyond is 
indicated in the majority of the 164 scenarios reviewed”, including in the business 
as usual scenario (2011, p. 24). We can find the same trend in the last BP Energy 
Outlook 2030 (2012), which clearly states that the energy mix of the world 
economy will be more diversified with an expected global growth in energy 
production coming from non-fossil fuels where “renewables, nuclear and hydro 
together account for 34% of the growth, [which is] for the first time, larger than 
the contribution of any single fossil fuel” (p. 13). The growing share of renewable 
and alternative energy sources in the future energy mix is projected to be even 
stronger “in the following decade to 2030, with 75% of the growth coming from 
these sources and very little from coal” (BP, 2012, p. 17). As far as the power 
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generation sector is concerned, the focus of this research project in the GCC 
energy system, it will be the main driver for the diversification of energy sources 
and remains the fastest growing sector, with 57% of the projected growth in the 
primary energy consumption to 2030, compared to 54% for the period from 1990-
2010 (BP, 2012, p. 15). 
 The Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf are directly concerned by this 
global trend, and their vulnerability regarding climate change is to be found on 
two levels. The first level concerns the impact it will have on the ecological and 
human systems of GCC societies; the second is related to the objective and 
potential outcomes of the climate regime negotiations on their political 
economies, knowing that the climate regime being negotiated seeks as an ultimate 
objective to phase out fossil fuels from the global economy as a result of their 
direct responsibility in global warming. 
Indeed, on the ecological front, it is expected that the adverse effects of 
climate change will significantly affect the GCC economies, as we will see in 
more details in the course of this research thesis. In addition, the GCC countries 
have one of the largest carbon footprints in the world and are classified among the 
highest CO2 emitters, as their economies contribute 2.4% of the global greenhouse 
gas emissions, while their populations represent only 0.6% of the world 
population (Reiche, 2010, p. 2395). 
As far as the impact on their political economies is concerned, the 
objective of phasing out the world economy from the use of fossil fuels, and oil in 
particular, represents a direct threat to the main source of revenue of the GCC 
countries and to their existing political economy. Such a trend can be considered 
an existential threat to the Arab monarchies of the Gulf but also a very strong 
motivation to diversify their economies away from oil wealth. 
Moreover, there are also a number of other concerns related to the political 
economy of the region that should be pushing for an energy transition in the GCC 
countries. 
Firstly, oil and gas resources are finite resources and should be replaced by 
new energies in order to sustain their economies in the long term. Indeed, the 
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depletion of oil and gas resources is inevitable, and these countries must begin 
their preparations for the post-oil era in order to spread the necessary investments 
in a long-term perspective and achieve a well-planned, successful energy 
transition. Secondly, the share of the domestic energy consumption is increasing 
at the expense of the share of the exports, which represents a direct threat to the 
level of GCC government revenues. It is therefore in the interest of the GCC 
governments to save the use of domestic energy by adopting renewable and 
alternative energies in order to increase their export capacity and monetize their 
cash earning resources.  
 
AIM AND OBJECTIVES  
Grounded on this new international energy environment and the 
challenges facing the GCC countries in diversifying their long-term energy 
sources away from hydrocarbons, this study focuses on the power generation 
sector of the energy system of the GCC countries and will propose a number of 
possible scenarios regarding an energy transition towards a more diversified 
energy mix in that sector until the year 2050. The scenario methodology will 
allow an exploration of the possible future pathways for diversifying the energy 
sources of the GCC power generation sector, and how the energy transition 
process could be influenced and shaped within the context of the rentier state 
theory. In this perspective, this research will analyse the interaction between the 
three levels of the GCC energy system as proposed by the multilevel perspective 
(MLP) framework of analysis selected for conducting this research project, and 
will question the role and the possible evolutions of the central level of the MLP; 
namely, the socio-technical regimes level, which includes the regimes actors that 
are in command of the whole energy system. In this regard, the research project 
will first identify the key variables that will drive the energy transition of the GCC 
economies in the power generation sector, and then analyse how these key 
variables may be affected, either positively (as an opportunity), or negatively (as 
an obstacle), by the rentier nature of the region’s social-political contract. In this 
respect, we hypothesize that the classical rentier state theory as developed in the 
1970s (Mahdavy, 1970) and 1980s (Beblawi & Luciani, 1987), even if its main 
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assumptions are still valid, has also proven to be incorrect in a number of its 
assumptions and superficial in others, and that late rentier theory (Gray, 2011) is a 
better theoretical framework for analysing rentier states. Indeed, we hypothesize 
that even if the rentier nature of the GCC states presents structural obstacles to the 
energy transition of their economies, a rentier state also provides structural 
characteristics that could become potential opportunities for a successful energy 
transition in the long run. The hypothesis will be tested through a critical analysis 
of the rentier state theory grounded in a historical analysis of the development of 
GCC economies and how they have been performing until now. Further analysis 
will explore a number of key variables of the energy landscape and their relation 
to the political economy of the region as they play a central role in the transition 
of the GCC energy mix of the power generation sector.  
Selecting the key variables that will have a determining impact on the 
future of the energy mix of the region will be necessary for building our scenarios 
until 2050. These variables will be selected using the MLP, framework of analysis 
for studying socio-technical energy transitions to sustainability that has been 
essentially used in the context of developed economies, but with no prior known 
use in the GCC countries or in the Arab world in general. Briefly defined, the 
MLP is a “systemic model of three inter-connected levels that are defined by the 
metaphorical notions of ‘niche’, ‘regime’ and ‘landscape’” (Jørgensen, 2012, p. 
997). In this respect, the ‘niche’ or micro-level is where the technological variable 
is found; the ‘regime’ or meso-level is where the social, cultural and political 
variables are found; and finally, the ‘landscape’ or macro-level is where the 
policies and international environment variables are found. Following the analysis 
phase of the energy system of the GCC countries within the MLP framework, we 
will propose a number of relevant energy transition pathways in the power 
generation sector of these countries up to 2050, based on one or more tentative 
assumptions regarding the possible future evolution of a number of variables 
found at the three levels of the MLP.   
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RESEARCH DESIGN 
Given the complexity of the problem under study and the use of the 
multilevel perspective (MLP) approach, selected for studying energy transitions in 
the GCC economies, this research is grounded in the systems thinking framework 
of analysis. Systems thinking is defined as “a process of understanding how things 
influence one another within a whole” (Konkarikoski, Ritala, & Ihalainen, 2010, 
p. 1), and as an approach for dealing with complex systems, where ‘system’ refers 
to a “complex whole of related parts” (Cabrera, Colosi, & Lobdell, 2008, p. 301). 
It has also been defined as “a formal, abstract, and structured endeavour” (Cabrera 
et al., 2008, p. 301) where there is a balance between the whole and the parts, and 
where the multiple levels of the system are taken into consideration. Before we go 
any further, it is necessary to expand on defining the concept of systems thinking 
and its relationship to this research project. 
 
Systems Thinking  
Systems thinking emerged in the first half of the twentieth century as a 
result of the limitations of Descartes’s analytic reasoning, also known as 
reductionism, and following the 1950’s work of Ludwig von Bertalanffy in the 
field of biology as he developed a theory of open systems. According to 
Bertalanffy, “open systems theory employs functional and relational criteria to 
study the whole, rather than principles of reductionism to study simple elements” 
(as cited in Flood, 2010, p. 271). The principles of open systems theory have been 
generalized to other fields of study and given birth to what Bertalanffy called the 
general systems theory (GST), from which emerged systems thinking considered 
“as the basis of a new form of social theory” (as cited in Flood, 2010, p. 271). 
However, it is important to highlight the difference between systems theory and 
systems thinking prior to any further developments in order to clarify the 
foundations of this research thesis. 
As defined by Floyd (2008), “systems theory is a set of abstract conceptual 
frameworks or models for describing . . . systemic perspectives” (p. 140), and as 
such, it acts as a representational tool used to help describe the world around us; 
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whereas “systems thinking is first and foremost an epistemology” (Checkland, 
1981, p. 318), one according to which social systems are constructed from an 
“interpretation made through cognitive processes of the human brain” (Flood, 
2010, p. 270). In other words, systems thinking rejects the idea of a world 
composed of ‘real’ social systems, and describes instead a world composed of 
social systems that are constructed. Such social construction is systemic, and it is 
based on this understanding of systems thinking that this research project will be 
grounded. 
Systems thinking focuses on the ‘whole’ with the belief “that the world is 
systemic, which means that phenomena are understood to be an emergent property 
of an interrelated whole” (Flood, 2010, p. 269). The expression an emergent 
property of a whole refers to the fact that a phenomenon is much more than the 
properties of its constituent parts, or in other words, that “the whole is greater than 
the sum of its parts” (Flood, 2010, p. 269). As a consequence, valid knowledge 
cannot be produced from the process of breaking up phenomena into separate 
parts and “seeing the parts” only, but rather from the process of building pictures 
of social phenomena under study and “seeing the whole” (Floyd, 2008, p. 138). 
The concept of emergent properties, which is an intrinsic characteristic of 
the idea of complexity in physical, chemical, and sociocultural systems, has been 
defined by Checkland (1985) in the following terms: “in an organization there is a 
hierarchy formed by levels in such a way that each level is more complex than the 
level below it and it is characterized by emergent properties, which are 
nonexistent at the level below” (as cited in Mannermaa, 1988, p. 289). For 
example, chemistry can explain certain biological mechanisms but cannot explain 
the existence of biology or replace it as such. 
The literature about systems thinking is very diverse and reveals a 
plurality of meanings and claims about the necessary conditions for performing 
the task of a systems thinker. To help achieve some clarity in this varied literature, 
Henning and Chen (2012) have performed a content analysis of 14 popular books 
about systems thinking. While these books were written to explain systems 
thinking to public laypeople, we have found that the conclusions from their 
content analysis are also valid for explaining systems thinking in an academic 
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context. Henning and Chen (2012) have thus revealed a common ground among 
systems thinking scholars, which they have linked to Kruglanski’s theory of lay 
epistemics
4
 (1989, 2004 as cited in Henning & Chen, 2012, p. 471). In this 
respect, Henning and Chen (2012) have used two dimensions of the theory in 
order to classify a common ground among systems scholars and systems thinkers, 
which Kruglanski has named “the knowledge domains of a system thinker, and 
welcoming cognitive conditions for systems thinkers” (1989, as cited in Henning 
& Chen, 2012, p. 471). 
This knowledge domain, which is the first requirement for systems 
thinkers, has been defined by Henning and Chen “as an understanding of the key 
characteristics all systems possess” (2012, p. 473), and consists of a definitional 
task of the system under study; i.e., a description of the characteristics of the 
system as a whole and its tangible and intangible properties in the people and the 
ideas, beliefs, and values they hold, as well as the goals, declared or undeclared, 
of the people who compose the system and the necessary techniques to analyze 
and understand them.  
In order to define and uncover the key characteristics of a given system, 
the systems thinker must understand a number of key characteristics of systems as 
summarized by Henning and Chen (2012) in the following points: Human systems 
are purposeful and they exist in order to achieve goals, individual or collective, 
conscious or unconscious; members of a system require one another to achieve 
their goals, and it is through this interdependency that the system achieves its 
goals; people exist in relationship, or in other words, it is more important to 
understand the way people relate to each other than to understand the 
characteristics of people; the way a system is organized arises from interactions 
among its members, meaning that it is the structure of the system that determines 
how interactions will happen within the system, which in turn determines the 
outcomes achieved by the system; and systems are rife with tensions and 
dichotomies, as they are characterized by plurality and unity, where every member 
of the system seeks individual as well as collective objectives (Henning & Chen, 
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 The theory of lay epistemics, as developed by Kruglanski, “account[s] for the 
process whereby [non-academic] people form their knowledge of various matters” 
(Kruglanski, 1989; 2004, as cited in Henning & Chen, 2012, p. 471). 
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2012, p. 474). Consequently, systems thinkers have recognized that systems 
thinking demands a transdisciplinary approach requiring a variety of techniques or 
methodologies (Henning & Chen, 2012, p. 477). 
According to Kruglanski (1989), possessing the knowledge domain is a 
necessary requirement for systems thinkers but not sufficient in itself, as the 
systems thinker needs also “particular modes of thinking conductive to perceiving 
something accurately” (as cited in Henning & Chen, 2012, p. 471). In his theory 
of lay epistemics, Kruglanski calls these mental attitudes and cognitive skills the 
“welcoming cognitive conditions” (1989, as cited in Henning & Chen, 2012, p. 
471); they also appear under a variety of different names in the literature, 
including “systems thinking mindset” (Haines, 1999, p. 1) and “a type of 
thinking” (Boardman & Sauser, 2008, p. xvii). According to Henning and Chen 
(2012), the ‘type of thinking’ required for a systems thinker should be based on a 
number of mental orientations summarized as the following: an orientation 
towards causality, as a system’s behavior is intimately linked to the multitudes of 
causally linked variables that make up the structure of the system; an orientation 
towards logic, even when this logic is not apparent; and an orientation towards 
particular data sources in order to unveil the logic within a system. The data 
sources must be found in the incidents and/or problems that occur in patterns of 
events, and also found in the patterned behavior which is indicates the presence of 
a structure. Also necessary is an orientation towards the explicit and implicit 
structures required to understand the behavior of a system, and an orientation 
towards subjectivity that is “a particularly potent feature of human systems” 
(Jackson, 2003, as cited in Henning & Chen, 2012, p. 480), and which form the 
judgments and values that people hold about issues, predisposing them to a certain 
behavior. Finally, an orientation towards self-reflection is also to be found in the 
systems thinker himself in order to challenge his own subjectivity and bring to the 
surface his own worldviews (Henning & Chen, 2012, p. 482). 
The common ground for systems thinkers as summarized by Henning and 
Chen will be the foundation of this research, which is grounded in a systems 
thinking approach given the complexity of the research project. Indeed, energy 
transitions are complex processes that involve several levels of analysis, and since 
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systems thinking promotes holism as its primary intellectual strategy for handling 
complexity, it is very well placed for analyzing and understanding the process of 
energy transitions. In this respect, the multilevel perspective (MLP) will be 
applied as a theoretical framework to allow us to model as well as analyze and 
describe the energy transition process within a system as a first step before 
building the scenarios. 
As far as systems thinking and the MLP are concerned, the only study that 
has been found in the literature combining these two approaches is a paper by 
Papachristos under the title “A System Dynamics Model of Socio-Technical 
Regime Transitions” (2011), which builds a system for an energy transition based 
on the MLP theory. The objective of this research is not to engage in a modeling 
study to shed light on the energy transition process, but to shed insight on the 
process of an energy transition with a perspective of prospecting the future of the 
energy system of the GCC countries in the power generation sector. Dealing with 
the future engenders the relationship between systems thinking and futures 
studies. 
 
Systems Thinking and Futures Studies  
Futures studies involve a multidisciplinary approach, and as such, a 
systems thinking approach is highly recommended for dealing with complex 
social problems and futures studies (Floyd, 2008, p. 138). Indeed, Mannermaa 
(1988) argues that “multidisciplinarity and systemic thinking are . . . important 
scientific criteria of futures research” (p. 281), and according to Emery (1967), a 
major condition for the validity of any futures approach is that it must originate 
from an analysis of the broader systems (p. 217).  
Futures studies and building scenarios, according to Mannermaa (1996), 
requires a necessary shift to a new paradigm away from the reductionist 
Newtonian understanding of reality, towards an evolutionary paradigm that takes 
into consideration the holistic and systemic nature of natural as well as social 
systems (p. 620). As a consequence of the holistic and systemic nature of futures 
studies, there is a need for a multidisciplinary approach built on a consistency 
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between the different levels of hierarchies or explanations (Mannermaa, 1988, p. 
294). 
In regards to the literature combining systems thinking with futures 
studies, a limited number of studies have been found, as summarized in the 
following main references: in the work of Ervin Laszlo, the editor of World 
Futures: The Journal of General Evolution (Floyd, 2008, p. 138); in the work of 
Hjorth and Bagheri (2006), who have implemented a system dynamics modeling 
approach to sustainable development in a futures study; in the work of Hames, 
Oliver, and Saliba in Australia (Floyd, 2008, p. 139); in the work of Hayward 
(2004); in the work of Inayatullah (2002) using the causal layered analysis (CLA); 
and finally, in Sarkar’s progressive utilization theory into futures thinking and 
practice (Floyd, 2008, p. 139). Studies combining systems thinking with futures 
studies remain limited; they are mainly focused on a western context, and none on 
developing countries in general or the GCC countries in particular. In this respect, 
this research proposal is the first of its kind, combining both approaches in the 
context of the Arab world and the GCC countries, and as such will contribute to 
shedding a new light on the complex process of energy transition in the Arab 
countries of the Gulf with a futures perspective. 
Due to the complex nature of the research and its long-term perspective, 
this research will adopt a combined quantitative-qualitative approach. The first 
part of the research, which deals with the present of the system, will explore a 
thorough quantitative analysis of the energy landscape and the selected key 
variables. A qualitative narrative approach will be employed to build the 
scenarios, as we will be dealing with the long-term future of the energy mix of the 
GCC countries until 2050, and thus with very little reliable quantitative data that 
extends as far as the time horizon of this research. In this respect, it is important to 
mention the personal motivations that are behind this research. There is, first of 
all, a motivation that stems from my professional background of almost nine years 
experience in the energy industry, first as an executive in different departments of 
SONATRACH, the Algerian public oil and gas company, from 2001 to 2007, and 
as an energy officer at the British Embassy in Algiers, from 2007 to 2008, just 
before I started this PhD research project in January 2009. The second motivation 
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is based on my personal belief that oil and gas economies, or rentier economies, 
need to engage in an energy transition as soon as possible if they want to ensure 
the smooth transition of their societies to a post-oil economy and still remain 
active actors of the international community. Coming from the energy industry, I 
am very much aware of the central role of energy in the modern world, and that 
engaging in an energy transition is more than a technical issue, but rather an 
existential and vital one that will determine the future of not only the oil and gas 
exporting societies, but of all humanity. 
In addition, this study will build scenarios by using an intuitive-logics 
approach that relies essentially on information of a qualitative nature. However, 
the narratives of the scenarios built through 2050 will be based on a detailed 
qualitative as well as quantitative analysis of the available data about the power 
generation sector of the GCC countries in addition to the long term energy targets 
that they have set for themselves. The information as represented by the key 
variables and selected through the MLP and their corresponding assumptions will 
be generated through a thorough review of the available literature about energy 
policy more broadly and more narrowly, the power generation sector of the GCC 
countries. 
 
SIGNIFICANCE AND CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY 
Nearly all research concerning the political economy of the GCC countries 
has dealt almost exclusively with the issue of the economic diversification 
policies or with strategies in order to diversify the sources of revenues away from 
the hydrocarbon exports. There are numerous studies about the potential of 
selected alternative or renewable energy technologies in the context of the GCC 
countries; however, studies that have dealt with the issue of the diversification of 
their energy sources with a future perspective are very limited. In this respect, we 
have found a future research by Al-Saleh under the title “Renewable Energy 
Scenarios for Major Oil-producing Nations: The Case of Saudi Arabia” (Al-Saleh, 
2009), in which the author has used the scenario methodology through the Delphi 
technique, and a study by Hepbasli and Alsuhaibani titled “A Key Review on 
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Present Status and Future Directions of Solar Energy Studies and Applications in 
Saudi Arabia” (2011), which reviews the present status of solar energy in Saudi 
Arabia and its future possible applications in the power generation sector through 
scenarios based on narratives. A research paper by Kazem (2011) under the title 
“Renewable Energy in Oman: Status and Future Prospects” (2011), focuses on the 
present and future of renewable of energy in Oman for producing electricity but 
without the use of the scenario methodology. The book edited and published by 
the Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research (2008), Future Arabian 
Gulf Energy Sources: Hydrocarbon, Nuclear or Renewable? (2008), consists of a 
selection of papers regarding the potential of renewable and alternative energy 
sources in the GCC power generation sector and future prospects from a technical 
perspective, and again without proposing scenarios. The book by Bachellerie 
(2012) published by the Gulf Research Center under the title Renewable Energy in 
the GCC Countries: Resources, Potential, and Prospects (2012), is mainly a 
review of the present situation and the technical potential of renewables energies 
in the future energy mix of the GCC region, but with no scenarios developed. 
There are also numerous studies that have dealt with the subject of renewable and 
nuclear energies in the GCC context from purely technical or policy perspectives 
but without a futures perspective, and which will be cited as references in the 
course of the research, as they are too numerous to be listed at this stage of the 
study.  
Futures studies that rely on the scenario methodology in the context of the 
GCC countries in general are very limited. Moreover, there are no studies that 
have used the scenario methodology in combination with the MLP framework of 
analysis, as proposed by this study for building future energy scenarios for the 
GCC countries.  
Furthermore, Al-Saleh’s future study mentioned above focuses on the 
single case of Saudi Arabia, and no project has used the scenario methodology for 
the GCC countries as a whole on the issue of the diversification of energy sources, 
including renewable energies and nuclear energy. This research proposes to 
contribute toward addressing this issue by building scenarios that will focus on the 
upstream of the economic system of the Gulf region; namely, the energy sources 
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in the power generation sector, and the role and place of the rentier states in this 
perspective for making the economies of the region continue to function in the 
long run in a sustainable way.  
Moreover, transition studies have been primarily undertaken in developed 
societies with almost no studies focusing on other regions. Indeed, according to 
Lachman (2013), despite its wide use in other parts of the world, it would appear 
that the transition concept has not been used in any other project about the GCC 
region or Arab countries, with the exception of a few recent studies in Asian 
countries (Berkhout et al., 2010, I. H. Rehman et al., 2010; Romijn, Raven, & de 
Visser, 2010; Verbong, Christiaens, Raven, & Balkema, 2010). In this regard, this 
research thesis is the first of its kind using the transition concept and the MLP 
approach for the study of energy transitions in the GCC region and the Arab world 
in general, and will constitute the foundation for further studies dedicated to the 
subject of energy transitions. 
The outcomes and benefits of this research to the GCC countries can be 
summarised in the following points: Firstly, it will fill an apparent gap in the 
academic field by undertaking a future study of the power generation sector of the 
GCC countries from a regional perspective. Secondly, it will introduce the 
scenario methodology and transition studies using the MLP approach in the region 
and their benefits as tools for future studies and forward-looking policy-making. 
Thirdly, it will help policy makers in government and decision makers in industry 
achieve a better understanding of the risks and opportunities inherent in each of 
the scenarios and thus better able to act effectively and proactively. Finally, it will 
contribute to raising the public profile of energy and climate change among the 
actors and stakeholders of the energy industry at large. 
Before we introduce the outline of the research, it is necessary to define a 
number of terms and concepts that will be used in the course of this thesis. 
When referring to electricity or power generation in this research it should 
be understood along the International Energy Association’s (IEA) definition “as 
the total amount of electricity generated by power only or combined heat and 
power plants” (2012, p. 645). 
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The energies that will compose the focus of this research are oil and gas, 
defined as ‘conventional energy sources’, renewable energies that include solar, 
wind, and nuclear energy defined as ‘alternative energy’. When using the 
expression ‘new and/or clean energies’, we mean the renewable energies selected 
for this research in addition to nuclear energy. The expression ‘unconventional 
energies’ will refer to shale oil and/or gas. 
 
OUTLINE OF THE RESEARCH 
This research thesis will be structured around six chapters, in addition to 
an introduction and conclusion. The first chapter will introduce the concept of 
futures studies and the scenario methodology. The second chapter will be devoted 
to introducing the energy transitions theory and the multilevel perspective (MLP) 
for studying the process of an energy transition. The third chapter will begin the 
process of analysing the energy system of the GCC countries using the MLP 
framework of analysis, starting at the landscape level. The fourth chapter will 
focus on the political economy of the GCC through a combined macro- and meso-
level analysis. The fifth chapter will review the available niche-innovation 
technologies for power generation in the context of the GCC countries. Finally, 
based on the findings of the previous chapters, the sixth chapter will be dedicated 
to our proposed scenarios regarding the possible transition pathways in the power 
generation sector of the GCC countries until 2050. 
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Chapter 1 
FUTURES STUDIES: THE SCENARIO 
METHODOLOGY 
 
1.1. DEFINITION AND SCOPE 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary (1991), the word ‘future’ is 
defined in its adjective form as “that is to be, or will be, hereafter [and] [o]ften 
qualifying a substantive, with the sense: The person or thing that is expected to be 
(what the substantive denotes)” (p. 295). As a noun, ‘the future’ is defined as a 
“time to come; future time” (p. 295).  
As far as futures activities are concerned, according to Garret (1993), they 
can be classified into two main categories: ‘futures studies’ and ‘futures projects’, 
with the first category being essentially an academic activity that “aim[s] at 
building futures as a discipline” (p. 255) and they involve gathering data and 
scenario building. Futures projects are grounded on futures studies, but are carried 
out by groups larger than academic research teams, within the framework of 
public or private organizations from which the demand for a futures project 
originates. This distinction has also been proposed by Slaughter (1993a), who 
distinguishes between futures research—equivalent to a futures project according 
to Garret (1993)—and futures studies, “where teachers, critics, writers and 
academics can be found” (Slaughter, 1993a, p. 291)5. As far as this research 
project is concerned, given its academic grounding, it should be classified as a 
futures study
6
. 
                                                          
5
 In addition to the above mentioned two categories, Slaughter (1993a) adds a 
third one coined futures movements, which includes NGOs such as peace 
movements, green movements, women’s movements, etc. (p. 292). 
 
6
 In order to avoid any misunderstanding, when the expressions ‘research project’, 
‘futures research’, or ‘futures research project’ are used, this should be understood 
to refer to this PhD thesis, which is classified as a futures study. 
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1.2. THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL DEBATE IN 
FUTURES STUDIES 
According to Mannermaa (1988), “a short way to outline futures research 
is to say that it is the study of the present from the point of view of a special 
interest in comprehending the future” (p. 280). Indeed, futures alternatives imply 
present choices, or in other words, as stated by Slaughter (1993a), it is “clear that, 
to the extent that we become aware of different future alternatives, we gain access 
to new choices in the present” (p. 290). The main interest in studying the future 
lies in understanding the possible future alternatives and the choices they pose in 
the present. Consequently, Mannermaa concludes that futures research needs a 
multidisciplinary approach in addition to systemic thinking, and shares with the 
social sciences the same criteria that determine what is scientific from what is not 
(1988, p. 281). The multidisciplinary approach is justified by the use of 
complexity for describing futures studies, which necessarily involves different 
levels of analysis—past, present, and future—and needs different theoretical 
frameworks. 
Futures research and scenario building are defined as a ‘technical norm’ 
composed of two distinct parts. The first part consists of the analysis work 
undertaken in order to understand the present through the use of different 
scientific disciplines. The second part consists of value considerations about the 
future (Mannermaa, 1988, p. 281). Including value considerations as an intrinsic 
component of futures studies brings to the surface a debate about objectivity, in 
particular a strong tendency to aim for objectivity at the expense of normativity. 
In this sense, futures studies are “basically a normative activity [where] the role of 
values . . . is even more emphasized than in social sciences generally” 
(Mannermaa, 1988, p. 285). Indeed, Mannermaa (1988) adds that present day 
economics is strongly influenced by values as is the case concerning the debate 
about the desirability of economic growth, illustrated in the famous book 
commissioned by the Club of Rome under the title The Limits to Growth
7
 (1972). 
Considering certain value loaded factors as “objective facts” is a very common 
                                                          
7
 It is worth mentioning in this respect that The Limits to Growth is considered 
one of the first major works that initiated the discipline of futures studies. 
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mistake in the social sciences in general and in futures studies in particular, and 
has been “strongly criticized by the ideas of multiverse realities” (Mannermaa, 
1988, p. 286), which questions “the idea of one (and only one) universal reality 
and truth, which is thought to be discoverable by the means of scientific methods 
and reality” (Mannermaa, 1988, p. 286).  
 
1.2.1. The Concept of Multiverse Realities 
The concept of a multiverse of realities implies rejecting the artificial 
distinction that is made between the subject observing the reality and the object of 
observation, as the researcher is considered an integral part of the process of 
observation and conceptualization. As a consequence, “the subject and the object 
together form a ‘reality’ where both are needed” (Mannermaa, 1988, p. 286). As 
far as futures studies are concerned, the idea of a multiverse of realities has 
become a dominating concept in futures research, following the decline of the 
tendency to forecast the future into single realities and the rise to prominence of 
the ‘scenario era’, which argues that “the future consists of several essentially 
different alternatives instead of one ‘dominating trend’; i.e., the future is a 
multiverse of ideas” (Mannermaa, 1988, p. 286). In this respect, it should be noted 
that this shift in futures studies took place for practical, not theoretical, reasons, as 
a consequence of the increasing uncertainty in the international arena during the 
seventies. This uncertainty included the oil crisis of 1973, uncertainty about the 
international monetary system, rapid technological progress, the rise of popular 
movements such as the green movements, the anti-nuclear movements, and the 
debate about poverty within the framework of north-south widening gap 
(Mannermaa, 1988, pp. 286-287). 
The concept of a multiverse of realities should be understood not only 
applicable to the future part of a futures research, but also to the present as well, 
which consists of “several realities or ‘alternatives’” (Mannermaa, 1988, p. 287), 
depending on the nature of the observer. These realities or ‘alternatives’ are more 
or less scientific with a certain dose of subjectivity that has to be understood 
within the framework of the personal ideas and values of the researcher and the 
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motivations that are driving the research, in addition to his or her intuitions. 
Whether aware of it or not, willingly or unwillingly, the researcher is an active 
anticipator in the research process, and as such, will definitely leave a personal 
impact on the outcomes of his or her research. 
At this stage of the discussion, it is difficult to mention the concept of the 
multiverse of realities and the intuitions of the researcher without briefly 
mentioning the philosophical and theoretical debate that has been always present 
in the backyard of the science of knowledge production between modern and 
postmodern research methodologies. Postmodern methodologies are based on an 
understanding of the knowledge production process that should equally rely on 
the use of rationalism as well as on intuition. As rightly put by Lacey (1996), 
“poetry is as important as quantification” (p. 7). In this respect, postmodern 
research methods “rely on and involve discourse and narrative explanation” 
(Lacey, 1996, p. 134), and as a consequence of the above debate, the use of the 
scenario methodology can be very easily considered a post-modern research tool 
in the field of futures studies. 
Discussing the future raises a number of philosophical as well as 
epistemological issues about the capacity of humankind to know what cannot be 
known, as the future has not materialized yet. As stated by Mitroff and Turoff 
(1973), the real concern when dealing with the future is not about how we can 
have a perfect knowledge of the future—because we cannot—or if we can happen 
to know all that there is to know about the present with certainty, but rather, “what 
can we know of the future, and, even more to the point, how can we justify what 
we think we know” (Mitroff & Turoff, 1973, p. 116). The answer to this question 
is philosophical as well as epistemological with the issue of role of prediction in 
futures studies. In other words, are futures studies about making predictions? 
As Bell and Olick (1989) have defined it, the word ‘prediction’ refers to 
“things that under certain circumstances, will, could, or would happen or vary in 
the future” (Bell & Olick, 1989, p. 116). In this definition, predictions are about 
the possibility for certain events or outcomes to take place in the future. In the 
literature, these have also been found under different terms such as forecasts if 
they refer to concrete events to take place at a precise date; prophecies when used 
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with a mystical or religious perspective; prognostication; foresight; prevision; or 
anticipation (Bell & Olick, 1989, p. 116). There is no consensus among futurists 
regarding the definition of these terms; however, in this research, and based on 
Bell and Olick’s work (1989), predictions will be understood to mean a statement 
or assertion about some future outcome, whether accurate or inaccurate, absolute 
or probabilistic, in the long or short term.   
Making predictions about the future and projecting ourselves in the future 
is an intrinsic human activity and an everyday exercise for individuals as well as 
organizations for the purpose of planning and decision-making. As defined by 
Bell and Olick (1989), the role of the futurists, engaged in futures studies from an 
academic perspective,  
is in part to make this process more conscious [and] can explicate what 
often remains implicit or taken for granted about anticipative thinking, and 
he or she can critically examine and possibly improve the grounds by 
which the accuracy and usefulness of anticipations are judged. (Bell & 
Olick, 1989, p. 117) 
In other terms, the futurist makes predictions consciously in a structured 
and critical manner in such a way that it could be verified and improved.  
Despite the fact that prediction is an intrinsic component of science, 
including the social sciences, and knowing that futures studies are essentially 
involved in exploring the future, there is no agreement among the futurists 
regarding the role of prediction in futures studies. However, as we will see, the 
disagreement is more apparent than real. Indeed, on one hand, some futurists 
consider prediction the main goal of their discipline and engage fully in the 
exercise of making predictions; for example, Martino, Bardis, Toffler, and Van 
Vught (Bell & Olick, 1989, p. 119). On the other hand, other futurists either 
minimize or altogether deny any role for prediction in futures studies, while yet 
others are ambiguous or have contradictory views about the subject—as is the 
case with Daniel Bell, who claims that it is impossible to predict the future, yet at 
the same time “claims that forecasting (as distinct from predicting) is possible 
under some circumstances” (Bell, 1973, as cited in Bell & Olick, 1989, p. 119). 
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There has always been a philosophical debate about the role of making 
predictions in science in general and the social sciences in particular. As far as the 
philosophers of knowledge are concerned, according to Popper, the 
trustworthiness of a theory is judged based on its capacity to produce “reliable 
predictions and instrumental utility” (Weimer, 1979, p. 52, as cited in Bell & 
Olick, 1989, p. 118). Neurath considers successful prediction a benchmark of the 
usefulness of a science (Neurath, 1959, as cited in Bell & Olick, 1989, p. 118); 
while according to Scheffler, the “prevalent view of science is that when a 
prediction is borne out by experience, the set of beliefs in question has passed a 
critical test” (Scheffler, 1967, as cited in Bell & Olick, 1989, p. 118). In a more 
extreme statement, Reichenbach questions the validity of “knowledge if it does 
not include the future?” (Reichenbach, 1951, p. 89). 
In the social sciences, making predictions is already an objective for the 
founder of sociology, Auguste Comte, who is very well known for his statement 
savoir pour pouvoir (Bell & Olick, 1989, p. 118). Schuessler considers that 
“American sociologists have more or less taken for granted that prediction is one 
of their main objectives” (Schuessler, 1971, as cited in Bell & Olick, 1989, p. 
118). It is generally accepted by most social scientists that prediction is an integral 
part of the social scientific enterprise; however, it must be recognized that many 
social scientists who share this belief do not necessarily make predictions, as they 
are content with systematic associations between variables in past and present 
situations without making projections in the future. Another argument for making 
predictions in futures studies is found in the human tendency to control its present 
and future, as rightly described by Henshel (1976) when he states that “man tends 
to predict by controlling” (as cited in Bell & Olick, 1989, p. 130). In other words, 
there is no control without prediction, and the human tendency for control leads 
ultimately to performing the exercise of prediction. 
Prediction starts from the knowledge of the past and present, which raises 
a philosophical issue regarding our capacity in knowing them, especially when we 
take into consideration the attacks on positivism and the validity of knowledge, 
and the debate that has emerged as a consequence. The post-positivist period that 
emerged following the work of Kuhn (1962) and Feyerabend (1975) does agree 
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with the positivists regarding the pursuit of objective truth; however, post-
positivists recognize the role of the biases that can be brought by the researcher 
from his or her background and found in the values, ideas, and theories he or she 
holds. Post-positivism is not a rejection of positivism; rather, it is an amendment 
of logical positivism and a recognition of the conjectural nature of knowledge, but 
without advocating relativism. 
 
1.2.2. Critical Realism  
As far as futures studies are concerned, Bell (1980) has recommended 
futurists to adopt the post-post-positivist philosophy known as critical realism, 
which argues in favour of the possibility of knowing the past and present, and that 
the limitations to this knowledge are to be found “in human capacities and 
methodologies” (Bell & Olick, 1989, p. 124). Critical realism advocates the 
existence of a real world to be known and discovered objectively, but as a result 
of limited human capacities, certain aspects of reality go beyond the capacity of 
humans to sense or observe. These limitations to knowing the past and present are 
the main obstacles for knowing the future
8
, as knowledge of the latter is based, 
partly, on knowledge of the former (Bell & Olick, 1989, p. 124). 
Grounded in the critical realism theory, and in order to clarify the 
epistemological foundations of futures research, Reichenbach (1951) states that 
“in any event, inductive inference is the best method we have of making 
assertions about the future” (Reichenbach, 1951, p. 246). In this respect, 
Reichenbach proposes the concept of a ‘posit’, where a posit is defined as “a 
statement [about the future] which we treat as true although we do not know 
whether it is so” (Reichenbach, 1951, p. 240). From a practical perspective, the 
concept of a posit means that futurists advance (or posit) likely and unlikely 
alternative possibilities for the future in order to assess the probability and impact 
of each alternative. As our knowledge of the past and present is incomplete and/or 
inaccurate, Coddington (1975) refers to the obstacles to knowing the past and 
                                                          
8
 It is necessary to remind ourselves that while we do not know the future, as it 
has not yet unfolded, we can explore the future by constructing images or 
scenarios of the future based on a number of assumptions. 
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present as ‘knowledge deficiencies’, which include “risk, uncertainty, 
mistakenness, ignorance, deception and delusion” (p. 152).  As far as knowledge 
of the future is concerned, Coddington (1975) refers to it as ‘knowledge 
surrogates’, which include “conjecture, expectation, perception, learning, 
adaptation and so on” (pp. 152-153). Knowledge surrogates describe a knowledge 
of the future based on ‘as if’ and ‘what if’ statements in order to build alternative 
images of the future; in other words, they are hypotheses grounded on our actual 
knowledge of the past and present, and as such, they substitute for the knowledge 
of the future that we cannot know, but that is necessary for projecting ourselves in 
the future. 
Most futurists agree on the fact that the role of futures studies is not to 
make precise predictions or to make one single prediction. Indeed, as stated by 
Fleonora Masini, the ex-president of the World Futures Studies Federation, 
“futures research should rather reveal the alternative possibilities, and analyse the 
risks concomitant of these possibilities and their consequences’” (Masini, 1987 as 
cited in Bell & Olick, 1989, p. 119). There is a shared understanding among most 
futurists that some form of prediction should be found in futures studies: not one 
single, precise prediction, but a multitude of images of possible futures with the 
objective to highlight the probable risks and consequences of the choices that 
could be made today regarding the future, as well as highlighting the probable 
opportunities available with other choices. In this respect, John and Magda 
Cordell McHale rightly stated that “futurists do not aim to ‘prophesy what a 
specific future will be, but rather more to explore the plurality of future(s) states, 
which may be contingent upon our actions or accessible to our choice” (J. Cordell 
& M. C. Cordell McHale (n.d.), as cited in Bell & Olick, 1989, p. 120). The future 
should be considered open, and as stated by Amara, “the futurists role [is to raise] 
people’s consciousness of time and [to increase] their awareness of the openness 
of the future” (1981, p. 25). 
As a concluding note, it appears that there are no fundamental 
disagreements among futurists regarding prediction. Indeed, in one way or another, 
and depending on the approach, there is a certain level of agreement that 
prediction is a necessary exercise for futurists, with the understanding that the role 
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of the futurists is not to make specific and precise predictions, but to construct 
different images of possible futures; i.e., to conceive scenarios that describe 
alternative images of the future based on our knowledge of the past and present, in 
addition to different assumptions or models regarding future developments. 
Prediction is, therefore, a central component of a futures study, one that must be 
multiple and contingent, although it may be true, false, or uncertain. Knowledge 
of the past and present is justified, but knowledge deficiencies that may threaten 
validity must be recognized in order to reduce them through scientific techniques, 
and thereby improve the quality of prediction. As far as knowledge of the future is 
concerned, it cannot be justified, as it has not yet unfolded. As proposed by 
Reichenbach, we can only make posits of the future, which Coddington refers to 
as knowledge surrogates—or in other words, knowledge of the future based on ‘as 
if’ and ‘what if’ statements for conceiving multiple scenarios. 
 
1.3. PRACTICAL FOUNDATIONS OF A FUTURES STUDY 
When reviewing the literature dealing with futures studies in a search for a 
general or standard approach for undertaking a futures study, a very large 
diversity of concepts and approaches appears. Concerning these concepts, 
Slaughter (1993a) has identified 20 that according to him “form an important part 
of the core of futures studies” (p. 289). Among them, foresight is considered one 
of the most powerful and highly elaborate concepts of futures studies (Slaughter, 
1993a, p. 290). Foresight is first and foremost a basic human skill that 
materializes in different ways in everyday life to protect ourselves or to avoid 
making mistakes—for example, checking the weather forecast to know whether 
we should take a raincoat or not. On a social level, foresight work has now 
become a necessity in order to prepare for contingencies and assess the likely 
implications of decisions and choices made in the present time (Slaughter, 1993a, 
pp. 304-305). 
Regarding the approaches for undertaking a futures study, the literature 
has shown a very significant diversity, as the approach depends on the subject 
under study as well as the nature and needs of the utilizer. In this respect, 
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according to Garret (1993), “there is simply no standard approach for futures 
studies, despite the claims of vociferous advocates” (p. 259). However, the lack of 
a standard approach can be compensated by focusing on the basic components of 
a futures study, as proposed by Garret (1993), who summarizes them in the 
following points: 
 Limiting the scope, which should clarify the purpose of the study by 
answering the question: what is to be studied? Limiting the scope of 
the study should also identify the time frame of the study and “whether 
the study will look just at the ‘end states’ or also with the behaviour of 
the system over the whole timespan” (p. 260). In this respect, 
Slaughter (1993a) adds to Garret’s approach on this issue that the time 
frame of a study depends on the nature of the subject under study; 
indeed, for subjects related to social policy, economics or education an 
extended time frame is necessary and could extend to 100 years and 
beyond (Slaughter, 1993a, p. 305). As far as this study is concerned, 
the system under study includes political, social, and economic 
perspectives, with a timespan extending as far as 2050 and 
representing nearly 40 years. In this respect, it is worth mentioning that 
the transition process of an energy system is a very large structural 
change requiring long time frames.  
 Gathering information, which involves gathering information about 
the system under study. Different methods are available for building 
this knowledge base, spanning from the use of computer-based tools to 
simple desk research. The information gathered could be quantitative 
as well as qualitative or a mixture of both. In this respect, it should be 
noted that “qualitative information obtained through public surveys, 
in-depth interviews, and the collection of items from books, journals, 
and newspapers is often just as valuable [as information of quantitative 
nature]” (Garret, 1993, p. 260). As already stated in the introduction, 
the design of this futures study will be essentially qualitative but will 
rely on a thorough quantitative analysis of the past and present of the 
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system under study; namely, the power generation sector of the GCC 
countries.  
 Determining the key variables by focusing on the relevant variables 
that will play a central role in the evolution of the system under study. 
For this study, the multilevel perspective has been selected as an 
approach to analyse the power generation sector of the GCC countries 
and help us determine the key variables of the system. As will be 
explained in detail in chapter 2, the transition theory and the MLP 
approach provide a very useful framework for bringing to the surface 
the main actors as well as the relevant variables at work in an energy 
transition process at the three levels of a given energy system. 
 Examining the past and present, which could also be considered part 
of the more general task of gathering information, but with a focus on 
the history of the system under study. The value of a retrospective look 
lies in its natural foundation for discussing the future, but also for the 
clues that it could provide about the future (Garret, 1993, p. 261). 
 Identifying the actors, which could also be considered part of the task 
of gathering information, as it will also rely on the MLP approach and 
will include information that is mainly focused on the main actors of 
the system and their respective roles within it.  
 Choosing the assumptions, which precedes the scenario construction 
and is concerned with the “conditions, forces and events shaping a 
particular future” (Garret, 1993, p. 262). At this stage, and as far as this 
futures study is concerned, the assumptions on which the scenarios 
will be built will rely on a selection of relevant transition pathways that 
will be introduced in chapter 3. Indeed, the transition pathways are 
built on a number of assumptions about what could happen in the 
landscape environment and the innovations-niche levels, as well as 
their implications on the regimes level: how it might react to them and 
how the overall system could evolve. As stated by Garret (1993), the 
assumptions “include on-going trends and unique occurrences, 
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welcome and undesired factors that are beyond control and ones that 
can be decided or influenced, things that can happen inside the system 
and things that are external to it” (p. 262), which is exactly how the 
transition pathways operate, and the reason why we are proposing to 
use them as a starting point for building the scenarios. The 
assumptions are chosen based on their probability, where ‘very likely’ 
and ‘very unlikely’ shaping events are considered from an objective 
approach; as well as their desirability—in this case, events that we 
want to see happen—are considered from a normative approach. 
 Constructing the scenarios based on the selected relevant assumptions 
and transition pathways. In this respect, the typology of transition 
pathways as defined by Geels and Schot (2007) proposes different 
transition pathways, or developments in the system under study, based 
on different assumptions. 
 Evaluating the choices, which involves a judgment about the different 
scenarios built. This stage, and the one that will follow, are not 
necessary components of a futures study, as they could be carried out 
by the specific users concerned by the study or proposed to the public 
for consideration and debate (Garret, 1993, p. 264). In this respect, this 
study will not make an evaluation of the choices, but aims to trigger a 
debate about the future of the energy system of the GCC countries. 
 Selecting strategies and tactics, in order to determine what actions will 
be needed to achieve the selected scenario. As already mentioned in 
the paragraph above, such selection is not a necessary component of a 
futures study, and accordingly, this research project will not make a 
selection of strategies and tactics, but rather propose a number of 
policy recommendations in the conclusion. 
Based on these components, we will use the scenario methodology to 
explore the future of the energy system of the GCC countries concerning the 
diversification of the energy sources of the power generation sector. In this 
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respect, before building the scenarios, it is necessary to introduce the scenario 
methodology in the following section. 
 
1.4. THE SCENARIO METHODOLOGY: HISTORY AND SCHOOLS 
Scenario thinking has always been a cornerstone of human thought, as 
humanity has always explored the future and its uncertainties through imagining 
stories, or scenarios, built around the question of what could happen. In time, such 
imagined scenarios took the form of treatises on utopias and dystopias. 
Documented evidence about the use of scenario thinking in order to imagine ideal, 
utopic, future societies goes back as far as Plato’s Republic, written around 380 
BC, Thomas More’s Utopia in 1516, Francis Bacon’s New Atlantis in 1627, and 
Henry Nevill’s Isle of Pine (1668). Grounded in a dystopian fiction approach, 
works such as George Orwell’s Nineteen-Eighty-Four (1949), Aldous Huxley’s 
Brave New World (1931), and Margaret Atwood’s The Handmaid’s Tale (1985), 
imagined the consequences to the world if there were no change in the existing 
trends, and as such, aimed at giving early warning signs about the evolution of 
their societies (Hughes, 2009a, p. 2).   
Scenarios moreover have a very well established historical tradition in the 
military through the form of war game simulations. The first documented 
frameworks of scenarios are attributed to two 19
th
 century Prussian military 
strategists, von Clausewitz and von Moltke, who were the first to articulate the 
principles of strategic planning (von Reibnitz, 1988, as cited in Bradfield et al., 
2005, p. 797). In modern times, the term ‘scenario’ was introduced into futures 
studies by Herman Kahn in the second half of the 1940s in connection with 
military and strategic studies conducted by the Rand Institute in the U.S., and it 
was further developed by the Hudson Institute, established by Herman Kahn, after 
his resignation from Rand in 1961.  
Simultaneously to Kahn’s work with Rand in the U.S., Gaston Berger, a 
French philosopher, created the Centre International de Prospective in 1957 
(Godet, Durance, & Gerber, 2008, p. 12) and conceived an original approach to 
scenario building for the purpose of long-term planning, which he named La 
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Prospective, and which was first implemented by a French interdepartmental 
government organization known as DATAR (Office for Regional Planning and 
Development) (Godet, Monti, Meunier, & Roubelat, 2004, p. 35). As in France, in 
the U.S., scenarios have initially been used as tools for public policy planning 
before they were adopted by the private sector at corporate levels, as planning 
became more complex and sophisticated. The Royal Dutch Shell oil company 
(Shell) was a pioneer in the field and became the benchmark for corporate 
scenario planning. Shell's scenario planning delivered the ‘Year 2000’ study in 
1967 which concluded that the predictable, surprise-free environment for the oil 
business would not continue, and that a shift in power from the oil companies to 
the oil producers in the Middle East would create major discontinuities in the oil 
price. The conclusions of this study enabled Shell to anticipate the oil crisis of 
1973 and 1985 and adapt to the new environment better than its competitors. 
Since then, scenarios have been used by the financial services industry, banks, and 
insurance companies, given their value as a tool for analysing and understanding 
key competitive decisions. Nowadays, almost all types of private organizations 
(especially multinational companies) use scenarios to develop their business 
strategies. 
In the present time, the scenario is the most prominent method used in 
order to undertake a future or foresight study for medium-term to long-term 
strategic planning in public and private sector organizations. Indeed, “foresight is 
seen as the attempt to explore alternative futures by taking into account 
uncertainties [and] scenario analysis is a foresight method” (Rijkens-Klomp, 2012, 
p. 431). 
Scenarios are “stories” or “narratives” illustrating visions of possible or 
desired futures. The objective of these representations is to highlight the driving 
forces and the early indicators of the breaking points of the general environment. 
Scenarios are not predictions or forecasts about the future but rather simulations 
of various possible futures
9
. Scenarios do not predict the future so much as they 
illuminate it, preparing us for the unexpected; they are multiple approaches to the 
                                                          
9
 As we have already seen in the section above, prediction is a necessary 
component of a future study and defined as multiple visions of the future rather 
than one precise prediction. 
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future, stories of the inevitable and necessary recombined with the unpredictable 
and matters of choice (Mc Corduck & Ramsey, 1996, p. 18). It has been rightly 
said that scenarios are not meant to necessarily “reflect any empirical objective 
reality, but rather serve as heuristic tools to elucidate the possibility (threat) space 
for certain objectives and policy options” (Söderholm, Hildingsson, Johansson, 
Khan, & Wilhelmsson, 2011, p. 1113). In addition, qualitative scenarios can be 
complementary to qualitative approaches and can lay the foundations for 
qualitative modeling and analysis. 
According to Hughes (2009a), “scenario thinking is about the use of 
imagination to consider possible alternative futures, as they may evolve from the 
present, with a view of improving immediate and near-term decision making” (p. 
4). The significance of the scenario method lies in its capacity to go beyond the 
mental, cultural, political and organizational limitations and constraints that tend 
to hinder creative thinking by developing critical and challenging mental attitudes. 
Schwartz rightly defines scenarios as “a tool for ordering one’s perceptions about 
alternative future environments, in which one’s decision might be played out [or 
in other words] a set of organised ways for us to dream about the future” (1991, p. 
4).  
In this respect, the scenario method is an invaluable tool for identifying the 
early signs of change and its implications for an organization, consequently 
enabling it to be proactive and able to detect and adapt to change in a timely and 
organised manner before the event occurs. Indeed, the scenario methodology is 
based on the fact that the future is unpredictable, and that it is necessary to accept, 
understand, and integrate uncertainty in our thinking about the future. 
Scenarios provide multiple views of the future, and as such, offer a 
powerful framework for organizational learning, allowing the different 
components of the organization to share and to understand information about risk. 
Decision-makers will often reject projections of the future that deviate from what 
they expect or what they regard as comfortable. Diverse scenarios help overcome 
this mental barrier by developing diversified scenarios that will include those with 
which the decision-makers are comfortable in addition to those that challenge 
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them. In addition, the diversification of the scenarios allows for introducing the 
idea that many alternative futures are possible. 
Based on the above definitions of scenarios, we can clearly see the 
fundamental link between scenario thinking and action for decision making, and 
that building scenarios is a necessary undertaking in order to achieve a number of 
objectives, which are summarized by Hughes (2009a) in the following points:  
 To improve the protective decision making process in order to be 
prepared for dealing with possible external developments that could 
unfold;  
 To improve the proactive decision making process in order to be able 
to act pro-actively, take advantage of possible opportunities, and 
influence and act upon the external environment;  
 To achieve consensus building through the engagement of the relevant 
stakeholders in the scenario building process (Hughes, 2009a, p. 4). 
There is a very large, and sometimes confusing, variety of approaches for 
building strategic scenarios in the literature, to the extent that it has been 
described as a “methodological chaos” (Simpson, 1992; Martelli, 2001 as cited in 
Hughes, 2009a, p. 4), which makes it necessary to propose in the following 
sections a presentation of the different schools and approaches regarding the 
scenario methodology.  
From the very specific American and French experiences mentioned above, 
two main schools for scenario building emerged: the American school and the 
French school. In the sections that follow, a short description of these schools and 
the approaches that have emerged from them will be described. 
 
1.4.1. The American School and its Approaches  
The American school for building scenarios emerged following a demand 
from the US Department of Defense, which was in need of developing new 
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defense systems after the second world war, and more particularly, with the new 
challenges that emerged with the beginning of the cold war in 1949 (Bradfield, 
Wright, Burt, Cairns, & van der Heijden, 2005, p. 797). The complexity of 
decision making in the new post war international environment gave rise to two 
specific needs: the need for a new methodology capable of addressing the 
diversity of opinions and experts and achieving consensus among them; and the 
need for a methodology to explore and simulate the consequences of various 
policy alternatives. 
The American experience and its developments gave birth to two distinct 
approaches: the intuitive logics approach and the probabilistic modified trends 
approach. 
 
1.4.1.1. The intuitive logics approach 
The intuitive logics approach is the result of the combination of Kahn’s 
work and his followers with the work of Shell, using the scenarios which have 
since become the standard for scenarios in the private sector, “which is why the 
intuitive logics methodology is sometimes referred to as the ‘shell approach’ to 
scenarios” (Bradfield et al., 2005, p. 800). The main features of the intuitive logics 
approach are: first, its flexibility, as it uses an openly intuitive approach in the 
elaboration of scenarios comparatively to the probabilistic modified trends 
approaches that rely heavily on computer-based mathematical models, and are 
discussed in the following sections. Second, “the perspective of intuitive logics 
scenario work can be either descriptive or normative and the scope extremely 
broad as in the development of global scenarios or narrowly focused on a 
particular issue” (Bradfield et al., 2005, p. 806). Third, the intuitive logics 
methodology is more process oriented and relies essentially on the insights 
learned from the process than from the output of the scenarios. Fourth, this 
approach toward building scenarios is subjective, “relying fundamentally on what 
Jungermann and Thuring refer to as ‘disciplined intuition’” (Jungermann & 
Thuring, 1987, as cited in Bradfield et al., 2005, p. 806). Fifth, the members of the 
scenario team are essentially “individuals from within the organisation 
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undertaking the scenario work” (Bradfield et al., 2005, p. 808), in addition to 
experts represented by an experienced scenario practitioner in charge of designing 
and facilitating the scenario process, as well as “outside experts in the form of 
‘remarkable people’ who have some knowledge of the industry and are acute 
observers of the environment . . . in order to challenge and stimulate the thinking 
of the scenario team” (Bradfield et al., 2005, p. 809). 
Finally, the final output of the process using the intuitive logics 
methodology consists of two to four scenarios that are logically linked, presented 
in a discursive narrative form, and all of equal value. In other words, no 
probability should be assigned to the scenarios, as they are all equally probable 
(Bradfield et al., 2005, p. 809). 
Under this methodology, the initiation phase is subject to the purpose of 
the scenario exercise, which could be related to a specific management problem or 
a very general issue, and “which in turn determines the focus in terms of the 
driving forces to be examined” (Bradfield et al., 2005, p. 809). The process and 
the tools can vary from one practitioner to the other, however, as 
they are basically generic and include desk research, individual and group 
brainstorming and clustering techniques, contextual environment analysis 
using the Societal, Technology, Economic, Environment, Technology 
(PESTEL) framework or its derivatives, matrices, systems dynamics, 
stakeholder analysis and discussions with remarkable people. (Bradfield et 
al., 2005, p. 809) 
 
1.4.1.2. The probabilistic modified trends approach (PMT) 
From the American experience and the work done by Gordon and Helmer 
et al. at Rand Corporation, emerged the Probabilistic Modified (PMT) approach 
for scenario techniques, which relies on “the probabilistic modification of 
extrapolated trends” (Bradfield et al., 2005, p. 800) and includes two distinctive 
methodologies: trend-impact analysis (TIA) and cross-impact analysis (CIA). 
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Trend-impact analysis (TIA) appeared in the early 1970s from the field of 
forecasting studies undertaken by the Futures Group in Connecticut. It is a 
forecasting technique in which a team of external experts conceive a baseline 
scenario using trend exploration. Future events that may affect this scenario are 
identified and evaluated on the basis of their probability of occurrence and degree 
of impact, and the combined effect of these events are applied to the baseline 
scenario to create future scenarios. According to Gordon, TIA evolved as a 
consequence of the criticism of traditional forecasting methods that relied on the 
extrapolation of historic data—from time-series techniques to econometrics—
without considering “the effects of unprecedented future events” (T. J. Gordon, 
1994, p. 1). Determining the surprise-free extrapolation is, indeed, the first step of 
the process, followed by the second step in which the surprise-free extrapolation 
is modified in order to take into consideration significant unprecedented future 
events which “should be plausible, potentially powerful in impact, and verifiable 
in retrospect” (T. J. Gordon, 1994, p. 3). Finally, expert judgments are used to 
determine the probability of incidence of the unprecedented events, as identified 
in the previous step and relatively to their expected impact, to generate 
accustomed extrapolations. 
According to Bradfield, following a literature search, “references to TIA in 
context of scenarios are relatively few in the literature” (Bradfield et al., 2005, p. 
801). 
 As far as the cross-impact analysis (CIA) is concerned, it refers to a 
family of forecasting techniques designed in 1966 by Gordon and Helmer et al. at 
the Rand Corporation, which involves identifying and evaluating the impact of 
trends or events on each other by a team of external experts through the use of a 
matrix. Similarly to the TIA, “the CIA methodology attempts to evaluate changes 
in the probability of occurrence of events which might cause deviations in the 
naïve extrapolations of historical data” (Bradfield et al., 2005, p. 801). The TIA 
and the CIA follow a similar process in addition to another layer of analysis for 
the CIA that attempts to connect relationships between events and variables in 
order “to move from a system of ‘unprocessed initial probabilities’ to a set of 
corrected probabilities’” (Bradfield et al., 2005, p. 801). The scenarios are built 
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from the combination of narratives and judgments with the extrapolation of 
historical data. 
 
1.4.2. The French School: ‘La Prospective’ 
As mentioned previously, Gaston Berger initiated the French scenario 
work in the 1950s with a focus on the socio-political foundation of France itself, 
whereas the scenario work simultaneously initiated in the U.S. was of a global 
nature within the framework of the cold war. Grounded on the work done by 
Berger, Michel Godet conceived his own approach to building scenarios in the 
1970s while he was the head of the Department of Future Studies at SEMA (a 
defence firm) and developing scenarios for a number of French organizations, 
such as EDF (Electricité de France), the public electricity company, and Elf, a 
petroleum products company. The methodology developed by Godet for the 
development of scenarios is an essentially mathematical and computer-based 
probabilistic approach, which includes a combination of systems analysis tools 
and procedures. 
According to Bradfield et al. (2005):  
La Prospective approach to scenarios incorporates certain features of the 
intuitive logics methodology [and] is a more elaborate, complex and more 
mechanistic rather than an openly intuitive approach to scenario 
development, relying heavily on computer-based mathematical models 
which have their roots in TIA and CIA. (p. 801) 
In this respect, La Prospective School is a mixture of intuitive logics and 
probabilistic modified trend methodologies, and relies on a team composed of key 
internal managers led by an external expert consultant for its conduct. It is 
necessary to mention that the methodological contribution made by Godet is quite 
different from the more philosophical thinking of Berger and de Jouvenel (Hughes, 
2009a, p. 7). Indeed, the work done by Berger and de Jouvenel was conducted 
within a national public planning perspective, whereas Godet’s work extended the 
field of scenario applications to the industrial sector as well as private companies. 
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As a result, the methodological approach developed by Godet relies heavily on a 
number of quantitative and probabilistic tools. In this respect, the process to 
conceive scenarios based on La Prospective School, as developed by Godet 
(2007a), starts by formulating the problem and analysing the system under study 
by a group of relevant stakeholders—moderated by an external consultant—
before using a number of computer based programmes specific to every stage of 
the process, which can be described as follows: 
 The first stage of the process is dedicated to the search for key internal 
and external variables. An inventory of the key variables is established 
with a description of the relationships amongst them through a 
structural analysis and the use of a software called MICMAC (Matrice 
d’Impacts Croisés Multiplication Appliqués à un Classement) (Godet, 
2008, p. 61); 
 In the second stage, an analysis of the stakeholders analysis is 
undertaken by which the positions and strategies of the relevant actors 
are identified and analysed through the use of the software MACTOR 
(Methode Acteurs, Objectifs, Rapports de force) (Godet, 2008, p. 65); 
 The third stage is dedicated to exploring the field of possible 
combinations between the constituting elements of the system under 
study through the use of the morphological analysis and the software 
MORPHOL (an abbreviation of morphological analysis) (Godet, 2008, 
p. 69). This method is essentially used for conceiving scenarios, and is 
also used for technological forecasting. 
 Finally, based on the results of the morphological analysis, the 
scenarios are then built. In order to delimit the most probable 
scenarios, it is possible to use the Smic-Prob-Expert software in order 
to evaluate the probability of certain events occurring in the future 
(Godet, 2008, p. 77). 
According to Godet (2007a), computer programmes are simple tools that 
help deal with complexity and are necessary for allowing the users to appropriate 
the system under study and the process (p. 16). When compared to the American 
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school, the French school is mainly focused on the socio-political dimensions of 
the future of France, whereas the American approach is essentially of a more 
global nature. In addition, the French approach has a strong bias towards 
normative scenarios of ideal futures and tends to neglect the exploratory approach 
to the future (van der Heijden, Bradfield, Burt, Cairns, & Wright, 2002, p. 129).  
 
1.4.3.  Comparing the Two Schools 
Following this review of the three major schools for building scenarios, it 
is important to compare between the salient features of each of them in order to 
choose a specific methodology for our research subject and justify our choice. The 
success and failure of a scenario project lies in the degree to which a scenario 
work achieves one or more of the four purposes (van der Heijden et al., 2002, p. 
234): 
 Making sense of a particular puzzling situation; 
 Developing strategy; 
 Anticipation; and 
 Adaptive organisational learning. 
The literature relating to scenario work reveals that the intuitive-logics 
methodology has been used to achieve all of the four purposes identified due to its 
great flexibility (Bradfield et al. 2005, p. 806). However, as far as La Prospective 
and PMT methodologies are concerned, they have been essentially used to 
achieve the first and second of the above mentioned purposes in order “to 
determine the most likely evolutionary development of a particular phenomenon 
with a view of improving the effectiveness of policy and strategic decisions” 
(Bradfield et al., 2005, p. 806). In this respect, the intuitive-logics methodology 
relies mainly on subjective and qualitative information to a greater extent than La 
Prospective and the PMT methodologies, where subjective information is taken 
into consideration but within a pre-established framework of “complex 
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mathematical, extrapolative forecasting and computer simulation models in their 
development of scenarios” (Bradfield et al., 2005, p. 806). 
A scenario project undertaken using the intuitive-logics methodology can 
be either descriptive/exploratory or normative and with a very comprehensive 
scope ranging from global scenarios to scenarios focusing on a specific issue. La 
Prospective and PMT methodologies are mainly used, however, for the 
development of descriptive scenarios with a limited scope as they “focus on a 
specific phenomenon and the set of key variables which bear on the future of that 
particular phenomenon” (Bradfield et al., 2005, p. 806). In addition, the PMT 
methodologies are even more limited as far as the scope is concerned, as they 
“need to have detailed and reliable time series data” (Bradfield et al., 2005, p. 
806). 
Regarding the time horizon of the scenario project, all three methodologies 
offer the possibility to consider a period of between 3 and 20 years or more, 
especially if the scenarios have a very wide focus. As has been noted previously, 
the intuitive-logics methodology is mainly process oriented, while La Prospective 
and PMT methodologies are primarily concerned with the output. 
There are also differences concerning the composition of the scenario team 
and the role played by external experts. In the case of the intuitive-logics 
methodology, the scenario process is generally carried out by a team composed of 
members from within the relevant organisation with the possibility of including an 
outside expert to play the role of the ‘remarkable person’ in order to challenge and 
stimulate thinking. The La Prospective and PMT methodologies rely on teams 
composed of key internal managers in addition to an external expert who has the 
necessary skills and knowledge for using a number of sophisticated tools to 
conceive and run the scenario exercise. The final and main difference is that, 
unlike the two other methodologies that attach probabilities to their scenarios, no 
probabilities are attached to the scenarios produced using the intuitive-logics 
methodology.  
There are objective and visible differences between the intuitive-logics and 
the PMT methodologies, but fewer differences between the intuitive-logics and La 
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Prospective methodologies, as “the range and sophistication of tools advocated in 
some of the more recent variants of the intuitive-logics models are similar in 
nature to those on which the La Prospective functions” (Bradfield et al., 2005, p. 
810)—despite the essential differences that still exist between thee two 
methodologies in methodological orientation, the composition of the teams, and 
the role of external experts in the course of the scenario exercise. 
From a comparison between the two main schools, two types of scenarios 
can be identified: exploratory scenarios and normative scenarios. 
Exploratory scenarios: Starting from a present situation with its dominant 
trends, explorative scenarios describe a succession of events that would logically 
and necessarily lead to a possible future. Such a scenario can be trend-based, and 
in this case, focuses on the driving forces of the system under study. They can 
also focus on the breaking points in relation to the trend-based scenario in order to 
explore contrasted hypothesis at the limit of the possible. The objective of 
exploratory scenarios is to scan the most likely possible futures. 
Normative scenarios: Often called anticipation scenarios, these do not 
begin from the present, but from the image of a desired future which is composed 
of a number of objectives to be achieved, and from there, they describe the course 
that links this desired future to the present. The normative scenario is, in general, 
established in relation to the exploratory scenarios: either as the outcome a 
selected one, or conceived as a synthesis of them. 
As far as this research project is concerned, the choice has been made to 
build explorative scenarios. 
 
1.5. SCENARIO METHODOLOGIES AND TYPOLOGIES 
Grounded in the schools discussed in the sections above, a very large 
variety of scenario methodologies and typologies have been found in the 
literature—to an extent that gives rise to a sense of chaos and a great difficulty to 
find a standard methodology for building scenarios. Indeed, it has been rightly 
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noted that “the literature reveals a large number of different and at time 
conflicting definitions, characteristics, principles and methodological ideas about 
scenarios” (Bradfield et al., 2009, p. 796). Moreover, the schools mentioned 
earlier do not have clear-cut boundaries to separate them, despite the work 
endeavored in some studies to construct ‘typologies of scenarios’ (Hughes, 2009a; 
Bradfield et al., 2005; see also International Energy Administration [IEA], 2003; 
McDowall and Eames, 2006; van Notten et al., 2003, as cited in Bradfield et al., 
2005). The confusion is mainly due to the diversity of the users as well as the 
contexts and objectives for which it has been used; however, and in order to have 
some clarity in the overall confusion about scenarios and their methods, this 
research will consider the work by Bradfield et al. (2005) and Hughes (2009a) as 
the main sources for reviewing the scenario methods found in the literature. 
Following this clarification, a customized approach for building the scenarios of 
this research thesis will be suggested. 
In this regard, Figure 1 below is a representation in the form of a family 
tree of the main figures and institutions that have been involved in scenario 
development, and the main methodologies attributed to them. 
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 Figure 1: Family tree of scenario practitioners and approaches. Adapted from 
Transition pathways to a low carbon economy: A historical overview of strategic 
scenario planning, by N. Hughes, 2009a, p. 6. 
The blue boxes represent the key personalities that have been involved in 
scenario work, and the green boxes represent the main methodological tools that 
have been developed for building scenarios. As described by Bradfield et al. 
(2005), we can clearly see the beginnings of scenario work from the American 
(RAND) and French (Berger) schools, and the different approaches and tools that 
have emerged as a result.  
In this respect, the line linking Berger and Godet represents the French 
school already described above. Whereas the line starting from Herman Kahn and 
passing by Pierre Wack at Shell, and Peter Schwartz at the Global Business Unit 
(GBU), represents the intuitive-logics school, which is more based on qualitative 
techniques and intuitions in comparison to the French school, which is more 
quantitative. However, there is also a convergence between the two schools that 
has evolved from the work done by Gordon and Helmer at RAND, known as the 
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Probabilistic Modified Approach, and from which has emerged the two distinctive 
methodologies known as: the trend-impact analysis (TIA) and cross-impact 
analysis (CIA) discussed above in the section dealing with the American school. 
Indeed, this school shares similar characteristics with the approach developed by 
Godet in the French school. Other common characteristics between the American 
and French schools can be found in the work of Kahane (1999) in South Africa, 
who initially came from Shell, and the work of Berger and de Jouvenel, as it has a 
strong normative public policy orientation, comparatively to the exploratory 
perspective done at Shell (as cited in Hughes, 2009a, p. 7). 
Another important branch of scenario methodologies based on the 
‘backcasting’ concept for locating low carbon energy scenarios, and developed by 
a group of Canadian researchers including Robinson and Valiskakis, proposed a 
synthesis between the American and French schools (Hughes, 2009a, p. 8). 
According to this approach, in order to locate the desired low carbon energy 
scenarios, the starting point of the process should be a description of the desirable 
future followed by a retrospective identification of the necessary steps and 
conditions to reach it. 
As a concluding note, we can see that the diversity of the scenario 
methodologies is explained by the diversity of the users and the contexts in which 
it has been used, and that every use of the scenario method requires the user to 
conceive a customized approach depending on the subject, the context, and the 
available means to achieve it. Indeed, as stated by Hughes:  
It follows from the start of a scenario development process, understanding 
the perspective and bounds of influence of the potential scenario user 
(whether implicitly or explicitly defined), and from this understanding the 
objectives of the process, is key to understanding which type of approach, 
from the numerous variations available to draw on, is the most appropriate 
for that particular process. (Hughes, 2009a, p. 8) 
Accordingly, a specific approach will be proposed for building the 
scenarios of this research project based on the typology of scenarios as defined by 
Slaughter (1993a), and combined with the typology of transition pathways as 
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defined by Geels and Schot (2007). In this respect, it is worth noting that prior 
works linking scenarios and transition pathways have been found in a number of 
working papers: Hughes (2009a) A Historical Overview of Strategic Scenario 
Planning and Lessons for Undertaking Low Carbon Energy Policy, Hughes 
(2009a) Transition Pathways and Low Carbon Energy Scenarios, and Hughes, 
Mers, and Strachan (2009) Review and Analysis of UK and International Low 
Carbon Energy Scenarios. As far as the MENA region and the GCC in particular 
are concerned, no studies have been found linking the transition concept to the 
scenario methodology, and in this respect, this study could be considered the first 
attempt for the region. However, the approach used in this research project for 
linking scenarios and transition pathways is new and will be explained in the 
following section. 
 
1.5.1. A Scenario Typology 
 In the course of studying the future, a choice has to be made between 
different future alternatives. Building the scenarios helps imagine the future, but 
more importantly, it contributes in providing a road map about the different routes 
to the future. In this respect, Slaughter (1993a) has recommended building 
contrasting images of the future by considering a range of alternative future 
developments, generated through a set of five broad scenarios rooted in our 
present: a breakdown scenario; a repressive or managed societies scenario; a 
business as usual scenario; the ecological decentralist scenario; and the 
transformational societies scenario. 
The breakdown scenario represents a scenario where a major negative, 
triggering event occurs, such as a sudden environmental degradation, a nuclear 
accident, or a chronic rise in political and social conflict (Slaughter, 1993a, p. 
295).  
The repressive or managed societies scenario represents a scenario where 
there is a return of totalitarian and fascist types of political regimes which could 
be triggered by a number of different economic and/or political factors. 
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The business as usual scenario assumes continuity in the present policies 
and the planned projects. In this scenario, the present situation with all its 
challenges and the unsustainable way of managing the resources remain 
unchanged, which could lead to a breakdown scenario in the future as a result of 
the incapacity to adapt to the changing realities. 
The ecological decentralist scenario assumes a departure from the actual 
aggressive ideology of economic growth towards a new approach to nature, based 
on decentralized ‘soft energy paths’ and a deep commitment to ecological 
reconstruction (Slaughter, 1993a, p. 296). This scenario requires a radical 
ideological shift with a very significant civilizational change; as such, it is highly 
unlikely that any government would consciously and deliberately engage in such a 
scenario unless without significant external pressure. 
The transformational societies scenario could evolve from two main 
routes: either from a process that leads humanity to a new stage of development, 
or through “the benign operation of a new form of technology” (Slaughter, 1993a, 
p. 296). 
The scenarios typology as proposed by Slaughter (1993a) provides for a 
useful framework or a starting point for building the scenarios of this futures 
study. The following chapter will be dedicated to the energy transitions theory and 
the MLP framework of analysis that will be used in order to make a thorough and 
systematic analysis of the energy system of the GCC countries, in addition to 
helping us determine the possible future scenarios for an energy transition in the 
power generation sector of the GCC countries, based on Slaughter’s (1993a) 
scenario typology.  
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Chapter 2 
ENERGY TRANSITIONS: A MULTILEVEL 
PERSPECTIVE 
 
An energy transition is briefly defined as the process of a qualitative 
and/or quantitative transformation of the energy system. A qualitative energy 
transition involves shifting from one source of energy to another source of energy, 
whereas a quantitative energy transition involves a study of the historical 
changing patterns of energy consumption between different fuels. However, the 
concept of energy transitions mainly implies a shift from one or a group of energy 
sources that dominate the market to another major energy source or sources. The 
following sections will necessarily define the concept of energy transition and its 
history before dealing in detail with the multilevel perspective (MLP) approach 
that has emerged from the study of transitions. 
 
2.1. ENERGY TRANSITIONS DEFINED 
Historically, humanity has witnessed local and global, qualitative and 
quantitative energy transitions, with the first global qualitative energy transition 
taking place between the 17
th
 and 19
th
 centuries—shifting from wood to coal as a 
source of energy in the first industrial revolution. The second global qualitative 
energy transition occurred at the beginning of the 20
th
 century when oil replaced 
coal, becoming the major energy source of the world energy mix of which coal 
still remains a component (Solomon & Krishna, 2011, p. 7424). Based on human 
history and the literature dealing with energy transitions, it can be concluded that 
energy transitions take place when a number of the following factors are present: 
 A depletion of the energy source; 
 An increase in the price of the dominant energy as a result of the first 
factor; 
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 The existence of environmental and/or health consequences of the 
energy used, as for example happened with coal at the end of the 19
th
 
century; 
 The introduction of a new source of energy that is price competitive 
and more efficient than the existing dominant source of energy, as 
happened at the beginning of the 20
th
 century when oil replaced coal; 
 New geopolitical and economic factors that influence national security. 
The 1973 oil crisis was the result of the oil embargo imposed by the Arab 
oil exporting countries on the major consumers represented by the U.S., Western 
Europe, and Japan for their support to Israel. As a result of the embargo, the price 
of oil suddenly increased by 70% on the world energy markets and was one of the 
reasons that led the world economy into a period of economic recession
10
. The 
significant increase in the price of oil has burdened the budget of all the importing 
countries of oil and petroleum fuels, which ultimately led to new policies for 
saving energy through a wiser and more economic consumption of energy at an 
individual micro-level and a more efficient energy system at the macro-level. In 
addition, a number of new measures and policies were implemented in order to 
decrease the dependency on oil through the development of alternative and/or 
renewable energy sources. In this respect, the Brazilian and French experiences 
are considered the most prominent of successful qualitative energy transitions in 
the twentieth century. The U.S. has also launched a policy for a qualitative energy 
transition following the 1973 oil crisis, The Independence Project, but it did not 
lead to a successful outcome. 
In the academic literature, the term ‘transition’ has been mainly used in the 
context of research conducted about sustainable development. The first book 
containing both terms was published in 1998 under the title The Politics of 
Agenda 21 in Europe, edited by Timothey O’Riordan and Heather Voisey, and 
followed by two other books under the titles Our Common Journey: A Transition 
                                                          
10
 It is very difficult to identify the real reasons that have led to the economic 
recession after the oil crisis of 1973, as it was concomitant to a number of 
monetary and financial policies implemented in western countries, which had an 
aggravating role. 
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Toward Sustainability, published in 1999 by the U.S. National Research Council, 
and Sustainable Development: The Challenge of Transition, edited by Jurgan 
Schmandt and C.H. Ward in 2000 (Kemp, 2010, pp. 291-292). At this stage, the 
term ‘transition’ is used in order to describe a general process without any 
theoretical background. However, in the last decade and more, as a result of 
historical studies dealing with past energy transitions, a number of descriptive 
models and concepts have been developed in order to propose a general theory 
explaining the transitions processes. In this respect, a system level theory emerged, 
known as the multilevel perspective (MLP), which included concepts drawn from 
ecology (niches, landscapes), political science (regimes), and evolutionary 
biology (evolution, selection) (Hughes, 2009b, p. 1). In the literature, the MLP 
gradually emerged from a number of studies: Kemp et al. (1998), Rotmans, Kemp, 
& van Asselt (2001); Geels (2002, 2004, 2005a, b, 2006); Perez (2002), Berkhout 
et al. (2003); Smith et al. (2005); Grin (2006); Kemp, Rotmans, and Loorbach 
(2007); Geels and Schot (2007); Melosi (2010); Solomon and Krishna (2011). The 
theory about transitions that emerged from this debate was concerned with 
transformative change where multiple levels and drivers interact and mutually 
influence each other in a transition process, and represented a major shift from the 
traditional perspective of transitions based on a single and linear causality as a 
result of a ‘technological push’. 
Transitions theory emerged from the need for a general framework in 
order to understand the processes through which significant technological and 
social transformations take place in a given society. Indeed, a transition from 
present energy sources to new alternative energy sources implies that a paradigm 
shift will occur (Nader, Cesarino, & Hebdon, 2010, p. 1) and involve political, 
economic, and security issues that are fundamentally political in nature (Nader, et 
al., 2010, p. 3). As noted by Melosi, through the examination of the mechanism of 
change we can reach the conclusion that “potentially, energy transitions can help 
to clarify how energy development and use influences and is influenced by the 
technical, economic, political, environmental and social forces that shape society” 
(2010, p. 45). Finally, “if history teaches us anything on this subject it is that 
energy transitions are not simply exercises in swapping fuels and technologies, 
but disruptive events with the potential to remake societies in fundamental ways” 
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(Melosi, 2010, p. 58). It is based on this historical conclusion that the multilevel 
perspective (MLP) was developed as an ‘appreciative theory’ (Nelson & Winter, 
1982, as cited in Geels, 2002, p. 1259) that integrates findings from different 
literatures (Geels, 2002, p. 1259). 
Transition studies have used different approaches, and the more frequently 
used can be summarized as the following: the multilevel perspective (MLP); 
strategic niche management (SNM); transition management (TM); innovation 
systems (IS); techno-economic paradigm (TEP); and socio-metabolic transitions 
(Lachman, 2013, p. 270) approach. The strategic niche management approach 
(SNM) shares some elements of the multilevel perspective (MLP) and focuses on 
the niche level and the necessary conditions for a technological niche to operate a 
breakthrough in the regime level. The transition management (TM) approach is 
interested in the management aspect of a transition and how to influence the speed 
and direction of a transition process. The TM approach has proven to be difficult 
to implement despite its theoretical attractiveness (Lachman, 2013, p. 272). The 
innovation systems (IS) approach developed in the mid-1980s seeks to uncover 
the bottlenecks in a transition process by breaking down the system into its 
constituents and “tends to marginalize cultural and demand side aspects” 
(Lachman, 2013, p. 273). The techno-economic paradigm (TEP) approach, based 
on the long wave theory, is a macro view that comprises the whole economy and 
“argues that major technological shifts are the basis of macro-economic cyclical 
movements, and together with this shift in technology, the other subsystems 
within society co-evolve” (Lachman, 2013, p. 273). The TEP approach has been 
mainly criticized for its deterministic understanding of macro-economic 
phenomena and for its incapacity to determine the causes of long wave cycles 
(Geels 2006; van den Bergh & Oosterhius, 2008, as cited in Lachman, 2013, p. 
273). Finally, the socio-metabolic approach focuses on a society’s general 
metabolism for studying transitions, but without including the actors and their 
background represented by their culture, belief systems and political interests 
(Lachman, 2013, p. 274). Comparatively to the above mentioned approaches, the 
MLP has been considered as encompassing all the factors relevant in a transition 
process, and a powerful tool for policy-makers as it “does not employ linear 
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cause-and-effect relationships or simple drivers . . . [and] is well suited to study 
uncertain and messy processes such as transitions” (Geels, 2012, p. 474). 
Based on these arguments, and as far as this research is concerned, the 
choice has been made to rely on the MLP approach in order to study energy 
transitions in the context of the GCC countries with a futures perspective. The 
section below will expand further on the MLP approach and its relevance to this 
research project. 
 
2.2. THE MULTILEVEL PERSPECTIVE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 
The debate about transitions, and more particularly technological 
transitions, has led to the development of a specific approach to analysing the 
process of technological transitions known as the multilevel perspective (MLP), 
which draws “on evolutionary economics, the sociology of technology, political 
economy and other factors” (Solomon & Krishna, 2010, p. 7427). The MLP 
consists “of three inter-linked dimensions in a nested hierarchy” (Solomon & 
Krishna, 2010, p. 7427), known as ‘niche innovations’ at the micro-level; 
‘sociotechnical regimes’ at the meso-level; and ‘sociotechnical landscapes’ at the 
macro-level. 
According to the MLP framework of analysis, the transition of a new 
technology (generated and developed at the niche level) from the niche level to 
the sociotechnical regimes level essentially results from combined, successful 
developments at the three levels of the MLP. In this respect, in addition to the 
analysis of the MLP and the different levels involved, it is essential to understand 
the process through which a niche technological innovation succeeds in moving 
from niche to regime level and how the reconfiguration process of the regime is 
managed. 
As far as the transition from niche to regime level is concerned, it is 
mainly the result of a gradual accumulation process, also called niche 
accumulation, which involves “experimentation, learning processes, adjustments 
and reconfigurations” (Geels, 2002, p. 1271). Based on previous historical 
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experiences, niche technological innovations have been able to break through into 
the regime level through the mechanism of technological add-on and 
hybridisation whereby new technologies link up with already established 
technologies as a result of a specific need (Geels, 2002, p. 1271). Such was the 
case of gas turbines in the power generation sector. First introduced in order to 
improve the productivity of steam turbines in combined steam power stations, gas 
turbines soon replaced steam as the main technology for electricity production, 
and steam turbines became the auxiliary add-on (Islas, 1997 as cited in Geels, 
2002, p. 1272). In this respect, it should be noted that reconfiguration processes in 
the regime occur as a result of a gradual and stepwise evolution while the 
technological transition takes place, and where a new regime grows out of an old 
regime (Van Den Ende & Kemp, 1999 as cited in Geels, 2002, p. 1272), which 
involves all the dimensions of the sociotechnical regime.  
The significance and value of the MLP lies in its usefulness as an 
analytical framework for dealing with the complexity of real world situations—
which also, however, happen to be its primary weakness. In addition to the 
difficulty of drawing borders between the different units of analysis that compose 
it, the MLP requires many data that are essentially of a qualitative nature (Geels, 
2002, p. 1273).  
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As explained in Figure 2 below, the MLP is a process whereby the three 
levels mentioned above work together according to an ordered dynamic: 
 
Figure 2: Multilevel perspective on transitions. Adapted from “Technological 
Transitions as Evolutionary Reconfiguration Processes”, by F. W. Geels, 2001, 
Research Policy, 31, p. 1263. 
According to the MLP, the dynamic of a transition follows the following 
pattern: first, a technological niche innovation gradually evolves as a result of 
technical improvements, cost reduction, and a learning process, in addition to 
support from interest groups. Second, an increased pressure is placed on the 
sociotechnical regime as a result of major changes at the sociotechnical landscape, 
which leads, in a third stage, to destabilizing the regime level who is pushed 
towards adopting the niche innovations (Geels & Schot, 2007, p. 400). 
This standardised conceptualisation of the MLP has been criticised on 
three main points. The first criticism questions the level of the empirical analysis 
as “it is unclear how these conceptual levels should be applied empirically” 
(Berkhout et al., 2004, p. 54). In other words, in the case of the electricity 
sector—the subject of interest of this research—different regimes are involved at 
the level of primary fuel (oil, gas, coal, nuclear, or renewables), or at the level of 
  73 
the entire system. This includes the aspects of production, transport, distribution, 
and consumption, and it is unclear if the focus should be on the whole system or 
just at one level of the system. In order to overcome this criticism of the MLP, 
Geels and Schot (2007) suggest to “first demarcate the empirical level of the 
object of analysis, and then operationalize the MLP” (p. 402). In this respect, and 
according to DiMaggio and Powell (1983), transitions in sociotechnical regimes 
are found at the organisational fields, which are defined as: 
Those organisations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of 
institutional life: key suppliers, resource and product consumers, 
regulatory agencies, and other organisations that produce similar services 
or products. The virtue of this unit of analysis is that it directs our 
attention . . . to the totality of relevant actors. (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, 
p. 148) 
Based on this definition, as far as this research is concerned, the 
organisational field of the electricity, or power generation, sector of the GCC 
countries is composed of a selection of relevant primary energy technologies for 
electricity production, the institutions and organizations involved in the policy-
making process of the power generation sector, and the consumption patterns of 
electricity as related to demographic growth and economic development, in 
addition to the international oil market and the climate change issue. 
The second criticism of the MLP suggests that it is over-functionalist and 
too descriptive and structural (Smith et al., 2005, p. 1492). This criticism mainly 
arises from the use of Figure 2 above, which does not include or mention the role 
of actors in the transition process. However, the MLP is much more sophisticated 
than suggested by this figure, as it takes into consideration the nature of the levels 
and the actors involved, as well as the relationship of the levels to agency.  
The third criticism involves the focus of the MLP on the niche innovations 
level, or micro-level, considered the central level responsible for a regime change. 
Indeed, the MLP favours the bottom-up approach and explains a regime change as 
a consequence of changes at the niche innovations level (Berkhout et al., 2004, p. 
62). However, it should be noted that this early bias of the MLP has since been 
  74 
addressed in more recent works and can be easily overcome through greater focus 
on the regime and landscape levels (Geels, 2002, p. 1261). 
 
2.2.1. The Technological Niche Innovations Level  
At the niche innovations level (i.e., the micro-level), new niche 
technological innovations appear on the market and are promoted by governments 
through subsidies, taxes, or regulation. Indeed, in Brazil following the first oil 
crisis of the seventies, biofuels have benefited from “strong support and subsidies 
for the sugarcane industry, [and] funded R&D with rapid payoffs for ethanol 
production” (Solomon & Krishna, 2010, p. 7427). In France, again following the 
first oil crisis, nuclear energy benefited from a similar type and level of support. 
When a significant and fundamental technological innovation takes place, it can 
have a triggering effect for a major energy transition. An example of a historical 
niche technological innovation is the discovery of oil and the techniques to 
produce it, leading to a shift from coal to oil. More recently, another example of a 
niche innovation can be seen in the Shale gas revolution that took place lately in 
the U.S. as a result of a major technological breakthrough in the shale gas 
extraction technology. It is at this level that technical novelties developed by 
small network of actors emerge (Geels & Schot, 2007, p. 400), as will be seen 
later in this research in chapter 3 regarding the development of techniques for the 
extraction of shale gas; namely, horizontal drilling and fracking. 
Regarding our research thesis, a thorough review will be undertaken of a 
selected number of energy technologies—solar, wind, nuclear energy, oil and 
gas—in order to evaluate their present technological status, their costs in the 
international markets, and standing in the context of the GCC countries. This 
work is essential in order to make projections about the level and scope of their 
potential future deployment. 
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2.2.2. The Socio-technical Regimes Level 
The meso-level, also known as the socio-technical regimes level, consists 
of three intertwined dimensions: “a network of actors and social groups, formal 
normative and cognitive rules, and material and technical elements” (Solomon & 
Krishna, 2010, p. 7427). According to Geels (2002), “the term ‘sociotechnical 
regimes’ . . . refer[s] to the semi-coherent set of rules carried by different social 
groups” (p. 1260) that are responsible for the stability of the sociotechnical regime 
as they are the providers of orientation and co-ordination among the relevant actor 
groups (p. 1260). As shown in Figure 1 above, Geels (2002) distinguished seven 
interlinked “dimensions in the sociotechnical regime: technology, user practices 
and application domains (markets), symbolic meaning of technology, 
infrastructure, industry structure, policy and techno-scientific knowledge” (p. 
1262). According to Rip and Kemp: 
A technological regime is the rule-set or grammar embedded in a complex 
of engineers’ practices, production process technologies, product 
characteristics, skills and procedures, ways of handling relevant artefacts 
and persons, ways of defining problems; all of them embedded in 
institutions and infrastructures. (Rip & Kemp, 1998, p. 340) 
In this respect, the sociotechnical regime (the meso-level) is a deep 
structure that is relatively stable; however, this stability is not static but rather 
dynamic, as it allows for innovation to take place through an incremental process. 
In other terms, the sociotechnical regimes represent a deep structure that “in 
evolutionary terms, . . . function[s] as [a] selection and retention mechanism” 
(Geels, 2002, p. 1260) for novel technologies that are being generated and 
developed at the niche level and actively looking for an opportunity to emerge. 
It is worth noting that at this regime level, path dependency and 
technological lock-in are strongly present in energy systems, which cannot be 
overcome without a “thinking outside of the box” attitude from the concerned 
network of actors and social groups mentioned earlier. Given the centrality of the 
regime level, technological transitions have been defined by Geels and Schot 
(2007) “as changes from one sociotechnical regime to another” (p. 399). Indeed, 
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the importance of this level is related to the central role of the formal normative 
and cognitive rules in shaping social behaviour and policies within the context of 
a specific socio-political contract. The formal normative rules include values, 
behavioural norms, and role relationships, whereas cognitive rules include belief 
systems, innovation agendas, problem definitions, guiding principles, and search 
heuristics. Consequently, at this level are found the policy makers and interest 
groups who, depending on the socio-political context in which their own values, 
belief systems, and interests have evolved, will make choices and conceive 
policies that can either foster a technological transition or hinder it.  
 
2.2.3. The Socio-technical Landscape Level  
The macro-level, or the socio-technical landscape level, is represented by 
the external “environment that usually changes very slowly, over many decades, 
and influences the dynamics at the niche and regime levels (though not vice-
versa)” (Solomon & Krishna, 2010, p. 7427). The macro-level can be summarized 
in the following factors: “the macro-economy, deep cultural patterns, and [global] 
political developments” (Solomon & Krishna, 2010, p. 7427). The sociotechnical 
landscape is relatively static and is similar “to the historian Braudel’s concept of 
longue durée” (Geels & Schot, 2007, p. 403). However, the relative stability of 
the socio-technical landscape does not exclude dynamic aspects, which as 
elaborated by Van Driel and Shot (2005), can be classified around three types: 
firstly, “factors that do not change or that change only slowly, such as climate; 
secondly, long term changes, such as the German industrialization in the late 19
th
 
century; thirdly, rapid external shocks, such as wars or rapid fluctuations in the 
price of oil” (Geels & Schot, 2007, p. 403). These factors are classified at the 
socio-technical landscape because they represent an external environment that 
cannot be influenced by actors in the short run. 
Developments at the sociotechnical landscape do not necessarily have an 
immediate impact on the niche-innovations and regimes; rather, they “need to be 
perceived and translated by actors to exert influence” (Geels & Schot, 2007, p. 
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404), whereas niche-innovations and regimes have the capacity of leading to 
action through sociological structuration (Geels & Schot, 2007, p. 404).  
 
2.2.4. A Typology of Environmental Change 
In an effort in order to establish a typology of environmental or landscape 
change, four dimensions of environmental change have been proposed by Suarez 
and Olivia (2005) that can be summarized as the following: frequency, which 
represents the number of environmental changes per unit of time; amplitude, or 
the extent of deviation from the initial circumstances as a result of the disturbance; 
speed, or rate of change of the disturbance; and finally scope, which represents the 
number of environmental dimensions that have been affected by the simultaneous 
disturbances (p. 1022). From the various combinations of these four dimensions, 
Suarez and Olivia (2005) have identified five typologies of environmental change, 
as shown in Table 1 below:  
Table 1 
Attributes of Change and Resulting Typology 
Note: Adapted from “Environmental Change and Organizational Transformation”, 
by F. Suarez and R. Olivia, 2005, Industrial and Corporate Change, 14(6), p. 
1022. 
The resulting typology generated by the different ways of combining the 
four attributes of change have been defined by Suarez and Olivia (2005) in the 
following terms: 
 Regular change refers to a regular low intensity environmental change. 
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 Hyperturbulance change refers to environments that witness a high 
frequency of high-speed change in one or a few dimensions. 
 Specific shock corresponds to rapid and high intensity environmental 
changes. Their occurrence is rare and they are narrow in scope. 
 Disruptive change refers to changes that are not very frequent. They 
develop gradually but have a high intensity effect on the system and 
require significant adaptation efforts. 
 Finally, avalanche change—the most extreme typology—does not 
occur very frequently but is of high speed and intensity and 
simultaneously affects multiple dimensions of the system. Following 
an avalanche change, radical transformations are needed, which in turn 
will lead to a radical change at the regime level (pp. 1022-1023). 
Based on Suarez and Olivia’s (2005) typology of environmental change, 
Geels and Schot (2007) have proposed a typology of transition pathways, with the 
exception of hyperturbulance, as according to them, such a change is found only 
in markets and is very unlikely in the case of landscape dynamics (p. 404). 
 
2.3. A Typology of Transition Pathways  
In order to address the above mentioned criticisms of the MLP, and more 
particularly the bottom-up bias of the MLP, Geels and Schot (2007) have 
proposed a ‘typology of transition pathways’ describing different multilevel 
interactions that combine two criteria: the first is the criteria of ‘timing of 
interactions’, and the second is the criteria of ‘nature of interaction’ (p. 405). 
The timing of interventions criteria argues that “different timings of 
multilevel interactions have different outcomes” (Geels & Schot, 2007, p. 405), 
which is a significant evolution from earlier MLP descriptions found in the 
literature that highlighted a simultaneous unfolding process between the different 
levels. The timing of the pressure originating from the landscape is of particular 
importance, as the outcome of the transition process will depend from the level of 
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maturity of niche innovations. In this respect, this point refers to another difficulty 
with the MLP, which is to evaluate the level of development or maturity of 
technological niches present at the micro-level and whether they are ready to 
achieve a breakthrough at the meso- or regimes level. Indeed, as regime actors and 
niche actors can have different opinions about the level of maturity of niche 
innovations, Geels and Schot (2007) have proposed the following indicators: 
(a) Learning processes have stabilized in a dominant design; 
(b) Powerful actors have joined the support network; 
(c) Price/performance have improved and there are strong expectations of 
further improvements (e.g., learning curves); 
(d) The innovation is used in market niches, which cumulatively amount 
to more than 5% market share (p. 405). 
These indicators will serve as the benchmark to evaluate the maturity of 
the new energy technologies selected for this research. 
The second criteria, ‘nature of interaction’, questions the nature of 
relationships shared between the niche-innovations and landscape levels with the 
regime level and whether they are reinforcing or disruptive relationships through 
pressure or competition. It is argued that reinforcing landscape developments that 
stabilize the existing regime are not considered drivers for transitions (Geels & 
Schot, 2007, p. 406). Conversely, disruptive landscape developments are a push 
for change at the regime level. As far as niche-innovations are concerned, their 
relationships to the existing regime are described as competitive when they aim at 
replacing it, and symbiotic when they are introduced as competence-enhancing 
add-ons in the existing regime (Geels & Schot, 2007, p. 406). 
Depending on the nature and strength of relationships between niche-
innovations and landscape developments with the existing regimes, Geels and 
Schot (2007) have proposed different transition pathways that can be summarized 
as follows: 
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Reproduction process creates no pressure on the sociotechnical regime 
(meso-level) from the landscape (macro-level), and no significant technological 
breakthrough at the technological niches level (micro-level); even if they exist, the 
stability of the regimes level does not allow them to materialize. In this situation, 
the regime reproduces itself. This pathway can be considered as a ‘business as 
usual’ scenario. However, while this pathway does not exclude a transition from 
taking place, the transition will occur only through an incremental, very long-term 
process without any destabilizing effect on the sociotechnical regime. 
Transformation path results from a moderate pressure from the landscape 
level on the regime level, whereas the niche-innovations have not yet matured. In 
this case, the pressure has a disruptive effect on the regime, which reacts by 
engaging in a reorientation and innovation strategy. It is important to note that the 
regimes actors do not react immediately to landscape pressure, as it takes some 
time before they internalize this pressure and consider outside criticism that can 
originate from social or interest groups as well as the scientific community. This 
path does not threaten the existence of the regime actors, although some changes 
may occur at the level of the social networks. In fact, the change in the regime 
structure takes place from within the regime itself (Geels & Schot, 2007, p. 407). 
De-alignment and re-alignment path appears when the pressure from the 
landscape is rapid and sudden with a resulting disruptive effect on the whole 
regime architecture. This triggers a high risk of a collapse leading to de-alignment, 
as no ready technological niche exist to fill the vacuum, but instead a variety of 
niche innovations who compete for access to the regime level. As a result of this 
competition, one innovation niche becomes dominant over time and leads to a re-
alignment into a new sociotechnical regime (Geels & Schot, 2007, p. 408). 
Technological substitution takes place when there is a sudden and 
disruptive pressure from the landscape level, also described as ‘avalanche change’, 
simultaneously to the presence of a ready and mature technological niche waiting 
for the opportunity to be adopted by the regime actors. Without the landscape 
pressure, the situation would otherwise resemble the reproduction process as a 
result of the entrenchment and stability of the regime structure. The technological 
substitution path ultimately leads to the replacement of the old regime by a new 
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one, as the old regime actors did not pay attention to the technological 
developments that were taking place at the niche level. Rather, they reacted only 
at the last minute as a consequence of a sudden and rapid pressure from the 
landscape level. 
Reconfiguration pathway is the result of “symbiotic innovations, which 
developed in niches, [and] initially adopted in the regime to solve local problems 
[and as a result] they subsequently trigger further adjustments in the basic 
architecture of the regime” (Geels & Schot, 2007, p. 411). Similarly to the 
transformation path, the new regime emerges from the old regime, with 
substantial changes in the architecture of the regime as the only difference. 
Finally, a fifth transition pathway has been proposed by Geels and Schot 
(2007) which would start as one path before shifting to another path, or a 
successive combination of other paths (p. 406). This can happen especially if the 
pressure from the landscape takes the form of ‘disruptive change’ which is 
initially perceived as slow and moderate by the regime actors, before it gradually 
builds and becomes disruptive, leading the regime actors to react to the increasing 
pressure by shifting from one path to the other before finding a new equilibrium. 
This transition pathway allows for a greater flexibility in the use of the MLP and 
for imagining different possible scenarios that will depend on the nature and 
strength of the pressure that is exerted on the regime.   
It should be noted that the proposed pathways are not deterministic or 
automatic, and that their application to specific cases requires care and adaptation 
to the specific context in which it is used. Based on this typology of transition 
pathways, it is proposed in the section below, that the scenarios regarding the 
transition of the power generation sector of the GCC will consist of relevant 
combinations between the scenarios typology, as proposed by Slaughter (1993a), 
and reviewed in chapter 1, and transitions pathways, as proposed by Geels and 
Schot (2007) typology, and reviewed in this chapter.  
As we have already seen in chapter 1, The breakdown scenario represents 
a scenario where a major negative, triggering event occurs, such as a sudden 
environmental degradation, a nuclear accident, or a chronic rise in political and 
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social conflict (Slaughter, 1993a, p. 295). By comparing this scenario with the 
typology of transition pathways as elaborated by Geels and Schot (2007), we find 
that it could correspond to the de-alignment and re-alignment path, in case there 
are no fully matured technological niche-innovations ready to replace the existing 
technology, or the technological substitution path, in case a mature technological 
niche-innovation is available and waiting to be adopted by the regimes actors. 
The repressive or managed societies scenario, reviewed in chapter 1, 
represents a scenario where there is a return of totalitarian and fascist types of 
political regimes which could be triggered by a number of different economic 
and/or political factors. There seems to be no equivalent to this scenario in the 
typology of transition pathways reviewed in this chapter. 
The business as usual scenario, reviewed in chapter 1, assumes continuity 
in the present policies and the planned projects. In this scenario, the present 
situation with all its challenges and the unsustainable way of managing the 
resources remain unchanged, which could lead to a breakdown scenario in the 
future as a result of the incapacity to adapt to the changing realities. This scenario 
seems to be equivalent to the reproduction process transition pathway, reviewed 
in this chapter, which could evolve into the fifth transition pathway in case a 
breakdown scenario is materialized halfway into the business as usual scenario. 
The ecological decentralist scenario, reviewed in chapter 1, assumes a 
departure from the actual aggressive ideology of economic growth towards a new 
approach to nature, based on decentralized ‘soft energy paths’ and a deep 
commitment to ecological reconstruction (Slaughter, 1993a, p. 296). This scenario 
requires a radical ideological shift with a very significant civilizational change; as 
such, it is highly unlikely that any government would consciously and deliberately 
engage in such a scenario unless without significant external pressure. In this case, 
a breakdown scenario will correspond either to the de-alignment and re-alignment 
transition pathway or the technological substitution pathway, depending on the 
availability of a mature technological niche-innovation waiting to be adopted by 
the regimes actors. 
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The transformational societies scenario, reviewed in chapter 1, could 
evolve from two main routes: either from a process that leads humanity to a new 
stage of development, or through “the benign operation of a new form of 
technology” (Slaughter, 1993a, p. 296). This scenario is very similar to the 
transformation path transition pathway as defined by Geels and Schot (2007) 
where a disruptive pressure from the landscape takes place at a moment where a 
niche-innovation is not yet completely mature. In this case, the regime actors react 
belatedly to the landscape pressure but will ultimately manage to engage in a 
reorientation and innovation strategy, leading to changes from within the regimes 
structure. 
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Chapter 3 
THE LANDSCAPE LEVEL: CLIMATE CHANGE AND 
THE INTERNATIONAL OIL MARKET 
 
As previously defined in previous chapter 3, the macro-level, or the socio-
technical landscape level, is represented by the external environment which 
characterized by its stability, as changes are very slow and can take decades in 
certain circumstances, in addition to its capacity to influence the dynamics at the 
niche and regime levels (Solomon & Krishna, 2011, p. 7427). Grounded on the 
above definition and a desk research focused on the GCC energy system, the 
following relevant factors have been identified as belonging to the socio-technical 
landscape of the GCC energy system.  
First of all, in the category of factors that do not change or that change 
very slowly, climate change has been identified as the main potential impact on 
the future course of the GCC energy system and even on the whole structure of 
the regimes actors in the advent of an international legally binding climate regime. 
Climate change has been one of the main factors that have been pushing for the 
diversification of the energy mix away from the hydrocarbons driven mainly by 
national or regional (the EU case) considerations and in the absence of 
international obligations. In this respect, it is necessary to note that the energy 
diversification efforts have been originally and essentially undertaken by energy 
importing countries and not by oil and gas producing and exporting countries. In 
fact, the oil and gas producing countries perceive the energy diversification efforts 
away from the fossil fuels as a threat to their interests and to their main source of 
revenue. To date, there are no global legally binding GHG emissions obligations, 
but this situation could change if the threat of climate change to the global 
political and economic order leads to a paradigm shift in the global energy system. 
In this respect, and for the purpose of this research project, it will be necessary to 
evaluate the possibility of such developments in order to see how it could affect 
  85 
the energy diversification efforts and strategies of the GCC countries between 
now and 2050. 
Given the centrality of oil revenues to the GCC economies, and as a result, 
to their political stability, the price of oil in the international markets has been 
identified as a variable that can also have a significant impact on the socio-
technical regimes level, with the potential to exercise a rapid external shock on the 
regimes level of the GCC countries due to the fluctuating nature of energy 
markets. 
The following sections will analyze the past and present of each of these 
factors before projecting their possible future developments, or ‘knowledge 
surrogates,’ as defined by Coddington (1975) and based on ‘what if statements’, 
as discussed in chapter 1. 
 
3.1. THE CLIMATE CHANGE FACTOR: A GAME CHANGER? 
Climate change issue has gradually emerged as a central issue on the 
international relations agenda, moving from a subject of interest limited to 
scientists and environmental circles, to an issue debated in international arenas as 
well as in domestic political debates about policy choices. This section will first 
discuss the science that is behind the climate change factor and giving it its 
‘raison d’être’, before focusing on the development of the international climate 
change negotiations and their possible outcomes within the time framework of 
this research project, i.e., between now and 2050. 
 
3.1.1. What the Science Has to Say About it  
Since the seventies, a very large body of scientific studies dealing with the 
climate change issue has been produced by various academic governmental 
international and private institutions. On this subject, the most prominent 
international institution is the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 
which summarizes the findings of the scientific community’s current knowledge 
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of climate science and is considered “the standard reference for all concerned with 
climate change in academia, government and industry worldwide” 
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], 2007a, p. i). In this respect, 
it is necessary to mention that “the IPCC does not conduct new research . . . its 
mandate is to make policy-relevant—as opposed to policy-perspective—
assessments of the existing worldwide literature on the scientific, technical and 
socio-economic aspects of climate change” (IPCC, 2007a, p. v), which makes it 
very relevant to our research. Due to the central role played by the IPCC in the 
scientific as well as political debates related to climate change, we will briefly 
review its history and role in the next paragraph. 
The IPCC is an intergovernmental scientific body established in 1988 by 
the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP) with the objective of providing an authoritative 
international statement of scientific understanding of climate change (IPCC, 2011, 
p. viii). The scientific reports published by the IPCC are in support of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) work, and since 
its establishment, the IPCC has produced five comprehensive Assessment Reports 
in addition to a number of Special Reports on specific subjects. The First 
Assessment Report (AR1) was published in 1990, in addition to a Supplementary 
Report in 1992; the Second Assessment Report (AR2) was published in 1995; the 
Third Assessment Report (AR3) in 2001; the Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) in 
2007; and the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) in 2013. The 2007 report considers 
all published, peer-reviewed “relevant scientific literature available to the authors 
in mid-2006” (IPCC, 2007a, p. vii). 
According to the IPCC’s Special Report on Renewable Energy Sources 
and Climate Change Mitigation (2011): 
Climate change refers to a change in the state of the climate that can be 
identified (e.g. using statistical tests) by changes in the mean and/or the 
variability of its properties and that persists for an extended period, 
typically decades or longer. Climate change may be due to internal 
processes or external forcings, or to persistent anthropogenic changes in 
the composition of the atmosphere or in land use. Note that article 1 of the 
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UNFCC defines ‘climate change’ as a change of climate which is 
attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the 
composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural 
climate variability observed over comparable time periods. The UNFCC 
thus makes a distinction between ‘climate change’ attributable to human 
activities altering atmospheric composition, and ‘climate variability’ 
attributable to natural causes. (IPCC, 2011, p. 956) 
In other words, climate change is defined as a significant statistically 
verifiable change in either the variability of the climate or its mean state, which 
traces its origins in the significant greenhouse gases released in the atmosphere 
during the past 150 years. Since the pre-industrial period, CO2 emissions from 
fossil fuel use
11
 have been considered the largest known source responsible for the 
increased concentrations of carbon dioxide (CO2) in the atmosphere. Indeed, 
according to the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4), since 1750, “it is 
estimated that 2/3rds of anthropogenic CO2 emissions have come from fossil fuel 
burning” (IPCC, 2007a, p. 25). Indeed, this report concluded that “Most of the 
observed increase in global average temperature since the mid-20
th
 century is very 
likely
12
 due to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas 
concentrations” (p.10).  In this respect, the choice has been made to consider only 
the emissions of carbon dioxide, as they are directly relevant to the combustion of 
fossil fuels, whereas other greenhouse gas emissions have a comparatively lower 
impact on the atmosphere and are not relevant to the burning of oil and gas. 
Human activities are responsible for the emission of four main greenhouse gases: 
carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), and the halocarbons 
(a group of gases containing fluorine, chlorine and bromine) (IPCC, 2007a, p. 
135), with each one of them having a different Radiative Forcing Effect
13
 on the 
                                                          
11
 In IPCC usage, “fossil carbon dioxide emissions include those from the 
production, distribution and consumption of fossil fuels and as a by-product from 
cement production (2011, p. 2).  
 
12
 According to the formal uncertainty language used in the AR4, the term ‘very 
likely’ refers to a ˃90% assessed probability of occurrence (IPCC, 2011, p. 7). 
    
13
 In IPCC usage, it refers to:  
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atmosphere, as detailed in Figure 3 below. It has been scientifically established 
that carbon dioxide is the main anthropogenic
14
 greenhouse gas
15
 (GHG) and has 
seen its concentration in the atmosphere increase from a pre-industrial value of 
about 280 ppm
16
 to 379 ppm in 2005 (IPCC, 2007a, p. 2). In addition, the annual 
growth of carbon dioxide concentration was higher during the last ten years 
(1995–2005 average: 1.9 ppm per year), than it has been since direct atmospheric 
measurements began in the 1950s (1960–2005 average: 1.4 ppm per year) (IPCC, 
2007a, p. 2). 
                                                                                                                                                               
The influence of a factor that can cause climate change, such as 
greenhouse gas, [and] is often evaluated in terms of its radiative forcing. 
Radiative forcing is a measure of how the energy balance of the Earth-
atmosphere system is influenced when factors that affect climate are 
altered. The word radiative arises because these factors change the balance 
between incoming solar radiation and outgoing infrared radiation within 
the Earth’s atmosphere. This radiative balance controls the Earth’s surface 
temperature. The term forcing is used to indicate Earth’s radiative balance 
is being pushed away from its normal state. 
Radiative forcing is usually quantified as the ‘rate of energy 
change per unit area of the globe as measured at the top of the 
atmosphere’, and is expressed in units of ‘Watts per square meter’ . . . 
When radiative forcing from a factor or group of factors is evaluated as 
positive, the energy of the Earth-atmosphere system will ultimately 
increase, leading to a warming of the system. In contrast, for a negative 
radiative forcing, the energy will ultimately decrease, leading to a cooling 
of the system. Important challenges to for climate scientists are to identify 
all the factors that affect climate and the mechanisms by which they exert 
a forcing, to quantify the radiative forcing of each factor and to evaluate 
the total radiative forcing from the group of factors. (IPCC, 2007a, p. 136) 
 
14
 In IPCC usage, it refers to CO2 “resulting from or produced by human beings” 
(IPCC, 2007a, p. 941). 
 
15
 In IPCC usage, “greenhouse gases are those gaseous constituents of the 
atmosphere, both natural and anthropogenic, that absorb and emit radiation at 
specific wavelengths within the spectrum of thermal infrared radiation emitted by 
the Earth’s surface, the atmosphere itself, and by clouds” (IPCC, 2007a, p. 947). 
 
16
 In IPCC usage, “ppm (parts per million) or ppb (parts per billion, 1billion = 
1000 million) is the ratio of the number of greenhouse gas molecules to the total 
number of molecules of dry air. For example, 300 ppm means 300 molecules of a 
greenhouse gas per million of molecules of dry air” (IPCC, 2007a, p. 2). 
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Figure 3: Radiative forcing of climate between 1750 and 2005
17
. Adapted from 
Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis, by IPCC, 2007a, p. 136. 
It is clear from the figure above that, among the greenhouse gases, carbon 
dioxide has caused the largest forcing on the climate from 1750 to 2005. 
In fact, carbon dioxide emissions from the power generation sector alone 
account for 41% of global energy-related CO2 emissions, as the electricity 
production sector is highly energy intensive and has reached 4839 Mtoe in 2010, 
which represented two thirds more than the building sector and double the 
transportation sector for the same year (International Energy Agency [IEA], 2012, 
                                                          
17
 Per IPCC: 
Summary of the principal components of the radiative forcing of climate change. 
All these radiative forcings result from one or more factors that affect climate 
change and are associated with human activities or natural process . . . .The 
values represent the forcings in 2005 relative to the start of the industrial era 
(about 1750). Human activities cause significant changes in long-lived gases, 
ozone, water vapor, surface albedo, aerosols and contrails. The only increase in 
natural forcing of any significance between 1750 and 2005 occurred in solar 
irradiance. Positive forcings lead to warming of climate and negative forcings 
lead to a cooling. The thin black line attached to each colored bar represents the 
range of uncertainty for the respective value. (IPCC, 2007a, p. 136) 
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p. 351). In the Current Policies Scenario (a ‘business as usual’ scenario), CO2 
emissions from the power generation sector are expected to remain at the same 
level in the future
18
, as the share of fossil fuels (coal, oil and gas) in the power 
generation sector is expected to remain the dominant source of energy at 66% for 
the coming decades until 2035 (IEA, 2011, p. 188). 
Given the fact that the levels of GHG and CO2 are expected to continue 
rising, it will be necessary for the sake of this study to review the climate 
projections for the period between now and 2050, in order to determine the quality 
and magnitude of the pressure that could originate from the climate change issue 
at the landscape level and on the socio-technical regimes level. Answering this 
question will allow us to determine which transition pathway could originate from 
climate change pressure. Accordingly, the following sections will deal with the 
climate projections in the short-term as well as in the long-term. 
 
3.1.1.1. Near-term climate change expectations
19
 
Existing scientific knowledge does not allow for accurate predictions 
about future global or regional climates as “the innate behaviour of the climate 
system imposes limits on the ability to predict its evolution” (IPCC, 2013, p. 962). 
As a consequence, predictability studies have limitations intimately linked to the 
state of scientific knowledge and on the quality and number of variables used for 
representing the climate system. In the absence of major environmental accidents, 
such as volcanic eruptions or secular changes in total solar irradiance before 2035, 
                                                          
18
According to the International Energy Agency (IEA) definition, “The Current 
Policies Scenario embodies the effects of only those government policies and 
measures that had been enacted or adopted by mid-2012. Without implying that 
total inaction is probable, it does not take into account any possible, potential or 
even likely future policy actions” (IEA, 2012, p. 34). 
 
19
 According to the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (AR5): “Unless otherwise 
stated, ‘near-term’ change and the projected changes . . . are for the period 2016-
2035 relative to the reference period 1985-2005” (2013, p. 955). 
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it is likely
20
 that the Global Mean Surface Temperature (GMST)
21
 anomaly
22
 for 
the period 2016-2035, relative to the reference period of 1986-2005, will be in the 
range 0.3°C to 0.7°C (medium confidence)” (IPCC, 2013, p. 955). However, when 
compared to the mean of the period 1850-1900, it is more likely than not that the 
increase in the global mean surface air temperature will be more than 1°C 
(medium confidence) (IPCC, 2013, p. 955). As a consequence, we can assume that 
the climate change issue, at the landscape level, will continue to exercise a 
moderate but mounting pressure on governments globally, including the GCC 
governments in the short-term. However, can we exclude a climate accident, or an 
abrupt climate change
23
 taking place during this period? 
The factors that could lead to an abrupt climate change are the strength of 
the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC)
24
, an increase in CO2 
and/or methane (CH4) concentrations in the atmosphere as a result of permafrost 
thawing, and changes in the cryosphere, which is defined as a loss of sea ice  
(IPCC, 2013, pp. 70-71). However, “in general there is low confidence25 and little 
                                                          
20
 According to the IPCC (2013), the term likely refers to a probability of 66-
100% (p. 142). 
 
21
 According to the IPCC (2013), Global Mean Surface Temperature (GMST) is 
defined as: “An estimate of the global mean surface air temperature” (p. 1455). 
 
22
 According to the IPCC (2013), an anomaly is defined “as [a] departure from a 
climatology” (p. 1455). The term climatology is to be understood as “an estimate 
of mean climate” (IPCC, 2013, p. 967).  
 
23
 According to the IPCC AR5, abrupt climate change is defined “as a large-scale 
change in the climate system that takes place over a few decades or less, persists 
(or is anticipated to persist) for at least a few decades and causes substantial 
disruptions in human and natural systems” (2013, p. 70). 
 
24
 Meridional Overturning Circulation (MOC) is defined as:  
Meridional (north-south) overturning circulation in the ocean quantified by 
zonal (east-west) sums of mass transports in depth or density layers. In the 
North Atlantic, away from the subpolar regions, the MOC (which is in 
principle an observable quantity) is often identified with the thermohaline 
circulation (THC), which is a conceptual and incomplete interpretation. 
(IPCC, 2013, pp. 1457-1458) 
   
25
 According to the IPCC (2013), “Confidence in the validity of a finding, [is] 
based on the type, amount, quality, and consistency of evidence (e.g., data, 
mechanistic understanding, theory, models, expert judgment) and the degree of 
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consensus on the likelihood of such events over the 21
st
 century (IPCC, 2013, p. 
70). Consequently, we can assume that during the time frame of this research 
project—i.e., between now and 2050—there will be no disruptive change 
originating from the climate change factor at the landscape level which could lead 
to a technological substitution transition pathway as defined by Geels and Schot 
(2007) according to their proposed typology of transition pathways, as discussed 
in chapter 2. 
 
3.1.1.2. Long-term climate change expectations
26
 
 Beginning from the mid-21
st
 century, the projections regarding the 
evolution of the global mean temperature start to be more dependent on the 
scenario methodology as a result of the long-term framework of analysis and the 
uncertainty about the climate mitigation policies that will be implemented by 
governments globally. In this respect, it is projected that the “global mean 
temperature will continue to rise over the 21
st
 century under all the RCPs”27 
(IPCC, 2013, p. 90). Indeed, for the period between 2046-2065, relative to the 
1986-2005 period, the mean temperature increase will likely
28
 range between a 
minimum of 1°C to a maximum of 2°C; while during the period between 2081-
2100, relative to the 1986-2005 period, the mean temperature increase will likely 
range between a minimum of 0.3°C to 3.7°C (IPCC, 2013, p. 90). 
                                                                                                                                                               
agreement. Confidence is expressed qualitatively” (p. 139). For further details 
regarding the treatment of uncertainty in the IPCC AR5, please read pages 139 to 
142. 
 
26
 According to the IPCC AR5, long-term projections concern the period from the 
end of the 21
st
 century and beyond where “changes are expressed with respect to a 
baseline period of 1985-2005, unless otherwise stated” (2013, p. 1031). 
 
27
 RCP stands for Representative Concentration Pathway, defined as “scenarios 
that include time series of emissions and concentrations of the full suite of 
greenhouse gases and aerosols and chemically active gases, as well as land 
use/land cover” (Moss et al., 2008, as cited in IPCC, 2013, p. 1461). 
 
28
 According to the IPCC AR5 (2013), the term likely refers to a probability of 66-
100% (p. 142). 
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The increase of the global mean sea level (GMSL)
29
 will have a significant 
impact on human societies and especially on the human presence and activities on 
shores where the majority of the global population and economic activity is 
located. The 21
st
 century, especially its second half, will witness an increase in the 
GMSL as relative to the 1986-2005 period, that will likely range between 0.24 to 
0.30 meters during the period 2046-2065; while it is projected that it will likely 
increase between 0.40 to 0.63 during the period 2081-2100. 
The increase of the global mean sea level has likely lead to an increase of 
the magnitude of extreme high sea level events since 1970, as it was very obvious 
in the case of hurricane Katrina in 2005, where flooding of the city of New 
Orleans caused the death of at least 1833 persons (Knabb, Rhome, & Brown, 2005, 
p. 11), in addition to an estimated total damage cost of US$ 108 billion (Knabb et 
al., 2005, p. 13). As far as the future is concerned, “it is very likely30 that there will 
be a significant increase in the occurrence of sea level extremes and similarly to 
past observations, this increase will primarily be the result of an increase in mean 
sea level” (IPCC, 2013, p. 112).    
The increase in the global mean sea level is already being felt, and 
measures have been taken by advanced economies in a number of projects—
including in the UK with the Thames barrier; in the Netherlands with human-
made dikes, dams, and floodgates that protect the coast and inland from the sea; in 
Italy with the Mose project to protect the city of Venice from the rising sea level; 
and in the U.S. with the Great Wall of Louisiana to protect the coast of Louisiana 
from the rising sea level and from extreme storm surge. However, poor and 
developing countries, like Bangladesh and the Small Island States,
31
 are already 
                                                          
29
 According to the IPCC (2013),  “Sea level can change, both globally and locally 
due to (1) changes in the shape of the ocean basins, (2) a change in ocean volume 
as a result of a change in the mass of water in the ocean, and (3) changes in ocean 
volume as a result of changes in water density” (p. 1462). 
 
30
 According to the IPCC AR5 (2013), the term very likely refers to a probability 
of 90-100% (p. 142). 
 
31
 Organized within the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), these are 
composed of “a coalition of small islands and low-lying coastal countries that 
share similar development challenges and concerns about the environment, 
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feeling the impact of sea level rise and will be most affected by this phenomenon, 
as they lack the scientific and financial capacities to mitigate the already existing 
and future expected sea level rise.
32
  
As a consequence, we can assume that the pressure from the climate 
change issue at the landscape level, during the time frame of this study between 
now and 2050, will increase over time, potentially leading to a transformation 
transition pathway as described by Geels and Schot (2007). This pressure on 
global governments, including the GCC, can yet be described as moderate, as no 
legally binding international GHG reduction targets currently exist. The reasons 
for this will be discussed in the following section. 
 
3.1.2. Climate Change: A Central issue in the Global Agenda 
The choice of climate change as one of the main factors of the macro-level 
stems from its position as a global problem—with potential negative impact on 
worldwide economy, society, and security—requiring a global solution, and as 
such, climate change is a central issue in the international agenda. While global 
mitigation efforts remain slow, they are increasing worldwide and are expected to 
gain in speed as scientific evidence regarding anthropogenic responsibility in 
global warming accumulates. As a consequence, in recent years, climate change 
                                                                                                                                                               
especially their vulnerability to the adverse effects of global climate change. It 
functions primarily as an ad hoc lobby and negotiating voice for small island 
developing States (SIDS) within the United Nations system” (AOSIS, 2014, para. 
1). 
  
32
 In this respect, it is necessary to mention the following clarification regarding 
sea level rise as per the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report of Working Group II 
(AR4):  
Many coastal regions are already experiencing the effects of relative 
(local) sea-level rise, from a combination of climate-induced seal level 
rise, geological and anthropological-induced land subsidence, and other 
local factors. A major challenge, however, is to separate the different 
meteorological, oceanographic, geophysical and anthropogenic processes 
affecting the shoreline in order to identify and isolate the contribution of 
global warming. An unambiguous attribution of current sea-level rise as a 
primary driver of shoreline change is difficult to determine at present. 
(IPCC, 2007b, p. 92) 
  95 
has been integrated into the national security agenda of a number of countries that 
consider it a source of potential future instability and a security threat.  
In the United Kingdom’s 2008 National Security Strategy, climate change 
is described as “potentially the greatest challenge to global stability and security, 
and therefore to national security” (Cabinet Office, 2008, p. 18). This challenge is 
described in the following terms: 
Rising sea levels and disappearing ice will alter borders and open up new 
sea lanes, increasing the risk of territorial disputes. An increase in the 
frequency and intensity of extreme weather events—floods, droughts, 
storms—will generate more frequent and intense humanitarian crises, 
adding further stresses on local, national and international structures. 
Rising temperatures together with extreme weather will increase pressures 
on water supplies.” (Cabinet Office, 2008, p. 18) 
In France, the 2008 National Security White Paper clearly recognized 
climate change and its potential impacts as a source of national and international 
security threats (Blanc, 2008, pp. 25-26).  
In the U.S., the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) Military Advisory Board, 
a federally funded research center for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 
issued a report in 2007 under the title National Security and the Threat of Climate 
Change. In this report, former U.S. Chief of Staff Gordon Sullivan, drawing from 
his military experience, urges for immediate climate mitigation policies before it 
is too late, even without total certainty regarding the evaluation of climate change 
risk: 
We never have a 100 percent certainty. We never have it. If you wait until 
you have 100 percent certainty, something bad is going to happen on the 
battlefield. That’s something we know. You have to act with incomplete 
information. You have to act based on the trend line. (Center for Naval 
Analysis, 2007, p. 10) 
Moreover, since 2010, all Quadrennial Defense Reviews published by the 
U.S. Department of Defense have mentioned the potential security risk of climate 
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change and the necessity of understanding its implications on military operations 
and installations, especially coastal, which could be threatened by the rising sea 
levels. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review describes the security challenges 
posed by climate change in detail: 
Climate change poses another significant challenge for the United States 
and the world at large. As greenhouse gas emissions increase, sea levels 
are rising, average global temperatures are increasing, and severe weather 
patterns are accelerating. These changes coupled, with other global 
dynamics, including growing, urbanizing, more affluent population, and 
substantial economic growth in India, China, Brazil and other nations, will 
devastate homes, land and infrastructure. Climate change may exacerbate 
water scarcity and lead to sharp increases in food costs. The pressures 
caused by climate change will influence resource competition while 
placing additional burdens on economies, societies and governance 
institutions around the world. These effects are threat multiplier that will 
aggravate stressors abroad such as poverty, environmental degradation, 
political instability, and social tensions – conditions that can enable 
terrorist activity and other forms of violence. (U.S. Department of Defense, 
2014, p. 8) 
In the 2010 National Security Strategy of the U.S. White House, climate 
change is clearly defined as a danger to national and international security 
requiring action from the United States and the international community at large: 
The danger from climate change is real, urgent, and severe. The change 
wrought by a warming planet will lead to new conflicts over refugees and 
resources; new suffering from drought and famine; catastrophic natural 
disasters; and the degradation of land across the globe. The United States 
will therefore confront based upon clear guidance from the science, and in 
cooperation with all nations – for there is no effective solution to climate 
change that does not depend upon all nations taking responsibility for their 
own actions and for the planet we will leave behind. (White House, 2010, 
p. 47)  
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Climate change is now an integral part of the agenda of regional and 
international organizations. The European Union Commission published a 
Climate Action document that describes the actions the EU countries should take 
in order to reduce the GHG emissions and gradually transition to a low carbon 
economy. In this document, the EU urges the member countries to act quickly in 
order to adapt to climate change as “the cost of not adapting to climate change is 
estimated to reach at least €100 billion a year by 2020 for the European Union as 
a whole” (European Commission, 2013, p. 4). 
In Asia, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), very 
clearly identified climate change among other major “non-traditional security 
threats, such as terrorism, natural disasters, drug trafficking . . . and infectious 
diseases [that] are increasing in complexity and require enhanced cooperation 
among themselves as well as with ASEAN’s external partners” (2013, p. 4). 
In November 2009, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
published a special report titled Climate Change and Global Security, 
summarizing the debate within the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO 
Parliament Assembly, 2009). Climate change has already been an integral element 
of all NATO’s strategic concepts since at least 2010 (NATO, 2010, p. 13). In 
addition, in its Chicago Summit Declaration in May 2012, climate change was 
considered as a concern among other “environmental risks . . . that have the 
potential to significantly affect NATO planning and operations” (NATO, 2012, 
para. 53). 
The climate change issue is intimately linked to the sustainable 
development debate and requires the mobilization of the international community. 
According to the Secretary General of the United Nations (UN), climate change is 
“the defining issue of our time” (United Nations, 2011, para. 36) and a main 
component of his Five-Year Action Agenda (United Nations, 2012). During the 
last World Economic Forum at Davos in January 2014, the UN Secretary-General 
urged world leaders to intensify climate action ahead of the Climate Summit in 
New York in September 2014—convened to mobilize the international 
community toward reaching a global legal climate agreement by 2015, when the 
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UN Framework Convention on Climate Change will meet in Paris for COP21 
(United Nations, 2014, para. 1-3). 
In a resolution adopted during its 64
th
 session in December 2009, the UN 
General Assembly recognized “that climate change poses serious risks and 
challenges to all countries, particularly developing countries . . . and calls upon 
states to take urgent global action to address climate change in accordance with 
the principles identified in the Convention” (United Nations General Assembly, 
2009, p. 4).  
A statement of the UN Security Council in July 2011 recognized “that the 
possible adverse effects of climate change could, in the long run, aggravate certain 
existing threats to international peace and security” (United Nations Security 
Council, Department of Public Information, 2011, para. 1). Moreover, during the 
last World Economic Forum at Davos in January 2014, action on the climate 
change front was a major focus of the meeting (United Nations, 2014). 
In addition, and parallel to the international climate negotiation process 
under the umbrella of the UN, other international and regional initiatives have 
also been launched recently. Major initiatives in that respect include the European 
Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS), which is the world’s first and 
largest GHG cap and trade program. In addition, the EU has also launched a 
complementary measure represented by the “20-20-20” directive which requires 
reducing the overall EU’s GHG emissions by 20% and reaching a level of 20% of 
renewable energy consumption in the EU by 2020. During the Major Economies 
Meeting on Energy Security and Climate Change, launched by the United States 
in September 2007, the largest GHG emitters met to discuss a global response to 
climate change.
33
 In July 2005, the meeting of the Group of Eight (G8) nations, 
also known as the Gleneagles Leaders Summit, launched the Gleneagles Dialogue 
on Climate Change and discussed issues of finance and technology for dealing 
with climate change. In September 2007, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
                                                          
33
 The participants of the meeting included the United States, Australia, Brazil, 
Canada, the European Union, France, Germany, Indonesia, India, Italy, Japan, 
Mexico, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United 
Nations.  
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(APEC) Leaders Meeting in Sydney, Australia, agreed on an action plan that 
would reduce the energy intensity of their economies by at least 25% by 2030 
(with 2005 as the base year) and increase the forest cover of their region by at 
least 20 million hectares by 2020 (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, 2007, p. 
3). 
Many international organizations are also involved in climate change 
mitigation and/or adaptation efforts, among them UN agencies such as the World 
Bank Group (WBG), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, and other institutions including 
regional banks and the International Energy Agency (IEA).  
 
3.1.2.1. The evolving international framework for addressing climate 
change 
From a historical perspective, the international climate change 
negotiations can be divided into five major phases summarized in the following 
three periods: the first period, during which the climate change issue first emerged 
as a global issue, began with the First World Climate Conference in Geneva, 
Switzerland, in February 1979—an essentially scientific conference sponsored by 
the World Meteorological Organization (WMO). This period witnessed the 
organization of the 1988 Toronto conference, which placed the climate change 
agenda in the global policy agenda and saw the creation of the IPCC.  
The second period, spanning between 1991 and 2001, saw the 
establishment of the treaties and legal instruments of the climate change agenda. 
The main achievements of this period are the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992, the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, 
and the Marrakesh Accords in 2001.  
Finally, the current period beginning from 2002 until the present time has 
seen competition between the emerging group of BRICS
34
 on one side, and the 
rich industrialized nations on the other. In addition to the competition, both groups 
                                                          
34
 BRICS refers to Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. 
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have acted as two leaders of the international climate negotiations, but a 
leadership that has failed to reach an agreement on a post-2012 treaty as a result of 
their conflicting interpretations of the principle of “common but differentiated 
responsibility” regarding climate change. 
The following sections will analyze the historical development of the 
international climate negotiations, the international organizations involved in the 
negotiation process, the outcomes of these negotiations up to the present time, and 
their outlook within the future up to 2050 (the time frame of this thesis). The 
interest in the past, present, and future of the international climate negotiations 
logically derives from the requirements of a futures study. Indeed, this approach is 
necessary to determine the future potential pressures—originating from climate 
change—on the landscape level and on the socio-technical regimes level, and 
whether these pressures may trigger an energy transition in the power generation 
sector of the GCC countries.  
The section below will describe the UNFCCC with a focus on key steps of 
their process, before moving on to the Kyoto Protocol and the key steps of climate 
negotiations and their future outlook. 
 
3.1.2.1.1. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) was established in 1992, entered into force on the 21
st
 of March 1994, 
and has been ratified by 195 governments to date. The UNFCCC is a ‘Rio 
Convention’35 adopted at the ‘Rio Earth Summit’ in 1992, which provides the 
framework within which the international collaborative efforts take place in order 
to mitigate and adapt to climate change (United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change [UNFCCC], 2014a). The main objective of these efforts is to 
                                                          
35
 The sister ‘Rio Conventions’ of the UNFCCC are the UN Convention on 
Biological Diversity and the Convention to Combat Desertification (UNFCCC, 
2014b, para. 2).  
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achieve a global goal of “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference 
with the climate system
36” (UNFCCC, 1992, Article 2, p. 9). 
All the parties to the Convention have a commitment to report their 
mitigating efforts and policies in addition to their commitment to “formulate, 
implement, publish and regularly update national, and where appropriate, regional 
programs containing measures to mitigate climate change by addressing 
anthropogenic emissions” (UNFCCC, 1992, Article 4.1(b), p. 10). 
 According to the Convention, the allocation of the mitigation efforts is 
divided among Annex 1 and Annex II countries based on their commitments. 
Annex I countries include the industrialised members of the OECD (Organization 
for Economic Development and Cooperation) in 1992, as well as the economies in 
transition, and are required to extend more efforts on the “basis of equity and in 
accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities” and “developed country parties should take the lead in combatting 
climate change and the adverse effects thereof” (United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, 1992, Article 3.1, p. 9). Moreover, Annex I 
countries, in addition to other developed countries included in Annex II, also have 
the responsibility of providing for “new and additional financial resources to meet 
the agreed full costs incurred by developing country parties in complying with 
their obligations under Article 12, paragraph 1 . . . including for the transfer of 
technology needed by developing countries” (United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, 1992, Article 3.1, pp. 13-14). 
The international climate change negotiations are organized under the 
umbrella of the UNFCCC through the periodic United Nations Climate Change 
Conference or the Conference of the Parties (COP). The first Conference of the 
Parties (COP1) took place in Berlin from March 28 – April 7, 1995. The meetings 
of the COPs serve as a framework for assessing the progress made in dealing with 
climate change, in addition to negotiating an internationally binding agreement 
                                                          
36
 The climate system is defined in the UNFCCC convention as “the totality of the 
atmosphere, hydrosphere, biosphere and geosphere and their interactions” (United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992, Article 1, p. 7).  
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that would place limits on GHG emissions. Until now, the main achievement of 
the COPs meetings is the Kyoto Protocol, to be discussed in detail below. 
Nineteen COPs have taken place to date, with COP20 planned for December 2014 
in Peru, and COP21 planned for December 2015 in Paris. 
The following sections will review the main instruments and landmark 
steps of the international climate negotiations under the umbrella of the UNFCCC 
before discussing the future outlook of the international climate change 
negotiations. 
 
 3.1.2.1.2. The Kyoto Protocol 
The Kyoto Protocol is an international agreement adopted in Kyoto, Japan, 
on the 11
th
 of December 1997, at the third session of the Conference of the Parties 
(COP3) to the 1992 UNFCC. It entered into force on the 16
th
 of February 2005 
and includes 192 Parties
37
 to the Protocol, “which commits its Parties by setting 
international binding emission reduction targets” (UNFCC, 2014c, para. 1). The 
rules regarding the implementation of the Protocol were adopted during COP7 in 
Marrakesh in 2001 and are referred to as the “Marrakesh Accords,” (UNFCCC 
Conference of the Parties, 2002, FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add) with the first 
commitment period starting in 2008 and ending in 2012. In December 2012, the 
Kyoto Protocol was extended until the upcoming meeting in Paris in December 
2015, and the “Doha Amendment to the Protocol” (Kyoto Protocol, C.N.718.2012) 
was adopted.
38
 During the Durban Climate Change Conference in December 2011, 
                                                          
37
 The Parties include 191 countries in addition to the EU. As far as the countries 
are concerned, they include almost all UN members with the exception of 
Andorra, Canada, South Sudan and the United States. The United States signed 
the treaty but did not ratify it. 
 
38
 The Doha Amendments included: 
New commitments for Annex I Parties to the Kyoto Protocol who agreed 
to take on commitments in a second commitment period from 1 January 
2013 to December 2020; A revised list of greenhouse gases (GHG) to be 
reported on by Parties in the second commitment period; and, 
Amendments to several articles of the Kyoto Protocol which specifically 
referenced issues pertaining to the first commitment period and which 
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Canada officially notified the Secretary General of the United Nations of its 
decision to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol, a decision that became effective on 
the 15
th
 of December 2012. (Kyoto Protocol, C.N.796.2011)
39
 
According to Article 3 of the Protocol, quantified emission reduction 
targets are imposed on Annex I Parties in order to reduce the overall GHG 
emissions “by at least 5 per cent below 1990 levels in the commitment period 
2008 to 2012” (Kyoto Protocol, 1998, Article 3, p. 3.1). In order to give some 
flexibility to help countries reach their emission reductions targets, three market 
based mechanisms were introduced: International Emissions Permit Trading,
40
 the 
Clean Development Mechanism,
41
 and Joint Implementation.
42
 In order to be able 
                                                                                                                                                               
needed to be updated for the second commitment period. (UNFCCC, 
2014c, para. 5-7)  
 
39
 Please read the withdrawal notification: https://unfccc.int/files/kyoto_protocol/ 
background/application/pdf/canada.pdf.pdf 
 
40
 According to Article 17, the Kyoto Protocol “allows countries that have spare 
units to spare—emissions permitted to them but not used—to sell this excess 
capacity to countries that are over their limits” (UNFCCC, 2014d, para. 2). 
 
41
 The Clean Development Mechanism: 
Allows emission-reduction projects in developing countries [Parties not 
included in Annex I] to earn certified emission reduction (CER) credits, 
each equivalent to one tonne of CO2. These CERs can be traded and sold, 
and used by industrialized countries to meet a part of their emission 
reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol. The mechanism stimulates 
sustainable development and emission reductions, while giving 
industrialized countries some flexibility in how they meet their emission 
reduction limitation targets. The CDM is the main source of income for 
the UNFCC Adaptation Fund, which was established to finance adaptation 
programmes in developing country Parties to the Kyoto Protocol that are 
particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. The 
Adaptation Fund is financed by a 2% levy on CERs issues by the CDM. 
(UNFCCC, 2014e, para. 1-3).  
For more details, please read Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, page 11. 
 
42
 According to Article 6, the Kyoto Protocol: 
Allows a country with an emission reduction or limitation commitment 
under the Kyoto Protocol (Annex B Party) to earn emission reduction units 
(ERUs) from an emission-reduction or emission removal project in 
another Annex B Party, each equivalent of one tonne of CO2, which can be 
counted towards meeting its Kyoto target. Joint Implementation offers 
Parties a flexible and cost-efficient means of fulfilling a part of their 
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to account and follow the emission targets of the Parties, the Kyoto Protocol has 
established a Compliance Committee
43
 in addition to specific rules concerning the 
accounting and reporting of emissions. 
 
3.1.2.1.3. The Bali Road Map 
In December 2007, the “Bali Action Plan” was adopted at the13th 
Conference of the Parties (COP13), and the Third Meeting of the Parties. The 
adopted document launched the negotiation process regarding the succession to 
the first Kyoto commitment period post-2012 that was supposed to be signed at 
the 15
th
 Conference of the Parties in Copenhagen in December 2009. The “Bali 
Action Plan” consisted of “a set of forward looking decisions that represent the 
work that needs to be done under various negotiation ‘tracks’ that is essential for 
reaching a secure climate future” (UNFCCC, 2014g, para. 1). In addition to 
agreeing on a second commitment period post 2012, the Protocol track is also 
meant to achieve an agreement on quantified reduction targets for UNFCCC 
Annex I Parties. In the history of climate change negotiations, the Bali meeting 
represents a major landmark, as it is at this meeting that the U.S. “has moved from 
a position of climate denial a few years ago to participation in an international 
dialogue on tackling climate change” (Ott, Sterk, & Watanabe, 2008, p. 93).  
 
3.1.2.1.4. COP15, the Copenhagen set back 
Initially, the objective of the COP15 meeting at Copenhagen in December 
2009 was to sign a new treaty in order to replace the Kyoto Protocol by a new 
climate treaty for a second period of commitment post-2012. However, as a result 
of divergent views between developed and industrialized countries regarding the 
                                                                                                                                                               
commitments, while the host Party benefits from foreign investment and 
technology transfer. (UNFCCC, 2014f, para. 1-2) 
 
43
 For more information regarding the Compliance Committee please go to: 
https://unfccc.int/bodies/body/6432.php 
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principle of “common but differentiated responsibility” 44  (UNFCCC, 1992, 
Article 3.1, p. 9), which is a key principle of climate change negotiations, COP15 
failed to reach its initially declared objective, despite the wave of optimism during 
the build-up phase of the meeting. The final agreement was reached following last 
minute intense negotiations between the U.S., Brazil, China, India, and South 
Africa. Many countries were upset by their exclusion from the negotiations and 
decided not to support it. This was the case for Kuwait, which objected to the 
agreement reached at the end of the conference (State of Kuwait, Environment 
Public Authority, 2010) and as a consequence, the agreement had no legal 
standing under the UN convention, with the participating countries merely 
recognizing its existence but without necessarily supporting it. 
 
3.1.2.1.5. Doha COP18: The GCC on the climate regime map 
The significance of COP18 lies in the fact that it took place, for the first 
time, in a country that is an Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) member, and more specifically in a GCC country. This is another 
                                                          
44
 According to Rajamani, 
The principle of common but differentiated responsibility brings together 
several strands of thought. First, it establishes unequivocally the common 
responsibility of States to protect the global environment. Next, it builds 
on the acknowledgement by the industrial countries that they bear the 
primary responsibility for creating climate change by taking into account 
the historical (rather than future) contributions of States to climate change 
by determining their responsibility under the regime. In doing so it 
recognizes broad distinctions between States, whether on the basis of 
economic development, natural vulnaribility or consumption levels. The 
principle proceeds to cast emphasis on the ability of States to respond to 
the environmental crisis at hand and ‘accordingly’ carves out a leadership 
role for industrialized countries within the climate regime. (Rajamani, 
2000, p. 121) 
In other words, according to this principle, it is acknowledged that 
industrialized nations have a historical responsibility in most of the GHG 
emissions that are causing climate change, that the emissions from the developing 
countries are likely to rise in order to meet their developmental needs; and as a 
consequence, while the goal of limiting the GHG is the same the means and the 
burden on each side in order to tackle climate change are different. 
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indicator of the recent interest of the GCC countries in the international climate 
debate, in an attempt to change their image as countries that are blocking or 
slowing down advancements in the climate change negotiations. This interest 
could also be explained by the fact that the GCC countries have made the strategic 
choice to be active members of the international climate negotiations process in 
order to influence it and be in a better position to defend their interests. In this 
respect, it is noteworthy that during COP18, a number of GCC countries took a 
very important step, as Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE submitted a 
note in which they informed the Parties of the conference of their “readiness . . . 
to put forward their current actions and plans in pursuit of economic 
diversification that have co-benefits in the form of emissions reductions, 
adaptation to the impacts of climate change and response measures” (UNFCCC, 
2014h, Economic Diversification Initiative section, para. 1). This is, again, 
another significant development within the framework of the new climate 
diplomacy most of the GCC countries have adopted in the past few years.  
  The UNFCCC COP18 meeting at Doha, Qatar, in December 2012, 
adopted the Doha Amendment to the Protocol (Kyoto Protocol, C.N.718.2012) 
and confirmed the pledge taken at the COP17 meeting at Durban, South Africa, in 
December 2011. This pledge officially launched a process to conceive “another 
legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force applicable to all countries” 
concerning global climate change mitigation policies, which should be completed 
by 2015 for the post-2020 period (IEA, 2012, p. 242). 
 
3.1.2.1.6. A critical review of the climate negotiations: An international 
relations perspective 
Grounded on the past evolution of international climate negotiations, it is 
now necessary to question the future course of these negotiations. Are we heading 
towards more binding international obligations, or are we going to witness a 
continuation in the existing debate and conflict between developed and 
developing economies regarding the responsibility of each side in global warming 
and how to share the burden? The answer to this question will determine whether 
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there will be a mounting international pressure on developed and developing 
countries, including the GCC, to reduce their GHG emissions and engage in an 
energy transition by diversifying their energy mix away from the fossil fuels. 
The most recent scientific findings “plainly indicate that global emissions 
must peak as soon as possible and then decline as rapidly as possible to avoid 
potentially catastrophic impacts on the climate system” (Mace, 2010, p. 231). As 
rightly said by Ed Miliband in a speech delivered at the London School of 
Economics in November 2009, “The world requires a comprehensive agreement 
that is consistent with the science and the need to limit climate change to no more 
than 2 degrees of warming . . . that means a deal which will ensure that global 
emissions will peak by 2020 at the latest” (Miliband, 2011, p. 194). There is 
therefore, an urgent necessity to reach a post-Kyoto global treaty that will include 
binding measures; however, despite this global necessity, the question remains 
whether this objective will be achieved and to what extent respected and 
implemented its Parties. In this respect, it is necessary to recall that the 
conferences of Copenhagen, Cancun, and Durban have failed to produce a new 
legally binding treaty despite the repeated pledge to achieve this objective at every 
meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP). This present incapacity to move 
forward undermines the ability of the existing multilateral negotiation framework 
to achieve the long sought objective of avoiding an increase of the global 
temperature above 2 degrees in a timely and effective manner.  
There are, indeed, serious doubts regarding the possibility of agreeing on a 
new post-Kyoto Protocol “because it requires the impossible: consensus decision-
making by 194 parties on every line of a complex and lengthy treaty” (Eckersley, 
2012, p. 24), in addition to the North-South deadlock regarding the 
implementation of the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility. 
Since the early stages of international climate negotiations, the focus has been on 
an approach that favors the global deal strategy in order to achieve a 
comprehensive treaty with binding commitments on mitigation and adaptation 
funding—a strategy based on five main elements, and:  
 It prescribes, in a top-down way, generally applicable policies that are 
based on commonly understood principles; 
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 It strives to develop targets and instruments of climate governance 
(regarding mitigation measures, carbon sinks, adaptation efforts) in a 
comprehensive manner; 
 It is intended to be universal in its application, applying to all countries 
according to agreed principles of burden-sharing; 
 It is universal in its negotiation and decision-making process, being 
based on the primacy of the UN framework; and 
 It seeks to establish legally binding international obligations. (Falkner, 
Stephan, & Vogler, 2011, p. 204) 
The global deal strategy finds its origin in the established model of 
environmental regime-building since the 1970s, which has dealt with 
environmental issues “in a compartmentalized way by negotiating issue-specific 
treaties and building institutions around them” (Susskind 1994, as cited in Falkner, 
Stephan & Vogler, 2011, p. 204), and has proven to be successful on a growing 
and significant number of issues reaching over a thousand environmental treaties 
today (International Environmental Agreements Database Project, 2014). The 
most prominent example of this successful strategy, and the model for climate 
diplomacy, is the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, 
with its attached Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer 
adopted in September 1987 (Parson, 2003, as cited in Falkner, Stephan & Vogler, 
2011, p. 204). 
It is by building on this successful trend that the international climate 
change negotiations were launched with the establishment of the UNFCCC at the 
Rio Earth Summit in 1992, despite the fact that “climate change was widely 
recognized to pose a more complex and costlier challenge than ozone depletion, 
and early on there was some debate about a universal approach versus regional or 
sectoral ones” (Nitze 1990, as cited in Falkner, Stephan & Vogler, 2011, p. 205). 
Despite the absence of binding commitments, as a result of the U.S. opposition, 
the Convention did establish the norm regarding the issues of global stabilization 
and the principle of  ‘common but differentiated responsibility,’ paving the way 
for the establishment of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. However, comparative to the 
Montreal Protocol, the Kyoto Protocol was limited in scope, did not extend to 
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developing countries, and the United States failed to ratify the deal, despite the 
fact that they initially signed it, which has seriously undermined the long term 
course of the Protocol. 
The Kyoto Protocol has been successful in establishing the first climate 
agreement that included quantitative emission targets, in addition to introducing 
innovative market based mechanisms for achieving the mitigation objective in a 
cost-effective manner such as the International Emissions Permit Trading, the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), and Joint Implementation. However, it 
also suffered from a number of built-in shortcomings as a consequence of the 
necessary compromises that had to be done in order for the Protocol to be adopted. 
These compromises can be summarized in the following points: First, based on 
the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibility and respective 
capabilities,’ all developing countries were exempted from emission targets 
obligations, which has greatly contributed toward creating a sharp dividing line 
between Annex I and non-Annex I countries, and without questioning or putting 
in place a mechanism that would ultimately include in the future the developing 
countries—whose emissions are growing—into the global mitigation efforts. 
Second, as a consequence of the first point, the U.S., the largest GHG emitters at 
that time, has refused to ratify the Protocol, which has greatly reduced the 
effectiveness of the mitigation efforts and has discouraged other industrialized 
countries from taking the economic and political burden without the participation 
of the U.S. Third, the Kyoto Protocol suffered from design shortcomings that 
included the “the short-term nature of its emission targets, the ability of countries 
to withdraw from the agreement and a weak compliance system” (Falkner, 
Stephan & Vogler, 2011, p. 208). For this reason, the Copenhagen Conference of 
the Parties (COP15) in December 2009 attempted to deliver a new compromise 
that would include all the major emitters in Annex I and non-Annex I countries—
but without success. 
Obviously, there is a very clear lack of political will from the major 
emitters, which represents a serious obstacle for moving forward with the 
international climate negotiations. The reasons behind this lack are found in 
domestic pressures, as well as the in the consequences of the changing global 
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political economy. Indeed, the United States lacks the necessary domestic support 
for accepting any international climate change commitments, despite agreeing and 
ratifying the UNFCCC, because of the entailing cost and a fear of negative 
impacts on the competitiveness of its economy, especially if developing countries 
such as China, India, or Brazil are exempted from any emission targets 
commitments—which brings to the discussion the changing global political 
economy factor. Indeed, since the signature of the Convention in 1992, the world 
has witnessed a structural shift in the international political economy with the 
emergence of new economic powers, especially in Asia, that are becoming large 
GHG emitters as a result of their rapid economic growth. This has brought about a 
significant change in the map of global emissions, with China becoming the 
largest CO2 emitter, ahead of the U.S.,
45
 in 2007 (Falkner, Stephan & Vogler, 
2011, p. 211). This structural shift is a major argument used by the U.S. and a 
number of industrialized countries in order to call for the participation of the 
emerging economies in the global emissions commitments, and one of the main 
reasons for the successive failures since Copenhagen in achieving a new post-
2020 treaty. 
Given that the global deal strategy has reached its limitations, it is 
therefore necessary to question whether alternatives are available to climate 
change negotiators and in which direction the international climate negotiations 
will be heading in the future, especially within the time frame of this research 
project—i.e., between now and 2050. Is the climate change agenda heading 
towards a new legally binding global post-2020 treaty that will include emissions 
targets commitments on all the major emitters? Or is it moving towards increased 
national and regional initiatives—with the risk that this approach, even if proven 
more effective from a practical perspective, will not reach the long sought 
objective of less than two degrees increase of the global temperature?  
In this respect, it is worth noting that when looking at the developments on 
the front of national climate mitigation policies and strategies, an argument exists 
for the national and regional approach. Indeed, based on the findings of a survey 
                                                          
45
 However, it should be noted that the U.S. is still the largest CO2 emitters per 
capita. 
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study covering almost all United Nations countries between 2007 and 2012, three 
main conclusions have emerged: First, during this time frame, there has been an 
increase in climate legislation and strategies, as 67% of GHG global emissions are 
now under national climate legislation or strategy, compared to 45% in 2007; 
second, most of the increase took place in non-Annex I countries and mainly in 
Asia and Latin America; and third, there is a significant global trend in the 
number of countries that are adopting climate mitigation policies, rising from 23% 
in 2007 to 39% in 2012, which is equivalent to an increase in the percentage of 
the global population from 36% in 2007 to 73%. The increase in climate 
mitigation and strategy is significant and expected to continue expanding despite 
the very slow pace of the international climate change negotiation process. In this 
respect, an increase in national and regional negotiations and non-binding climate 
legislation has been observed, as opposed to international climate negotiations and 
binding legislation (Dubash, Hagemann, Höhne, & Upadhyaya, 2013). 
It is in this context that “the George W. Bush administration explicitly set 
up the Major Economies Meeting in 2007 as an alternative forum for discussing 
and coordinating climate change issues within a select group of major emitters” 
(Terhalle & Depledge, 2013, p. 578), which was rebranded in 2009 by President 
Obama as the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate (MEF). Since 
Copenhagen, the U.S. has repeatedly shown its frustration with the UN-based 
climate negotiations and its intention to move its focus on other arenas on the 
model of the MEF (Goldenberg & Vidal, 2010; Nelsen, 2012, as cited in Terhalle 
& Depledge, 2013, p. 578). On the other side, even if China, similarly to the U.S., 
has resisted being drawn into a deeper institutionalization of the climate change 
issue, “it remains, however, a strong supporter of the UN, and notably the climate 
change regime, as the only legitimate forum for taking international action on the 
issue” (Terhalle & Depledge, 2013, p. 578). 
From a theoretical perspective, it is worth mentioning that the 
institutionalization tendency is referred to as the theory of ‘institutional 
enmeshment’, which is a theoretical framework in international relations aimed to 
conceptualize a “process of engaging with a state so as to draw it into deep 
involvement into international and regional society, enveloping it in a web of 
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sustained exchanges and relationships, with the long term goal of integration” 
(Goh, 2007, as cited in Terhalle & Depledge, 2013, p. 576). From this theoretical 
framework, both the U.S. and China have constantly insisted that a greater 
enmeshment from their side will depend on that of the other side as 
the U.S. has consistently claimed, for economic reasons, that it will not 
sign up to legally binding commitments that do not apply to other ‘major 
emitters’ (i.e., China) . . . [and on the other side] China is well versed in 
the refrain that developed countries (i.e., the US) bear the most 
responsibility for the cumulative emissions in the atmosphere, and thus 
must take the lead in addressing the problem before developing countries 
(i.e., China itself) take on stronger obligations.  (Terhalle & Depledge, 
2013, pp. 578-579) 
There is no doubt that the failure to reach a globally legally binding 
climate treaty is not only due to the complexity of the issue, but also to a change 
in the balance of power since the nineties “and of diverging normative world 
views [between developed and developing countries]” (Terhalle & Depledge, 
2013, p. 583). Despite the increase in domestic legislation and measures in the 
U.S. and China to limit their GHG emissions and the recent wave of optimism 
(Jacobs, 2014), it is very difficult to imagine how the objective of signing a 
legally global binding climate regime that would include clear emissions 
commitments with an efficient enforcement mechanism, could be achieved in the 
forthcoming COP21 in Paris in December 2015, in the absence of an agreement 
between the major emitters (especially the U.S. and China) on a new international 
relations order. 
Therefore, it is assumed for the sake of this research that the international 
climate negotiations will continue evolving slowly before they can eventually 
achieve a post-Kyoto agreement that would be enforced between 2020 and 2025, 
in conjunction with an increase in national legislation and measures in order to 
reduce the GHG emissions, and regional non-binding climate mitigation 
commitments. As a result, as we have already concluded in this chapter in the 
section dedicated to climate change science, it is reasonable to assume that the 
pressure that will originate from the climate change issue at the landscape level, 
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on the regimes level, will be a moderate pressure in the mid-term, and could 
become much stronger in the long-term (2020 and 2025), leading to a 
transformation transition pathway as described by Geels and Schot (2007). 
 
3.1.3. The GCC and Climate Change: A Gradual and Sustained 
Involvement 
As we have already seen in the previous sections, climate change is 
definitely an integral issue of the global agenda, and as such, the GCC countries 
have been exposed to climate change as an emerging and growing external 
pressure on their political economy as well as on their energy consumption 
patterns. Indeed, they are considered among the countries with the highest per 
capita carbon emissions with Qatar, the UAE, and Kuwait, holding the first three 
positions in the 2012 WWF/Ecological Footprint report, which is a very good 
indicator of the severity of the situation in the GCC region, especially when the 
data shows that carbon emissions represent the bulk of their total per/capita 
emissions (WWF, 2012, p. 43). This status is a very clear indicator of the 
unsustainable model of development in the GCC countries, which is related to the 
central role of oil in their political economy, in addition to geographic and 
climatic factors that generate very high levels of demand for air conditioning and 
water from desalination plants. 
The following sections will deal first with the potential impacts of climate 
change on the GCC countries, before moving on to the GCC response to the 
international climate regime negotiations and the level of their interest in them. 
 
3.1.3.1. Adverse climate change impact on GCC countries 
The GCC region will not be immune from the predicted dangerous 
consequences of climate change on their environment, societies and economies. 
Indeed, rising sea levels will have an immediate impact on the coast where the 
majority of the GCC populations and industrial infrastructures are located, 
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including the desalination plants that provide the bulk of water needs of the region. 
In this respect, Bahrain alone could potentially lose up to 15 kilometers of 
coastline (Raouf, 2008, p.4). Furthermore, rising sea levels will also increase the 
salinity of underground water and consequently the water stress in the region. 
Rising temperatures will also increase the demand on desalinated fresh water and 
add another pressure on already very scarce water resources, in addition to an 
increased demand for air conditioning, which in turn will increase their energy 
consumption and put more pressure on their available and limited oil and gas 
reserves. 
Indeed, according to the findings of a study that has assessed the critical 
impact elements (land, population, agriculture, urban extent, wetlands and GDP) 
of a 1 meter sea level rise that is expected to occur by the end of this century on 
84 developing countries, including the GCC, Qatar, and the UAE, count among 
the 10 most impacted on several critical elements, as shown in Table 2 below: 
Table 2 
Top 10 Most Impacted Countries With a 1-M Sea Level Rise 
 
Note: Percentage impact in parenthesis. Adapted from Dasgupta et al., 2009, p. 
385. 
In the case of a scenario with a 1 meter sea level rise, we can clearly see 
from Table 2 that regarding the impact on land area, Qatar is in the third position 
with a potential loss estimated at 2.70% of its land area; regarding the impact on 
population, the UAE is at the eight position with a potential impact that will affect 
4.59% of its population; regarding the impact on urban areas, the UAE is on the 
seventh position with a potential impact that will affect 4.80% of its urban areas; 
and finally, regarding the impact on wetlands, Qatar is at the 4
th
 position with a 
potential impact that will affect 21.76% of its wetlands. Based on the most recent 
scientific findings, as already explained in the section dedicated to the climate 
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change issue in this chapter, thermal expansion and deglaciation would continue 
to raise the sea level even if the GHG emissions were stabilized in the near future 
(Dasgupta et al., 2009, p. 387).  
 Bahrain is a small island state where most of the unban and economic 
infrastructure is located on the coast line with very limited capacity to adapt to sea 
level rise, as most of the coastal areas “do not exceed 5 meters above current main 
sea level and it will be physically and economically difficult, if not impossible, to 
establish zoning setbacks for new development or for marine habitats to migrate 
toward higher land elevation” (Kingdom of Bahrain Public Commission for the 
Protection of Marine Resources, Environment and Wildlife, 2012, p. 23).  
Table 3  
Long-term Inundation Scenarios for Bahrain up to 2050
46
 
Note: Adapted from Bahrain’s Second National Communication Under the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, by Kingdom of 
Bahrain Public Commission for the Protection of Marine Resources, Environment 
and Wildlife, 2012, p, 25. 
As very clearly shown in the table above, Bahrain will be severely 
impacted by sea level rise in all the scenarios, with the prospect of losing 11% of 
its total land area by 2050 in case of the no accelerated deglaciation or low 
                                                          
46
 The results in the table are based on the Geographic Information Systems (GIS) 
mapping analysis. The values represent projected impact of permanent 
submergence of low-lying lands on the main islands of the Kingdom of Bahrain as 
associated with the three sea level rise scenarios, disaggregated by land use type. 
Percentages in the rows corresponding to the eight land use types refer to the 
share inundated for those land types. 
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deglaciation scenarios, which considered a sea level rise of only 0.3 metre by 
2050. In terms of land use type, this scenario will lead to a loss of 5% of its built 
up area and 17% of its industrial infrastructure. 
In the case of an extreme deglaciation scenario, with a 1 metre sea level 
rise, Bahrain faces the prospect of losing 27% of its total land up to 2050, which 
represents 22% of its built up area and 63% of its industrial infrastructure.  
 It is worth noting that these scenarios conform to the long-term projections 
of the IPCC AR5, as discussed above in this chapter in the section dealing with 
the long-term sea rise expectations. 
 Rising sea levels will also increase the vulnerability of ground water and 
the aquifers of Bahrain and the GCC countries as a whole (Kingdom of Bahrain 
Public Commission for the Protection of Marine Resources, Environment and 
Wildlife, 2012, p. 33). 
Temperature projections in Kuwait expect that it will continue to rise from 
the current annual average of 26.1°C (according to 2010 figures) (State of Kuwait, 
Environment Public Authority, 2012, p. 28), to an annual average of 28.7°C 
during the 2010-2035 period (State of Kuwait, Environment Public Authority, 
2012, p. 30). During the month of July, the temperatures are expected to rise in 
most of the Arabian Peninsula and to reach an average above 36°C by 2050 (State 
of Kuwait, Environment Public Authority, 2012, p. 30). There are no doubts that 
the rising temperatures will increase electricity consumption and aggravate the 
water stress in the region. 
The coastline of Kuwait spans over 350 km and is where most of the population 
and critical infrastructure is located (Al-Bakri and Kittaneh, 1998, as cited in State 
of Kuwait, Environment Public Authority, 2012, p. 31). As a consequence, 
the climate change induced sea level rise could lead to serious adverse 
impacts on future socioeconomic development . . . [as] [t]here is ample 
evidence from the international research literature that rising seas will 
likely flood low-lying urban infrastructure, threaten coastal lagoons and 
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salt marshes, and contribute to the deterioration of groundwater quality”. 
(State of Kuwait, Environment Public Authority, 2012, p. 31-32) 
Indeed, according to sea level rise scenarios ranging from 0.5 and 2 meters, 
Kuwait would lose between 1.4% and 3% of its total land area, which would 
impact between 1.8% to 4.8% of the population (State of Kuwait, Environment 
Public Authority, 2012, p. 37). 
 Regarding the Sultanate of Oman, according to future projections, 
temperature is expected to increase by a range between 1°C and 2°C during the 
period between 2011 and 2040, and by a range of 2°C to 3°C during the period 
between 2041 and 2070 (Sultanate of Oman, Ministry of Environment & Climate 
Affairs, 2013, p. 54). 
 According to the latest findings, the Sultanate of Oman is highly 
vulnerable to rising sea levels, as it is estimated that “nearly 400 km2 of total land 
area is projected to be inundated under the smallest sea level rise . . . and over 900 
km2 [under the highest sea level rise scenario]” (Sultanate of Oman, Ministry of 
Environment & Climate Affairs, 2013, p. 57), which will claim between 3% and 4% 
or rare arable land, but without affecting the urban and industrial areas (Sultanate 
of Oman, Ministry of Environment & Climate Affairs, 2013, p. 58). 
 Coming to the case of Saudi Arabia, as a consequence of sea level rise and 
based on the IPCC scenarios, “biophysical impacts were identified [such] as salt 
water intrusion, coral reef bleaching, and costal inundation and erosion” 
(Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Presidency of Meteorology and Environment, 2011, p. 
93), which could have adverse effects on water supply and agriculture (Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia Presidency of Meteorology and Environment, 2011, p. 102). 
Concerning temperature trends, results from running a General Climate Model 
(GCM) have shown that by the year 2041, general warming in Saudi Arabia will 
be higher than the global average (Darfaoui & Al Assiri, 2010, p. 1). 
 As a consequence, climate change is now a reality the GCC countries will 
have to deal with, as there is an urgent necessity for their involvement in the 
climate regime. Even public opinion regarding climate change has changed; 
according to a survey conducted in 2008 in 128 countries by the Gallup poll, “49% 
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of the surveyed individuals in Saudi Arabia were aware of climate change and 40% 
perceived it as a threat to their country” (Darfaoui & Al Assiri, 2010, p. 2). 
 
 3.1.3.2. The GCC and the international climate regime 
Since the beginning of the 21
st
 century, GCC countries have started to 
show more interest in climate change and the international negotiations related to 
it, as it becomes increasingly clear that they will face an increasing pressure that 
“would come in two main forms: through changing international energy demand 
patterns and policies, and through the politics of the international climate regime” 
(Luomi, 2012, p. 47). As a first indicator of this emerging interest in the 
international climate regime negotiations, all the GCC countries are now parties to 
the UNFCCC Convention in their quality of non-Annex I countries
47
 in addition 
to the Kyoto Protocol, which they have all ratified in the past few years as shown 
in Table 4 below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
47
 According to the UNFCC Convention:  
Non-Annex I parties are mostly developing countries. Certain groups of 
developing countries are recognized by the convention as being especially 
vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change, including countries 
with low-lying coastal areas and those prone to desertification and 
drought. Others (such as countries that rely heavily on income from fossil 
fuel production and commerce) feel more vulnerable to the potential 
economic impacts of climate change response measures. The convention 
emphasizes activities that promise to answer the special needs and 
concerns of these vulnerable countries, such as investment, insurance and 
technology transfer. (UNFCCC, 2014i, para. 4) 
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Table 4 
Status of Accession of GCC to UNFCC and Kyoto Protocol 
Country UNFCC KYOTO PROTOCOL 
Bahrain 
Ratified in December 
1994 
Ratified in January 2006 
Kuwait 
Ratified in December 
1994 
Ratified in March 2005 
Oman 
Ratified in February 
1995 
Ratified in January 2005 
Qatar Ratified in April 1996 Ratified in January 2005 
Saudi Arabia 
Ratified in December 
1994 
Ratified in January 2005 
United Arab Emirates 
Ratified in December 
1995 
Ratified in January 2005 
Note: Adapted from  “Status of Ratification of the Convention”, by UNFCC, 
2014j (treated by the author).  
As shown in Table 4 above, all GCC countries have ratified the UFCC 
Convention and the Kyoto Protocol as well as established a Designated National 
Authority (DNA) (UNFCCC, 2014k) the organization that is granted the authority 
by a country party to the Kyoto Protocol in order to authorize and approve 
participation in Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects. Another 
indicator of the GCC interest in the climate regime is their involvement in CDM 
projects as shown in Table 5: 
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Table 5 
Clean Development Mechanism Projects in the GCC 
COUNTRIES REGISTERED CDM PROJECTS 
BAHRAIN No CDM projects registered to date. 
KUWAIT Central Gas Utilization Project (CGUP), in Al Wafra, the 
neutral zone. Recovery and utilization of gas from oil wells that 
would otherwise be flared or vented. The Project Design 
Description has been submitted in August 2012.   
OMAN Oman Waste Water Services Company (OWSC), in Muscat 
governorate. Sludge management in order to avoid dumping. 
Applied for the project in January 2013. 
QATAR Al Shaheen oil field gas recovery and utilization project. In 
effect as of July 2004. 
SAUDI 
ARABIA 
North Park Building solar power plant project, 10.5 MW 
photovoltaic plant project in Dhahran. In effect as of December 
2006. 
UAE Abu Dhabi Future Energy Company (ADFEC), 100 MW Abu 
Dhabi solar thermal power plant project in Madinat Zayed. In 
effect as of July 2006. 
ADFEC, 10 MW solar power plant project in Masdar City. In 
effect as of December 2006. 
Abu Dhabi Gas Industries (GASCO), Implementing energy 
efficiency measures to reduce fuel gas consumption at GASCO. 
In effect as of 22
nd
 of December 2006. 
Dubai Electricity and Water Authority (DEWA), 10 MW 
photovoltaic plant project in Dubai. In effect as of December 
2006. 
Dubai Aluminum (DUBAL), emission reduction project at 
DUBAL. In effect as of July 2006. 
Note: Adapted from “Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)”, by UNFCC, 
2014l (treated by the author). 
To date, with the exception of Bahrain, all GCC countries have either 
submitted a CDM project (Kuwait) or are already the execution phase of the 
project, which is a very clear indication of the engagement of GCC countries in 
climate mitigation policies and actions. In addition, it also shows their interest in 
taking advantage of the financial and technological benefits of CDM projects. In 
this respect, it is worth noting that in 2011, Saudi Arabia was among the winners 
of the 2011 DNA Communicators of the Year Showcase, with Spain, Côte 
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d’Ivoire, and Columbia, in recognition of the work of their respective DNAs in 
promoting the CDM in their countries (UNFCCC, 2014m). 
 Another indicator of the growing GCC interest and involvement in the 
international climate regime can be found in the fulfillment of their UNFCCC 
obligations by submitting National Communication Reports. These reports review 
the scientific findings regarding climate change in each respective countries, as 
well as the measures and policies taken in order to mitigate the impact of climate 
change. 
 After Bahrain’s ratification of the UNFCCC convention in 1994, as a party 
to the Convention and in fulfillment of its obligations, Bahrain submitted two 
National Communication reports reviewing the state of scientific findings 
regarding climate change in Bahrain and the measures being undertaken. The 
Initial National Communication was presented in March 2005 (Kingdom of 
Bahrain General Commission for the Protection of Marine Resources, 
Environment and Wildlife, 2005), and the Second National Communication in 
February 2012 (Kingdom of Bahrain Public Commission for the Protection of 
Marine Resources, Environment and Wildlife, 2012). 
 Kuwait submitted its one and only Initial National Communication (State 
of Kuwait, Environment Public Authority, 2012) to the Conference of the Parties 
under its UNFCCC Convention obligations in November 2012. In October 2013, 
Oman submitted its first and only Initial National Communication to the 
Conference of the Parties under its UNFCCC Convention obligations (Sultanate 
of Oman Ministry of Environment & Climate Affairs, 2013). Qatar submitted its 
first and only Initial National Communication to the Conference of the Parties 
under its UNFCCC Convention obligations in 2011 (State of Qatar, Ministry of 
Environment, 2011). Saudi Arabia submitted two national communications to the 
Conference of the Parties under its UNFCCC Convention obligations: the First 
National Communication in November 2005 and its Second National 
Communication in October 2011 (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Presidency of 
Meteorology and Environment, 2005, 2011). Finally, the UAE submitted three 
National Communications to the Conference of the Parties under its UNFCCC 
Convention obligations: the first National Communication was submitted in 
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January 2007, the second in April 2010, and the third in August 2013 (United 
Arab Emirates Ministry of Energy 2007, 2010, 2013). 
From a policy perspective, until the present time the GCC countries have 
not yet elaborated a national climate legislation
48
 or strategy
49
 as shown in Map 2 
below: 
 
 
Figure 4: World map of climate legislation and strategies in 2012. Adapted from 
Developments in National Climate Change Mitigation, Legislation and Strategy, 
by Dubash et al., 2013, p. 656.  
Despite some significant actions taken by the GCC governments as 
described above, the climate change agenda has not yet materialized into a subject 
of national policy or strategy, which could mean that the climate change issue has 
                                                          
48
 A ‘climate legislation’ is defined as:  
An act that has been passed by a national parliament, that is in force, and 
that includes in its title or in its statement of objectives limits or reductions 
in greenhouse gas emissions. This legislation may include a national 
climate goal, but this is not necessarily a condition. If a parliament does 
not exist, the equivalent government act necessary to pass legally 
enforceable measures should be used as the benchmark. (Dubash, et al., 
2013, p. 659). 
  
49
 A ‘climate strategy’ is defined as: “One or more documents or statements 
passed by a national government to promote climate change mitigation, but not 
passed by a national parliament or through any other formal lawmaking process” 
(Dubash, et al., 2013, p. 659). 
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not matured enough within the policy making establishment. This may be due to 
the central role of oil and gas revenues in the GCC budgets, in addition to the 
absence of a bottom-up pressure from the society at large as a result of the rentier 
culture—a by-product of the rentier nature of the economy and the state, and will 
be discussed in detail in chapter 4. 
As we have mentioned at the outset of this section, the GCC countries are 
characterized by an unsustainable energy consumption pattern that is intimately 
related to the political economy of the region in addition to the significant 
economic and population growths they have witnessed since the discovery of oil 
in the region in the 1930s, and that are expected to continue growing in the future. 
According to the scenario developed in the MED-CSP study, the GDP per capita 
of the GCC region will grow from US$ 10,000 to 20,000/capita/year to around 
US$ 30,000 to 50,000/capita/year in the period between 2000 and 2050 (German 
Aerospace Center, 2005, p. 88). 
In this respect, it will be interesting to review the historical developments 
of the GCC populations and the impact on electricity consumption in the region 
and how they are likely to evolve in the future. This historical analysis, with an 
outlook perspective, will also need to include a discussion regarding the energy 
subsidies issue, which is central to the political economy of the region and closely 
related to the wasteful energy consumption pattern of the GCC countries. 
 
3.2. THE INTERNATIONAL OIL MARKET 
 The price of oil is, without any doubt, one of the most important global 
economic indicators, its evolution closely monitored by producers and policy-
makers as well as consumers. As far as the producers are concerned, and the GCC 
countries in particular, the price of oil is a major concern knowing that oil is at the 
heart of their political economies and the raison d’être of their economic growth 
as well as political stability. In this respect, it has been selected as the second 
factor at the landscape level that has historically been the source of the most 
important pressure on the regimes level of the GCC countries.  
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 The objective of this section is to review the historical developments of 
world oil markets and how it has affected the GCC economically and politically; 
to review past and recent oil price forecasts; and finally, to explore future oil 
demand, supply, and prices and how it could affect the GCC countries based on 
past experiences. The main objective of this study is to offer a view on long-term 
oil prices within the time framework of this research project, which is between 
now and 2050. 
 It is necessary to mention that the objective is not to make predictions 
about the future oil prices, but to attempt exploring the most probable trends 
within the time frame of this research. There have been several consistent attempts 
by private and state owned companies to predict the future of the energy markets 
using minute and complex economic models. However, international energy 
expert Jean-Marie Chevalier asserts that despite the existence of these 
sophisticated analytic tools, predicting the behavior of the oil markets remains an 
impossible task. All of the predictive models that have been formulated have 
mistaken the size of the oil and gas reserves, the cost of their extraction, the 
evolution of pricing, and the global levels of energy demand, as well as other 
factors affecting the energy markets in general and the oil and gas market in 
particular (Chevalier, 2004, p. 25).  
 Before we engage in the analysis of the oil market, it should be noted that 
this section will focus on the oil market and its price only, and not the gas markets 
as even Qatar, which is mainly a gas exporting country, derives the bulk of its 
revenues from the export of oil and not from the export of gas (Hertog & Luciani, 
2009, p. 8). Indeed, according to 2012 figures, out of the total revenues of 
US$ 133.717 billion from the export of oil and gas in Qatar, US$ 116.209 billion 
came from the export of petroleum products
50
 alone (OPEC, 2013a, p. 16-17), 
                                                          
50
 According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration,  
Petroleum products are obtained from the processing of crude oil 
(including lease condensate) [and they] include unfinished oils, liquefied 
petroleum gases, pentanes plus, aviation gasoline, motor gasoline, 
naphtha-type jet fuel, kerosene-type jet fuel, kerosene, distillate fuel oil, 
residual fuel oil, petrochemical feedstocks, special naphthas, lubricants, 
waxes, petroleum coke, asphalt, road oil, still gas, and miscellaneous 
products. (IEA, 2007, p. 8). 
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which represents around 87% of its revenues from petroleum products exports. 
Moreover, it should be noted that the development of gas fields is much more 
costly than the development of oil fields and “has been undertaken in conjunction 
with confirmed [long term] agreements for the off-take of the gas either as 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) or as piped gas” (Abi-Aad, 2008, p. 68), and in these 
agreements, the price of gas is indexed on the price of oil. Based on these facts, 
the choice therefore has been made to focus only on oil and the factors that could 
affect its prices in the long term, especially the development of unconventional oil, 
in order to assess the future possible trends of GCC governments’ revenues for 
building the scenarios.  
 
 3.2.1. The Fundamentals of Oil Markets: A Historical Perspective 
Since the beginning of the industrial revolution in the 18
th
 century, fossil 
fuels—first coal, followed by oil and gas at the beginning of the 20th century—
have become the world’s principal energy sources, the engine of economic 
activity, and a pillar of global growth. In less than three decades, the global 
energy regime switched to using oil as the world’s main energy source, primarily 
because of its low production cost and its liquid nature, which facilitates its 
production and transport, making it a vital commodity.  
The oil industry’s early history was marked by the discovery of the largest 
reserves of crude oil in specific and limited geographic locations—primarily, the 
Middle East and Latin America—by Western companies based in Western Europe 
and the U.S., which has given to oil a strategic value and a source of geopolitical 
conflict and competition that has greatly affected its prices on the international 
markets. Indeed, as a result of the economics and geopolitics that characterize the 
oil industry, the price of oil has been marked by a chronic instability and volatility, 
which has made the task of predicting its future price an almost impossible 
endeavor. Nevertheless, within the framework of a futures study, it is necessary to 
undertake a detailed analysis of the oil market from a historical perspective and 
identify the main factors and circumstances that have historically influenced oil 
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prices in the international markets, in order to be able to make assumptions about 
the most probable evolutions or trends regarding oil prices. 
 
 3.2.1.1. Cycles and trends in the oil market 
The oil market is an international market where the prices are determined 
according to the conjunction of two main factors, firstly, the supply and demand 
factor, which remains the most influential factor and explains the oil market 
behaviour; and secondly, the geopolitical factor, which threatens oil supply and 
influences its prices in the international markets, as was the case with the 1973 oil 
crises, the Iranian revolution in 1979, the Iran-Iraq war until 1988, and the 
invasion of Kuwait and its liberation by a coalition under the U.S. leadership 
between 1991 and 1992. 
 The past decade has witnessed a sharp volatility in oil prices. In July 2008, 
the price of oil reached US$ 147 per barrel before falling to less than US$ 40 per 
barrel in December 2008 as a consequence of the unfolding of the global financial 
crisis. It took two years for oil prices to increase again, reaching US$ 90 per barrel 
at the beginning of 2011, and picking up again with the beginning of the Arab 
Spring and especially following the loss of the Libyan production. 
 Figure 5 below summarizes the historical fluctuations the price of oil has 
witnessed since the birth of the oil industry in the 19
th
 century, whereas Figures 6-
8 highlight the three main cycles of oil price history and the main organizations or 
forces that had a major role in influencing the oil market. 
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Figure 5: Historical Oil Price Fluctuations 1861-2012. Adapted from BP 
Statistical Review of World Energy June 2013, by BP, 2013, p. 15. 
 The details of this long history of nominal oil prices (2012 $) can be 
divided into three main cycles as per the three figures below: 
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Figure 6: First cycle. Adapted from BP Statistical Review 2009 as cited in “The 
Petroleum Market: The Ongoing Oil Price ‘Shock’ and the Next ‘Counter-
Shock’”, by F. Lescaroux, 2010, p. 102. 
 The first cycle starts with the birth of the oil industry in Pennsylania, 
United States, and is divided into two main periods: the pioneer’s period from 
1861 until 1876, followed by the Rockfeller’s period until the first decade of the 
20
th
 century. 
  129 
 
Figure 7: The second cycle. Adapted from BP Statistical Review 2009 as cited in 
“The Petroleum Market: The Ongoing Oil Price ‘Shock’ and the Next ‘Counter-
Shock’”, by F. Lescaroux, 2010, p. 103.51 
 The second cycle starts in 1911 and is also divided into two main periods. 
The first period runs from 1911 until 1928, and is defined as a competitive period 
between the main oil companies. The second period, the Seven Sister’s period, 
begins in 1928 with the Achnacarry Agreement
52
 signed between the main oil 
producers known as the Seven Sisters
53
, until just before the first oil crisis in 1973. 
                                                          
51
 The surge in 1947 is the result of a monetary shock. 
 
52
 The Achnacarry Agreement, also known as the “As-I” agreement, refers to a 
secret pact signed on the 17
th
 of September 1928 between main oil companies the 
Anglo-Persian Oil Company (later BP), Royal Dutch Shell, and Standard Oil of 
New Jersey (later Exxon), agreeing on quotas and the price of oil in the 
international market. The agreement came as a result of a price war between 
major oil companies in the 1920s that led the price of oil to fall. The pact agreed 
on limiting the excessive competition responsible for over-production by 
establishing a system of quotas and division of markets among the major oil 
companies, fixing prices, and limiting the expansion of over-capacity. 
 
53
 The expression “Seven Sisters” refers to the companies that controlled the 
world oil market prior to the first oil crisis in 1973. The group included the Anglo-
Persian Oil Company (now BP), Standard Oil of California (SoCaL), Texaco and 
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Figure 8: The third cycle. Adapted from BP Statistical Review 2009 as cited in 
“The Petroleum Market: The Ongoing Oil Price ‘Shock’ and the Next ‘Counter-
Shock’”, by F. Lescaroux, 2010, p. 103.  
 The third cycle is divided into two main periods: from 1973 until 1986, the 
period of the two oil shocks in 1973 and 1979; and after the collapse of oil prices 
in 1986, which is defined as OPEC’s period. 
 We can clearly see from the figures above that the oil market has been 
moving from one phase to another. Indeed,  
historically, the nominal oil price exhibits a series of long and irregular 
‘cycles’ made of two periods, one of turbulence and one of stability . . .  or 
an entrepreneurial period and a cheeseparing one in non-physicist’s terms 
- with periodicities varying from thirty to sixty years. (Lescaroux, 2010, p. 
101).  
Such a periodicity is mainly explained by the long investment cycles of the 
oil industry and is materialized by a succession of over and under-capacity periods 
                                                                                                                                                               
Gulf Oil (these three companies merged and are known today as Chevron), Royal 
Dutch Shell, Standard Oil of New Jersey (Esso, now part of ExxonMobil), and 
Standard Oil Company of New York (Socony, now ExxonMobil). 
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“as well as the market’s natural tendency to turn into oligopoly or some other 
form of control during periods of excess capacity” (Lescaroux, 2010, p. 101). As 
rightly noted by Paul Frankel in 1946:  
As there is always either too much or too little oil, the industry, not being 
self- adjusting, has an inherent tendency to extreme crises . . . As no 
individual unit can evolve a rational production policy on its own, some 
sort of communal organization is almost inevitable. Paradox though it may 
appear, oil, competitive par excellence, is usually controlled by some 
‘leading interests’”. (Frankel, 1946, as cited in Lescaroux, 2010, p. 101) 
 Even today, as stated by Francisco Parra (2004), “the important players in 
the industry have policies on price . . . [and] [t]he market is not characterized by 
the kind of intense competition where price for one and all is a ‘given’, set by the 
forces of supply and demand, and every one is a price-taker who must accept what 
he finds” (Parra, 2004, p. 335). However, this does not exclude altogether market 
forces from the oil price mechanism, as they remain powerful forces in the 
industry and in fact, “the battle with them is what it’s all about” (Parra, 2004, p. 
335). In this respect, one of the main subjects of this battle has been to manage the 
significant disparity between costs and reserves in the Middle East on one side 
and everywhere else on the other side, a concern which was explicitly expressed 
by the U.S. Interior Secretary Harold Ickes, who in the 1940s, wondered “how to 
fit low-cost Saudi Arabia into a structure dominated at the time by high-cost 
Texas” (Parra, 2004, p. 335). 
 However, while recognizing that this fact is still valid to a certain 
extentas the cost for producing one barrel of oil in the Middle East and North 
Africa and particularly the Gulf remains the lowest in the oil industryanother 
factor has in the past decade become of primary importance to OPEC, including 
the GCC governments. When discussing what they have termed as the “fair price”, 
it is the break-even fiscal oil price that allows for the GCC budgets to remain in 
equilibrium and to sustain their very large expenditure policy that stands at the 
core of the socio-political contract of the region. As a result, even if the cost of 
producing oil in the GCC countries is still very low compared to the high end 
within the range of costs for producing tight oil in the U.S., tar sand oil in Canada, 
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or the ultra-deep pre-salt oil in the Brazilian offshore, the GCC budgets will have 
great difficulties keeping the equilibrium between their revenues and expenses 
with a barrel of oil below US$ 90, an issue that be analyzed with in more details 
in chapter 4 dealing the political economy of the GCC countries. Consequently, 
there seems to be a consensus among the major players of the oil industry to keep 
the prices high in order to allow the GCC budgets to remain in equilibrium on the 
one hand, and to allow for the development and production of expensive 
unconventional oil on the other. Nevertheless, the uncertainty about future oil 
prices remains high, as in the long run, “advances in energy production from shale 
and other unconventional sources could depress prices of hydrocarbons, as has 
already been seen in the U.S. market for natural gas” (International Monetary 
Fund, 2012, p. 11), without forgetting uncertainties of geopolitical nature that 
could disrupt this unwritten consensus and lead to another oil crisis—either 
upward or downward. 
 
 3.2.2. Current and future outlook of oil markets 
 Currently, and for many years to come, there is no objective reason to fear 
for the availability of energy sources to satisfy global demand. This was 
reconfirmed by the 2012 World Energy Outlook (WEO) of the International 
Energy Agency (IEA) regarding the future of energy in the world. According to 
the report and its assumptions regarding the future price of energy and 
developments in extraction technologies, there are sufficient energy reserves to 
satisfy the projected global demand for energy until 2035 and beyond (IEA, 2012, 
p. 63). Indeed, fossil fuel reserves, including oil, gas, and coal, are available in 
quantities capable of fulfilling the global demand for energy for decades to come, 
and this is especially true regarding coal. Proven coal reserves exceed the 
combined global reserves of oil and gas, with the ability to power the international 
economy for 132 years—based on 2011 production levels (IEA, 2012, p. 63). On 
the other hand, global proven natural gas reserves—half of which are concentrated 
in just three countries: Russia, Iran, and Qatar—are capable of fulfilling the 
projected global gas demand, with combined proven reserves of over 232 billion 
square feet of natural gas (IEA, 2012, p. 63). 
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 Globally, oil reserves should be able to supply global demand for 55 years 
based on 2011 production rates. Importantly, OPEC’s production alone represents 
71 percent of the proven oil reserves around the world (IEA, 2012, p. 63). All 
available data on proven conventional oil reserves show that there are no objective 
reasons to worry about potential supply shortages. In addition, more than 70 
percent of the increases in the proven global oil reserves since the year 2000 have 
originated from revisions of data on existing oil fields, a process known as 
“reserves growth”54, and only 30 percent of new oil reserves is attributed to new 
discoveries (IEA, 2012, p. 98). 
 Moreover, the global oil sector has witnessed an unprecedented level of 
investment in the domain of oil exploration and production since 2003, reaching 
US$ 1.5 trillion between 2010 and 2012 alone, and these investments are capable 
of increasing the production capacity in most oil-producing countries in the 
coming years (Maugeri, 2012, p. 2). Notably, in the medium and long term, 
recoverable conventional resources are much larger than proven reserves, and 
with the changing conditions of the global energy market and advancement in 
exploration and production technologies, a large share of these resources have 
been included in the ‘proven reserves’ category. Moreover, the advancement in 
exploration and production technologies have also allowed for the production of 
new forms of oil and gas
55
. 
 Though the production costs of these new forms of oil and gas deposits 
will undoubtedly be higher than those of conventional resources, the exhaustion of 
conventional reserves will likely force energy companies to seek new resources 
that require a more complex process of exploration and production. However, this 
cost will decrease over time and with the expansion of energy projects, as is the 
                                                          
54 Reserves growth is defined as the estimated increases in crude oil, natural gas, 
and natural gas liquids that can be added to existing reserves through expansion, 
revision, and recovery enhancement technologies, in addition to discovering new 
oil layers and oil-bearing formations connected to main oil reservoirs. This refers 
to a revision of the size of previously discovered reservoirs, rather than new 
discoveries (Maugeri, 2012, p. iii). 
 
55 This specifically refers to large quantities of unconventional oil and gas reserves that 
are available in many parts of the world, as evidenced by the American experience with 
shale gas. 
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case with all investments in new domains and technologies—bearing a high cost 
initially before gradually decreasing. Even so, the era of cheap oil is well behind 
us, as the cost of producing high-quality oil and gas from unconventional sources 
will never be as low as that of conventional oil and gas.  
 In developing its productive capacity of shale oil and gas, the U.S. offers a 
unique experience that might redraw the global energy map, especially if it is 
reproduced in other parts of the world. These developments are attributed to 
technological breakthroughs in the production of new types of natural gas, such as 
shale gas, that are considered unconventional. These breakthroughs may 
constitute a qualitative leap in the long-run production capacity of shale oil in the 
U.S., and probably in other regions of the world. Based on these premises, the 
long-term trends in the international energy system can be summarized in the 
following points:  
 All studies indicate that there is no structural deficiency in the sources 
of energy, and that the global oil supply—estimated at 93 million 
barrels of oil per day—is higher than global demand, which is 
estimated at 88 million barrels per day. Furthermore, there is a 
consistent increase in proven global oil reserves (BP, 2012, p. 3). 
 Fossil fuels (oil, gas, and coal) continue to dominate the international 
energy mix, reaching 87 percent of global energy consumption. 
Renewable energy represents no more than 2 percent of the global 
consumption of energy (BP, 2012, p. 3). 
 Oil remains the dominant fuel source, representing 33.1 percent of 
global energy consumption. However, there has been a decrease in the 
percentage of oil consumption for 12 successive years in favor of gas 
and coal, both of which have witnessed a brisk growth estimated at 5.4 
percent annually in 2011 (BP, 2012, p. 5). 
 Data covering energy consumption in the world indicates that the focus 
of global consumption is shifting away from the OECD member 
countries toward developing economies, especially in Asia, headed by 
China and India. According to a 2012 IEA report, 96 percent of the 
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expected increase in global energy demand will come from outside the 
OECD region from 2010-2035 (IEA, 2012, p. 56). 
 The oil revolution witnessed in the U.S. is not a temporary 
phenomenon; rather, it is the most important revolution the oil sector 
has seen in decades, and it can be replicated in other parts of the world. 
It is possible for this revolution to produce spectacular results in the 
long term (Maugeri, 2012, p. 6). 
 Though it may be true that the age of cheap oil is over, technology and 
the scaling of projects can lower costs, as the experience of oil and gas 
production from the North Sea has demonstrated 
56
 
 Given the scale and significance of the shale oil and gas revolutions in the 
U.S., it is necessary to shed some light on this experience, which has the potential 
to redraw the global oil map, especially if replicated successfully in other parts of 
the world.  
 
 3.2.2.1. The U.S. revolution of unconventional resources 
  As explained above, during the past decades, the oil market has been 
characterized by the emergence of new areas for the exploration and/or production 
of unconventional oil, such as in Canada (oil sands and tar oil), Venezuela (extra-
heavy oil), Brazil (oil produced from the pre-salt formations in the very deep 
offshore), and above all, the shale gas revolution in the U.S., which has benefited 
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 When oil was discovered under the North Sea in the 1970s, the extraction of the 
oil deposits was initially deemed to be an extremely arduous, complex, and 
expensive task as production took place in waters that were 100 to 200 meters 
deep and over a kilometer under the seabed. Nevertheless, due to the rise in oil 
prices and the political will of Western countries, the production of North Sea oil 
became an economically viable operation. After 10 years of exploration, 
production, and infrastructure construction, the cost of producing oil in the North 
Sea decreased by 50 percent. Today, major oil companies can economically 
produce oil in waters that are more than 3,000 meters deep, and from oil 
reservoirs that lie more than 6 kilometers under the seabed. North Sea oil 
production, which was previously seen as extremely complex and expensive, has 
now become a routine operation. Oil that is seen today as too difficult and too 
expensive to extract will likely become easy and cost-efficient in the future. 
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from new extraction technologies and is being duplicated for the production of 
shale oil. Before we deal with the American unconventional oil and gas revolution, 
it will be useful to shed some light on the technical terminology used to define 
different types of oil. 
 
 3.2.2.1.1. Defining the different forms of oil  
Oil is a dense liquid found in the upper layer of the earth’s crust and is 
composed of a complex mixture of hydrocarbons; its appearance, composition, 
and purity vary widely depending on its origin. Oil and its derivatives are used to 
generate electricity and to fuel various means of transportation. Over half of the 
total global oil consumption goes to the transportation sector, a percentage that is 
expected to increase in the coming decades (IEA, 2012, p. 88). Oil is also the 
main feedstock for many chemical products, including fertilizers, plastics, and 
various forms of textiles.  
 The Society of Petroleum Engineers defines traditional crude oil as oil that 
is found in a liquid state that can flow naturally (“Conventional Crude Oil,” 2011). 
This means that oil and gas produced through a well should be in a geological 
formation that has the characteristics of a conventional geological reservoir. The 
pressure within this reservoir permits the liquids and the gas contained therein to 
flow easily to the surface. In contrast, the production of unconventional oil and 
gas takes place under different conditions, either because the geological formation 
that bears the liquids has low permeability, or because these liquids have a density 
that is close to, or less than, that of water, requiring different methods of 
production, transportation, or refining.  
 The oil industry classifies crude oil according to its relative density or 
viscosity (light, medium, heavy, or extra heavy). The refining industry also 
focuses on the level of sulfur in oil, classifying types of crude oil into ‘sweet,’ 
when it features a low level of sulfur, and ‘sour,’ when its sulfur content is high. 
The refining of crude oil that is rich in sulfur requires refineries that are especially 
equipped for this process in order to extract high-quality petroleum products.  
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 The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) divides 
unconventional oil into four categories: heavy oil, extra-heavy oil, bitumen, and 
shale oil (D. Gordon, 2012). Some analysts argue that oil produced through gas-
to-liquid (GTL) or coal-to-liquid (CTL) processes is also a form of 
unconventional oil (D. Gordon, 2012). 
 The standards established by the American Petroleum Institute (API) are 
generally used to gauge the specific density of oil and measure the relative weight 
of petroleum liquids compared to water. If oil has an API higher than 10, it is 
lighter than water and can flow on the water’s surface; when oil has an API lower 
than 10, it is heavier than water and is likely to sink. There is a direct inverse 
relationship between oil’s specific density and its API level: the higher the 
specific density, the lower the API. The oil industry classifies oil types into light 
oil (with an API lower than 31.1), medium oil (with an API between 22.3 and 
31.1), heavy oil (with an API lower than 22.3), and extra-heavy oil (with an API 
lower than 10). The density of oil, then, indicates its distillate content.  
 Oil viscosity, on the other hand, is considered the most important 
characteristic in the oil industry, because it indicates the ease with which the oil 
will flow from its reservoirs thereby determining the extraction method. Based on 
this, high viscosity oil is classified as extra-heavy, and oil with extremely high 
viscosity is classified as bitumen, which is extremely hard to extract using 
conventional techniques. Oil shale (not to confuse with shale oil), also known as 
Kerogen oil, is found within rock formations that bear large quantities of Kerogen 
and similar deposits that produce oil when refined (“Oil Shale,” 2011). Given the 
huge reserves available, oil shale is qualified to become the main source of 
unconventional oil throughout the world, especially in North America, which 
contains the largest and richest oil shale formations.  
 In this regard, ‘tight oil’57   t laer ni does not differ from conventional oil 
in quality, since it is light and does not feature high levels of sulfur. However, the 
                                                          
57 Tight oil refers to the light crude oil confined in shale, limestone, and sandstone 
formations and can be characterized as having very low porosity and permeability. 
Even though there are some minor differences between tight oil and shale oil, we 
will mainly use the term shale oil when referring to these forms of oil. 
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unconventional nature of the geological reservoirs that contain tight oil or shale 
oil deposits necessitates the employment of complex and expensive techniques to 
extract it, leading to its classification as ‘unconventional oil’. On the other hand, 
oil shale is an unconventional form of oil that is trapped in rocks with extremely 
low permeability. Thus, it is oil that is still in its early stages of geological 
formation, requiring an expensive heating and refining process for extraction.  
 It is expected that the production of Kerogen oil will rise from now until 
2035. In the U.S. alone, which contains large resources of shale oil  (especially in 
the Green River formation covering Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming), the amount 
of recoverable oil shale reserves exceed 800 billion barrels of oil, according to a 
2011 report by the National Petroleum Council (National Petroleum Council, 
2011, p. 46). The mass production of oil shale remains a future potential, but there 
is no significant production from these resources so far. It is possible that the 
production of oil shale will increase in the coming years to reach one million 
barrels per day in 2035, which could  ea subsequently much higher if 
economically-viable techniques become available, and if the environmental 
damage can be minimized (National Petroleum Council, 2011, p. 50). The 
available reserves of oil shale indicate this form of energy as one of the most 
important sources of unconventional fossil fuels in the world. In addition to the 
abundance of oil shale in North America, it is also available in large quantities in 
Brazil, historical Palestine, Jordan, Indonesia, China, Australia, Estonia, France, 
Spain, Sweden, Great Britain, and South Africa (D. Gordon, 2012, p. 12). 
 As indicated above, conventional oil and gas produced in limited 
geographic regions have dominated the energy system throughout the 20th century. 
These reserves still represent the majority of oil and gas produced globally today. 
However, the recent growth in the share of unconventional oil and gas in the 
global energy mix, especially in the U.S., points to an essential shift in the quality 
of future oil and gas, as well as a change in the production geography of these 
resources. By 2040, it is estimated that “about 45% of liquids supply will be from 
sources other than conventional crude” (ExxonMobil, 2014, p. 37), with the 
supply from tight oil (shale oil) alone growing faster than the other liquids 
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reaching ten times the 2010 level (ExxonMobil, 2014, p. 38). As far as Canada is 
concerned, oil sands production will grow by more than 200% over the period 
between 2010 to 2040 (ExxonMobil, 2014, p. 38).  
 This ongoing shift is not limited to the use of new types of oil outside the 
GCC region; this change will also affect the political geography of oil, since the 
majority of unconventional oil resources are concentrated outside the Middle East 
and North Africa region, most notably in Eastern Europe and North America. In 
its 2011 World Energy Outlook, the IEA predicted that North America’s 
unconventional petroleum technically recoverable resources could exceed the 
technically recoverable conventional oil resources in the Middle East by 50 
percent (2011, p. 121). 
 The following sections will be dedicated to the shale gas revolution in the 
U.S., and how building on this experience, a shale oil (tight oil) revolution in the 
oil industry is also transforming the entire U.S. energy landscape, with the 
potential to reshape the global oil map if this experience is duplicated in other 
regions of the world. 
 
 3.2.2.1.2. The shale gas revolution in the U.S. 
Throughout the past five years, the significant increase in the production 
of shale gas in the U.S. has led to a state of national self-sufficiency, and 
according to the IEA’s New Policies Scenario, the U.S., as well as Canada, will 
emerge as gas exporting countries before 2020 (IEA, 2012, p. 68). This revolution 
in gas production became possible because of a breakthrough in extraction 
technology—specifically, the use of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing. 
The process requires pumping a mixture of water, sand, and chemicals under high 
pressure to fracture rock layers in order to free the gas confined within them.   
 In 2000, these techniques were widely employed for the first time in the 
Barnett shale gas formation in Texas. Oil explorers have known about hydraulic 
fracturing technology since the 19th century, but it has taken years of development 
—especially since the 1950s—to reach fruition and increase oil and gas 
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production in the U.S. A second phase in the evolution of this technology began in 
the mid-1970s, when the U.S. Energy Information Administration sought, along 
with a number of private partners, to develop technologies that would allow the 
commercial production of gas from the geological basins in the East. This 
permitted the development of various technologies, including horizontal drilling, 
to extract shale gas. The Mitchell Energy and Development Corporation benefited 
from these technologies in the 1980s and the 1990s by turning the shale gas 
experiment into a significant economic reality. After their success in producing 
shale gas in commercial quantities, other companies rushed to replicate its success, 
spreading to other geological formations across the U.S. After a decade of 
development and production, the production of shale gas in the U.S. has risen 
from zero in 2000 to more than 130 billion square meters of natural gas annually 
(Maugeri, 2012, p. 44). This has resulted in a sharp decrease in the price of natural 
gas on the American market, where the price of gas reached historic lows. In June 
2012, it reached US$ 2.10 per million British Thermal Units (MBTU) at Henry 
Hub (the leading U.S. trading hub), compared with US$ 9.90 MBTU in the British 
market, US$ 12 MBTU in the Mediterranean market, and US$ 17.40 MBTU for 
spot LNG in northeast Asia (IEA, 2012, p. 129). 
 
3.2.2.1.3. The U.S. shale oil revolution 
The revolution that America is witnessing in the production of shale oil is 
a replication of the shale gas revolution. The same techniques have been used to 
produce shale oil, allowing for the recovery of massive quantities of oil. The U.S. 
has, in fact, registered successive leaps in its shale oil production since 2008 (IEA, 
2012, p. 75). This success is primarily attributed to both new discoveries in 
extraction technology and the highly competitive environment and the openness 
of the American market compared to other economies around the world. Given 
the revolution experienced by the U.S. in the production of unconventional oil and 
gas, it is clear that the existence of a competitive market and a level playing field 
have encouraged innovation leading to the exploitation of unconventional 
resources that were difficult to reach in the past.  
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 The expected decline in U.S. oil imports, from 9.5 million barrels per day 
in 2011 to 3.4 million barrels per day in 2035, is mainly the result of the increased 
production of shale oil from now until 2020, and after that time, the decline of 
imports will primarily be the result of qualitative evolution in the efficiency of 
vehicle engines, as well as the use of bio-fuels and natural gas in the 
transportation sector (IEA, 2012, p. 76).  The drop of oil imports and the increase 
in gas exports will positively effect on the U.S. trade deficit, especially if one 
takes into account that oil imports in 2011 alone constituted two-thirds of the 
deficit in the trade of goods. In addition, a positive economic stimulus will be 
provided to the U.S. economy through the export of gas (IEA, 2012, p. 76). 
 The U.S. became a net oil importer in the mid-1940s, and by the mid-
1970s, it was importing 25% of the oil traded globally (IEA, 2012, p. 75)—a 
situation that has drastically changed since the beginning of the shale gas 
revolution in the mid-2000s which laid the foundations for the shale oil revolution 
now taking place. Indeed, according to the IEA (2012), the increase in U.S. 
unconventional gas over the past five years is equivalent to the current annual gas 
exports from Russia. As a result of this phenomenal development, and based on 
the IEA’s New Policies Scenario, it is expected that the continuous and combined 
growth in the production of unconventional oil and gas and biofuels will lead the 
U.S. to become 97% energy self-sufficient in net terms by 2035 (IEA, 2012, p. 
75). In addition, by 2025, the U.S. is expected to become the largest oil producer 
in the world after Saudi Arabia (Maugeri, 2012, p. 81).  
While there are some environmental concerns regarding the production of 
shale oil or gas, it is not sure that they will represent a serious obstacle to the 
development of unconventional resources as it is already taking place in the U.S. 
and Canada. The main obstacle for duplicating the U.S. experience in other parts 
of the world will be mainly at the regulatory and legal level. As we have the U.S. 
market benefits from a very specific regulatory environment that is very difficult 
to find elsewhere, but that can be engineered by governments if they see the 
necessity to develop their shale resources as an economic and strategic necessity. 
Having said this, there is no doubt that the re-emergence of the U.S. 
energy industry is a key event and a turning point in the history of the global 
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energy sector “that is reshaping the world’s energy landscape with far reaching 
implications” (IEA, 2012, p. 49). 
 
3.2.2.1.4. Early signs of increasing interest in unconventional resources  
As a result of the continuous decline in conventional oil resources coupled 
with an increase in the price of oil in the international markets, “oil shale presents 
opportunities for supplying some of the fossil energy needs of the world in the 
years ahead” (World Energy Council, 2010, p. 93). Moreover, following the 
success of the U.S. shale oil and gas revolutions, a number of governments have 
demonstrated a serious and rising interest in developing their own resources, as is 
already the case with the UK (Stevens, 2013, p. 2). In the coming decades, China 
and Australia have the potential to become one of the major gas producers as, 
according to the IEA, “unconventional gas [or shale gas] accounts for nearly half 
of the increase in global gas production to 2035, with most of the increase coming 
from China, the United States, and Australia” (IEA, 2012, p. 27). In this respect, 
Tables 6 and 7 below show the top 10 countries in terms of shale oil and shale gas 
resources globally.  
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Table 6 
Top 10 Countries With Technically Recoverable Shale Oil Resources 
RANK COUNTRY 
SHALE OIL 
(Billion barrels) 
1 Russia 75 
2 USA 58 
3 China 32 
4 Argentina 27 
5 Libya 26 
6 Venezuela 13 
7 Mexico 13 
8 Pakistan 9 
9 Canada 9 
10 Indonesia 8 
WORLD TOTAL  345 
Note: Adapted from Technically Recoverable Shale Oil and Shale Gas Resources, 
by U.S. Energy Information Administration [EIA], 2013c, p. 10. 
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Table 7 
Top 10 countries with technically recoverable shale gas resources 
RANK COUNTRY 
SHALE GAS 
(Trillion cubic feet) 
1 China 1,115 
2 Argentina 802 
3 Algeria 707 
4 USA 665 
5 Canada 573 
6 Mexico 545 
7 Australia 437 
8 South Africa 390 
9 Russia 285 
10 Brazil 245 
WORLD TOTAL  7,299 
Note: Adapted from Technically Recoverable Shale Oil and Shale Gas Resources, 
by U.S. EIA, 2013c, p. 10. 
 From Table 6 and 7 above, we can clearly see that China is very well 
placed in terms of shale oil resources, 3
rd
 globally, and shale gas resources, 1
st
 
globally. The interest and focus on China stems from the fact that it has become 
one of the major energy consumers and importers at the same time and is expected 
to see its demand in energy grow substantially in the future. Indeed, the last 
decade has seen very significant growth in the demand for energy from the 
emerging economies in Asia, and especially China and India, to the extent that the 
energy markets have witnessed a shift in oil and gas trade directions from the 
OECD countries to the non-OECD countries. This trend is expected to continue in 
the coming decades as demand for oil from “North America, Europe and Japan 
[has] already peaked [as a result of declining] demographics, increased efficiency, 
and substitution” (Yergin, 2011, p. 712), whereas emerging economies will see 
their demand in energy increase as a consequence of the significant economic 
growth they are witnessing and which is expected to last for the foreseeable future. 
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 Given this situation, and since the shale oil and gas revolution in the U.S., 
the Chinese government has shown an interest in developing its shale gas 
resources, as according to initial Chinese shale gas resources greatly exceed 
American reserves by as much as 50 percent and may exceed 1,375 trillion cubic 
feet of technically-recoverable gas (Gismatullin, 2012). This amount would be 
enough to fulfill Chinese gas demand for more than 200 years (Evans-Pritchard, 
2012). On the same front, Royal Dutch Shell signed a contract to explore and 
produce shale gas in China in November 2012 with the China National Petroleum 
Corporation (Gismatullin, 2012). Judging by the American experience, one cannot 
discount the possibility that shale gas production will lead to shale oil production, 
which would reduce the proportion of imported oil and gas in China.  
 However, before being economically produced on a large scale, the 
development of shale oil and gas in China will most probably face a number of 
hurdles above the ground—i.e., obstacles of regulatory nature—as well as under 
the ground—i.e., obstacles of geological nature. Indeed, the success of the 
American shale gas and oil revolution was made possible especially because of 
the very specific regulatory environment in the U.S., which is not the case for 
China at the moment. In addition, from a geological perspective, the Chinese 
geology will need to adapt the technology used in the U.S. in order to unlock the 
oil and gas trapped in the geological formations. Moreover, the regions that have 
great geological potential for shale gas and oil are also regions with much water 
scarcity, which will increase the cost of production, as water will have to be 
transported over long distances. However, regions where water and shale 
formations are present together are also highly populated areas. The latest figures 
indicate that the Chinese government has been addressing these issues in the past 
three years, as the production of shale gas in China has already started in certain 
regions of the country and has risen to 200 million cubic meters in 2013 (“China's 
2013 Shale Gas Output”, 2014).  
 In the long run, there are no doubts that the global energy market will be 
completely different from its current state today. However, in order for the early 
indicators of a transformation of the energy landscape to take place—as seen in 
the development of unconventional oil, or in the potential for a technological 
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breakthrough in the transport sector with the development of the electric car—in 
the climate regime debate as well as the issue of sustainable development, it is 
only “after 2030 that the energy system could look quite different as the 
cumulative effect of innovation and technological advance makes its full impact 
felt” (Yergin, 2011, p. 715). 
 As far as the GCC region is concerned, there are credible geological 
indications that the region and in particular Saudi Arabia have significant shale 
gas resources. Indeed, Saudi Arabia has already launched its domestic 
unconventional gas program two years ago. At the World Energy Congress held 
in South Korea in October 2013, the CEO of ARAMCO Khalid Al-Falih declared 
the Kingdom ready to start producing their shale gas resources and “to commit 
gas for the development of a 10000 MW power plant which will feed a massive 
phosphate mining and manufacturing sector” (“Saudi Arabia to Use Shale Gas”, 
2013, para. 2).  
 Grounded on the above survey of the international oil market and the 
expected future developments, the following sections will review a number of oil 
price projections elaborated by a selection of energy related institutions. 
 
 3.2.3. Oil Price Projections 
This section will focus on the oil price projections of the U.S. Energy 
Information Administration (EIA), the oil price projections elaborated by the 
International Energy Agency (IEA), and finally, the oil price projections of OPEC. 
The U.S. EIA was selected as it represents the point of view of the main oil 
consumer in the global economy and the country where the shale gas and tight oil 
revolutions are taking place. The IEA was selected as it represents the point of 
view of the OECD countries that are among the biggest energy consumers. And 
finally, OPEC’s oil projections were selected as representing the point of view of 
the main oil producers, including the GCC countries. Given the difficulty to 
predict the price of oil in the short term and even less in the long term, the longest 
oil price projection we have been able to find in the literature extends until 2040 
only. However, as this research extends until 2050, these projections will be 
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nevertheless very helpful in providing a general trend for the current oil price 
cycle, given that one cycle could extend between 20 to 30 years as already 
mentioned in this section.  Considering the possible trends between now and the 
coming 20 years should therefore give us an idea about the possible trends for the 
next cycle. In any case, as already explained, the objective of this research is not 
to make predictions, let alone precise predictions, but to explore the most probable 
trends in the oil market between now and 2050.  
 
 3.2.3.1. U.S. Energy Information Administration oil price projections 
In its 2013 the long-term oil price projections until 2040, the U.S. Energy 
Information Administration built three contrasting cases. The first is a reference 
case which assumes that there are no changes in the current costs of exploration 
and development and unchanged accessibility conditions to oil resources; in 
addition to OPEC maintaining their share of the oil market at between 39 and 43% 
of the world’s total production, their planned investments in incremental 
production capacity are also maintained. It is also assumed that the OECD 
demand will remain flat between 2010 and 2040, while non-OECD demand will 
increase by 28 million barrels per day over the same period (U.S. EIA, 2013d, p. 
25). In this case, the price of oil will reach US$ 106/barrel in 2020 (real 2011 
dollars) and US$ 163/barrel in 2040 as shown in Table 8 and figure 9 below. 
 The second case is a low price case where oil prices could reach 
US$ 75/barrel in 2040, as it assumes that average growth in the non-OECD 
countries will decline from 4.7% (in the reference case) to 4.3% during the period 
from 2010 to 2040, with growth in the OECD region similar its counterpoint in 
the reference case and over the same period. On the supply side, OPEC’s share 
increases to 51% of the global oil production by 2040, while the share of non-
OPEC production is lower than the reference case, as the low oil prices prevents 
the production of their more expensive oil (U.S. EIA, 2013d, p. 25).   
 Finally, the third case is the high price case where oil prices could reach 
US$ 237/barrel by 2040, as it assumes GDP growth in the non-OECD countries as 
high as 5.1% during the period between 2010 and 2040, compared to 4.7% in the 
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reference case, which leads to a higher consumption of petroleum liquids and 
largely offsets the decline in OECD countries as a result of improved energy 
efficiency and a gradual switch to alternative energy sources. In this case, OPEC’s 
production is lower than the reference case, with a share ranging between 37 and 
39% of the global oil production (U.S. EIA, 2013d, p. 26). From past historical 
patterns, it is expected that in all three cases, OPEC will decrease its production 
when prices decrease, while non-OPEC countries will increase their production. 
Table 8 
U.S. EIA Brent Crude Oil Prices in Three Cases 2010-2040 (2011 $/b) 
YEAR REFERENCE LOW OIL 
PRICE 
HIGH OIL 
PRICE 
2010 81 81 81 
2015 96 79 134 
2020 106 69 155 
2025 117 70 173 
2030 130 72 192 
2035 145 73 213 
2040 163 75 237 
Note: Adapted from International Energy Outlook 2013 with Projections to 2040, 
by U.S. EIA, 2013d, p. 25. 
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Figure 9: U.S. EIA Brent crude oil prices in three cases 2010-2040 (2011 $/b) 
Adapted from International Energy Outlook 2013 with Projections to 2040, by 
U.S. EIA, 2013d, p. 25. 
 
3.2.3.2. OPEC’s oil price projections  
According to OPEC’s World Oil Outlook (2013), the price of oil can be 
informed by looking closely at a number of issues including: supply and demand 
relationship; the behaviour of futures markets, despite its limited predictive 
content; the way stock accumulation behaves; the expected future supply and 
demand balances; and finally, the impact of the geopolitical factor. However, in 
addition to these factors, OPEC’s analysis regarding oil price projections 
considers that  
it is the rising cost of supplying the marginal barrel that has been, and 
remains, one of the major factors in making revisions to oil price 
assumptions in the medium- and long-term . . . [and where the marginal 
cost would be represented by] the costs of producing oil sands projects, 
tight oil plays, deepwater and Arctic fields. (Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries [OPEC], 2013b, p. 26)   
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The choice of these plays is justified in OPEC’s World Oil Outlook (2013) 
by the fact that they represent the high end within the range of costs and as a 
consequence, the need to have high oil prices in order to keep up with the 
production economically. Table 26 below summarizes OPEC’s reference basket 
price assumptions according to the reference case. 
Table 9 
OPEC Reference Basket Price Assumptions in the Reference Case 
 
NOMINAL PRICES 
$/b 
REAL PRICES 
2012$/b 
2015 110 104 
2020 110 94 
2025 125 96 
2030 141 98 
2035 160 100 
Note: Adapted from 2013 World Oil Outlook by OPEC, 2013b, p. 27. 
 From the table above, according to OPEC’s oil price projections, the price 
of oil is to remain stable in the long run as the nominal OPEC Reference Basket 
(ORB) price
58
, will remain at an average price of US$ 100 per barrel over the 
period until 2020, before rising to a nominal value of US$ 160/b in 2035, which in 
real terms will be valued at US$ 100/b due to the increase in the upstream capital 
costs (OPEC, 2013b, p. 28). As far as the share of renewable energies is 
concerned, OPEC’s projections in the reference case expect an average annual 
increase “of 7.5% . . . which is faster than any other fuel type”  (OPEC, 2013b, p. 
53), with the fastest growth taking place in non-OECD countries.  
 
 
                                                          
58
 According to OPEC definition:  
The OPEC Reference Basket (ORB) was introduced on January 1, 1987. 
Up to  June 15, 2005 it was the arithmetic average of seven selected 
crudes . . . As of June 16, 2005, the ORB is calculated as a production 
weighted average of the OPEC basket of crudes. (OPEC, 2013a, p. 101) 
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 3.2.3.3. IEA’s oil price projections 
The long-term oil price projections of the IEA are based on three 
contrasting scenarios that reflect different governmental actions related to energy 
policy, in addition to different assumptions regarding future oil demand, economic 
growth, and climate mitigation policies. The first scenario is the Current Policies 
Scenario, and is based on the policies adopted by mid-2012; the second scenario is 
the New Policies Scenario, the central scenario of the IEA, which assumes that the 
existing policy commitments will be implemented in addition to those recently 
announced; and the third scenario is the 450 Scenario which assumes policy 
actions that are consistent with the objective of limiting the long-term global 
temperature increase to 2°C (IEA, 2012, p. 33). Figure 29 below summarizes the 
oil price projections until 2035 for each scenario. 
 
 
Figure 10: World oil demand and oil price
59
 by scenario. Adapted from World 
Energy Outlook, by IEA, 2012, p. 82.  
 According to the New Policies Scenario, oil demand increases from 87.4 
mb/d in 2011 to 99.7 mb/d in 2035 with a price of oil that will rise to US$ 125/b. 
China alone accounts for around 50% of the net increase (IEA, 2012, p. 81). In 
this scenario, in the period 2011 to 2015, the share of non-OPEC countries 
increases to above 53 mb/d as a result of an increase in unconventional oil 
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 Average IEA crude oil import price. 
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production in the U.S. and Canada, in addition to the production of deep water oil 
in Brazil. After 2025, the share of non-OPEC countries falls back to 50 mb/d in 
2035 (IEA, 2012, p. 81). OPEC’s share in the global oil production increases from 
42% in 2011 to 48% in 2035 with the biggest absolute increase coming from Iraq 
(IEA, 2012, p. 81). 
 The three oil price projections are summarized, for the sake of comparison, 
in Table 10 below:  
Table 10 
Comparison of Oil Price Projections $/B 
 LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
US EIA 
$2011 
US$ 75 
in 2040 
US$ 163 
Reference case 
in 2040 
US$ 237 
in 2040 
OPEC 
$2012 
US$ 160 
Reference case 
in 2035 
 
n/a 
 
n/a 
IEA 
$2011 
US$ 100 
450 Scenario 
in 2040 
US$ 125 
New Policies 
Scenario 
in 2040 
US$ 145 
Current Policies 
Scenario 
in 2040 
Note: Adapted from International Energy Outlook 2013 with Projections to 2040, 
by U.S. EIA (2013d); World Energy Outlook, by IEA, 2012; 2013 World Oil 
Outlook, by OPEC, 2013b (treated by the author). 
 As we can see from the table above, the projections range from the lowest 
price at US$ 75/b, to the highest US$ 237/b, depending on the assumptions they 
are built on, which makes it very difficult if not impossible to know with precision 
the future destination of oil prices in the international markets. However, 
grounded on the history of oil price evolution into successive cycles, one of 
turbulence and one of stability, and for the sake of this research, the most probable 
trend in the long run will be a cycle of turbulence where the price of oil in the 
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international markets will witness a significant decline after 2030, as explained in 
more details in the section below. 
  
3.2.3.4. The scenario of a potential price decline 
As explained above, the current oil market is characterized by a surplus 
production of 4 million barrels per day, which is enough to replace the production 
of any single large oil producer, such as Iran (Maugeri, 2012, p. 64).  Furthermore, 
global oil production capacity exceeds global demand, a situation that will remain 
the same for at least the next decade due to the latest investments in production 
capacities. In addition to the developments on the front of the unconventional 
resources in North America and in other parts of the world, and the possible 
technological breakthroughs that could occur in the transport sector, there is 
evidence indicating the real possibility for a significant decline or collapse in the 
price of oil below the fiscal breakeven oil price after 2030. Historically, the oil 
market has had a fluid nature, with each “oil boom” usually being followed by an 
“oil bust”. Even if the unconventional resources are more expensive to produce, 
there is no guarantee that the price of oil will remain high, and this argument is 
weak when confronted with past historical experiences, as it “does not take into 
account the fact that learning by doing may significantly lower production costs 
for now ‘frontier’ resources, just like it did for North Sea oil or Canadian sands” 
(Lescaroux, 2010, p. 125). 
 Indeed, many of the same characteristics as the time period directly 
preceding the price collapse of the mid-1980s are currently prevalent, primarily:  
 There has been a technological breakthrough in the field of 
unconventional oil production with the shale gas revolution in the U.S., 
a situation similar to the exploitation of the North Sea oil and gas 
deposits.  
 New discoveries of unconventional oil reserves have been located 
largely outside of the OPEC countries.  
 Governments have the political will to implement policies encouraging 
the production of unconventional oil in the U.S., Canada and in other 
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countries. The same public support existed for the development of 
North Sea resources and for the development of nuclear energy in 
France for the production of electricity.  
 The high prices of oil permit the profitable production of 
unconventional oil. The cost of producing a barrel of shale oil is 
usually between US$ 50-65, while the price of oil is currently over 
US$ 100 per barrel (Maugeri, 2012, p. 54).   
 The price collapse in 1986 was preceded by a phase of intense 
investment in production capacity, benefiting from the rise in oil prices 
during the 1970s. This investment trend has also been seen since the 
beginning of the rise of the price of oil in 2000. This dynamic will lead 
to the expansion of production capacities and the saturation of the 
global oil market in the long run.  
If the repercussions of the U.S. shale gas revolution were projected onto 
the decreased prices for gas in the North American market, it would be logical to 
conclude that the shale gas scenario is on the cusp of repeating itself in the 
production of shale oil followed by a decrease in the price of oil in the 
international markets
60
. Furthermore, there is a real possibility that this experience 
will also be replicated in other world regions, such as China. It appears that the 
long-term price collapse scenario below US$ 100/b is likely to take place between 
2030 and 2035, if no other global economic crises occur before this date or if a 
geopolitical event does not push the prices to another record high level. 
 In addition to the points above, a potential crisis between OPEC members 
also looms with the gradual return of Iraq and Iran on the oil market to claim their 
justified share in OPEC’s production, which will inevitably put them in direct 
confrontation with Saudi Arabia, which has benefited from both nations’ long 
absence from the oil market. The fiscal pressure and the geopolitical environment 
will make it very difficult for Saudi Arabia to decrease its production in order to 
                                                          
60
 It is worth mentioning that the oil and gas markets are different, and that there 
is no international market price for gas but instead regional fragmented markets 
with regional prices that are not linked to each other. Contrary to gas, there is an 
international oil market with an international price, and therefore any changes in 
the profile of production in one region of the world can and do have an impact on 
the price of oil. 
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allow for the increase of the Iraqi and Iranian oil production without leading to a 
sharp decline in oil prices.  
 As far as Iraq is concerned, the IEA’s 2012 World Energy Outlook report 
considers it the future potential big player in the oil industry. However, this 
prospect will need time to materialize, as there is a need for significant 
investments requiring at least a decade before any substantial increase in the Iraqi 
oil production can take place; moreover, there are a number of obstacles that stand 
in the way of developing Iraq’s potential. The first obstacle is the political 
instability of the country and its security consequences, as it will be very difficult 
for Iraq to develop its oil industry in the absence of security and political stability. 
The second potential obstacle could come from Iran, which “regards any 
substantial expansion in Iraqi output as a threat because that could lead to lower 
prices . . . [as] [f]rom a geopolitical point of view, Iran does not want Iraq to 
supplant it as the second largest producer in the Gulf and in OPEC” (Yergin, 2011, 
p. 297). Iran’s calculations in that respect were very clear in 2010, when Iran 
lifted its own reserve estimates from 138 billion to 150 billion barrels a week after 
Iraq raised its reserve estimates from 115 to 143 billion, as a result of new bidding 
rounds and exploration efforts (Yergin, 2011, p. 297). 
 In the more immediate term, the most probable confrontation could take 
place between Iran and Saudi Arabia following the signature of the nuclear deal 
between Iran and the group of P 5+1
61
 in Geneva in November 2013 (“Iran 
Agrees to Curb Nuclear Activity”, 2013), which opens the way for signing a 
permanent agreement in six months and the return of Iran’s production and export 
capacities before the sanctions. In this respect, it is interesting to note that Iran’s 
oil production has been gradually rising since the signature of the Geneva nuclear 
deal (Lawler & Saul, 2014).  
 
 
                                                          
61
 The five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany. 
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3.2.3.5. The potential repercussions of an oil price collapse on the 
GCC 
Given the dependency of political economy of the GCC countries on oil 
revenues, the decrease in the price of oil will undoubtedly have severe 
repercussions on the GCC economies and societies with possible political 
implications. On the domestic level, a collapse in the price of oil would 
doubtlessly have a negative impact on the GCC government budgets, especially if 
this takes place simultaneously with a shrinking global demand for Gulf oil, given 
the predictions that other oil-consuming countries, such as China, will develop 
their unconventional oil and gas resources.  
 The financial difficulties that could befall the Gulf states would 
necessarily impact their ability to satisfy social demands and maintain 
the state’s distributive role, which could engender acute political 
crises.  
 The dearth of financial resources could then push Gulf governments 
toward external debt, requiring them to submit to the conditions of the 
lending institutions if the oil bust were to last for more than five years. 
In fact, because of their massive foreign currency reserves, Gulf 
economies are capable of surviving an oil price collapse for various 
periods of time, but it will also lead to more conservative fiscal and 
budgetary policies, as we will see in chapter 4. 
 As far as the subject of this research is concerned, i.e., the 
diversification of the energy sources in the power generation sector, it 
is very probable that the materialization of the oil price decline below 
the fiscal break-even oil price could also probably lead to a decline in 
the planned investments for deploying renewable and alternative 
energy sources in the power generation sector, as the GCC 
governments will be faced by hard policy choices between maintaining 
their expenditures for social programs, and their investments in 
diversifying their energy sources. 
 In short, if the scenario of an oil price collapse takes place, the region will 
witness the same crises it experienced during the 1980s and the 1990s, but with a 
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greater intensity than the previous oil busts given the growing size of social 
demands that has been induced by the combination of economic and population 
growth, in addition to the very instable geopolitical environment represented by 
the Arab Spring and which is not expected to abate in the short or even long term, 
and from which the GCC countries will most probably not be completely immune 
from.  
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Chapter 4 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE GCC WITHIN 
THE RENTIER STATE PARADIGM: A COMBINED 
MACRO- AND MESO-LEVEL ANALYSIS 
 
This chapter will be dedicated in its first part to a review of the rentier 
state theory from the classical period in the 1970s and 1980s and its evolution 
until to the present time. The second part of this chapter will analyse the impact of 
the rentier nature of the socio-political contract in place in the region on the 
political economy of the GCC countries. In a third and final part, a special 
attention will also be given to the power generation sector in the GCC countries 
with, in a first stage, a detailed analysis of the power industry within the MLP 
framework of analysis, and in a second stage, we will deal with the economics of 
power generation in the GCC region and how electricity consumption has been 
affected by the rentier nature of the regional political economy. 
 
4.1. THE RENTIER STATE THEORY: A CRITICAL REVIEW 
The starting point for discussing the concept of an energy transition in the 
power generation sector of the GCC countries should necessarily start by a review 
of the rentier state theory as, within the framework of the multilevel perspective, it 
represents a major landscape shaping factor of the political economy of the GCC 
countries, the culture and values of the society, as well as the whole energy 
system of the region and more particularly, the regimes actors at the meso-level. 
Indeed, an objective and scientific study of the political economy of the 
GCC countries with a focus on the energy system of the region coupled with a 
future outlook perspective must necessarily take into consideration the very 
specific socio-political context of the rentier, or distributive, state paradigm. The 
importance of this context, in this respect, is recognized by Tim Niblock when he 
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states that “an understanding of the dynamics affecting policy and development 
should provide a basis on which to project likely future developments” (Niblock 
& Malik, 2007, p. 2). Such consideration is necessary in order to build the 
scenarios and to precisely identify and evaluate the potential obstacles and 
opportunities that could face the GCC countries in their efforts to engage in a 
successful energy transition towards a more sustainable and diversified energy 
system in the power generation sector.  
Similarly, the institutional context in which policies are conceived and 
implemented should also be considered when making policy recommendations for 
mitigating environmental impact from climate change or transitioning to a more 
sustainable energy system. 
 
4.1.1. The Main Assumptions of the Classical Period 
The concept of economic rent goes back to the classical political economy 
writings of Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Thomas Robert Malthus and Karl Marx 
in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The term was first used by these 
authors in relation to the pre-capitalist relations of land property in the context of 
the economy they were living in and which described an unearned income that 
stems from the physical property of land. According to Adam Smith, a Scottish 
economist who is considered the father of modern economics and political 
economy, rent originates from a monopoly situation as in his words “the rent of 
land . . . considered as the price paid for the use of land, is naturally a monopoly 
price” (Smith, 2011, p. 225). In Karl Marx’s work, it is used in order to describe a 
monopoly situation on a limited natural resource that allows for the generation of 
a ground-rent or a surplus profit. According to Marx, the surplus profit, or the 
ground rent, generated is not the result of capital invested in the sphere of 
production, but from “a monopolized force of nature which . . . is only at the 
command of those who have at their disposal particular portions of the earth and 
its appurtenances” (Marx, 1959, p. 630). Grounded on this definition, Marx makes 
a distinction between on one hand, capital investment which is based on a 
combination of capital, labour and means of production in order to produce goods, 
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and on the other hand, an economy of rent which is based on a situation of 
monopoly on a natural force or resource 
In modern economics, and according to Bannock, rent is defined as “the 
difference between the return made by a factor of production and the return 
necessary to keep the factor in its current occupation” (Bannock et al., 1992, p. 
129), or in other words, when the difference exceeds normal levels of the owner’s 
opportunity cost. 
As far as the use of the term ‘state’ is concerned, it is worth noting that in 
the context of the GCC countries, the concept of state as proposed by Weber and 
Marx are only partially relevant to the region, as according to Weber, one of the 
main functions of the state is the extraction function, whereas in the case of the 
GCC, the states are relieved from this function (Beblawi, 1990, p. 89). The 
Marxist approach regarding the term state emphasizes the concept of class, which 
does not apply to the region, as the social linkages and identities are based on a 
variable combination depending on the context, of the family, the tribe and 
religion. The only class distinction that could be made in the context of the GCC 
is between the local and expatriate populations (Okruhlik, 1999, p. 295).  
State formation in the GCC countries has taken place in two phases. The 
first phase started before the advent of the oil wealth and saw the creation of 
various state institutions that allowed for the exercise of power from the ruling 
elites, and which included the army, the security forces, and the bureaucracy. 
Simultaneously, based on the pre-existing relations of patronage and clientelism 
within the historical pattern of ‘sheikhly rule’, a process that took place of 
“incorporation of one or more groups of social actors into the state, who in turn 
would become key stakeholders in the maintenance of the evolving political 
system” (Kamrava, 2012, p. 39). These social groups that included rich merchants 
and representatives of big families or tribes constituted what can be called the 
neo-patrimonial network through which the ruling families established their 
power. The second phase started with the advent of oil wealth, which reinforced 
the ulterior process and “enabled state actors to deepen their incorporation of the 
different social groups into the orbit of the state, and to devise new ways in which 
this incorporation took shape” (Kamrava, 2012, p. 40). It is within this context 
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that the rentier arrangements were devised as an instrument of power and wealth 
distribution. As rightly stated by Karl (1999), when state-building coincides with 
petroleum exploitation, the outcome is a self-reinforcing “legacy of overly 
centralized political power, strong networks of complicity between public and 
private sector actors, [and] highly uneven mineral-based development subsidized 
by oil rents” (as cited in Eifert, Gelb, & Tallroth, 2002, p. 5). 
It is the specific history and context of the oil producing countries in 
general, including the monarchies of the Gulf, that the rentier state theory has 
emerged, as there was a need for a specific theoretical framework in order to 
understand the state society relations in the oil producing countries and the 
political economy of an oil based economy.  
Since the second half of the twentieth century, the term rentier state has 
been used to define states that derive their revenues from an external source of 
revenue and especially the states of the oil producing countries of the Persian Gulf. 
Hossein Mahdavy first developed the rentier state theory in the Iranian context in 
1970, but it was only with the publication of Beblawi and Luciani’s edited 
collection, The Rentier State (1987) that the theory took shape and the foundation 
of most of the rentier state literature in the context of the oil producing countries 
was produced. Beblawi and Luciani make a clear distinction between a rentier 
state and a rentier economy, as the first is a consequence of the second, and they 
identify four main characteristics of an ideal rentier state: Firstly, the origin of the 
rent must be external and generated outside the economy; secondly, at least 40% 
of the revenues of the state originates from the external rent
 
(Luciani, 1987, p. 70); 
thirdly, the majority of the population is involved in the consumption and 
redistribution of the rent instated of producing it
 
(Hanieh, 2011, p. 11); finally, the 
government is the main beneficiary of the rent and has the responsibility of 
redistributing it through government expenditures. 
From the literature dealing with the concept of the rentier state, we can 
clearly identify the following key dynamics that characterize the rentier state: 
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The first dynamic refers to the centrality of the state, as it “becomes the 
origin of all significant economic and social developments and the determinant of 
how resources are spread around the population” (Niblock & Malik, 2007, p. 15). 
The second dynamic concerns the significant degree of autonomy that a 
rentier state enjoys from the different sectors or interests groups within the society 
or economy, as it does not need to extract revenues from them in the form of taxes. 
The resulting autonomy gives the state the “ability to plan and pursue an 
economic strategy unfettered by special interests” (Niblock & Malik, 2007, p. 19). 
The third dynamic arises in consequence to the two above-mentioned 
dynamics, and concerns a government independent from local economic forces 
and therefore uninterested in long-term planning and development policies, 
needing only an expense policy
 
(Luciani, 1990, p. 76). 
In the fourth dynamic, the relations between the ruling family and the 
political and economic elites take place within a neo-patrimonial network through 
which the rent is redistributed and the relations with the rest of the society are 
managed in order to compensate for the lack of a larger political representation
 
(Gray, 2011, p. 7). According to the neo-patrimonial theory, the ruler is at the 
heart of a dependent network of elites who compete for a share of the rent, and 
through their own client list network, redistribute the rent to the lower levels of 
the neo-patrimonial structure in the institutions and the society at large. Through 
this fully integrated network the rent is redistributed; in addition, the network 
plays an important role in keeping intact the whole political system.
62
 
The fifth dynamic concerns the rentier mentality that characterizes the 
society and which is reflected in an excessive and wasteful pattern of consumption, 
especially insofar as energy consumption is concerned. According to Beshara, 
“the rentier mentality is a corrupt, parasite and unproductive mentality, in addition 
to being authoritarian and non-ideological” (2012, p. 327). 
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 For a detailed analysis of the neo-patrimonial structure of the Arab countries of 
the Gulf, please see Bill and Springborg, Politics in the Middle East (1990). 
 
  163 
In the sixth dynamic, the commercial and service sectors represent a much 
larger share of the economy and at the expense of the industrial and agricultural 
sectors. As Niblock points out, “given that the state has the resources to permit 
substantial imports, and that it has an interest in satisfying popular demands for 
adequate and reasonably priced food and consumer goods, there is a strong 
dynamic against production” (2007, p. 17).  
The seventh dynamic involves the near-absence or weakness of the civil 
society, which is not organized enough in order to claim a larger political 
representation or to have a say in the economic or political choices of their 
country. According to Beblawi, the financial surplus enjoyed by the rentier state 
leads to a bargain between political rights and economic welfare, which in turn 
explains the near absence of democratic institutions in almost all of the Arab 
countries of the Gulf
 (1987, p. 59). In this respect, Beshara adds, “the weakness of 
the civil society is due to the fact that the society is not immune from the state as 
its immunity is not based on rights but on privileges and on tribal linkages” (2012, 
p. 328). 
The eighth and final dynamic concerns the significant size of the 
expatriate labour in the economy given the importance of the revenues, the size of 
the economy, and the very small population of the Arab countries of the Gulf. The 
issue of the expatriate labour raises the issue of the local labour competitiveness 
for GCC countries that have recently initiated policies in order to reduce the 
number of foreign workers and replace them with a local labour. This is, indeed, 
the case in Saudi Arabia where, according to Niblock, “Saudi governments in the 
past two decades have sought, no doubt justifiably, to reduce reliance on foreign 
labour (skilled, unskilled and professional) [and] the impact of these measures has 
been to raise overall labour costs and reduce labour productivity” (2007, p. 3). 
 
4.1.2. A Critical Perspective of the Theory 
Since its first elaboration, the rentier state theory produced an intense 
academic debate about the validity of some its assumptions about the economic, 
social, and political context of the oil producing countries, and especially in light 
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of the significant developments the countries of the Gulf have witnessed in these 
contexts since the seventies. It is worth noting that the critiques to the theory and 
the changes witnessed by the rentier states of the Gulf have led to a number of 
changes in the theory that do not undermine its main assumptions or its validity as 
a theoretical framework for the study of the Arab countries of the Gulf. However, 
the rentier state theory has gradually evolved through a number of phases and is 
now mainly known as the ‘late rentier state theory’, as defined by Gray (2011)63. 
The critiques directed to the rentier state theory can be summarized as 
follows: 
The classical rentier state theory suggests an impression of unrealistic 
determinism, as if the oil rent is the only factor controlling the destiny of these 
countries and that their future is predictable. However, as suggested by Niblock, 
rent is not the only factor that determines the conception of policies and their 
outcomes, as there are other factors, internal and external, that influence the 
rentier states and impose on them policies that reduce the unlimited autonomy the 
classical rentier state theory implies. Domestically, the autonomy of the state can 
be limited by interests arising from within the state itself represented by high level 
state officials or members of the ruling family
 
(Niblock & Malik, 2007, p. 19). In 
addition, the necessary spending on social services as in health and education has 
ultimately led to higher future expectations in the sectors of employment as a 
result of the demographical growth and the generalization of education at all 
levels. The public employment policies implemented by the GCC countries since 
the seventies have led to the creation of large bureaucracies that represent a 
significant financial burden to the budgets of their governments and are now 
increasingly involved and consulted in the decision making process. 
Internationally, the instability of the international oil market and its influence on 
the GCC economies, in addition to regional and international geopolitical factors, 
has greatly reduced the margin of autonomy of the rentier states as assumed by the 
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 For a full and detailed analysis of the stages of developments the rentier state 
theory has witnessed and especially the last phase known as ‘late rentierism’, 
please read Gray (2011), A Theory of Late Rentierism in the Arab States of the 
Gulf.  
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classical rentier state theory. As members of the international community, the 
GCC countries have international obligations that factor into the policy-making 
process, as mentioned earlier in chapter 3 regarding the climate change issue. 
Another critique of the classical theory points out that the centrality of the 
rentier state does not grant the capacity to induce social changes, as the rentier 
nature of the socio-political contract in place in these countries deprives the state 
of the capacity to impose taxes on its citizens. Collecting taxes is one of the tools 
available to states in order to influence and change social relations and 
consumption behaviour in the society, and is a very efficient tool for collecting 
statistical data about the economy. However, the GCC countries are deprived of 
this tax structure and their governments are therefore limited in their capacity of 
inducing social change. 
The classical theory moreover assumes that the commercial and service 
sectors represent a much larger share of the economy and at the expense of the 
industrial sector, whereas the actual context of the GCC countries shows a 
different reality. Actually, Gulf Arab countries have been able to develop an 
important petrochemical industrial base in addition to transformation industries 
that rely on oil and gas as a feedstock. The GCC countries have successfully used 
their relative advantage of oil and gas availability at low prices in order to build a 
significant and competitive petrochemical industrial sector. 
Finally, the classical theory’s assumption that a rentier state is not 
interested in policy-making and especially long-term and strategic planning has 
proven to be incorrect. The GCC governments are not only limited to a 
redistributive role of the rent, as they have shown, since the seventies, an interest 
and improving capacity in long-term strategic planning in all the sectors of the 
economy. Indeed, the huge investments made in education, health care, 
infrastructure, and industrial development, are unmistakably the result of a 
visionary and developmental approach that has radically changed the societies and 
economies of the GCC countries that are now much more diversified and 
integrated into the world economy.  
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The classical theory has thus ignored the possibility of a gradual evolution 
of the rentier states of the Gulf into states that, as a result of domestic and 
international challenges, increasingly share characteristics of ‘state capitalism’. 
This possibility is an important assumption of the late rentier theory, as we will 
see later in this chapter
 
(Gray, 2011, p. 8). 
As a result of these developments, the classical rentier state theory, has 
also been adapted to the new realities of the oil producing countries, and 
following the classical phase, which lasted from the end of the 1970s to the early 
1990s, the second phase of the theory is defined as the ‘specialised and 
conditional rentier state’ theory, and the third actual phase is defined as the ‘late 
rentier state’ theory (Gray, 2011). 
However, the theory remains valid in its main assumptions. Indeed, the 
revenues from oil and gas still represent the main source of revenue of the GCC 
countries, and the rentier nature of the socio-political contract is still in place 
despite some political reforms at different levels from one country to another. The 
state is still the main economic and political player, and there are very clear 
boundaries that define the limits of political as well as economic transformations 
or developments, limits that are to be found in the socio-political contract at the 
landscape level. 
 
4.1.3. The New Perspective of Late Rentierism 
The classical rentier state theory has evolved through a number of 
developments and phases that reflected the developments the rentier states have 
been witnessing since the first oil boom of the seventies. In the academic literature, 
this evolved theory is known as the theory of late rentierism. In this latest 
articulation, the main assumption of the classical rentier state theory is still valid 
as the revenues from oil and gas still represent the main source of state revenue. 
However, the new theoretical framework takes into consideration the 
developments and transformations witnessed by rentier states and societies since 
the seventies and is now more adapted for the study of the actual economic 
political and social realities of rentier states. In his latest study of the Arab states 
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of the Gulf 
 
(2011), Gray describes the main characteristics of the late rentier state 
as follows: 
 A responsive but non-democratic state. As a result of the significant 
economic and population growth the GCC societies have witnessed in the 
past decades, the GCC societies have been completely transformed. The 
new reality of the GCC societies has created new domestic and 
international challenges that have pushed the states of the GCC to be 
responsive and to adapt to the new realities imposed on them but without 
reaching the level of a genuine democratic transformation of the political 
system. Domestically, the GCC governments have been positively 
responsive to the growing demand for education, employment, health, 
social services, and communication by investing heavily in the 
developments of these services. The GCC countries have also been 
responsive politically by engaging in limited political reforms in varied 
degrees between countries, but without undermining the status or role of 
the ruling elites. It is worth noting here the exception of the Kuwaiti 
political experience, where an elected parliament exists. This is largely due 
to the very specific history of the Kuwaiti parliament and the nature of the 
social relationships among the elite. On the international scene, the role 
and position of the GCC countries in the world economy as providers of 
energy has put on them an additional pressure and responsibility within the 
framework of the concept of energy security. There is, indeed, a mutual 
interdependency between the oil and gas producers of the GCC region and 
the consumers in the global economy that seriously curtails the assumed 
autonomy of the rentier state as claimed by the classical rentier state 
theory. 
 A state that is open to globalization but retains a certain level of economic 
protectionism. The classical rentier state theory assumed a tendency to 
isolationism, which—while potentially true during the period between the 
thirties and seventies—proved incorrect after the first oil boom. Indeed, 
the GCC countries have rapidly opted for a certain level of economic open 
door policy and integration into the world economy in their efforts to 
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diversify their economies. In this respect, it is worth noting that one of the 
reasons that explains the significant economic growth the GCC countries 
in the past decades is their success in opening their economies to the 
global economy. However, they have simultaneously kept a significant 
level of governmental control on the strategic sectors of the economy 
represented by the energy sector, through public oil companies. In this 
respect, the GCC economies are monopoly economies. 
 A dynamic developmental economic policy based on long-term planning. 
Since the seventies, the late rentier state has been a dynamic economic 
player interested in development and long-term planning. Saudi Arabia 
announced its first five-year plan in 1970 conceived on the basis of a long-
term strategic vision. Nowadays, almost all GCC countries plan for the 
future within the frameworks of long-term visions, as manifested by the 
“2030 Vision” for Qatar, “Abu Dhabi’s 2030 Urban Plan”, and “Oman’s 
2020 Vision”. Furthermore, most GCC countries have embarked in long-
term economic diversification strategies and policies with significant 
investments for building an industrial infrastructure as well as in 
educational infrastructures in order to prepare for the transition of their 
economies from rentier economies to knowledge economies. Moreover, 
GCC governments have also invested substantial amounts of their oil 
revenues into sovereign funds in order to diversify their revenues and 
prepare for the post-oil period. 
 An ‘energy driven’ economy vs. an ‘energy-centric’ economy. The GCC 
economies have evolved from a phase where oil wealth was at the centre 
of the economy (between the fifties and the late eighties), to an economy 
where the wealth generated by oil is still a major source of its revenues, 
but is invested as a method of developing the economy in projects in 
petrochemical and transformative industries
 
(Gray, 2011, p. 31). These 
investments have been done within the framework of economic 
diversification policies by using their comparative advantage as oil and gas 
producers. 
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 An ‘entrepreneurial state capitalist’ structure. The dominant role played 
by the GCC states in the economy and their ownership of the means of 
production have given them, since the nineties, the features of a ‘new state 
capitalist’ or ‘entrepreneurial state’ structure as defined by Bremmer 
(2010). In the GCC context, the ‘entrepreneurial state’ has a number of 
characteristics that we can summarize in the following points: First, the 
energy companies are owned by the state but are managed professionally; 
second, the energy policies of the GCC are essentially based on a resource 
nationalist approach; third, the major companies outside the energy sector 
are either public companies or majority owned by the state; fourth, the 
private companies are owned by members of the ruling family or by an 
elite composed of families or persons closely associated with the ruling 
families. According to Gray, “there is a friendly-business policy 
orientation among the new or entrepreneurial state capitalist leadership but 
this remains subservient to the state” (2011, p. 33). 
 An active and innovative foreign policy. In opposition to the classical 
rentier state theory, the rentier Arab states of the Gulf have been able to 
develop very active regional and international policies and to defend their 
interests efficiently in international forums. This is the case for the climate 
change issue, which, if the world economies reduce their consumption of 
oil, represents a serious potential threat to the rentier Arab states’ position 
as the main supplier of hydrocarbons. This development has been even 
more noticeable since the beginning of the Arab Spring and the active and 
influential role the GCC countries have been playing regionally, even if 
GCC governments have divergent and sometimes conflicting visions or 
policies regarding the Arab Spring. Furthermore, the GCC countries have 
established strong strategic and security bonds with the major world 
powers, with Great Britain in a first stage until the seventies and the U.S.  
in a second stage following the withdrawal of Great Britain from the 
region, in order to protect them from regional and international threats. 
Concluding this critical review of the rentier state theory, we will now 
move to an analysis of the political economy of the GCC countries in order to 
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highlight the role of oil and its consequences on the economics and politics of the 
region. 
 
4.2. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE GCC: CHALLENGES AND 
FUTURE OUTLOOK 
It is an undisputed fact that oil rents and proceeds have had a central effect 
on the political economy of GCC countries since the 1930s when oil was 
discovered in the Arabian Peninsula, but especially following the first oil boom in 
the 1970s. This wealth has become the main axis of the political economy of the 
Arabian countries of the gulf, in a manner that has directly or indirectly affected 
all aspects of life in Gulf societies. On the local level, oil-based economies have 
contributed to the establishment of a socio-political contract that is characterized 
by the distribution of benefits to citizens through social services and high 
government spending in exchange for the citizens’ abdication of their right to 
political participation. Regionally and globally, the Gulf lies at the heart of the 
geopolitics of energy due to its abundant reserves of oil and gas. The influence of 
the oil wealth is not limited to the oil-exporting countries of the GCC, but extends 
to other countries in the Middle East and North Africa as well as Asia through the 
migrant remittances transferred from the oil-producing countries of the GCC. In 
2012 the total outflow of remittances transferred from the GCC countries 
(excluding the UAE for which there are no data) reached more than US$ 66 
billion (World Bank, 2013).  
The objective of this section is to undertake an analysis of the political 
economy of the GCC by focusing on two aspects. The first will highlight the role 
of oil revenues in the political economy of the GCC countries and how it has been 
historically affected by the volatility of the oil market. By doing so, the focus will 
be placed on the circumstances and impact of the oil price collapse in the 1980s 
on the GCC states in order to evaluate the potential consequences of an oil price 
collapse on the GCC economies, based on the past historical experience of the 
economic crisis the GCC countries witnessed as a result of the collapse of oil 
prices in the mid-1980s. This approach is justified by the fact that some aspects 
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and circumstances of the pre-1986 oil price collapse seem to be taking place now, 
as can be seen in the development of unconventional oil and gas in North America 
and discussed in detail in chapter 3. The second point of focus will deal with the 
political situation in the GCC countries and its relation to their economic 
performances, within the context of the Arab Spring and how it could affect the 
GCC political establishments in the long run. 
According to Kamrava (2012), the political economy of the GCC region 
has been characterized by three broad developments: first, the GCC countries 
have been witnessing a rapid economic growth and massive investments in 
infrastructural projects that have completely transformed these countries over the 
past decades. The second development concerns their unprecedented integration 
into the global economy, which has greatly contributed to their development 
efforts. Finally, the third trend that characterizes the political economy of the 
GCC is the emergence of the post-oil era debate and the premise of a sustainable 
development agenda through the strategic choice of building knowledge-based 
economies in the long run (Kamrava, 2012, pp. 1-3). 
In conjunction with these three main trends in the political economy of the 
GCC countries, there are, correspondingly, three main structural challenges that 
are facing the countries of the region (Kamrava, 2012, p. 5). The first structural 
challenge is found in the rentier nature of their political economy and its political 
as well as economic consequences. The second challenge involves the population 
issue, as the GCC countries are characterized by a small indigenous population 
despite the significant population growth of the last decades, and the reliance of 
their economies for achieving their developmental goals on imported labor to the 
extent where imported labor represents around 80% of the overall population in 
the most extreme cases of the UAE and Qatar. The third challenge comprises the 
structural deficiencies of their economies, as the economic performance of the 
GGC states is characterized by its volatility, which has been hampering the 
development efforts of their governments. 
The first structural challenge represented by the rentier nature of the 
political economy of the region has already been dealt with in the first section of 
this chapter from a theoretical perspective, knowing that the rentier nature of the 
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GCC region is a structuring factor that belongs to the macro-level within the MLP 
framework of analysis. In the following sections, we will first deal in detail with 
the second structural challenge, namely the population growth and structure of the 
region, in addition to a future outlook perspective. It should be noted in this 
respect that the population variable belongs to the macro-level of analysis within 
the MLP framework, as it is a variable that changes very slowly over time and 
directly influences the political economy of the region at the meso-level. 
Following the analysis of the two main macro-level structural challenges, the 
rentier framework and the population growth variable, we will move, in a second 
stage, to a meso-level analysis of the political economy of the GCC countries and 
to its many structural weaknesses and challenges. The first structural weakness is 
most certainly the role of oil revenues in the GCC political economy and how it 
affects the economic performance and the economic diversification efforts. In this 
respect, we will briefly review, in a specific section, the history of economic 
diversification policies in the GCC their relation to oil revenues and their 
challenges. In order to highlight the volatile nature of the GCC region, we will 
analyze the consequences of the oil crisis of the eighties and the nineties, when oil 
prices collapsed in the international markets, on the GCC economic and political 
situation. In a third stage, we will be giving a special attention to the power 
generation sector of the GCC countries in order to highlight the structure of 
electricity consumption in the GCC countries, as a consequence of the rentier 
nature of the political economy, and the challenges that it represents to GCC 
governments. Finally, in a fourth stage, will focus on the political factor in the 
GCC political economy by examining the role of oil in the regional political 
equation and how it affects political stability, coupled with the changing regional 
political map as a result of the Arab Spring, in addition to a future outlook 
perspective, as we consider that it could have a significant impact on the political 
future of the GCC region and on the future course of an energy transition.  
 
4.2.1.   The Population Factor: Structure and Growth 
Since the advent of oil wealth in the Arabian Peninsula in the 1930s, the 
region has witnessed a very significant economic growth, completely 
  173 
transforming the GCC societies and driving a steady and continuous population 
growth that is also expected to continue in the future. The relevance of the 
population growth variable lies in the fact that it is one of the main drivers for 
electricity demand and consumption (Trieb & Klann, 2006, p. 2), and on the fact 
that it is also a variable that belongs to the landscape level within the MLP 
framework of analysis as already explained in chapter 3. However, it should be 
noted that as far as this research is concerned, the population growth variable will 
not be considered as a variable that will affect directly the regimes level, but as an 
explaining factor that sheds light on the growing electricity consumption, the 
pressure that it puts on the available oil and gas resources, and the GHG emissions 
of the GCC countries. 
As a consequence of the unprecedented economic growth, for the past 50 
years, the GCC population has grown ten times, from 4 million in 1950 to 40 
million in 2006, and as such, the GCC countries are considered to have the highest 
population growth in the world (Kapiszewski, 2006, p. 3). Even if the fertility rate 
of the GCC societies declines in the future, the GCC population is still expected to 
continue growing as shown in Table 11 and Figure 11 below based on a medium 
fertility rate
64
 growth projection undertaken by the UN population division. 
Indeed, the fertility rate of GCC societies is expected to decline in the coming 
years in all fertility projections (low, medium, and high). In the case of the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the most populous country of the GCC, the fertility 
rate for the medium projection is expected to decline from 2.68 for the period 
between 2010-2015, to 1.64 for the period between 2045-2050 (United Nations, 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2013b).  
 
 
 
                                                          
64
 According to the United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
fertility rate is defined as: “The average number of children a hypothetical cohort 
of women would have at the end of their reproductive period if they were subject 
during their whole lives to the fertility rates of a given period and if they were not 
subject to mortality. It is expressed as children per woman” United Nations, 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2013b). 
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Table 11 
Population Structure of GCC Countries 
 POP. 
(2010) 
POP.  
(2050) 
POP. 
GROWTH 
(2010-2050) 
URBAN 
POP. 
IMMIG-
RATION 
(2010) 
IMMIG 
% 
(2010) 
BAHRAIN 1,252,000  1,835,000 1.16%  
(avg. annual) 
88.6% 315.4  
(thousands) 
39.1%  
KUWAIT 2,992,000  6,342,000 2.79%         
(avg. annual) 
98.4% 2097.5 
(thousands) 
68.8%  
OMAN 2,803,000  5,065,000 2.01%  
(avg. annual) 
71.7% 826.1 
(thousands)  
28.4%  
QATAR 1,750,000  2,985,000 1.76%  
(avg. annual) 
95.7% 1305.4  
(thousands) 
86.5%  
KSA 27,258,000  40,388,000 1.20%  
(avg. annual) 
82.3% 7288.9 
(thousands) 
27.8% 
UAE 8,442,000  15,479,000 2.08%  
(avg. annual) 
77.9% 3293.3 
(thousands) 
70.0%  
TOTAL 44,497,000  70,442,500 1.45%  
(avg. annual) 
85.7% 15126.6 
(thousands) 
53.4%  
Note: Adapted from The Migration and Remittances Factbook, by World Bank, 
2011, and World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision, by United Nations, 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2013b (treated 
by the author).  
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Figure 11: GCC population growth 2010-2050 (Medium Fertility Projection). 
Adapted from The Migration and Remittances Factbook, by World Bank, 2011, 
and World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision, by United Nations, 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2013b (treated 
by the author).  
According to the United Nations medium fertility growth projection, the 
GCC population will grow from 44.5 million in 2010 to over 70 million in 2050, 
which represents a 58.3% increase for the whole period, and an average annual 
increase of 1.45% per year. In terms of population, Saudi Arabia is the dominating 
country, accounting for more than 57% of the total GCC population in 2050. This 
population growth will represent a major challenge to the GCC economies and 
will put significant pressure on the energy resources of the region. 
As far as the GCC employment situation is concerned, it is characterized 
by a structural imbalance, as foreign labor constitutes the majority of the 
workforce in the private sector, with high unemployment among GCC nationals 
despite a policy in place for more than a decade to increase the share of nationals 
(Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia [ESCWA], 2013, p. 8). 
Indeed, The public sector is the main employer in the oil producing countries of 
  1 252   1 360   1 480   1 571   1 642   1 705   1 760   1 804   1 835 
  2 992   3 583   4 015 
  4 432   4 833   5 224   5 610 
  5 987   6 342   1 750 
  2 351   2 543 
  2 662   2 760   2 842 
  2 912   2 962   2 985 
  27 258 
  29 898 
  32 341 
  34 207 
  35 634 
  36 924 
  38 193   39 394 
  40 388 
  8 442 
  9 577 
  10 602 
  11 479 
  12 330 
  13 201 
  14 064 
  14 842 
  15 479 
0
  10 000
  20 000
  30 000
  40 000
  50 000
  60 000
  70 000
  80 000
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
United
Arab
Emirat
es
Saudi
Arabia
Qatar
Oman
Kuwait
Bahrai
n
  176 
the Persian Gulf (including Iraq and Iran), as according to official figures, the 
public sector employs 22% of the active population (Kamrava, 2012, p. 56), 
whereas according to Michael Herb, in the GCC countries alone, 90% of nationals 
are employed by the state (Herb, 2009, p. 382). 
 
4.2.2.   Oil Dependency of GCC Economies 
Thanks to oil revenues, the GCC countries have witnessed a significant 
economic growth and a radical transformation of their societies and economies, 
moving them from the status of one of the poorest and less developed regions in 
the world before the 1970s, to one of the richest, with some of the highest per 
capita GDPs in the world. Qatar’s per capita GDP was estimated at US$ (at PPP) 
101,717 in 2013 (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2014a, p. 8) and the UAE 
around US$ (at PPP) 54,839 per capita (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2014b, 
p. 9). In the long run, the GCC’s real GDP is expected to grow by 56% as nominal 
GDP, as from US$ 341.6 billion in 2000 is expected to be over US$ 2 trillion by 
2020 (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2010, p. 2). 
The oil dependency of the GCC economies is a fact that can hardly be 
challenged, even if relative progress has been made for the diversification of the 
GCC economies since the seventies
65
. This dependency is very obvious in the 
sensibility of their GDP growth trends to oil price fluctuations in the international 
markets as can be seen in Figure 12 below: 
 
                                                          
65
 In political economy, the concept of economic diversification refers to a set of 
policies that aim at reducing the dependence of the economy on the revenues of a 
limited, or single, export commodity that are subject to price and volume 
fluctuations (Diversification, 2001, p. 360). 
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Figure 12: Oil price change versus real GDP growth in the GCC and other 
economies 1977-2005.
66
 Adapted from Economic Diversification: The Road to 
Sustainable Development, by Abouchakra et al., 2008, p. 9.  
The high economic concentration in the GCC economies exposes their 
economies to the exogenous fluctuation of oil price in the international markets 
and as a consequence, affects the sustainability of their revenues and of their 
expenditure policies in the long term. 
 
4.2.2.1.  The chronic volatility of GCC economies 
The economic performance of the GGC states is characterized by its 
volatility; Figure 13 below presents the average annual growth of GDP per capita 
and the level of volatility measured on the basis of the standard deviation of the 
annual growth rate. In this way, one can observe fluctuations, representing 
instances of “oil shocks,” in average growth each decade. Most GCC states, with 
the exception of Kuwait and Qatar, witnessed significant economic growth during 
the 1970s, with rates of 12.6 percent in the UAE, 5.7 percent in Saudi Arabia, 5.5 
percent in Oman, and 2.9 percent in Bahrain. In the 1980s, all Gulf countries 
except Oman saw their economies shrink, with rates exceeding -3.6 percent in 
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 Transformation economies consist of: Hong Kong, Ireland, New Zealand, 
Norway, Singapore and South Korea. These economies have initiated or 
completed transformation to an industrialized nation sometime in the second half 
of the 20
th
 century. Group of Seven (G7) economies consist of Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States (Shediac et al., 
2008, p. 2). 
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Kuwait and -6.4 percent in Saudi Arabia (Koren & Tenreyo, 2010, p. 3). With the 
rebound in oil prices during the late 1990s and the early 2000s, economic growth 
rates are back on the rise in all GCC states, and they maintain an exceptional 
economic stability. In sum, the common denominator between all Gulf economies 
is their extreme instability and the tie between their economies and the oil 
market’s volatility. However, it must be noted that the volatility of GCC 
economies has been reduced by a factor of 4 since 2005, which is mainly due to 
two reasons: firstly, the rise of the service economy, as a result of the economic 
diversification strategies undertaken by GCC governments since the seventies, 
and secondly, the relative stability of the oil and gas international markets since 
the 1980s (Koren & Tenreyo, 2010, p. 3). 
Bahrain 
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Figure 13: Average yearly growth rates and volatility in the GCC states, 1970-
2006. Adapted from UN statistical database from 1970 to 2006 as cited in 
Volatility, Diversification and Development, by Koren & Tenreyo, 2010, pp. 4-5. 
The data above is a very clear demonstration of the chronic instability of 
the GCC economies and their economic vulnerability as a result of their structural 
dependency on oil export revenues.  
 
4.2.2.2.   The financial burden of the energy subsidies 
Before engaging in the analysis of energy subsidies, it is first necessary to 
define the concept of subsidies and how it will be used in the context of this 
research project. Energy subsidies include consumer subsidies and producer 
subsidies. The first category “arises when the prices paid by consumers, including 
both firms (intermediate consumption) and households (final consumption), are 
below a benchmark price, while producer subsidies arise when prices received by 
suppliers are above this benchmark” (International Monetary Fund, 2013, p. 6). It 
is understood that in the context of the GCC countries and this research, we will 
be dealing with the consumer subsidies. There are different methodologies for 
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calculating subsidies; however, for the sake of this research thesis it has been 
decided to use the IEA’s methodology for calculating subsidies which is based on 
the price-gap approach, and compares domestic prices to shadow international 
prices
67
.  
The rationale behind the energy subsidies in the GCC countries lies in the 
fact that these countries are endowed with substantial oil and gas wealth, but more 
particularly in the nature of the social contract of the region or the rentier state 
structure, which means that political considerations are the main reasons behind 
energy subsidies in the GCC region. Indeed, as rightly put by Fattouh and El-
Katiri, “many Arab Gulf exporters have engaged in providing their citizens with 
plentiful supplies of cheap energy for decades, as a cornerstone of their citizen’s 
participation in the natural resource wealth of their country” (2012, p. 15). The 
political aspect of these subsidies make them very resilient to reform, as the local 
populations consider them rights, and any attempt at bringing reforms to this 
structure could have a potentially high political price. In addition, there is also an 
economic rationale for subsidies found in the economic development or 
industrialization policies of the GCC countries. Indeed, as the countries of the 
region enjoy a comparative advantage from their status of oil and gas producers, 
they have pursued policies of industrialization in the energy intensive industries 
and the petrochemical industries that benefit from subsidized energy prices in 
order to attract foreign investors and to be competitive on the international 
markets. 
In parallel to their political and economic benefits, energy subsidies have 
economic as well as environmental consequences. Economically, energy subsidies 
“create distortive price signals and result in higher energy consumption or 
production, or barriers to entry for cleaner services” (Vagliasindi, 2012, p. 2). 
Higher energy consumption will also put pressure on the limited levels of oil and 
gas reserves, reduce the level of the available quantities for the export market, and 
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 For a detailed account of the IEA’s methodology for calculating subsidies 
please read pages 13 to 15 in: Analysis of the Scope of Energy Subsidies and 
Suggestions for the G-20 Initiative, IEA, OPEC, OECD, World Bank Joint 
Report. Prepared for submission to the G-20 Summit Meeting Toronto (Canada), 
26-27 June 2010. 
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affect the revenues of the government.  On the environmental front, the increased 
energy consumption induced by energy subsidies will only increase the GHG 
emissions in the atmosphere. 
The tables below summarize the level of subsidies in the GCC countries based on 
a pre-tax evaluation
68
, first as a percentage of their GDP, and second as a 
percentage of their budget. 
Table 12  
Pre-Tax Subsidies for Petroleum Products, Electricit,y and Natural Gas, 2011 
(Percent Of GDP). 
 Petroleum 
Products 
Electricity Gas 
Bahrain 5.37 2.57 n/a 
Kuwait 3.09 2.91 1.29 
Oman 3.01 0.76 2.20 
Qatar 1.22 1.20 1.07 
Saudi Arabia 7.46 2.48 n/a 
UAE 0.48 1.86 3.37 
Note: Adapted from IMF staff estimates, OECD, IEA, Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Internationale Zusammenarbeit, IMF World Economic Outlook, and World Bank 
as cited in Energy Subsidy Reform: Lessons and Implications, by IMF, 2013, p. 50. 
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 According to the IMF: 
 Pre-tax subsidies for . . . [petroleum products] are estimated as the 
difference between international prices adjusted for transport margins [in 
case of importing countries] and domestic consumer prices . . . between 
2000 and 2011. International prices are taken as the monthly average of 
spot prices from IEA. (International Monetary Fund, 2013, p. 42)  
Natural gas pre-tax subsidy estimates “are based on IEA data . . . in 37 countries” 
(International Monetary Fund, 2013, p. 42). According to the IMF, the pre-tax 
electricity subsidy estimates  
are based on average domestic prices and cost recovery prices that cover 
production costs, investment cost, distributional loss and the non-payment 
of electricity bills. An upward adjustment is also made for the input 
subsidies that electricity producers may receive through their use of 
subsidized fossil fuel products. For . . . [most] countries, the last year for 
which data are available is 2009. (International Monetary Fund, 2013, p. 
43) 
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The level of the subsidies ranges from a minimum of 3.49% of GDP in 
Qatar to as high as 9.94% of GDP in Saudi Arabia without adding the gas 
subsidies for which there are no available data. Saudi Arabia is, indeed, 
considered to be among the largest subsidizers in the world in absolute terms with 
more than US$ 10 billion of subsidies per year (World Bank, 2009, p. 41). As far 
as electricity subsidies are concerned, they range from as low as 0.76% of GDP in 
Oman and as high as 2.91% of GDP in Kuwait.  
Table 13 
Pre-Tax Subsidies for Petroleum Products, Electricity and Natural Gas, 2011 
(Percent of Government Revenues) 
 Petroleum 
Products 
Electricity Gas 
Bahrain 18.96 9.08 n/a 
Kuwait 4.57 4.30 1.91 
Oman 7.28 1.83 5.31 
Qatar 3.17 3.12 2.78 
Saudi Arabia 14.00 4.66 0.00 
UAE 1.38 5.32 9.61 
Note: Adapted from IMF staff estimates, OECD, IEA, Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Internationale Zusammenarbeit, IMF World Economic Outlook, and World Bank 
as cited in Energy Subsidy Reform: Lessons and Implications, by IMF, 2013, p. 55. 
The figures above are a very clear indication of the burden of subsidies on 
GCC budgets ranging from the lowest value at 9.07% of the budget in Qatar, to 
the high level of 28.04% of the budget in Bahrain, and between these two extreme 
margins, subsidies represent 18.66% of the budget in Saudi Arabia and 16.31% of 
the budget in the UAE.   
The GCC policy of subsidizing energy products in general and electricity 
in particular has led to an increasing electricity penetration in the GCC countries, 
and as a consequence, an increased electricity domestic consumption. However, 
differences exist among the GCC countries in the level of governmental electricity 
subsidies. Indeed, Kuwait and Qatar offer free electricity to their citizens, whereas 
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the price of electricity is heavily subsidized in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Oman. 
The UAE is the only exception in the region, as it has a more energy-conscious 
pricing policy, differing from one state to another, with electricity prices in 
general double the prices in Bahrain and Oman (Qader, 2009, p. 1203).   
Power generation in the GCC countries relies essentially on gas as a 
source of energy, and given that the international gas market is much more 
fragmented and regionalized than the oil market, it is very difficult to evaluate 
accurately the opportunity cost of using gas for power generation in the GCC 
region. However, as the gas industry is more costly than the oil industry, 
especially in the case of the LNG industry, and knowing that most of the gas 
exported outside the region is exported by LNG, which is even more costly than 
its export by pipelines, we can conclude in general terms that the opportunity cost 
for using gas in the power generation industry in the GCC region is lower than the 
opportunity cost of using oil. As a result, there is a significant use of gas among 
GCC countries for power generation and a tendency toward a growing share in the 
power generation energy mix. Therefore, we can conclude that gas is the main 
competitor to other alternative or renewable energy sources. Moreover, electricity 
subsidies represent in themselves another obstacle to the deployment of renewable 
energy technologies, as it is very well established fact that “subsidies to electricity 
reduce the returns to investment in renewable sources” (World Bank, 2009, p. 42). 
Building on this conclusion, we can assume that the development of shale 
gas in the GCC region, which is even more costly to produce and with an even 
lower opportunity cost than conventional gas, could have a negative impact on the 
development of renewable energy technologies in the power generation sector of 
the GCC region, especially if the shale gas resource base is significant as 
evaluated by different sources. 
The burden of the subsidies becomes even more important in case of a 
post-tax
69
 evaluation that takes into consideration the externalities related to the 
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 According to the IMF,  
Post-tax subsidies are estimated as pre-tax subsidies plus a corrective (or 
‘Pigouvian tax’), reflecting an (excise) tax on energy products to charge 
for externalities associated with CO2 emissions, local pollution, and (in the 
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use of fossil fuels and that are not accounted for in GCC budgets, as we can see 
from the table below: 
Table 14 
Post-tax Subsidies for Petroleum Products, Electricity and Natural Gas, 2011 
(Percent of GDP). 
 Petroleum 
Products 
Electricity Gas 
Bahrain 10.01 2.96 1.87 
Kuwait 6.86 3.12 1.81 
Oman 6.54 0.94 3.34 
Qatar 5.42 1.26 1.76 
Saudi Arabia 13.27 2.79 0.65 
UAE 3.49 2.04 4.26 
Note: Adapted from IMF staff estimates, OECD, IEA, Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Internationale Zusammenarbeit, IMF World Economic Outlook, and World Bank 
as cited in Energy Subsidy Reform: Lessons and Implications, by IMF, 2013, p. 60. 
By taking into consideration the externalities that result from subsidizing 
the fossil fuels, including electricity consumption, the percentage of the subsidies 
in the GDP almost doubles in almost all GCC countries as it rises from 7.94% of 
the GDP to 14.84% of the GDP in case of Bahrain, from 5.97% to 10.82% of the 
GDP in case of Oman, from 3.49% to 8.44% of the GDP in Qatar, and from 9.94% 
to 16.71% of the GDP in case of Saudi Arabia. 
The heavy cost of energy subsidies on GCC economies is an established 
fact that needs to be tackled through a reform policy of the subsidies system in 
order to improve the fiscal position of GCC budgets and reduce the domestic 
energy consumption, which is seriously threatening the export capacity of GCC 
                                                                                                                                                               
case of gasoline and motor diesel) other externalities such as traffic 
congestion and accidents; a revenue component, reflecting (ad valorem) 
tax on energy products that would be consistent with taxation of any other 
consumer good at the standard value-added tax (VAT) or general sales tax 
(GST) rate. (International Monetary Fund, 2013, p. 43) 
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countries. Indeed, in the case of Saudi Arabia, for example, as a result of the 
energy subsidies, energy consumption in Saudi Arabia increases by 5% annually, 
and in order to maintain its actual export capacity to actual levels, it will need to 
increase its oil production by 2% annually, which means that by 2030, Saudi oil 
production will have to be at 15 mb/d with a domestic production that will be as 
large as the exports (Gately, Al-Yousef, & Al-Sheikh, p. 2012, p. 65). However, 
given the expected growing expenditures in Saudi Arabia, by 2030 Saudi Arabia 
will need to export as much as 11 mb/d at the actual prices of oil in the 
international markets, if it wants to be able to maintain its expenditures levels and 
to be able to respond to the growing social and economic needs of the society in 
general, which means that Saudi Arabia should be able to export 11 mb/d by 2030 
with an overall oil production of 18 mb/d, which represents a 3% annual increase 
in its production capacity between now and 2030 and not 2% (Gately, et al., 2012, 
p. 65). Therefore, reducing the level of energy subsidies in order to reduce the 
energy consumption of all GCC countries is a vital necessity, assuming that the 
rentier political system is maintained. 
Reforming the subsidies policy in the GCC country will be a challenge 
both economically and politically. Politically, the subsidies issue is intimately 
linked to the rentier nature of the socio-political contract in place in the GCC 
societies, and it is feared that any reform to the subsidies policy, in the absence of 
political reforms, could have serious political implications on the stability of the 
regimes in place. Some reforms have been made in a number of GCC countries 
but on a very limited scope and did not lead to structural changes in the subsidies 
equation. On the economic front, there are concerns that reducing the level of 
energy subsidies in the GCC countries could have adverse effects on the 
competitiveness of its energy intensive industries. It is very well known that the 
GCC countries in their efforts to diversify their economies have heavily invested 
in petrochemical and energy intensive energies where they enjoy a relative 
comparative advantage. Therefore, a reform policy of the subsidies should take 
into account this concern by implementing specific measures in order to mitigate 
the impact of higher energy prices on energy intensive industries.  
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As a result of the heavy burden of the GCC expenditure policies, which 
includes the subsidies discussed in this section, a major uncertainty regarding the 
financial sustainability of the existing expenditure policies of GCC governments 
has become even more evident in the past years, namely the fiscal break-even oil 
price which depends on the price of oil in the international markets and 
determines the level of GCC fiscal revenues and their expenditure policy 
capacities. 
 
4.2.2.3.  The fiscal break-even oil price: A major uncertainty 
The budgets of the GCC states are currently characterized by a monetary 
and external surplus due to the elevated oil prices on the world markets. In 2011, 
financial surpluses reached around 13 percent of the GDP, with the external 
surplus exceeding 24% of the GDP (International Monetary Fund, 2012, p. 10). 
The financial situation of these countries is expected to remain the same in the 
short run; however, the increasing expenditures that have resulted from the rise in 
the price of oil have caused the fiscal breakeven price
70
 for the GCC state budgets 
to rise to historical levels. Moreover, these expenditures are expected to increase 
in the future in order to offer extensive social services to their citizens in 
accordance with the rentier state model, develop their infrastructure, keep up with 
economic growth in the Gulf, and fund their infrastructural and industrial projects. 
In addition, demographic growth is increasing due to natural birth rates among the 
local population and the influx of foreign labor.  
This fact in itself engenders a structural weakness and a propensity toward 
fluctuation. Indeed, Saudi Arabia increased its public “spending by over 100% in 
nominal terms between 2004 and 2009, and Qatar by almost 300%” (Alkadiri, 
2010, p. 76), and as a consequence, the break-even oil price has also increased 
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 As defined by APICORP:  
a fiscal break-even price is the oil price that balances and oil-exporting 
country’s budget . . its determination involves many different parameters 
[which include] hydrocarbon fiscal revenues (HFR) plus ordinary fiscal 
revenues (OFS) plus a transfer from a sovereign wealth fund (SWF) or a 
fiscal stabilization fund (FSF) (Aissaoui, 2013, p. 1). 
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from US$ 20 per barrel in 2000 to US$ 45 per barrel in 2009 (Alkadiri, 2010, p. 
76), to around US$ 90 per barrel in 2013 (Aissaoui, 2013, p. 2), which represents 
a 100% increase between 2009 and 2013, equivalent to an average annual increase 
of 25% of the fiscal break-even oil price. Figure 14 below illustrates the increase 
in the fiscal break-even oil price of GCC budgets between 2012 and 2013. 
 
Figure 14: Break-even oil prices for 2012 and 2013 (US$/b). Adapted from 
“Modeling OPEC Fiscal Break-even Oil Prices”, by A. Aissaoui, 2013, p. 2. 
 
From the figure above, we can clearly see that the fiscal break-even prices 
have increased in 2013 comparatively to 2012, with the exception of Kuwait, 
which has seen its fiscal break-even price decline to around US$ 65 per barrel in 
2013 as a consequence of declining investments in the oil industry. Saudi Arabia 
has seen its fiscal break-even price increase from US$ 94 per barrel in 2012 to 
US$ 98 per barrel in 2013. The fiscal break-even price in the UAE has risen from 
around 90 US$ in 2012 to US$ 98 per barrel. Qatar has also seen its break-even 
fiscal price increase from US$ 53 per barrel in 2012 to US$ 58 per barrel in 2013 
(Aissaoui, 2013, p. 2). Bahrain and Oman are the GCC countries most vulnerable 
to oil fluctuations, as their fiscal break-even point in 2013 is at US$ 120 and 
US$ 100 per barrel, respectively (International Monetary Fund, 2012, p. 23). 
Based on these figures, we can evaluate the average fiscal break-even price of the 
whole GCC region at around US$ 90 per barrel. Knowing that the average price 
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of oil during the fourth quarter of 2013 averaged US$ 107 per barrel and is 
expected to decline to US$ 102 per barrel in 2014 (U.S. Energy Information 
Administration, 2014), we can conclude that the GCC countries, taken as a group, 
have a very narrow fiscal margin. In the long run, it is thus clear that a significant 
collapse in the price of oil at US$ 90 per barrel or below would negatively affect 
the whole economy of the GCC region, and most of the GCC economies taken 
individually, with the exception of Kuwait and Qatar.  
Moreover, a decline of the price of oil to US$ 98 per barrel and below will 
have very serious implications on the two biggest economies of the GCC region, 
namely Saudi Arabia and the UAE, with inevitable consequences on the other 
GCC economies and the region as a whole. Such a scenario is not farfetched, as 
after rising to historical heights of US$ 147/b in July 2008 for West Texas 
Intermediate (WTI)—61% higher than six months earlier—the price of oil 
collapsed to US$ 30/b five months later in December 2008. 
A decline in the revenues of Saudi Arabia and the UAE alone will mean 
that these governments will more likely run budget deficits unless they have a 
fiscal stabilization fund (FSF) to draw from, and that they will have to reduce 
their expenditures, which will certainly have implications on their social welfare 
programs, defence expenditures, and check book diplomacy—i.e., on their 
regional role in the context of a very unstable regional political environment. 
Optionally, the GCC countries could increase their oil production in order to 
increase their revenues, but this option is constrained by the fact that it would 
have to be done within a collective agreement within OPEC; in addition, we must 
assume that the incremental production does not affect the price of oil downward 
in the international markets. 
The continuous increase in the fiscal break-even oil price is the major 
threat to the success of the developmental projects in the GCC economies in 
general and to the success of the investment plans for the diversification of their 
energy sources in the power generation sector, knowing that energy transition 
processes are long-term processes requiring high and long-term investments. This 
issue is intimately linked to the core of the energy security concerns of the GCC 
governments and “the sustainability of current crude oil prices into the future” 
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(Alkadiri, 2010, p. 76). In fact, the growing public expenditures of GCC 
governments due to the high oil prices may in and of themselves sow the seeds of 
future economic crises, especially if the price of oil collapses in the global market 
under the pressure of a number of emerging challenges. 
The long-term sustainability of the current oil prices, and the resulting 
sustainability of the actual levels of oil revenues to the GCC budgets, will be 
threatened by three main emerging challenges. In the short to medium-term, two 
main challenges will pressure the price of oil: the consequences of a gradual 
return of Iran in the oil market following the last nuclear accord with the group of 
5+1 at Geneva, and the gradual emergence of Iraq as a major oil producer in the 
mid-term. The third main challenge is also long-term, and concerns the 
consequences of the shale oil revolution in the U.S., which is expected to shift 
from an oil-importing country into a nearly self-sufficient country by 2035 (IEA, 
2012, p. 49), and the possibilities of its replication in the major oil consuming 
nations such as China and India. There is indeed a real possibility that these states 
will develop their capacities to produce unconventional oil and gas in large 
quantities, which would doubtlessly not only affect the price of oil in the 
international markets, but also the level of global demand for oil and gas produced 
in the GCC states (International Monetary Fund, 2012, p. 10), as already 
discussed in detail in chapter 3.  
In an effort to limit this vulnerability, GCC governments have launched long-
term economic diversification strategies that have produced mixed results, as we 
will see in the section below. 
 
4.2.3.   Measuring Diversification in the Context of the GCC 
In political economy, diversification “normally refers to exports, and 
specifically to policies aiming to reduce the dependence on a limited number of 
export commodities that may be subject to price and volume fluctuations or 
secular declines” (Diversification, 2001, p. 360). 
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Economic diversification can be horizontal, i.e., to diversify within the 
same sector, or vertical, which involves a shift from one sector to the other and 
generally from the primary to the secondary and tertiary sectors (Hvidt, 2013, p. 
5). In the GCC context, the objective of an economic diversification policy would 
be to reduce the dependency of the GCC budgets on the very heavy dependency 
on the revenues of oil and gas exports. According to Beblawi, when talking about 
economic diversification in the GCC countries, it is necessary to divide the 
manufacturing sector into two categories: oil based and import substitution 
industries (Beblawi, 2011, p. 186). In this respect, the GCC countries enjoy a 
comparative advantage in the petrochemical and energy intensive industries, 
which explains the development of these industries in the region at the expense of 
the import substitution industries. However, an economic diversification policy 
that will focus on the expansion of the oil and gas industry will not help achieve 
the goal of reducing the structural dependency on oil and gas nor contribute 
significantly in reducing the cyclical risk to which GCC economies are exposed. 
As far as this research project is concerned, measuring the outcome of the 
economic diversification of the GCC economies will rely on three indicators: first, 
oil and gas as a percentage of economic indicators in the GCC countries; second, 
a historical evolution of the GDP breakdown by economic sector in the GCC 
countries; and finally, a comparison of the GDP breakdown by economic sector 
between the GCC economies and other economies. 
 
4.2.3.1.   The evolving structure of GCC GDP: A historical and 
comparative analysis 
The economic growth of the GCC countries has been made possible 
mainly and essentially thanks to the oil wealth accrued from the export of oil in 
the international markets. Some achievements were made to diversify their 
economies, as they have relatively succeeded in lowering the proportion oil 
proceeds represent of their gross domestic products (GDP), with the UAE being 
the most notable example, as it has “seen a steady decline in mining as a share of 
GDP, from above 70% in the 1970s to around 30% in the 2000s, despite the sharp 
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increase in oil prices in recent years” (Koren & Tenreyo, 2010, p. 6). However, 
the GCC economies continue to be dependent on oil revenues, as they still play an 
important role in their state budgets, which represent on average around 40 
percent of the GDP and more than 78 percent of their export earnings, and 83 
percent of their state budgets as it can be seen in Table 15 below, according to 
2008 figures. 
Table 15 
Oil and Gas Revenues as a Percentage of Economic Indicators in GCC Countries 
in 2008   
 %  
of Export 
Earnings 
%  
of State Budget 
%  
of GDP 
BAHRAIN 69 86 24 
KUWAIT 90 93 45 
OMAN 65 77 41 
QATAR 91 80 46 
SAUDI ARABIA 85 85 50 
UAE 69 77 32 
TOTAL GCC 78.16 83 39.66 
Note: Adapted from data calculated in the statistical appendix following each 
country section in Europa Publications (2011), as cited in Hvidt, 2013, p. 13. 
Regarding the second indicator, the figure below reviews the historical 
evolution of GDP breakdown by economic sector in the GCC countries from 1975 
to 2005. 
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Figure 15: GCC GDP breakdown by economic sector 1975-2005. Adapted from 
UAE Ministry of Economy, SAMA, Central Bank of Kuwait, Oman Ministry of 
National Economy, Central bank of Bahrain, and Qatar Planning Council, as cited 
in Economic Diversification: The Road to Sustainable Development, by 
Abouchakra et al., 2008, p. 4.
 
We can clearly see the evolution of the GDP in GCC economies and how 
intimately linked it is to their revenues from the export of oil in the international 
markets. However, it is also worth observing that the share of oil sector in the 
economy has been on decline since the seventies, representing 60% of the GDP in 
1975 and declining to 47% in 2005, and according to 2009 figures, declining 
further to 40.15% (Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, 2012, p. 
183). Historically, the political impetus for economic diversification coincided 
with periods of low oil prices in the international markets, and as consequence, at 
times of reduced revenues; however, the recent interest in diversification policies 
is “atypical in the sense that the diversification coincided with a period of high 
income” (Hvidt, 2013, p. 2). 
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When it comes to the third indicator, the picture about the results of energy 
diversification is even clearer when compared with other economies including 
resource rich economies like Canada and Norway, as shown in the figure below: 
 
Figure 16: Comparison of GDP breakdown between GCC and other economies. 
Adapted from UAE Ministry of Economy, SAMA, Central Bank of Kuwait, 
Oman Ministry of National Economy, Central Bank of Bahrain, Qatar Planning 
Council, IMF, and OECD official statistics of sampled economies as cited in 
Economic Diversification: The Road to Sustainable Development, by Abouchakra 
et al., 2008, p. 5. 
As a consequence of the dependency of GCC revenues on oil and its price 
on the international markets, the economies of the Gulf countries are more 
cyclical in nature than economies with comparable levels of development (Koren 
& Tenreyo, 2010, p. 19). The over-reliance on oil wealth has negatively impacted 
the region’s development, which suffers from structural deficiencies that hamper 
its advance toward comprehensive development—the result of an over-reliance on 
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proceeds coming from outside the national economy, which is determined by the 
global oil market and its constant fluctuations 
 
4.2.3.2.  SWFs 
Historically, with the exception of two funds established in the U.S.  
during the second half of the 19th century, the Texas Permanent School Fund in 
1854, and the Texas Permanent University Fund in 1876, the first Sovereign 
Wealth Fund of the world during the 20th century was established in the GCC 
region by Kuwait in 1953 (Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, 2014a). A specifically 
established vehicle was created in that respect called the Reserve for Future 
Generations (RFFG), which was first managed—very secretively—by the 
London-based Kuwait Investment Office (KIO) until 1992, when its management 
was handed over to the Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA) following a 
parliamentary investigation prompted by doubtful investments in Spain in the 
mid-1990s (Seznec, 2012, p. 78). 
Given the variety of SWFs and the differences that exist between them, it 
is very difficult to find one definition that can embrace all, but for the sake of this 
research, it will be useful to use two definitions: the first given by the Sovereign 
Wealth Fund Institute, and the second by Deutsche Bank. For the former, a SWF 
is defined in the following terms:  
A Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) is a state-owned investment fund or 
entity that is commonly established for balance of payments surpluses, 
official foreign currency operations, the proceeds of privatizations, 
governmental transfer payments, fiscal surpluses, and/or receipts resulting 
from resource exports. The definition of sovereign wealth fund excludes, 
among other things, foreign currency reserve assets held by monetary 
authorities for the traditional balance of payments or monetary policy 
purposes, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the traditional sense, 
government-employee pension funds (funded by employee/employer 
contributions), or assets managed for the benefit of individuals (Sovereign 
Wealth Fund Institute, 2014b). 
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The definition given by Deutsche bank states that:  
SWFs have the following characteristics: 1- Sovereign, 2- Independently 
managed from the Central Bank reserves, 3- Have a higher foreign 
currency exposure, 4- Have no explicit liabilities, 5- Have a higher risk 
tolerance, 6- Have a long term investment horizon, 7- Potentially could 
make strategic investments to promote reciprocity to the country. (Seznec, 
2012, p. 71) 
As far as the size of the GCC SWFs is concerned, here again, we have 
been confronted with a variety of figures as a consequence of the lack of 
transparency in the management of these funds, a situation that “has triggered a 
guessing contest between academics, consultants, and bankers to figure out how 
much each fund is worth, and what type of instruments are being bought and sold” 
(Seznec, 2012, p. 71). The table below summarizes the various evaluations 
according to different institutions: 
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Table 16  
Estimates of GCC SWFs as per Various Institutions in US$ Billions 
 Name of 
Fund and 
Date of 
Inception 
Deutsche 
Bank  
2008 
McKinsey 
2008 
SWF 
Institute 
2014 
JF 
Seznec 
Dec. 
2010 
Bahrain Mumtalakat 
2006 
10  7.1  
Kuwait RFFG/KIA
71 
1953 
264 200 410  
Oman SGSF 1980 8  6  
Qatar QIA
72 2000 60 40-60 170  
Saudi 
Arabia 
SAMA73  365  675.9 392 
UAE ADIA 1976 
Mubadala 
2002 
874 
10 
500-875 
10-15 
773 363 
27 
Note: Adapted from Deutsche Bank: Sovereign Wealth Funds, Overview, October 
2008, and McKinsey Global Institute, The Coming Oil Windfall in the Gulf, 
January 2008, as cited in “The Sovereign Wealth Funds of the Persian Gulf”, by J. 
–F. Seznec, in The Political Economy of the Gulf, 2012, p. 72. The data from the 
SWF Institute was taken from its website (Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, 
2014a). (Treated by the author). 
Despite these different estimates, as of today, the GCC SWFs are 
considered among the wealthiest in the world, with funds close to US$ 1.6 trillion 
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 RFFG stands for The Reserve for Future Generations and KIA stands for 
Kuwait Investment Authority. 
 
72
 QIA stands for Qatar Investment Authority. 
 
73
 According to the SWFs definitions, SAMA should not be considered a SWF 
given the fact that SAMA is the Central Bank of Saudi Arabia, and the funds have 
no independence from it. As rightly defined by Seznec, “SAMA invests its 
‘Wealth’ on behalf of the ‘Sovereign’ but is not investing as a true SWF” (2012, 
p. 74). 
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according to 2007 figures (Shediac & Samman, 2009, p 2), which is already very 
significant. 
The development of SWFs in the GCC countries could be viewed within 
the framework of the development of State Capitalism with a neo-patrimonial 
structure. Indeed, it is interesting to note that in the case of the GCC, the 
management structure of the SWFs follows the general pattern of the neo-
patrimonial structure within the overall rentier system as discussed in the 
theoretical section of this chapter. In Abu Dhabi, for example, concerning the 
SWFs each “board of directors . . . represent the interests of one or more clans 
within the royal family . . . [and] [w]thin each board the chairman represents the 
royal clan that is most vested in the fund” (Seznec, 2012, p. 79). However, the 
funds are managed in a very professional way while at the same time efforts are 
made “to include the various clans and the major Abu Dhabi merchant families in 
all the funds” (Seznec, 2013, p. 79). 
Initially, SWFs have essentially been created for macro-economic 
purposes and in order to “hold, manage, or administer assets to achieve financial 
objectives” (El-Kharouf, Al-Qudsi, & Obeid, 2010, p. 125) by diversifying their 
revenues away from the oil revenues. As most of the SWFs have been invested 
abroad, they do not create jobs locally and do not always contribute to further 
education and training of the local workforce (Hvidt, 2013, p. 9). Indeed, with the 
exception of Mubadala74, and to a certain extent IPIC (International Petroleum 
Investment Company in Abu Dhabi), most SWFs invest internationally.  
The strategic importance of Sovereign Wealth Funds to the GCC 
economies has significantly changed since the beginning of the 21st century and 
the rise in the price of oil, as they are now intimately linked “to the GCC’s goals 
of economic diversification and socioeconomic development” (Shediac & 
Samman, 2009, p. 2), through investments that contribute toward acquiring new 
knowledge and technologies. In this respect, and with regard to our research 
subject, Mubadala—the mother company of Masdar city—has invested US$ 8 
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 Mubadala is an exception as it tends to invest in large industrial projects in the emirate, 
which ultimately benefits all Emiratis (Seznec, 2012, p. 81). 
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billion with General Electric on a number of projects that include clean energy 
technologies (Shediac & Samman, 2009, p. 8). 
The role of the Sovereign Wealth Funds became evident during the decade 
long of low oil prices in the international markets in the 1990s. Indeed, during that 
period in Saudi Arabia, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) was able to 
infuse money into the economy from the excess foreign reserves it accumulated 
starting from the 1970s (Shediac & Samman, 2009, p. 2). Likewise, in Kuwait, the 
Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA) has allowed for paying allowances to every 
exiled family during the occupation of the country by Iraqi forces, and the 
reconstruction efforts of the oil infrastructure sabotaged by the Iraqi forces 
following the first Gulf war in 1991 (Seznec, 2012, p. 77). 
In case of a future collapse of the price of oil in the international markets, 
the GCC countries have accumulated reserves that should allow them, to a certain 
extent and at varying capacity from one country to another, to fill the budgetary 
deficit for a certain period of time, as we can see from the figure below:  
 
 
Figure 17: Number of years cover for oil revenues from financial reserves75 in 
selected countries. Adapted from IMF, SWF Institute and Development Fund for 
                                                          
75
  Financial reserves estimates include central bank reserves (used primarily  
for backing a national currency) and, where appropriate, the estimated 
value of sovereign wealth funds (often used to serve a broader range of 
government objectives). While Qatar has a relatively low number of years 
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Iraq databases; IEA analysis as cited in World Energy Outlook by International 
Energy Agency (IEA), 2012, p. 405. 
According to the figures above, the UAE’s financial reserves can cover the 
oil revenues for seven years with a fiscal break-even oil price of US$ 98/b; Saudi 
Arabia’s financial reserves can cover the oil revenues for close to two years with a 
fiscal break-even oil price of US$ 98/b; Kuwait for more than three years, with a 
fiscal break-even oil price of US$ 65/b; and Qatar for slightly more than one year, 
but we have to keep in mind that Qatar has the lowest fiscal break-even oil price 
at US$ 58/b. The comparison between the number of years cover from the SWFs 
and the fiscal break-even oil price is useful in order to know which countries will 
be first affected by a decline in the price of oil and how fast their budgets will be 
placed under stress. 
In case of a decline in the price of oil below US$ 98/b, Saudi Arabia and 
the UAE—the two biggest economies of the region—will be the first affected and 
will be the first ones to use their financial reserves to fill the gap between their 
revenues and their expenditures. Kuwait has enough financial reserves to cover 
for three years of oil revenues but has a low fiscal break-even oil price at 
US$ 65/b, and Qatar, despite its low level of financial reserves, is favored by a 
very low fiscal break-even oil price at US$ 58/b. As far as Bahrain is concerned, 
its budget is already under stress, with a combination of very small SWFs and 
very high fiscal break-even oil prices at US$ 120/b, and remains afloat only 
thanks to Saudi financial contributions. Oman is very close to the disequilibrium 
point with a fiscal break-even oil price at US$ 100/b, and the price of oil ranging 
between US$ 100.60/b (WTI crude oil) and US$ 109.58/b (Brent crude oil) in the 
international markets (“Crude Oil,” 2014). 
Given that the GCC SWFs are now much more diversified than in the past, 
it is reasonable to expect that their sizes will continue growing in the long term, 
assuming that the price of oil remains high and that the GCC governments can 
rely on them for a relatively long period of time—most likely a decade—to 
balance their budgets in case of fiscal and budgetary deficits resulting from a 
                                                                                                                                                               
cover, it also has the lowest fiscal breakeven oil price of the countries 
shown. (IEA, 2012, p. 405) 
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sharp decline in the price of oil in the international markets. However, the fiscal 
pressure will be much higher beyond a decade, especially if we take into 
consideration the growth of the fiscal break-even oil price. 
In the past few years, the GCC governments have diversified the 
investment destinations of their SWFs towards higher-yielding assets like equity 
and non-state debt, even if until the present time “public equities represent a 
significant portion of some SWFs’ investments in the region” (Shediac & 
Samman, 2009, p. 6). Public equities are more secure; however, their return is 
very low and could reach less than 1% for a typical 0 to 3 years of dollar 
denominated Treasury bills, compared to an average annual return of 6% for a 
portfolio of stocks and bonds (with a 60/40 ratio respectively) (Shediac & 
Samman, 2009, p. 6). There is indeed a very clear difference in terms of risk 
between these two different types of investments. Treasury bonds allow for a 
relative security in the short term; however, “there is a substantial likelihood that 
real, inflation-adjusted returns over the long term for investments administrated 
by central banks will be negative” (Shediac & Samman, 2009, p. 7), whereas in 
the case of more diversified portfolios with private equities, the long term 
prospects are statistically more favorable, with higher returns and lower losses, 
than portfolios managed by typical central banks (Shediac & Samman, 2009, p. 7) 
with returns that are even higher than from the export of oil, as can be clearly seen 
from the figure below which compares the returns from the oil market to those of 
the private equities and treasury bonds. 
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Figure 18: Historical comparison between real returns from the oil market, 
equities and bonds 1900-1990. Adapted from Morgan Stanley as cited in The Vital 
Role of Sovereign Wealth Funds in the GCC's Future, by Shediac and Samman, 
2009, p. 7.  
It is true that the recent financial crisis has highlighted the potential risks 
inherent in investments in the global economy, as during the 2008-2009 financial 
crisis, “many funds lost from 30 to 60 percent of the value of their investment on 
the stock markets and in hedge funds” (Seznec, 2012, p. 74). Indeed, Qatar 
Investment Authority (QIA) “lost very large amounts on its purchases of shares in 
2008 and Spring 2009, when the shares of most financial institutions, especially 
banks like Barclays and Credit Suisse, declined enormously”76 (Seznec, 2012, pp. 
74-75). Between 2008 and 2009, QIA bought a share of 5.8% in Barclays capital, 
and 10% of Credit Suisse’s capital (Seznec, 2012, p. 74). However, in the long 
term, the outlook of SWFs is expected to remain positive even in the case of 
future financial setbacks (Shediac & Samman, 2009, p. 4). 
The economic diversification strategy of the GCC countries is not limited 
to the expansion of industry or to the financial aspect represented by the 
establishment of Sovereign Wealth Funds; it also includes an investment in 
education within the much broader objective of building knowledge economies in 
                                                          
76
 The values of the shares have by and large come back following the financial 
crisis: “For example, Credit Suisse, which was worth $78.59 per share on April 
27, 2007, plunged to $20.11 on March 6, 2009 but recovered to $46.15 as of 
February 4, 2011” (Google.com/finance under CS as cited in Seznec, 2012, p. 75). 
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the long-run and moving from a rentier economy and society to a productive 
economy and society that produces its wealth from innovation and the production 
of knowledge, or to what is more commonly known as a knowledge economy. In 
this respect, it will be interesting to see how the GCC countries have performed 
until now based on the Knowledge Economy Index produced by the World Bank.  
 
4.2.3.3.   The challenge of the knowledge economy in the GCC 
In today’s global economy, “knowledge (including education, skills, 
information, and know how) and its renewal and application have become critical 
factors for sustaining competitiveness and economic growth” (World Bank, 2008: 
p. 84). In this respect, to measure the progress that countries are making in their 
transition to a knowledge economy, the World Bank has developed a Knowledge 
Economy Index that it defines in the following terms:  
The Knowledge Economy Index (KEI) is an aggregate index representing 
a country’s or region’s preparedness to compete in the knowledge 
economy (KE). The KEI is based on a simple average of four sub-indexes 
which represent the four pillars of the knowledge economy: Economic 
Incentive and Institutional Regime (EIR); Innovation and Technological 
Adoption; Education and Training; Information and Communications 
Technologies (ICT) Infrastructure. (World Bank, 2012, p. 1) 
According to the 2012 KEI, the GCC countries are reasonably well ranked 
comparatively to other economies with three of them (Oman, Saudi Arabia, and 
the UAE) making significant improvements in their ranking when compared with 
the year 2000, whereas the three other GCC countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, and 
Qatar), despite a good ranking in 2012, have seen their ranking decline 
comparatively to the year 2000, as we can see from Table 17 below: 
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Table 17  
Knowledge Economy Index (KEI) 2012 Rankings of GCC Countries 
COUNTRY 2012 RANK KEI 2012 2000 RANK CHANGE 
FROM 2000 
UAE 42 6.94 48 6 
BAHRAIN 43 6.90 41 -3 
OMAN 47 6.14 65 18 
SAUDI 
ARABIA 
50 5.96 76 26 
QATAR 54 5.84 49 -5 
KUWAIT 64 5.33 46 -18 
Note: Adapted from Knowledge Economy Index (KEI) 2012 Rankings, by World 
Bank, 2012, p. 2 (treated by the author). 
We can clearly see from the table above that the general ranking of the 
GCC countries is relatively good, as they are placed in the first half of the 146 
countries subject of the ranking by the World Bank. Some GCC countries like 
Oman and Saudi Arabia have witnessed substantial improvements from the year 
2000, while others, and especially Kuwait, have witnessed a very significant 
decline in their ranking comparatively to 2000, which is most probably due to the 
political instability of its political system and the chronic crisis in the relationship 
between the parliament and the ruling establishment. However, it is interesting to 
compare the evolution of the KEI of the GCC countries on a longer time period 
and with other economies, as shown in Table 18 below, in order to assess how it 
has been performing until now, and what would be the most probable trend and 
the pace of development of a knowledge economy in the GCC region in the future. 
This issue is important, as it will allow us to assess the capacity of the GCC 
economies to acquire, imbed, and develop energy technologies in the process of 
energy transition and the diversification of their energy mix in the power 
generation sector, in the long run. 
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Table 18 
Knowledge Economy Index (KEI) Comparison, GCC & Others 1995-2000 
Country 
 
KEI Economic 
Incentive 
and Instit-
utional 
Regime 
Innovation Education ICT 
Rec-
ent 
1995 Rec-
ent 
1995 Rec-
ent 
1995 Rec-
ent 
1995 Rec-
ent 
1995 
United 
States 
8.77 9.53 8.41 9.30 9.46 9.55 8.70 9.44 8.51 9.84 
United 
Arab 
Emirates 
6.94 6.39 6.50 6.90 6.60 6.59 5.80 4.46 8.88 7.62 
Bahrain 6.90 6.97 6.69 6.95 4.61 6.93 6.78 6.49 9.54 7.52 
Oman 6.14 5.34 6.96 6.33 5.88 5.48 5.23 3.65 6.49 5.89 
Saudi 
Arabia 
5.96 5.02 5.68 4.45 4.14 5 5.65 4.11 8.37 6.51 
Qatar 5.84 5.86 6.87 5.64 6.42 4.79 3.41 5.52 6.65 7.49 
Russian 
Feder-
ation 
5.78 5.67 2.23 2.60 6.93 5.64 6.79 7.84 7.16 6.60 
Brazil 5.58 5.08 4.17 4.83 6.31 5.98 5.61 3.35 6.24 6.17 
Kuwait 5.33 5.71 5.86 5.36 5.22 5.50 3.70 4.51 6.53 7.46 
South 
Africa 
5.21 6.05 5.49 3.74 6.89 7.26 4.87 6.33 3.58 6.89 
China 4.37 3.99 3.79 3.46 5.99 4.07 3.93 3.68 3.79 4.77 
India 3.06 3.57 3.57 3.57 4.50 3.70 2.26 2.51 1.90 4.50 
Average 
GCC 
6.19 5.88 6.43 5.94 5.48 5.72 5.10 4.79 7.74 7.08 
Average 
BRICS 
7.39 4.80 3.85 3.64 6.12 5.33 4.69 5.88 4.53 5.79 
Middle 
East and 
N. 
Africa 
4.74 n/a 5.41 4.63 6.14 6.39 3.48 n/a 3.92 5.94 
World 5.12 n/a 5.45 5 7.72 7.91 3.72 n/a 3.58 7.16 
Note: Adapted from Knowledge Economy Index (KEI) 2012 Rankings, by World 
Bank, 2012, p. 2 (treated by the author). 
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On average, the GCC economies taken as a whole are not very far from 
the BRICS economies, they are doing much better than the Middle East and North 
Africa region to which they belong, and are above the world average. However, 
when we compare the long term evolution of the KEI of the GCC region, with the 
long term evolution of the KEI of the BRICS, it is interesting to note that the latter 
have improved their ranking by 53.9% from 1995 to 2012, whereas the GCC 
economies have only evolved by 5.3%—a clear indication of the very slow 
process of development of a knowledge economy in the GCC countries despite 
the very significant financial resources available to them, albeit some progress 
made during this period. Based on these findings, we can conclude that the GCC 
countries, given their high level of integration in the global economy, are 
relatively well prepared for acquiring new energy technologies developed 
internationally, but their progress in the long run in order to imbed and develop 
new energy technologies will be very slow. Indeed, from the figures above we can 
see that the GCC economies have performed very poorly as far as innovation is 
concerned, as they have not made any positive progress in that respect; on the 
contrary, they even regressed by 4.2% during the period from 1995 to 2012. 
Innovation is therefore the main weakness of the GCC countries and it will most 
probably be the main obstacle they will face in their efforts for a long term energy 
transition.  
This weakness becomes even more manifest in the education sector where 
“the composition of post-compulsory education programs continues to favor 
humanities and arts over scientific fields of studies, as on average about two thirds 
of university students in the GCC countries major in these fields, which is higher 
than the averages of East Asia at 53.68%
77
 and Latin America at 56.8%. Indeed, 
according to World Bank data, the proportion of students in education, humanities 
and social sciences reached 60% (per 2002 figures) in Bahrain, 75.3% (per 2003 
figures) in Oman, 67.4% (per 2003 figures) in Qatar, 75.6% (per 2003 figures) in 
                                                          
77
 It should be noted in this respect that the average for Asia exceeds the 50% as a 
result of the average of Indonesia at 76.2%, and Thailand at 71.9%. Without these 
two countries, the average would have been below 50% at 43.5%. The lowest 
proportion of students in education, humanities and social sciences is in China 
with only 32.2% (World Bank, 2008, p. 21). 
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Saudi, and 57.8 (per 1996 figures) in the UAE, with an average for the region of 
67.22% (World Bank, 2008, p. 21). 
The GCC countries have certainly made significant efforts in the education 
sector in the past decades; however, when we compare the outcomes regarding the 
scientific capacities of the region with other regions of the world, we can  see that 
very significant efforts remain to be made in the long-run. Indeed, according to 
UNESCO data, the whole MENA region performs very poorly in terms of 
scientific capacities, as we can see from Table 19 below:  
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Table 19 
Comparison of World Researchers, 2002 
 Researchers 
(thousands) 
% World 
Researchers 
Researchers 
per million 
inhabitant 
GERD
78
 per 
Researcher 
(US$ 
thousands) 
All Arab 
States 
39.7 0.7 136.0 47.2 
Arab States 
Asia 
9.7 0.2 93.5 66.6 
Arab States 
Africa 
30.0 0.5 159.4 40.9 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
30.9 0.6 48.0 113.9 
OECD 3414.3 61.8 2984.4 191.9 
Latin America 
and the 
Caribbean 
138.4 2.5 261.2 156.5 
Newly 
Industrialized 
Asia 
291.9 5.3 777.2 183.7 
Israel (1997) 9.2 0.2 1395.2 661.1 
WORLD 5521.4 100 894.0 150.3 
Note: Adapted from UNESCO Institute for Statistics estimations, December 2004, 
as cited in UNESCO Science Report 2005, by United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 2005, p. 6 (treated by the 
author). 
The data above very clearly shows a structural weakness in the entire 
MENA region, with an even poorer performance for the Arab states in Asia, 
where the GCC countries are included. The main indicator in that respect is the 
last position enjoyed by the MENA region in terms of number of researchers per 
                                                          
78
 GERD stands for Gross Expenditures on R&D. 
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inhabitants, where all Arab states have a ratio of 136 researchers per million 
inhabitants, whereas Israel alone has 1395.2 researchers per million inhabitants 
according to 1997 figures. In addition, despite the investments made in the 
development of education in the MENA region, the ratio of the Gross 
Expenditures on R&D (GERD) per researcher in the region remains the lowest in 
the selected countries in the table and among the lowest in the world. In general, 
the MENA region does slightly better only comparatively to Sub-Saharan Africa. 
This poor performance is also found regarding scientific publications, as 
compared to the global average, “the number of scientific publications originating 
in the Arab world does not exceed 1.1% of world production (United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization [UNESCO], 2005, p. 161).  
On the patents indicator, the figures indicate that patents originating from 
the Middle East and North Africa, including the GCC, illustrate the very poor 
scientific production and capacities of the region, as shown in the table below: 
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Table 20 
Regional Origin of Patents at the EPO, USPTO and JPO, 2000.
79
 
 Total 
1991 
Total 2000 % World 
1991 
% World 
2000 
All Arab States 2 3 0.0 0.0 
Arab States Asia 1 3 0.0 0.0 
Arab States Africa 1 0 0.0 0.0 
OECD 27822 40610 93.0 93.1 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 
1809 2192 6.0 5.0 
Newly 
Industrialized Asia 
150 698 0.5 1.6 
Israel 104 342 0.3 0.8 
Note: Adapted from OECD, Patent Database, September/October 2004, as cited in 
as cited in UNESCO Science Report 2005, by UNESCO, 2005, p. 8 (treated by the 
author). 
The figures above speak by themselves and show the extent of the 
structural weakness and deficiency of all MENA countries, including the GGG 
countries. 
According to the UNESCO Science Report (2005), the MENA region has 
failed in delivering the high quality scientists it desperately needs in order to build 
economic self-reliance and capacity for innovation in the region, and it attributes 
this situation to a lack of political stability and a low-quality education and 
inadequate R&D infrastructure (United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization [UNESCO], 2005, p. 159). 
As already mentioned above, the experience of the GCC countries in the 
oil and gas sector in regards to technology has mainly relied on importing the 
needed state of the art technologies and accompanying human knowledge in order 
                                                          
79
 EPO stands for European Patent Office; USPTO stands for United States Patent 
and Trade Office; JPO stands for Japan Patent Office. 
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to develop their oil and gas industry (including the petrochemical industry), and it 
is expected that this model will remain in force for the process of energy transition 
in the power generation sector up to 2050 or the foreseeable future. As stated by 
Hertog and Luciani, the GCC countries “have consistently built their development 
model on strong global integration and reliance on external sources of technology, 
know-how and manpower” (Hertog & Luciani, 2009, p. 16). This includes 
managerial best practices, and it is expected that the same model will be applied 
for the deployment of renewable and nuclear energy technologies in the power 
generation sector. As a consequence, the efforts of the GCC countries to transform 
their economies into knowledge economies, in which innovation will be imbedded 
in the social and economic fabric of their economies, will be a slow process and 
achieved only in the very long term. 
The concept of knowledge economy in the GCC region has resulted in 
numerous great improvements in a number of indexes but still has a significant 
structural weakness when it comes to the innovation index and the scientific 
capacities that are at its core. Despite the important achievements made in the 
whole MENA region and the GCC in particular, in the past three decades, a long 
way still remains ahead before they can achieve the long-sought objective of 
knowledge economies in the GCC region. In this respect, the GCC countries will 
need to improve the quality of their education system, but “most crucially, the 
region needs reforms that will help build societies that promote tolerance, allow 
freedom of expression, encourage free thinking and respect human rights if Arab 
states are to develop fully their potential” (UNESCO, 2005, p. 175). 
Based on the above findings, we can conclude that the GCC economies 
will need to sustain long-term investments in the education sector in order to 
develop the necessary scientific and R&D infrastructure and capacities, which 
will need to be coupled with necessary political reforms that will allow for a 
transition towards a knowledge economy. In this respect, the investment capacity 
of GCC governments in the long term will greatly depend on the future outlook of 
their revenues and the price of oil in the international markets, as any collapse in 
the price of oil could potentially destabilize the GCC budgets and reduce their 
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investment capacity in all the sectors of the economy, including education and the 
deployment of new energies in the power generation sectors. 
Between the mid-eighties and the end of the nineties, the GCC countries 
witnessed an economic recession as a result of a sharp decline in the price of oil in 
the international markets. It will be interesting for the sake of this research and in 
the perspective of our exploration of the future, to revisit this historical economic 
crisis and its implications on the GCC countries in order for us to evaluate the 
investment capacity of the GCC governments in pursuing their economic 
diversification efforts and for deploying alternative and renewable energies in the 
long run. 
 
4.2.4.   A Historical Perspective on the Oil Crisis of the 1980s and its 
Repercussions on the GCC 
 The rise in oil price in the 1970s led to a number of new decisions and 
policies in the major industrial countries aimed at lowering oil consumption and 
reliance on OPEC oil producers. These countries encouraged the development of 
energy-saving technologies and the production of oil from new fields outside of 
the OPEC countries, such as North Sea oil, despite its high production cost. These 
decisions, enacted in tandem with the economic recession that hit the global 
economy during the 1980s, led to a drop in global oil demand and heralded a 
phase of continuous decline in oil price that lasted until the late 1990s. The price 
per barrel went down by more than 40% in relative value between 1981 and 1996 
and by more than 59% in real value, which negatively impacted the revenues of 
the GCC countries (Rivlin, 2001, p. 51). For example, GDP per capita in Saudi 
Arabia went down from USD 18,039 per year in 1981 to USD 7,181 in 1998, a 
situation that was mainly a result of the significant fall in oil price during the 
1980s and the 1990s—as can be seen from Figure 19 below—coupled with fast-
paced demographic growth in Gulf countries (Niblock & Malik, 2007, p. 117). 
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Figure 19: Oil proceeds of OPEC countries between 1973 and 1999. Adapted 
from Economic Policy and Performance in the Arab World, by R. Rivlin, 2001, p. 
50. 
If analysis is based purely on economic principles, economic rationality 
should prompt oil-consuming nations to encourage oil production where the cost 
of extraction is low, such as in the GCC countries. Historically, however, the 
opposite has taken place. The 1973 oil crisis was spurred by the oil embargo 
imposed by the Arab oil-exporting countries on the US, Western Europe, and 
Japan, which came about as a retaliation for these countries’ support for Israel 
during the 1973 October War. This crisis constituted a major shock to the world 
economy, especially the economies of Western countries. During that time, the 
price of oil on the international market rose by 70 percent, which gravely affected 
the global economy, including a protracted worldwide economic recession.
80
 The 
sharp increase in the price of oil affected the cost of importing oil and oil 
derivatives for the majority of countries around the world, especially Western 
countries, as they tend to consume the most and are reliant on hydrocarbon 
imports. Between 1973 and 1987, this led to the adoption of consumption-curbing 
policies on the one hand—by increasing their energy system’s efficiency and 
changing the consumption habits of society—and on the other, to the enactment of 
                                                          
80 It would be difficult to determine the real reasons that led to the recession after 
the oil embargo crisis in 1973, since the crisis took place alongside the adoption 
of a number of new financial and monetary policies in Western countries that 
complicated the economic situation. 
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strategies by a number of countries to lower their reliance on imported oil by 
turning toward other non-OPEC oil-producing regions, especially outside the 
Middle East, such as the North Sea and Alaska, despite increased production cost. 
Moreover, these changes have also led to the encouragement of the development 
and adoption of alternative or renewable energy sources.  
Norway and Great Britain encouraged the exploration and production of 
oil in the North Sea through tax incentives and new policies. Simultaneously, a 
technological breakthrough lowered the cost of oil extraction from the North Sea 
fields, leading to a rise in production from 3.5 million barrels per day in 1988 to 
5.9 million barrels of oil per day in 1996 (Rivlin, 2001, p. 52). Based on this 
historical experience, it appears that governments of energy consuming countries, 
and especially Western governments, are presumably willing to sacrifice 
economics in exchange for strategic objectives relating to energy security, 
especially when they have the technological know-how coupled with a strong 
political will. These countries are endowed with superior scientific and 
technological capacities that may permit them to decrease the high cost of 
production in the early stages, as the production cost is usually seen to drop with 
the expansion and the scaling up of projects. For this reason, decision makers and 
experts in oil producing GCC countries rely excessively on an abundance of cheap 
oil, although it carries a variety of risks; however, history has shown the flaws in 
this way of thinking. 
The spike in oil prices during the 1970s prompted Arab governments to 
expand their budgets and increase investments in development projects, leading to 
deficits in the balance of payments and forcing these governments to resort to 
foreign loans during the 1980s. After the collapse of oil prices in the mid-1980s, 
oil-producing countries, including the GCC, suffered economically, and as a result, 
the economic aid sent from rich Arab countries to poor Arab countries was also 
curbed, forcing some Arab governments to resort to loans from the International 
Monetary Fund and to undergo its structural adjustment programs. 
The economic crisis of the 1980s and 1990s was not solely caused by the 
collapse of oil prices, but also by the emergence of other factors. Demographic 
growth, social changes, shifts on the international scene (e.g., the collapse of the 
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Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc), and regional security crises—the First Gulf 
War in 1990-1991, all played a role
81
. The significant and long-term drop in oil 
price negatively affected the budgets of these governments, limiting their ability 
to perform their distributive role within the rentier system of the GCC countries.  
Oil revenues have also indirectly affected these countries considering the 
massive investments the Gulf monarchies made in education, health, 
infrastructure, and industrialization over the last four decades. These 
improvements have radically changed these economies and societies, which have 
witnessed the highest rate of demographic growth throughout the world. These 
countries have also become more diversified and better integrated in the global 
economy, raising the bar for expected social services, such as employment, health, 
and education. This is a key issue, as spending on social services engenders higher 
expectations in terms of future employment, especially because of the expanding 
demographics and the emergence of mass public education. Moreover, the GCC 
countries have adopted a public employment policy that has led to the creation of 
an important financial burden on the budgets of these states. Even the regional 
crises witnessed in the Gulf and the political and military foreign interventions 
were directly related to the stature of the Gulf States and their role in the global 
geopolitical energy map.  
During the 1990s, the GCC states suffered economically as a result of their 
government’s financial situation after the collapse of the price of oil in 
international markets, which began in 1986 when the price of oil went below 
US$ 10 per barrel (Nonneman, 2001, p. 9).  Saudi Arabia was among the 
countries most affected by this slide in prices, as it was also influenced by 
external pressures after the First Gulf War and Western military intervention in 
the region. All of these factors prompted King Fahd to announce political reforms 
in 1992, including the issuance of the Basic Law of Saudi Arabia, according to 
                                                          
81 In this context, the economic crises went in tandem with the tenure of Ronald 
Reagan in the United States and Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom, both 
of whom reoriented the Western—and, subsequently, the global—economy 
toward liberal economic policies. This was part of their promotion of the 
Washington Consensus, which called for the reduction of the role of the state in 
economic development. Furthermore, both Reagan and Thatcher contested the 
notion of providing monetary aid to the poor countries.  
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which an appointed Shura Council was founded a year later for the first time since 
the establishment of the Kingdom in 1932.  
 
4.2.5. The Evolving Political Equation of GCC Power Equilibrium 
Political stability is a necessary pre-requisite for any developmental 
strategy or projects, as recognized by Davidson (2009) when he said that “no 
amount of careful planning and astute management can sustain Abu Dhabi’s 
economy should there be serious political instability” (Davidson, 2009, p. 94). 
From our analysis of the political economy in the previous section, we can clearly 
see that the internal contradictions and vulnerabilities in the political economy of 
the region reveal signs of weaknesses in the GCC monarchies—weaknesses that 
were evident in the popular unrest of Oman and Bahrain in 2011. These events are 
a reminder that the Arab monarchies of the Gulf are not immune from the Arab 
Spring, and as accurately observed by Kamrava (2012), “the mass-based 
rebellions that engulfed the Middle East, from Morocco to Algeria in the west, to 
Bahrain and Oman in the east, all had their roots in fundamental contradictions in 
the politics and economics of the region” (Kamrava, 2012, p. 1). 
Among these contradictions are the population growth issue and its 
consequences, as the arrival of a rapidly growing young and educated generation 
to the job market is taking place in a context of labor nationalization policies that 
in most cases are not necessarily in accordance with the high employment 
expectations of these generations. 
Demographically, the population in the Gulf is currently dominated by 
youth. In Saudi Arabia, for example, those aged 15 years or younger represent 40 
percent of the total population, while those under 25 years of age representing 
more than 60 percent (Nonneman, 2001, p. 8). A population pyramid of Gulf 
countries clearly shows that satisfying the demand for new jobs will require 
additional financial resources and extensive investments in development projects. 
Furthermore, the quality of the jobs required is an important issue. Due to the 
immense changes witnessed by Gulf societies in recent years, and the young 
generation’s desire to acquire jobs that fit their academic qualifications, salary 
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expectations, and culture, fulfilling these demands will place an increasingly large 
burden on the national budgets of these countries. Given the cyclical instability of 
the revenues from the export of oil and gas, there are very serious doubts that the 
GCC governments will be able to fulfill the job expectations of future generations. 
Ultimately, an inevitable equation exists between the resources available and the 
demand for certain resources: the higher the revenues from oil exports, the higher 
the demand for social and economic services. Accordingly, Nonneman rightly 
concludes that the future expansion in the production of oil and gas in the region 
does not appear sufficient to fully satisfy the expected rise in social demands and 
demographic growth, which could then undermine the rentier social contract that 
has historically shaped the policies of this region (Nonneman, 2001, p. 6).  
As already discussed in the theoretical section of this chapter, the 
autonomy of the late rentier state in the GCC, while large, is not absolute, as it has 
been responsive to social, economic, and—to a certain extent—to political 
demands and societal pressures. In this respect, the section below will review the 
historical constitutional as well as political developments in the GCC countries, as 
required within the framework of a futures study, in addition to a future outlook 
regarding possible future possible developments or trends regarding the political 
stability of the region. 
 
4.2.5.1. An overview of constitutional developments in the GCC 
Grounded on an analytical historical approach, this section will briefly 
review the constitutional developments in the GCC since their independence. 
 
4.2.5.1.1. Bahrain: An absolute constitutional monarchy 
Bahrain adopted its first constitution on the 26
th
 of May 1973 following 
the first national election in Bahrain’s history, an election that was restricted to 
native-born male citizens and to which women were excluded. However, as a 
result of the political repression undertaken under the 1974 State Security Law, 
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the parliament was dissolved in 1975 and the constitution suspended. Between 
1994 and 1999, Bahrain witnessed a popular uprising that was the result of 
political repression coupled with rising unemployment. It is worth noting in this 
respect that the triggering event of the uprising of the 1990s was a demonstration 
by unemployed citizens in front of the Ministry of Labour, which developed into 
an uprising where all political forces, leftists, liberals, and Islamists joined forces 
to demand a return to the constitutional process interrupted in 1975. The reasons 
behind the political instability of Bahrain can be found firstly in the erosion of the 
rentier socio-political contract as a result of the depletion of its oil resources, 
which created a deficit between the growing population and the dwindling oil 
revenues of the government; and secondly, in the political equation of the country, 
where a majority population composed of two thirds Shi’a Muslims is ruled by a 
ruling family that belongs to the one third Sunni Muslims minority (Peterson, 
2006, pp. 11-20). 
Following the death of the late Amir Sheikh Isa bin Salman Al Khalifa in 
1999 and the arrival to power of his son Amir Sheikh Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa, a 
national dialogue was initiated with all the political forces in Bahrain, which 
ultimately led to the adoption of the 2002 constitution following a referendum 
which allowed women to vote for the first time. The new constitution established 
a constitutional monarchy with a bi-cameral legislature, in which a lower-house is 
elected and the upper-house appointed by the current King.  According to written 
assurances from King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa to the opposition leaders, the 
upper-house would have only an advisory role, with the legislative role remaining 
the sole responsibility of the elected lower-house, However, following the 
referendum, King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa contradicted his written pledge and 
promulgated a new constitution granting both houses of the parliament equal 
legislative powers, and thereby sowed the seeds of the actual uprising in Bahrain 
during the Arab Spring. Accordingly, the institutional reforms initiated by King 
Hamad in Bahrain in the 2000s cannot be considered to have changed the power 
structure, as no evidence exists of genuine political reforms (Ehteshami, 2013, p. 
149). As a result, in the wake of the Arab Spring, popular demonstrations 
demanding political reforms and equality for the Shia majority of the country 
broke out again in February 2011 and were violently suppressed.  A state of 
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emergency was declared, and the military support of Saudi Arabia and the UAE 
was requested and then delivered through the Gulf Shield force in March 2011. 
This repressive policy was coupled with the pursuit of a national dialogue in an 
attempt “to reduce the prospects of total fragmentation between Sunni and Shia” 
(Ehteshami, 2013, p. 149). In addition, the Bahrain Independent Commission of 
Inquiry (BICI) was put into place to investigate the brutality of police repression, 
submitting a report to the King in November 2011. However, until the present 
time, the long-standing demands of the opposition have yet to see any concrete 
implementation, and the political stalemate in Bahrain remains in place, with a 
risk of increasing political violence in the future. 
 
4.2.5.1.2. Kuwait: A rich but unstable parliamentary experience 
Of the GCC countries, Kuwait has the oldest constitutional history, as its 
first constitution was written by a constitutional assembly between 1961 and 1962 
and signed into law in November 1962 by Amir Abdullah III Al Salim Al Sabah. 
The first Majliss Al Umma (National Assembly) members were elected in 1963. 
However, the parliament has been suspended a number of times—the second time 
in July 1986, after which it was not reinstated until after the Iraqi invasion and 
Kuwait’s subsequent liberation by a U.S.-led international coalition in February 
1992. Only as a result of domestic and international pressures did the Emir finally 
enact his pledge to resume the constitutional process after liberation. Despite its 
long history, the constitutional experience of Kuwait is thus characterized by 
instability and chronic crisis as a result of inter-divisions, manipulations from the 
ruling family, and a strong opposition that was first led by the liberal MPs and 
then in more recent times by the Islamists (Peterson, 2006, p. 11-12). 
Since the 2000s, long before the Arab Spring wave, the political landscape 
in Kuwait has been shifting towards “a new political era, where the concentration 
of power would be reduced as authority moved toward civil society, arguably at 
the expense of the ruling elite” (Ehteshami, 2013, p. 156). Indeed, the 
confrontation between the parliament and the Al Sabah rule culminated in 
November 2011 with the temporary occupation of the parliament by protesters 
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following weeks of street protests under the slogan “new country with a new 
prime minster”, and the subsequent intervention of the Amir Sheikh Sabah, who 
described the storming of the parliament as “black Wednesday” (Ehteshami, 2013, 
p. 156). The changing balance of power in Kuwait became even more apparent 
following the parliamentary elections of February 2012, where a conservative 
Sunni Islamist-tribal coalition of Muslim Brotherhood and Salafis won 34 out of 
the 50 seats of the parliament (Ehteshami, 2013, p. 158). Given the rising tensions 
between this conservative coalition and the government over economic and public 
policy issues, there are serious doubts regarding the longevity of the parliament; 
however, the future outlook regarding the political instability of the country is not 
positive, and it is reasonable to expect that in the future, the balance of power will 
continue to change in favour of the civil society and at the expense of the ruling 
Al Sabah family, thereby redrawing the political map of the country. 
 
4.2.5.1.3. Oman: A firm but responsive Sultan  
Oman established its first constitution, The White Book, in November 
1996 following a Royal Decree issued by Sultan Qaboos. The White Book, or the 
Basic Law, created a bicameral legislative body: the Majlis al-Dawla (Council of 
State), the upper house, and Majlis Al Shura (Consultative Council), the lower 
house, which were voted in during the 1997 elections. However, both councils 
were deprived of effective power, as they had no legislative power and could not 
overturn the Sultan’s decrees or government regulations.  
Under the pressure of the popular unrest that took place in many cities of 
the country during much of 2011 (“Omanis Protest at Slow Pace of Reform”, 
2012), Sultan Qaboos reacted with very limited repression combined with 
political as well as economic reforms. On the political front, two decrees were 
issued by Sultan Qaboos: the first in March 2011, and the second in October 2011, 
which included reforms that granted new but limited powers to the legislative 
bodies, “including approving, rejecting, and amending legislation, and the ability 
to question ministers who head agencies that provide direct citizen services” 
(Katzman, 2013, p. 6). As a result, legislative elections took place for the 
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Consultative Council, the lower house, in October 2011, and for the first time, 
municipal elections took place in December 2012. On the economic front, “Sultan 
Qaboos ordered that 50,000 new public sector jobs were created immediately, 
raised the minimum wage by about one-third (to about US$ 520 per month), and 
ordered that about US$ 400 be given to job seekers” (Katzman, 2013, p. 4-5). On 
the political front, the uprising led to the introduction of limited constitutional 
reforms that do not, however, undermine the powers of Sultan Qaboos. The 
originality of Oman in this respect is that Sultan Qaboos did not use the same 
levels of repression as seen in Bahrain and responded positively to the economic 
demands of the protesters coupled with limited political openings (Esteshami, 
2013, p. 161). The future outlook of Oman, despite the 2011 popular protests, 
looks positive as long as there is no degradation in the economic sphere. 
 
4.2.5.1.4.  Qatar: The internal politics of the Al-Thanis  
As far as Qatar is concerned, an appointed Consultative Council has 
existed since 1972, following its independence from the United Kingdom in 
September 1971, with only consultative powers. In July 1999, the ex-Amir Sheikh 
Hamad bi Khalifa Al Thani appointed a committee to draft a new constitution 
(Constitution of Qatar, n.d.) for the country, which was approved in a public 
referendum in April 2003 and approved by the Amir in June 2004 (Peterson, 2006, 
p. 11-27). According to the new constitution, the legislative body, the Shura 
Council, is vested with legislative authority and is composed of two thirds elected 
members (30) and one third (15) appointed by the Amir. According to the new 
constitution, its roles include an oversight authority over the Council of Ministers, 
and it will be able to propose legislation and review budgets. At the local level, 
municipal elections took place in July 1998, forming the Municipal Council. 
According to the new electoral law, women are allowed to participate in all 
elections. The political and constitutional promises of reform by the Amir Sheikh 
Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani were mainly the result of “elite factionalism, and 
more specifically intra-family competition within the Al Thanis”  (Kamrava, 2009, 
p. 403). Indeed, the main reason behind the promised reform agenda was to by-
pass the conservative circles within the family that were more favourable to the 
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Amir’s deposed father.  As soon as Amir Sheikh Hamad Al Thani consolidated 
his power domestically and internationally, it became clear that implementation of 
the promised reforms would take more time than the initially declared calendar, as 
the first parliamentary elections initially planned to take place in mid-2013 were 
postponed and the appointed Consultative Assembly’s term extended by three 
years—just before Sheikh Hamad transferred power to his son Sheikh Tamim bin 
Hamad Al Thani in June 2013. Despite the wave of optimism that followed the 
arrival of Sheikh Hamad Al Thani to power and his promoted and promised 
reform agenda, political reforms were not implemented, which led Kamrava (2009) 
to declare that “meaningful political liberalization remains as elusive as before, 
and the prospects for the political system becoming democratic do not seem even 
remotely possible” (Kamrava, 2009, p. 402). It is too soon at the moment to know 
the intentions of the new Amir, Sheikh Tamim, regarding the political reform 
agenda. However, it is possible to expect that the recent crisis between Qatar and 
Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain regarding their different and conflicting 
foreign policies concerning the Arab Spring and their attitudes towards the 
military coup in Egypt, could probably lead the new and young Amir to resort to 
the same policies as his father in order to consolidate his power base, which 
means effectively implementing, and probably accelerating, the reforms agenda. 
 
4.2.5.1.5. Saudi Arabia: An absolute monarchy albeit vulnerable 
Saudi Arabia was the last country of the GCC to engage in constitutional 
reforms, which came only in 1992 and mainly as a consequence of the economic 
crisis that started following the collapse of oil price in 1986, and the emergence of 
a strong, Islamist opposition movement known as the Sahwa in reaction to the 
presence of non-Muslim troops in the Kingdom following Iraq’s invasion of 
Kuwait in August 1990. In January 1992, King Fahd issued a Royal Decree to 
establish the Shura Council (Majliss Al Shura), whose members are appointed by 
the King, and which has only a consultative role without any legislative powers. 
The Saudi constitutional experience is the least developed in the GCC; the King 
still retains total control over the legislative as well as the executive functions. 
Indeed, in Saudi Arabia, despite the existence of vibrant social forces, the power 
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and “centrality of the ruling family in national political life has been consolidated 
rather than diffused even under the guise of a ‘reform agenda’” (Tétreault, 
Okruhlik, & Kapiszewski, 2011, p. 2). 
The vibrancy of the social forces in Saudi Arabia became very obvious in 
the 1990s, when the Sahwa movement led an “opposition campaign against the 
royal family” (Lacroix, 2011, p. 2) following the call of the Saudi regime on 
American troops to protect the kingdom from Saddam Hussein, who invaded 
Kuwait in August 1990. The “Sahwa insurrection”, referred to as intifadat al-
Sahwa in Saudi Islamist circles, was capable of drawing and organizing a large 
sector of the Saudi public, and especially among the younger generations—a 
movement that has been described as “the only Islamist mobilization of major 
magnitude in the history of the country” (Lacroix, 2011, p. 3) that was capable of 
shaking the Saudi political establishment. The protest was organized through 
critical sermons in mosques denouncing the presence of non-Muslim foreign 
troops on the Land of the Two Holy Places, and through petitions that were signed 
by “some of the intellectual and religious elites of the Kingdom demand[ing] the 
introduction of radical reforms” (Lacroix, 2011, p. 3). The Saudi regime reacted 
repressively to the protest campaign, which lasted until late 1994, by arresting 
several hundred opposition supporters and introducing limited political reforms in 
January 1992, when King Fahd issued a Royal Decree to establish the Shura 
Council (Majliss Al Shura) whose members are appointed by the King and which 
has only a consultative role without any legislative powers. 
The significance of this episode of Islamist political grassroots activism to 
the present situation and to the future political stability of the Kingdom is two-
fold. Firstly, the Sahwa movement was an opposition that challenged the 
monopoly of the Saudi establishment of Islamic legitimacy and its religious base; 
secondly, the Sahwa movement’s “principal originators were the exiled Muslim 
Brothers” (Lacroix, 2011, p. 38) who came to Saudi Arabia in the 1950s as exiles 
following the repression campaign they had suffered in Egypt’s Gamal Abdel 
Nasser. The main concern of the ruling establishment in Saudi Arabia regarding 
the Arab Spring in general, and Egypt in particular, stems essentially from this 
historical experience and from its fear that Egypt ruled by the Muslim 
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brotherhood could give birth again to a new Sahwa movement and threaten its 
absolute rule of the country. Even if the prospect of a new “Islamist insurrection” 
seems improbable in the short term, “it cannot be excluded in the medium term . . . 
[as] the Saudi Islamists—and the Sahwa—will remain central actors on the 
Kingdom’s political stage for years, and possibly decades to come” (Lacroix, 
2011, p. 270), in addition to the growing pressures originating from the structural 
weaknesses in its political economy. 
By approving and supporting the military coup in Egypt and the repression 
campaign that followed against the Muslim brotherhood, and labelling it as a 
terrorist organization in Egypt as well as in Saudi Arabia, the Saudi ruling 
establishment has opened itself to war with a very large section of Islamists 
abroad as well as domestically, and the outcome of which will mainly depend on 
the fate of the new military regime in Egypt, which has not yet consolidated its 
power, and does not seem to be winning its declared war on the Muslim 
brotherhood. 
 
4.2.5.1.6. The UAE: Tarnishing its Liberal Capital 
Following independence from the United Kingdom, the provisional 
constitution of the UAE was promulgated in December 1971. Being a federal 
system, the constitution provided for an executive federal body, the Supreme 
Council of the Union (SCU), and a legislative body represented by the National 
Federal Council (NFC) of 40 members, which has only a limited consultative role. 
The first elections of the NFC took place in 2006 with the participation of a 
selected electorate of around 7000 persons, representing less than 1% of the 
UAE’s population; the second elections of the NFC took place in September 2011 
with an electorate of 129,274—still inadequately representative of the UAE 
overall population—and 468 candidates (including 85 women) (Ehteshami, 2013, 
p. 164). The major development that is worth noting in the context of the Arab 
Spring is the open petition of 133 intellectuals sent in March 2011 to the federal 
authorities, demanding an elected national parliament and more accountability. 
However, the petition did not receive any positive feedback from the federal 
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authorities and any “evidence of major, or even incremental, change has been hard 
to come by” (Ehteshami, 2013, p. 165). 
As a concluding note, the limited legislative and political reforms in the 
GCC countries came, in most cases, as a result of a combination of domestic 
and/or international pressures, and not reformist initiatives from the ruling 
families. Even when pushed to engage in constitutional or political reforms, the 
ruling establishments in the GCC countries managed to retain most of the powers 
in a way that did not undermine their authority or the rentier-authoritarian system 
of rule in force, through a combination of accommodative political methods. 
Indeed, notwithstanding some scattered limited advances, the GCC countries 
remain ruled by a combination of rentier and neo-patrimonial authoritarian 
structures that self-reproduce and are still far from a democratic system of rule 
and governance. 
Despite the diversity of internal mechanisms of political life and 
developments in the GCC countries, there are still some common features that can 
briefly describe the actual situation: first, democratization is still a farfetched 
objective that has not yet materialized in the GCC region; second, in all GCC 
countries, if at different stages and speed, the balance of power between civil 
society and the ruling establishment is nevertheless definitely in the process of 
shifting, and it can be argued that this “is unlikely to be fully controllable by the 
elites” (Ehteshami, 2013, p. 166). 
 
4.2.5.2. GCC public opinion and the democratic issue  
The Arab Spring phenomenon has brought to the surface the emerging role 
of Arab societies in general and their demands for an increased role in the political 
and economic equations of their respective countries. In this respect, it will be 
interesting to use the results of the 2012-2013 Arab Opinion Index
82
 survey, 
                                                          
82
The Arab Opinion Index (AOI) is a research project that aims to annually  
and systematically measure Arab opinion on a variety of issues of interest to Arab 
masses . . . The Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies is conducting this 
project on representative samples in all Arab countries that permit the 
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published annually by the Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies, regarding 
the Saudi and Kuwaiti public opinion, the only two GCC countries included in the 
survey and which are a representative sample of the region in every respect, on a 
number of issues related to the democratic issue and its compatibility with Islam, 
whether their societies are ready for democracy or not, what is the opinion of their 
societies on democracy as a system of rule, and finally the public opinion of these 
two countries of the GCC regarding the Arab Spring. 
Table 21 below shows the results regarding the statement: “Democracy is in 
contradiction with Islam”. 
Table 21 
Results for the Statement: “Democracy is in Contradiction with Islam”. 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Do Not 
Know/Refused to 
answer 
Saudi 
Arabia 
20% 37% 4% 8% 31% 
Kuwait 9% 78% 2% 10% 2% 
Arab 
Average 
23% 45% 5% 13% 14% 
Note: Adapted from Arab Opinion Index, by Arab Center for Research and Policy 
Studies, 2013, p. 80 (treated by the author). 
According to the 2012-2013 Arab Opinion Index, in Saudi Arabia, 57%  of 
the public do not agree with the statement “Islam is in contradiction with 
                                                                                                                                                               
implementation of survey research. (Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 
2011). 
 
The 2012-2013 survey (the second since the launching of the Arab 
Opinion Index project) was conducted in 14 Arab countries including Mauretania, 
Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Sudan, Palestine, Lebanon, Jordan Iraq, 
Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Kuwait. The survey included all regions of the Arab 
world (Maghreb, Mashrek, Nile Valley, and the Arabian Peninsula), representing 
89% of the overall Arab population. The survey was based on field 
questionnaires, with 21,350 respondents divided among the surveyed countries 
according to population weight. (Arab Opinion Index, 2013, pp. 2-3).  
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democracy”, (divided between 20% who strongly disagree and 37% who simply 
disagree), while only 12% agree this statement (divided between 4% who strongly 
agree and 8% who simply agree), with a notable 31% of the respondents refusing 
to answer the question. In Kuwait, 87% do not agree with the statement (divided 
between 9% who strongly disagree and 78% who simply disagree), while only 12% 
agree (divided between 2% who strongly agree and 10% who simply agree), and 
with only 2% of the respondents refusing to answer the question (Arab Opinion 
Index, 2013, p. 80). When compared to the Arab world average, the results are to 
a certain extent in line with the general Arab public opinion, with a noticeably 
higher result in Kuwait of those surveyed (87% compared to the Arab average of 
68%) who do not agree that democracy is in contradiction with Islam.  
The second table below shows the results regarding the statement: “Our 
Society is not Ready for Practising a Democratic System”. 
Table 22  
Results for the Statement: “Our Society is Not Ready for Practising a Democratic 
System”. 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Do Not 
Know/Refused to 
answer 
Saudi 
Arabia 
13% 28% 9% 18% 33% 
Kuwait 5% 71% 3% 19% 2% 
Arab 
Average 
12% 33% 12% 28% 14% 
Note: Adapted from Arab Opinion Index, by Arab Center for Research and Policy 
Studies, 2013, p. 81 (treated by the author). 
Regarding the statement “Our society is not ready for a democratic 
system”, in Saudi Arabia, only 27% agree with this statement (divided between 9% 
who strongly agree and 18% who simply agree), while 41% do not agree (divided 
between 13% who strongly disagree and 28% who simply disagree), with a 
notable 33% of the respondents refusing to answer the question. In Kuwait, only 
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22% agree with this statement (divided between 3% who strongly agree and 19% 
who simply agree), while 76% do not agree (divided between 5% who strongly 
disagree and 71% who simply disagree), and with only 2% of the respondents 
refusing to answer the question (Arab Opinion Index, 2013, p. 81). From these 
figures, we can clearly see that in general, the public opinion in Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait, as representative sample of the GGC coutries, consider their societies 
ready for a democratic system, with a noticeably larger positive opinion in Kuwait 
compared to Saudi Arabia as a result of the differences in the political and 
institutional history of both countries. Moreover, the proportion of respondents in 
Saudi Arabia who refused to answer the question is very high, which could be 
largely attributed to a much narrower margin for the freedom of expression in 
Saudi Arabia, as this trend is also found with the other questions of the survey. 
When compared to the Arab world average, it is interesting to note that in Saudi 
Arabia, the proportion of those surveyed who agree that their society is not ready 
for a democratic system (27%) is much lower that the Arab average (40%), and 
this is in the context of a country that has no democratic experience and where the 
official political discourse categorically rejects the democratic system of rule. 
Table 23 below shows the results regarding the statement: “Democracy, with all 
its problems, is the best among the regimes”. 
Table 23 
Results for the Statement: “Democracy, with All its Problems, is the Best Among 
the Regimes”. 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Do Not 
Know/Refused 
to answer 
Saudi 
Arabia 
2% 10% 19% 38% 30% 
Kuwait 1% 28% 61% 7% 3% 
Arab 
Average 
4% 14% 23% 45% 14% 
Note: Adapted from Arab Opinion Index, by Arab Center for Research and Policy 
Studies, 2013, p. 83 (treated by the author). 
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 In Saudi Arabia, 57% agree with the statement “Democracy, with all its 
problems, is the best among the regimes” (divided between 19% who strongly 
agree and 38% who simply agree), while only 12% disagree with this statement 
(divided between 2% who strongly disagree and 10% who simply agree), and with 
a noticeable 30% of the respondents who refused to answer the question. In 
Kuwait, 68% agree with this statement (divided between 7% who strongly agree 
and 61% who simply agree), while 29% do not agree with this statement (divided 
between 1% who strongly disagree and 28% who simply disagree), and only 3% 
of the respondents refusing to answer the question. The comparison with the 
average results of the Arab world is also interesting in this respect, as we can 
clearly see that the proportion of those who disagree is lowest in Saudi Arabia 
(12%) compared to the Arab average (18%) or even Kuwait (29%). In the case of 
Kuwait, this could be explained by the chronic political instability of the country 
as a result of the struggle between the ruling establishment and the parliament. 
Finally, Table 24 below presents the results of Arab public opinion regarding the 
Arab Spring. 
Table 24 
Results of Public Opinion Regarding the Arab Spring 
 Very 
Positive 
Positive 
to a 
Certain 
Extent 
Very 
Negative 
Negative 
to a 
Certain 
extent 
Do Not 
Know/Refused 
to answer 
Saudi 
Arabia 
26% 29% 5% 4% 36% 
Kuwait 25% 37% 2% 4% 32% 
Arab 
Average 
25% 36% 11% 11% 17% 
Note: Adapted from Arab Opinion Index, by Arab Center for Research and Policy 
Studies, 2013, p. 203 (treated by the author). 
From the results above, it very clearly appears that public opinions in 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are generally positive regarding the Arab Spring, with 
55% reporting positive opinion in Saudi Arabia (divided between 26% “very 
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positive” and 29% “positive to a certain extent”), and 62% reporting positive 
opinion in Kuwait (divided between 25% “very positive” and 37% “positive to a 
certain extent”). In both cases, these results are in line with the average results of 
the Arab world, whereas the negative opinions are much below the Arab world 
average of 22% (divided between 11% “very negative” and 11% “negative to a 
certain extent”), with 9% reporting a negative opinion in Saudi Arabia (divided 
between 5% “very negative” and 4% “negative to a certain extent”), and only 6% 
reporting negative opinion in Kuwait (divided between 2% “very negative” and 4% 
“negative to a certain extent”). Again, as in all polls, the percentage of 
respondents who refused to answer the questions was highest in Saudi Arabia at 
36%. The high percentage of respondents who refused to answer the questions of 
the survey in Saudi Arabia could be explained by the lack of freedom of 
expression in the country and fear to give their opinion. 
The results of the survey above reveal the existence of a public opinion 
that is very favourable to the democratic idea and that looks forward to changes in 
the political equation of their countries. It is true that the political systems of the 
GCC countries are not static and have witnessed some reforms in the past, but it is 
equally true that these reforms were very limited and did not lead to deep and 
structural changes in the political equation of the GCC regimes. However, given 
all the present and future challenges and structural weaknesses discussed in this 
chapter, will GCC ruling establishments be able to maintain the existing political 
systems without engaging in a credible process of political transition towards a 
greater role for popular input in the political and economic decision making 
process?  
 
4.2.5.3. Political stability in the GCC: Where to? 
Thanks to its geographic and demographic as well as economic and 
political status, Saudi Arabia is, without contest, the largest country of the GCC 
region, and to a very large extent, the future political developments in Saudi 
Arabia will determine the fate of the whole region. In turn, the social and political 
stability of Saudi Arabia will greatly depend on two factors:  the first concerns the 
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capacity of the ruling establishment to deal with the structural weaknesses of their 
respective political economies and be able to provide for the growing social and 
economic demands of the growing local population; and the second concerns the 
potential impact of the regional geopolitical developments in the Arab Spring 
countries—particularly Egypt—on the future political establishments in the GCC 
countries.  
As far as the first factor is concerned, employment is as rightly stated by 
Niblock and Malik (2007) the central issue for the future stability of the Kingdom, 
as it will have to be able to create the necessary levels of jobs competitive in skills 
and ability according to the requirements of the World Trade Organization, of 
which Saudi Arabia is a member. However, “within the existing framework of 
policy, there is considerable doubt as to whether current patterns of development 
in Saudi Arabia will indeed create sufficient and appropriate employment 
prospects for the growing population in Saudi Arabia” (Niblock & Malik, 2007, p. 
228). Indeed, while the labour nationalization policies in Saudi Arabia as well as 
in Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE have been conceived in order to absorb the rising 
unemployment among the new educated generations that are arriving to the job 
market every year, “in most cases they have avoided addressing the structural 
problem of citizens being dependent on a distributive economy, and have only 
served to keep pricing nationals out of the market, which in turn has made them 
even less attractive employees” (Davidson, 2012, p. 118). 
The threat of political instability has grown even more evident with the 
regional instability consequent to the wave of Arab uprisings. The GCC region 
has not been immune from the Arab Spring wave, as has been very clear in the 
events in Bahrain and Oman, where the response to these developments has 
mainly involved financial hand-outs (Benham, 2011), an increased repression, and 
a stricter control over the media and especially social media. The human rights 
record of the GCC monarchies has been severely aggravated, including 
accusations of torture in the UAE against a young social media activist for a tweet, 
and accusations formulated by a Geneva-based NGO known as Al Karama 
(“Smuggles Notes”, 2013). In Saudi Arabia, there is a growing popular discontent 
despite the very large expenditures of the Kingdom in social, educational, and 
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infrastructure projects (“No Satisfaction”, 2014). Censorship and the limitations 
placed on freedom of expression have only increased since the beginning of the 
Arab Spring, and despite all the efforts of the GCC governments, especially Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE, to control social media, they are finding great difficulties in 
that respect. 
The Arab Spring has laid the foundations for “a paradigm shift in the 
political, social and economic structures of the region . . . [where] Arab peoples 
are being transformed from subjects to citizens” (Chatham House, Middle East 
and North Africa Programme, 2011, p. 3). As noted by Dr. Rima Khalaf Hunaidi, 
the Under-Secretary General and Executive Secretary at the United Nations 
Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), “the 
transformations that have taken place in Arab countries are non-linear and 
irreversible and the theory of ‘Arab exceptionalism’—the view that Arabs are 
somehow congenitally or culturally unsuited for democracy—has been 
irrevocably shattered” (Chatham House, Middle East and North Africa 
Programme, 2011, p. 4). 
As a result of the Arab Spring, GCC states have reacted through a mixture 
of populist economic measures such as financial hand-outs, job creation, and 
salary raises for the nationals in the public sector, as well as an increase in 
political repression and a strengthening of the security apparatus with the creation 
of 130,000 new security jobs in the GCC countries in 2011 (Chatham House, 
Middle East and North Africa Programme, 2011, p. 14). The fiscal and economic 
measures taken in the GCC countries in the wake of the Arab Spring “have gone 
against the economic trends of the past decades, during which most GCC 
governments allowed for a greater role for the private sector . . . [and as a 
consequence] the Arab Spring also adds to the long-term burden on GCC states’ 
budgets and means they will require higher oil prices in the future to balance their 
books” (Chatham House, East and North Africa Programme, 2011, p. 14). 
Moreover, the fiscal pressure has also been increasing as a result of the check 
diplomacy of GCC governments in the region, and especially Saudi Arabia, in 
their efforts to stop the wave of the Arab Spring by financially helping the new 
military regime in Egypt and all the counter-revolutionary forces in the Arab 
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Spring countries. Indeed, Saudi Arabia’s monarch has publicly promised 
continuous support to the military regime in Egypt (Nordland, 2013).  
The ruling establishment in Saudi Arabia perceived the Arab uprisings as a 
strategic threat to their rule, which is based on an autocratic system that denies its 
population a say in political as well as economic choices, and as such, could not 
be in favour of the Arab Spring. In addition, the arrival of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt to power through winning all the elections since the fall of 
Mubarak in February 2011, is in total opposition to the Saudi model of Islamic 
rule without elections as well as to the democratic principles of people’s choice, 
and also a challenge to the Kingdom’s claim as the only legitimate representative 
of Islam. In this respect, it was not a surprise to see Saudi Arabia, in addition to 
Kuwait and the UAE, as the first countries to welcome the military coup in Egypt 
in July 2013 and to immediately offer a financial package of US$ 12 billion in a 
clear sign of support to the new military rule in Egypt (Hearst, 2013).  
There is no doubt that the impact of the Arab Spring on the GCC states has 
been profound, and it can be argued that the future regional developments in the 
Arab Spring countries and Egypt particularly will determine the political future of 
the GCC ruling establishments, and especially Saudi Arabia. Indeed, Saudi Arabia, 
backed by the UAE and Kuwait, has put all its weight and influence into backing 
the military coup in Egypt, which is yet quite far from establishing its power over 
all sectors of Egyptian society, as the country has been in continuous turmoil since 
the coup, and it is very unlikely that the military regime in Egypt will succeed in 
maintaining its position. In addition, the branding of the Muslim Brotherhood in 
Egypt as a “terrorist” organization in December 2013 (“Egypt: Muslim 
Brotherhood”, 2013), followed by Saudi Arabia in 2014 (“Saudi Arabia Declares 
Muslim Brotherhood”, 2014), is a decision strongly criticized by Amnesty 
International, which considers the new terrorism law in Saudi Arabia a “recipe for 
systematic torture” (Amnesty International U.K., 2014), and an indication that the 
repression policy will only increase in the coming years in Saudi Arabia as well as 
Bahrain and the UAE. This was supported by the 2014 political risk map 
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published by Aon
83
, where all GCC countries are classified among the ‘medium-
low risk’ category, except Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, which are classified in the 
‘medium risk’ (Aon, 2014, p. 5). As far Saudi Arabia is concerned, according to 
Aon’s 2014 assessment of political risk, the country saw its political violence 
variable downgraded comparatively to previous years as a result of the “rising 
level of inequality and moderate increase in political violence” (Aon, 2014, p. 14).  
As we have shown in this section, opposition groups are not a new 
phenomenon in the GCC countries; they existed even before the Arab Spring, but 
were “successfully contained, as the various regimes were able to co-opt most of 
the modernizing forces impacting on the region and keep the number of dissents 
small” (Davidson, 2012, p. 231). However, since the Arab Spring, a new 
generation of opposition groups have appeared on the Gulf political landscape and 
are proving to be difficult to co-opt by the Gulf regimes, as these groups benefit 
from higher education levels than the previous generations, and they are more 
connected thanks to the technology of social media (Davidson, 2012, p. 231). The 
regional pressure represented by the Arab Spring is another helping factor for the 
new generation of opposition compared to their predecessors. In addition, we have 
clearly seen in this section that public opinion in the GCC countries is very 
favourable to the idea of democracy, and that the official argument, as in the case 
of the Saudi political establishment, of incompatibility between democracy and 
Islam is not a widely shared opinion among the public. 
A greater popular input and role in the political decision making process 
that would ultimately lead to more democratic regimes in the GCC countries “can 
only increase as the resources-demands equation shifts further: the projected 
expansion in in hydrocarbons production will not fully compensate for the 
population explosion and costs of maintenance, hydrocarbon development and 
welfare—thus undermining the rentier social contract” (Nonneman, 2001, p. 1). In 
addition, as a result of the very significant social and cultural transformations the 
GCC societies have witnessed in the past decades, the traditional bases of rule and 
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legitimacy in the GCC countries are less and less relevant in order to insure 
popular acquiescence (Nonneman, 2001, p. 1).  
Given all the structural challenges facing the political economy all GCC 
countries, in addition to the regional unstable political context and its 
ramifications on the GCC region, especially on the Saudi domestic political map, 
it is reasonable to expect that Saudi Arabia could be witnessing a rising political 
instability with very serious and perhaps radical consequences on its ruling 
establishment, which will have undeniable consequences on its economic policies, 
and especially its future plans for an energy transition, the subject of interest of 
this research thesis. Knowing the centrality of Saudi Arabia in the GCC region, 
there are no doubts that if such developments should occur, they will certainly 
impact all GCC countries and their energy diversification policies. 
 
 
4.3. A MESO-LEVEL ANALYSIS OF THE POWER GENERATION 
SECTOR OF THE GCC COUNTRIES 
In this final section of chapter 4, we propose to undertake an analysis of 
the power generation sector in the GCC countries at the meso-level within the 
MLP framework of analysis. In this respect, we will first deal with the structure 
and organization of the power industry, before moving to the economics of power 
generation in the GCC region. 
 
4.3.1. The Socio-technical Regimes of the Energy Sector in the GCC 
 According to the MLP framework of analysis, the policy aspect of the 
entire system is situated at the meso-level, considered the central level of the MLP 
where the regimes actors are located and the driving force of the whole energy 
transition process. As a result, this section will focus on the socio-technical 
regimes of the energy sector in the GCC countries with a special interest in the 
power generation industry. Understanding how these regimes and their relevant 
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actors operate in the power generation sector is first necessary in order to 
understand the dynamics of an energy transition, and before building scenarios 
based on a combination of a scenario typologies as proposed by Slaughter (1993a), 
and a typology of transition pathways as proposed by Geels and Schot (2007). 
 Accordingly, the first step will consist of a review of the existing political 
and institutional setting within which energy policies in the power generation 
sector of their respective countries are conceived, and in a second step we will 
review the energy diversification policy objectives and projects in the GCC 
countries as far as power generation is concerned.  
 
4.3.1.1. The political and institutional setting of GCC energy policy 
 Energy policy-making in the GCC countries has gradually evolved from 
an ad hoc informal process controlled by a few influential members of the ruling 
families, into a more formal bureaucratic and professional policy-making process 
with a forward policy outlook (Obaid, 2000, p. 5). However, despite this very 
obvious tendency, energy policy-making in the GCC countries still remains 
strongly dominated by the state and by political actors closely related to the ruling 
establishments. Indeed, “most of the successful large state enterprises in the Gulf 
are under the direct patronage of the ruling elites, and hence are shielded from 
much of the political interference and rent seeking that happens in other sectors” 
(Hertog & Luciani, 2009, p. 28). The structure composed by the ruling families 
and the elites from other big families constitute what has been defined by Gray 
(2011) as the neopatrimonial ruling structure of the GCC countries where “power 
[is] closely held at the core by a royal clique, and with elite relationships carefully 
managed for the sake of regime maintenance and elite enrichment” (p. 25). As 
already shown in this chapter in the section regarding the rentier state theory, the 
GCC states are highly centralized and enjoy a relatively significant autonomy 
from their respective societies; as a consequence, they have a relatively greater 
freedom in the management of their oil and gas revenues, and conceiving general 
economic policies and energy policies. 
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 Based on these findings above, we can conclude that the GCC energy 
sector regimes actors engaged in the process of energy policy-making, including 
the power generation sector, are found within the ruling elite and their 
neopatrimonial network. 
 
4.3.1.2. GCC Electricity sector organization 
 Despite the differences found in the organization of the electricity sectors 
of the GCC countries, they all share in common the predominant role of the state 
as the main actor. Indeed, in addition to its role as regulator, the state is also the 
main owner of the electricity utilities. More recently, efforts have been made by 
the GCC governments to allow for a greater role of the private sector in the 
ownership and management of electricity utilities through the establishment of 
Independent Power Producers (IPPs) and Independent Water and Power 
Producers (IWPPs).  Despite these efforts, however, the state remains the main 
player. Indeed, according to 2010 figures, IPPs and IWPPs represented only 27% 
of the generation capacity of GCC utilities (Qahtani, 2011, p. 5), knowing that the 
GCC governments are also directly or indirectly present in their capital through 
their national companies. The next section will review the organization of the 
electricity sector in each GCC country. 
 
 4.3.1.2.1. Bahrain 
The electricity and water desalination sector of the Kingdom of Bahrain is 
comprised of the following components: 
 The Ministry of Oil and Gas Affairs is in charge of the overall policy 
of the energy sector in general. 
 The Ministry of Electricity and Water is responsible for the policy-
making as well as planning aspects of the electricity and water industry 
in Bahrain.  
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 The Electricity and Water Authority (EWA) is a governmental body in 
charge of the production, transmission, and distribution of water and 
electricity in the Kingdom of Bahrain. The electricity and water 
industries in Bahrain are under the total control of the government. 
Energy companies are self-regulated in Bahrain, as there is no 
independent regulator for the energy sector or the electricity sector. 
 Alezl Power Company launched the first Independent Power Project 
(IPP) in 2006, a gas-fired power plant with a capacity of 950 MW 
(Bachellerie, 2012, p. 26). 
 Al Had Power Company, an Independent Water and Power Project 
(IWPP), previously state owned, has a power generation capacity of 
1006 MW (Bachellerie, 2012, p. 26). 
 Al Dur Power and Water Company, an IWPP that started its operations 
in 2011 with an installed capacity of 1234 MW, is owned by the Gulf 
Investment Company (GIC), a share holding company equally owned 
by the governments of the six GCC countries (Gulf Investment 
Corporation, 2014).    
 All the IPPs and IWPPs sell their output to the EWA with which they 
have a 25-year Power and Water Purchase Agreement. 
 Bahrain has been connected to the GCC grid since 2009. As a 
consequence of its dwindling financial resources and chronic political instability, 
the government of Bahrain has very limited resources to invest in the development 
of large scale renewable or nuclear energy projects. The renewable energy 
projects launched by Bahrain so far are mainly pilot solar PV projects. Electricity 
generation in Bahrain relies on conventional thermal fired power plants by using 
exclusively natural gas. 
 
4.3.1.2.2. Kuwait 
The electricity and water desalination sector of Kuwait is composed of the 
following components: 
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 The Ministry of Electricity and Water is in charge of the policy aspects 
in addition to the production, transmission and distribution of water 
and electricity in Kuwait. The electricity and water sector is under the 
total control of the government--the sole supplier of electricity and 
water in Kuwait. There is no independent regulation authority, and as a 
consequence, the power and water industry is self-regulated at the 
level of the Ministry of Electricity and Water, which manages the 
supply and demand of water and electricity, in addition to setting their 
prices. 
 Al Zour power plant is the first IWPP with a 1500 MW capacity and 
will be operational in 2015 (Daya, 2012). 
 Gas represents only 14.4% of the fuel used for generating electricity 
and the remaining coming from heavy fuel oil, crude oil and gas oil 
(Ministry of Electricity and Water in Kuwait, 2009, pp. 59-60). 
 Despite the very significant revenues enjoyed by the Kuwaiti government, 
it has been unable to invest in large-scale renewable energy projects as a 
consequence of the chronic political instability from the ongoing conflict between 
the parliament and the ruling family. The autonomy of the Kuwaiti ruling elite has 
been seriously limited by the political activism of the parliament, which often 
partners with public sector unions in order to block reforms in the economy in 
general, including the power generation sector. However, we must note that the 
lack of reforms in Kuwait is not due to the elected origin of the parliament, but 
rather to the fact that “it has the ability to stymie government action without the 
responsibility for rule that would come from the formation of the government by 
parliamentary parties” (Herb, 2009, p. 380). 
 
4.3.1.2.3. Oman 
The electricity and water desalination sector of the Sultanate of Oman 
consists of the following components: 
 The Ministry of Oil and Gas is in charge of the overall policy making 
and planning of the energy sector. 
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 The Electricity Holding Company (EHC) is a joint stock company that 
holds the shares of the government in nine power generation, 
transmission, and distribution companies in Oman. EHC controls 99.9% 
of the shares of eight subsidiary companies, and 98.10% of the shares 
of the ninth company, namely Dhofar Power Company (Electricity 
Holding Company, 2010). 
 The Authority for Electricity Regulation (AER) is in charge of 
regulating the electricity and water sectors, and as such, it has the 
responsibility of regulating the electricity and water sector, and issuing 
licenses for public and private companies.  It was established in 
August 2004 (Authority for Electricity Regulation, Oman, n.d.).  
 The Oman Power and Water Procurement Company (OPWPC) is the 
sole buyer of water and electricity produced by private power and 
desalination plants. Moreover, it is also in charge of the long term 
planning for electricity and water supply in Oman. 
 The Oman Electricity Transmission Company (OETC) is responsible 
for managing the country’s electricity transmission networks. 
 Oman has a largely autonomous political leadership but limited financial 
resources, and as a consequence, even if it will do better than Bahrain and Kuwait, 
it will not be able lead the deployment of large scale RE or nuclear projects at the 
same level as Saudi Arabia and the UAE. 
 The fuel mix of the electricity generation industry in Oman relies almost 
exclusively, or more than 80% in 2013, on natural gas (U.S. EIA, 2013b, p. 9). 
 
4.3.1.2.4 Qatar 
The electricity and water desalination sector of Qatar includes the 
following components: 
 The Ministry of Energy and Industry is in charge of policy-making and 
the overall strategy of the energy as well as industrial sectors. It is 
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worth noting that Qatar has no dedicated independent energy or 
electricity regulator, as energy companies are self-regulated. 
 Qatar Electricity and Water Company (QEWC) was founded in 1990 
as a shareholding company in which the government of Qatar owns 
directly 43% of the shares; the remaining 57% are owned by 
companies and individuals. QWEC is the main provider of electricity 
in Qatar with a market share of 62% (Qatar Electricity and Water 
Company, 2012, p. 8). The government of Qatar also controls 11% of 
the shares of QEWC indirectly through Qatar Petroleum, the public oil 
and gas company fully owned by the government, and as a 
consequence, the government of Qatar has an effective 54% stake in 
QEWC, without mentioning the 10% share of Qatar National Bank 
(QNB) in which the government controls 50% of the shares through 
Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), Qatar’s sovereign wealth fund. 
 Moreover, QEWC is a shareholder in the following power companies 
in Qatar, controlling 80% of the Ras Laffan Power Company; 55% of 
the shares of Qatar Power Company; and 40% shares in Ras Girtas 
Power Company, which is the largest power plant in the region with a 
capacity of 2730 MW of electricity (Qatar Electricity and Water 
Company, 2012, p. 8-9).     
 Qatar General Electricity and Water Corporation (QGWEC, 
KAHRAMAA) was established in 2000 and is in charge of the 
transmission and distribution of electricity and water in the state of 
Qatar. It is fully owned by the government of Qatar and is the sole 
buyer and distributor of water and electricity produced by Qatar 
Electricity and Water Company and the other electricity providers in 
Qatar (Qatar General Electricity and Water Corporation, n.d.). 
 The political leadership in Qatar is in a very comfortable situation, as it 
has a large political autonomy coupled with significant financial revenues 
invested in developing significant power generation capacities. The investments in 
large scale renewable and nuclear energy projects have been limited in Qatar due 
to its huge gas resources; however, it is investing heavily in RE research through 
the Qatar Environment and Energy Research Institute (QEERI) based in Qatar 
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Foundation, the flagship education organization in Qatar. In addition, in 2008, the 
Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), the financial arm of the Qatari government, 
funded a Qatari-British fund with ₤ 250 million for the promotion of research 
dedicated to clean energy technologies (Hertog & Luciani, 2009, p. 37). 
 The fuel mix of the power generation industry in Qatar is composed 
exclusively of natural gas. 
 
4.3.1.2.5. Saudi Arabia 
The electricity and water desalination sector of the Kingdom is composed 
of the following components: 
 The Supreme Council for Petroleum and Minerals Affairs is the 
governmental organ that has under its jurisdiction all the ministries and 
organs in charge of the energy sector, including the Ministry of Water 
and Electricity (Obaid, 2000, p. 21). The Supreme Council is 
composed of members of the royal family, government ministers, and 
industry leaders and is in charge of the overall energy policy-making 
of the Kingdom (U.S. EIA, 2013a, p. 1). 
 The Ministry of Water and Electricity, which is responsible for 
conceiving overall policies, strategies and plans of the sector. 
 The Electricity and Cogeneration Regulatory Authority (ECRA), 
which is the regulator of the electricity industry and responsible for 
issuing licenses to entities involved in electricity generation and water 
desalination. It was established in November 2001, and is financially 
and administratively independent. In addition to issuing licenses, 
ECRA is also in charge of reviewing the electricity tariffs periodically 
and insuring that they are cost-effective, and proposing new tariffs to 
the government.  
 The electricity and water desalination industry, where the Saudi 
Electric Company (SEC) is the main player, and the Saline Water 
Conversion Corporation (SWCC), which provides most of the 
Kingdom’s desalinated water. 
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 King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy (K.A.CARE) 
was established in April 2010 by a Royal Order with the objective to 
develop nuclear as well as renewable energy technologies and to 
diversify the energy mix of the Kingdom with a focus on the power 
generation and seawater desalination sectors (K.A.CARE, 2013). It is 
dedicated to research in nuclear and renewable energies in addition to 
the policy making process (Royal Decree, 2010, p. 4), and as such, will 
play a major role in the coordination of the national and international 
energy policy of the Kingdom. 
 From a general policy perspective, “The Science and Technology National 
Policy” determines the general orientation for the development of science and 
technology in Saudi Arabia, and as a policy framework, it sets long term 
objectives and goals within the overall national development plans of the 
Kingdom. In this respect, King Abdulaziz City of Science and Technology 
(KACST) plays the role of the national science agency and laboratory of the 
Kingdom, and as such, is involved in the scientific as well as the policy making 
aspects of the strategy for the development of solar energy technology. 
 Regarding electricity production in the Kingdom, the Saudi Electric 
Company is the dominant player in the electricity production industry in Saudi 
Arabia as it alone has a share of 77% of the electricity generation capacity in the 
Kingdom, followed by the state owned Saline Water Conversion Corporation, 
with a share of 7.6% of electricity generation capacity. Jubail Water and Power 
Company (JWPC) is the third largest power generation company with an 
electricity generation capacity of 4.4%. The remaining share of the generation 
capacity is distributed among eleven other small utilities with a share representing 
less than 2% per company (Electricity and Cogeneration Regulatory Authority, 
2012, p. 21). 
On the electricity supply front, the SEC produces 69% of the electricity 
produced in the Kingdom, SWCC produces 13%, Marafiq 12%, and 17% is 
produced by the remaining power companies (Electricity and Cogeneration 
Regulatory Authority, 2012, p. 31). 
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The mix of the primary fuel used for power generation in Saudi Arabia is 
composed of 41% gas, 28% crude oil, 20% heavy fuel oil (HFO), and 11% diesel 
(ECRA, 2012, p. 30). The mix of the backup fuel for power plants, which is 
available for only 57% of the power plants in the Kingdom, is composed of 44% 
diesel, 10% crude oil, and 4% HFO (Electricity and Cogeneration Regulatory 
Authority, 2012, p. 30). 
Saudi Arabia, with the UAE, is leading the GCC countries in renewable 
and nuclear energy investments, as it has a largely autonomous political 
leadership and important financial surpluses. In addition, with a growing domestic 
energy consumption pressuring its energy production and particularly its export 
capacity, Saudi Arabia has the strongest impetus for deploying renewable and 
nuclear energies in its power generation sector. Moreover, the previous successful 
experience of the Kingdom in developing an island of efficiency in the energy 
sector and petrochemical industries will most certainly play in favor of this 
deployment. The only potential limiting factors to this long term trend could be 
found in a decrease in the revenues of the Kingdom due to a drop in the price of 
oil in the international markets, a domestic political crisis in the wake of the Arab 
Spring, or the development of the very significant shale gas resources available 
domestically--a development, if materialized, which could redirect investments 
from RE and nuclear technologies to shale gas production. 
 
4.3.1.2.6. The United Arab Emirates 
Whereas the other GCC countries are centralized governments, the UAE is 
a federation composed of seven emirates where the electricity sector is managed 
at the state level; i.e., at the level of each individual emirate. When compared with 
other federal systems, such as in the U.S.  and Canada where states have equal 
powers in the federal system, the main difference lies in that not all the emirates 
have equal powers in the UAE federal system, as it is based on a power sharing 
agreement between Abu Dhabi and Dubai. According to this agreement, the 
president of the federation is the emir of Abu Dhabi, and the prime minister is the 
emir of Dubai. In addition, only the rulers of Abu Dhabi and Dubai have veto 
  246 
rights in the Supreme Council, the top policy-making body in the UAE. From a 
demographic perspective, Abu Dhabi and Dubai alone represent more than 65% 
of the total population and more than 90% of the territory of the UAE. 
Accordingly, this study will focus on the Emirates of Abu Dhabi and Dubai, as 
they are the main players involved in the development of renewable and nuclear 
energy sources in their respective power generation sectors.  
The electricity and water desalination sector of the United Arab Emirates 
is comprised of the following components: 
 The Ministry of Energy, which is in charge of coordinating at the 
federal level the energy policies and planning of the seven emirates, 
including the electricity sector.  
 The Abu Dhabi Regulation and Supervision Bureau as the regulator. 
 The Abu Dhabi Water and Electricity Company (ADWEC) as the sole 
buyer of electricity and water at the level of the emirate, which sells 
electricity and water to distribution and supply companies based on 
annually adjusted Bulk Supply Tariff (BST) (Regulation and 
Supervision Bureau, 2013). 
 The publicly owned Mubadala Development Company, established in 
2002, is the main promoter of renewable energy projects in the Emirate 
of Abu Dhabi through its branch Abu Dhabi Future Energy Company 
(ADFEC), very well known as Masdar (or “source” in Arabic). 
Khaldoon Al Mubarak is the CEO of Mubadala and the chairman of 
the Executive Affairs Authority of Abu Dhabi. Ahmad Ali Al Sayegh 
is the chairman of Masdar and Sultan Al jabber its CEO (Hertog & 
Luciani, 2009, p. 37). 
 In Dubai, the Dubai Supreme Energy Council (DSCE) is in charge of 
policy as well as general planning for the energy sector, including the 
power generation sector, in the emirate of Dubai (Dubai Supreme 
Energy Council, 2013).  
 In Dubai, the Dubai Electricity and Water Authority (DEWA), 
established in January 1992, is in charge of planning, building, and 
operating electricity and water plants in the emirate of Dubai. 
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Moreover, it is in charge of their transmission and distribution 
functions, and as such, it is the sole buyer of electricity and water 
supply from other independent companies (Dubai Electricity and 
Water Authority, 2012).  
 In Sharjah, the Sharjah Electricity and Water Authority (SEWA) has 
the responsibility of planning, building and operating electricity and 
water plants in the emirate of Sharjah, in addition to transmission and 
distribution tasks (Sharjah Electricity and Water Authority, 2014). 
 At the federal level, the Federal Electricity and Water Authority 
(FEWA), is the regulator responsible for the four other emirates of 
Ajman, Umm Al Qaiwain, Fujairah and Ras Al Khaimah. 
The UAE has been the precursor in the region for the deployment of 
renewable energy sources in the energy mix of its power generation sector, and as 
such, it is interesting to see how the regimes actors and their position has adapted 
to this new situation. In this respect, a good description of how the political 
structure of the Gulf Monarchies has evolved with the deployment of renewable 
energy sources in the UAE has been given by Christopher Davidson when talking 
about the political system in Abu Dhabi which he defines as a “system of ‘tribal 
capitalism’” (Davidson, 2009, p. 2), where “political power . . . [has been] 
maintained by placing key representatives of other powerful families and loyal 
clans in directorial roles in the surfeit of new parastatals and private companies 
charged with overseeing the new economic sectors” (Davidson, 2009, p. 2). This 
description is to a very large extent also valid in the other GCC monarchies and it 
is expected that the deployment of renewable energy technologies in GCC 
countries will most probably lead to a similar path as in the UAE with the same 
political configuration in which the actual regimes actors will maintain their 
dominant position in the socio-technical regimes level.  
The government of the UAE enjoys a very high level of autonomy in 
addition to significant fiscal surpluses. Notably, however, unlike the Emirate of 
Abu Dhabi, the Emirate of Dubai does not individually enjoy significant financial 
surpluses, and as a consequence, is not and will not be engaged in large-scale 
energy projects like Abu Dhabi. Politically, the UAE has been a very stable 
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country; nonetheless, signs of potential future political instability exist in the wake 
of the Arab Spring. 
 
4.3.1.2.7. Energy policy-making and the GCC organization 
Although GCC countries share much in common as far as energy policy is 
concerned, they are not a homogenous entity with a regional energy policy. This 
is despite of the existence of the GCC organization, which fixed as an objective in 
its Charter “to effect coordination, integration and inter-connection between 
Member States in all fields in order to achieve unity between them” (Cooperation 
Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, 2012, Article 4). After more than three 
decades, the GCC still remains very far from its initial objectives and has not been 
able to put into place a common energy policy for the region since its creation in 
May 1981. The only notable achievement of the GCC organization in the energy 
field has been the inter-connection of their electricity grid. 
There are no common projects regarding renewable energy; however, as 
far as nuclear energy is concerned, in December 2006, the six heads of state of the 
GCC countries announced the launch of a collective nuclear energy initiative 
(Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, 2006) to develop peaceful 
and civilian nuclear energy capacities in the power generation sector. 
Correspondingly, the Secretariat of the GCC undertook a feasibility study in 
collaboration with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to evaluate 
the possibilities of establishing a joint nuclear research program under the 
supervision of the GCC Secretariat (Stracke, 2007, p. 4). However, with the 
exception of this joint declaration, the cooperation with the IAEA is mainly 
conducted on a bilateral level, with the actual planning and implementation of the 
nuclear projects conducted on a national level without any regional collaboration 
within the GCC organization. 
Nonetheless, a number of general conclusions and common characteristics 
among the GCC countries can be highlighted as far as energy policy-making in 
the power generation sector is concerned. 
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4.3.1.2.8. General conclusions 
Following the above review and analysis of the electricity sector in the 
GCC countries, and based on Geels (2002) definition of the socio-technical 
regimes, which states that these regimes consist of a number of inter-connected 
dimensions, or “technology, user practices and application domains (markets), 
symbolic meaning of technology, infrastructure, industry structure, policy and 
techno-scientific knowledge” (Geels, 2002, p. 1262), we can draw a number of 
conclusions: 
First, the GCC states have a state capitalist structure and are ruled through 
a regime comprised of the ruling families at the top, and their neopatrimonial 
networks, who compose the main regimes’ actors in the energy sector in general 
and the power generation sector in particular, and are in charge of the energy 
policy-making process. 
Second, the power generation industry in the GCC region is on the whole 
vertically integrated, where the GCC governments directly or indirectly control 
the majority of the shares. The role of the private sector is still limited and has 
mainly acted as “a follower and policy-taker” (Hertog & Luciani, 2009, p. 39). In 
this respect, it is worth mentioning the World Bank definition of the private sector, 
which points to the difficulty of drawing a clear-cut dividing line between the 
public and the private sectors: 
The private sector is usually defined as the collection of enterprises that 
are owned by individuals or groups not representing the state, where the 
public sector comprises government agencies and state owned enterprises. 
In practice, however, the dividing line between the public and the private 
sector is always blurred, especially since ownership and control of the 
state may vary in degree and over time. Furthermore, countries differ in 
their legal or customary definitions of what is private and what is public. 
(World Bank, 1989, p. 1). 
This definition is even more relevant in the case of the GCC countries, 
where the state is the major shareholder of all the energy companies of the region, 
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as we have seen above regarding the utilities companies of the respective GCC 
countries. 
Third, power generation technologies in the GCC countries rely 
exclusively on conventional energy sources--namely, oil and gas--where the 
industry is vertically integrated under direct control of GCC governments and the 
ruling elites who compose the regimes actors. In this respect, the power 
generation infrastructure is exclusively based on these conventional oil and gas 
sources. 
Fourth, it is very difficult to speak of an energy or electricity market in the 
GCC countries, as no such market exists in the economic sense of the term. 
Indeed, the prices of energy in general, and electricity in particular, are set by the 
GCC governments and not by market forces. As a consequence, the introduction 
of new energy technologies in the energy mix of the GCC power generation sector 
cannot take place through market forces and will have to be introduced through 
GCC governments and the existing regimes actors that control it.  
Fifth, the increasing economic development and population growth have 
led to a higher demand on electricity, and as a result, large investments are needed 
in order to increase the generation capacity of the GCC countries. In response to 
this challenge, some GCC countries have started to introduce some reforms and to 
liberalize their electricity markets through the establishment of independent 
regulatory authorities, as we have seen above, and by encouraging private 
investments in the power generation sector through long term power purchase 
agreements with a single buyer or utility at competitive prices for the independent 
power plants. In this respect, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman are leading 
the way, whereas the other GCC countries still lag behind. However, discussions 
are on-going to reform the power generation sector of these trailing countries on 
the same line as the other leading GCC states. In their phased approach to 
competitive markets, the GCC governments have allowed for private investments 
in the generation sector while a regulated monopoly of the public utilities has 
been maintained in the transmission and distribution sectors. Under this model, 
the public utility is the single buyer who purchases electricity produced by 
independent power and power/water producers (IPPs and IWPPs) at competitive 
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prices, determined according to long term purchase agreements, before 
transmitting and distributing electricity to end-users. 
Sixth, the main constraints on the capacity of the GCC governments to 
invest in large scale power generation projects based on renewable and nuclear 
primary sources are to be found in the level of political autonomy of respective 
GCC governments, and the availability of the financial rents (Hertog & Luciani, 
2009, p. 38). Indeed, a restriction of the political autonomy of the GCC 
governments as a result of internal political instability, or/and a limitation in the 
revenues from the export of oil and gas resulting from price decline in the 
international markets, will greatly limit the capacity of the GCC governments to 
diversify their energy sources away from hydrocarbons, and could eventually risk 
the projects already declared. In this respect, there are signs of potential domestic 
instability in a number of GCC countries, especially in Saudi Arabia, which 
suffers from very high unemployment among its young population. Political 
instability will very likely divert investments from costly large-scale renewable or 
nuclear projects into social projects in order to buy social peace.  
Seventh, energy projects, like other projects in the GCC countries, will be 
undertaken without input from society; they are, and will continue to be for a 
relatively long time, initiated by top political elites in a top-down fashion without 
an impact on the society at large (Hertog & Luciani, 2009, p. 39). 
Eighth, in their efforts to diversify their energy sources away from the 
hydrocarbons, the GCC governments will primarily focus on two fronts. They will 
first invest in the development of their generation capacities through large scale 
power generation projects, including renewable and nuclear energies, and the 
development of islands of efficiency in the power generation sector, but with 
limited or no actions to curb domestic consumption through taxation or significant 
price increases, due to the high political cost involved  (Hertog & Luciani, 2009, p. 
40). The new energies niche-innovations will most probably find their way into 
the socio-technical regimes through the regimes actors, and will benefit from the 
concept of islands of efficiencies.  
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Lastly, the development of the generation capacities in order to cope with 
the growing domestic demand on electricity will be relatively easier for countries 
with small populations, such as Abu Dhabi and Qatar, but much more difficult for 
countries with a large population, such as Saudi Arabia, which will find it very 
difficult to continue investing on building capacities without working to decrease 
the local consumption through pricing tools. 
 
4.3.2. The Economics of Power Generation in the Monarchies of the 
Gulf 
The rapid and significant economic growth witnessed by the GCC 
countries in the past decades has been accompanied by rapidly growing electricity 
consumption, as shown in Figure 20 below representing the evolution of the GCC 
electricity consumption comparatively to the evolution of the GDP between 1981 
and 2008. 
 
Figure 20: GCC electricity consumption growth. GDP growth 1981-2008. 
Adapted from Interlinking the Arab Gulf, by L. El-Katiri, 2011, p. 6.  
The ups and downs of the GDP, and with it electricity consumption, are 
linked to the fluctuations of the oil price in the international markets, as oil 
revenues represent a very high proportion of the GCC revenues, and as a 
  253 
consequence, a very significant share of their GDP. Between 2005 and 2009 alone, 
electricity consumption in the GCC region increased by 8.87% with an average of 
3.5% per year—higher than the world average of 2.1% for the same period—and 
which represented in 2005 an average consumption of 1149 watt per capita. This 
was higher than the world average of 297 watt per capita, and the EU average of 
700 watt per capita, with the exception of the U.S. , which reached 1460 watt per 
capita  (W. E. Alnaser & N. W. Alnaser, 2011, p. 3082). Table 25 below shows a 
comparison of the watt per capita consumption of the GCC countries with a 
number of other economies. 
Table 25 
Watt per capita consumption of the GCC compared to other economies 
COUNTRY CONSUMP-
TION 
GW/y(2005) 
CONSUMP-
TION 
GW/y(2009) 
POPULA-
TION 2005 
W/pers
on 2005 
RAT
E % 
BAHRAIN 7614 8742 727,000 1195 12.9 
SAUDI 
ARABIA 
146,900 156,800 24,573,000 682 6.3 
QATAR 12,520 13,190 813,000 17,57 5.1 
OMAN 8661 11,190 2,567,000 385 22.6 
UAE 52,620 57,880 4,500,000 1335 9.1 
KUWAIT 36,280 39,540 2,687,000 1540 8.2 
TOTAL 
GCC 
264,595 287,342 35,867,000 1149 8.87 
WORLD 17,109,665 17,480,000 6,464,750,00
0 
297 2.1 
U.S.  3,872,598 3,892,000 298,213,000 1460 0.4 
CHINA 3,3650,600 3.271,000 1,314,844,00
0 
277 -11.6 
EU 2,950,297 2,926,000 459,387,000 700 -0.8 
Note: Adapted from The Status of Renewable Energy in the GCC Countries, by W. 
E. Alnaser & N. W. Alnaser, 2011, p. 3077. 
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It is worth noting that the generation of electricity in the GCC countries 
relies entirely on hydrocarbon fuels that benefit from substantial governmental 
subsidies, which partially explains their very high level of electricity consumption. 
Indeed, the rentier nature of the state has led to the development of a rentier-like 
mentality reflected in a very high level of energy consumption, but we also have 
to take into consideration the extremely harsh environment of the Arabian 
peninsula and limited water resources, which both imply an intensive use of 
electricity for air conditioning and water desalination for residential, commercial, 
and industrial needs.  
The breakdown of the electricity consumption in the GCC countries 
indicates that the residential and commercial sectors represent the biggest share of 
overall electricity consumption as shown by Figure 21 below: 
 
Figure 21: GCC electricity consumption by sector in 2009 (%). Adapted from 
Arab Union of Electricity, 2009, as cited in Interlinking the Arab Gulf: 
Opportunities and Challenges of GCC Electricity Market Cooperation, by L. El-
Katiri, 2011, p. 6.   
As far as electricity generation is concerned, in 2012, the installed capacity 
of the GCC region was estimated to be 117.4 GW, and based on an analysis of 
peak load demand and reserve capacity requirements, an additional 65.9 GW 
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capacity will be necessary for the period 2014-2018. This is equivalent to more 
than 56% of the existing capacity, representing an annual rate of capacity growth 
in the GCC region estimated at 8.7%, and needing a total investment of US$ 72.9 
billion in order to be able to respond to the growing domestic demand (Aissaoui, 
2013a, p. 2). Moreover, in addition to the investments in the new generation 
capacity, there will be an additional US$ 48.1 billion of investments needed in 
transmission and distribution, i.e., a total necessary investment in the whole power 
sector of the GCC estimated at US$ 121 billion for the period 2014-2018. Based 
on these estimates for the period between 2014-2018, we can project that for the 
period between 2014-2050, there will be a need to add a generation capacity of 
474.4 GW and to invest US$ 871.2 billion in the whole power sector, if economic 
and demographic growth continue growing at the same actual levels 
(corresponding to a medium level fertility rate as discussed in the previous section 
regarding the population growth variable). 
When dealing with the issue of long-term investments in the power sector, 
we need to determine the source and availability of funding of the expected 
projects for the selected period of time, i.e., between 2014 and 2050. In the 
present situation, following the reforms introduced by a number of GCC countries 
in the power generation sector, it was expected that through IPPs and IWPPs, the 
private sector will play a major role in funding the power generation projects 
undertaken on a project finance basis, with the ultimate objective of shifting the 
financial burden from the public sector to the private sector. However, the 
experience of the last decade since the first reforms were introduced has proven 
the expected private sector investments below expectations, which has pushed the 
GCC governments to maintain a high level of investments in the power generation 
sector (Aissaoui, 2013a, p. 4). As far as the transmission and distribution (T&D) 
sectors are concerned, they have been funded essentially from state budgets, in 
addition to their earnings when available, and eventually by external multilateral 
bank loans (Aissaoui, 2013a, p. 4). 
Unless more reforms are introduced in the whole power sector (Generation, 
Transmission, and Distribution) on the regulatory as well as on the price of 
electricity for end-users, the financial burden for future investments in the power 
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sector will remain on the shoulders of the GCC governments with only a limited 
role for the private sector. In this respect, continued governmental financial 
support will depend on the revenues of the GCC governments, and consequently 
on the price of oil and gas in the international markets, which must be maintained 
above their fiscal break-even price (Aissaoui, 2013a, p. 4). 
The availability of fuel—especially gas—in the long term is another major 
challenge that the GCC governments will have to confront in light of the gas 
shortages that a number of them have recently been facing. The power generation 
sector of the region relies heavily on thermal plants fuelled mainly by 
hydrocarbons in which gas is the main energy source, with the exception of Saudi 
Arabia and especially Kuwait, where gas represents only 14.4% of the fuel mix 
(Ministry of Electricity and Water in Kuwait, 2009, p. 59). If there are no new 
major gas discoveries in the GCC countries currently witnessing gas shortages 
(Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE), given the same levels of population and 
economic growth and avoiding any change in the price structure of electricity, it is 
extremely unlikely that the GCC countries, with the exception of Qatar, will find 
the necessary gas resources domestically. 
Indeed, since 1980, the total electricity consumption in the GCC countries 
has risen nearly tenfold, with the consumption tripling in the 1980s alone, and has 
been nearly doubling every decade since then (El-Katiri, 2011, p. 3). Despite the 
comparatively small population of the GCC countries, the consumption of 
electricity has reached 330TWh, which is slightly less than the consumption of the 
United Kingdom, according to 2008 figures (El-Katiri, 2011, p. 3).  
On the climate change front, the very high electricity consumption in GCC 
societies has been accompanied by a very high level of CO2 emissions with an 
important environmental impact.  In 2009 alone, the power generation sector was 
responsible for an average of 40% of CO2 emissions reaching even 50% in some 
GCC countries (Bachellerie, 2012, p. 22). Improving energy efficiency and 
diversifying the energy mix in the power generation sector are necessary measures 
to reduce the emission intensity of electricity production while at the same time 
securing future power supplies for growing needs. The transition to a more 
diversified energy mix will require strong political will coupled with significant 
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investments for the very large scale deployment of new technologies that will 
need to be subsidized in their initial launching phases. 
As a result of this background and the need to improve the energy security 
of the GCC countries as whole, the initial idea of interconnecting the electricity 
grid of the region was conceived (El-Katiri, 2011, p. 17). In May 2001, the GCC 
Interconnection Authority was officially established with the headquarters in 
Dammam, Saudi Arabia, and in May 2004, the energy ministers of the GCC 
approved the public funding of the project for an amount of $3bn, with cost 
divided among the GCC member countries according to the expected national 
share of the grid’s capacity. 
It is worth noting that simultaneous to the discussions about a regional 
power grid, the issue of diversifying the energy sources in the GCC was also 
discussed for the first time with an emphasis on nuclear energy, as it became 
evident that the projected electricity demand will push for the development of 
alternative energy sources (El-Katiri, 2011, p. 17). 
 
4.4. A REVIEW OF ENERGY DIVERSIFICATION POLICY 
OBJECTIVES AND PROJECTS IN THE GCC 
Since Masdar project was launched in the UAE in 2006, renewable energy 
policy targets and projects gradually became part of the overall energy policy of a 
growing number of GCC countries. Historically, energy policy in the GCC 
countries was limited to oil and gas production and their prices in the international 
markets with a very limited number of actors involved in the energy policy-
making process. In the present time, the energy policy landscape of the GCC 
countries has since completely changed, becoming more institutionalized and 
involving numerous actors. Even so, this level of institutionalization has not yet 
reached parity with western democracies, as it remains a top-down process with 
almost no input or participation from the larger society.  
In the sections below, we will first undertake a short review of the policy 
tools that have been globally used for the deployment of new energy technologies, 
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before reviewing the policy targets the GCC governments have set for themselves 
for deploying new energy sources in addition to the policy tools for reaching their 
objectives. In the final section, we will review the planned renewable and nuclear 
projects in each GCC country.    
Governments have developed a variety of policy tools for the 
diversification of their energy sources and for energy transition strategies, 
summarized in the following list: 
 Feed-in-tariff (FIT): “The price per-unit of electricity that a utility or 
power supplier has to pay for distributed or renewable electricity fed 
into the grid by non-utility generators. A public authority regulates the 
tariff” (IPCC, 2011, p. 959). 
 Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS): Also known as renewable energy 
quotas or renewable obligations, it represents “established quotas 
obligate designated parties (generators or suppliers) to meet minimum 
(often gradually increasing) renewable energy targets, generally 
expressed as percentages of total supplies or as an amount of 
renewable energy capacity, with costs borne by consumers” (IPCC, 
2011, p. 964). 
 Tax credit: It is a tax reduction or exemption for a certain period in 
order to encourage investments in renewable energies, within the 
context of an energy policy for the deployment of RE technologies.  
 Pricing laws. 
 Production incentives. 
 Trading systems, or tradable certificates, also known as tradable green 
certificates: Under this system, the established renewable energy 
quotas, produced by the renewable energy producers, are transformed 
into tradable certificates by the regulatory authority “and assigned to 
the renewable energy producers to sell or for their own use in fulfilling 
their quota” (IPCC, 2011, p. 966). 
 Subsidies: Direct payment from the government or a tax reduction to a 
private party for implementing a practice the government wishes to 
encourage. The reduction of greenhouse gas emissions is stimulated by 
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lowering existing subsidies that have the effect of raising emissions 
(such as subsidies for fossil fuel use) or by providing subsidies for 
practices that reduce emissions or enhance sinks (e.g., renewable 
energy projects, insulation of buildings or planting trees). (IPCC, 2011, 
p. 965)  
The feed-in-tariff (FIT) and the Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) are 
the most widely used instruments for the promotion of renewables globally 
(Solangi, Islam, Saidur, Rahim, & Fayaz, 2011, p. 2152). It should be noted that 
there is a debate among politicians and academics about the usefulness of these 
instruments, which varies from one country to another depending on the context 
of the instruments’ implementation and the objectives sought. According to Ekins, 
there is no standard model that could be used universally as every model must 
emerge from within the specific cultural and historical context of every country 
(Etkins, 2004, p. 1903). As a consequence, it is necessary to consider the political 
as well as the cultural context of the GCC countries, in order to determine the 
potential instruments available to them for promoting the deployment of RE 
technologies in their energy mix for the power generation sector. 
 
4.4.1. Policy Tools and RE Objectives in the Context of the GCC 
It is worth noting that, as far as the GCC countries are concerned, very 
significant developments took place recently regarding the deployment of 
renewable and nuclear energies in the power generation sector. The energy mix of 
the region is changing, and from the long-term plans declared by Saudi Arabia 
and the UAE, its future energy landscape will look very different from what exists 
today. The first section below will review the policy objectives and tools for the 
deployment of renewable energies, and the second section will concentrate on the 
nuclear energy policy objectives in the GCC countries. 
In their efforts to deploy renewable energy technologies, the GCC 
governments will need to use a number policy tools in order to achieve their 
objectives. In this respect, and based on the findings of the previous section, Table 
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26 below summarizes existing support policies in the GCC countries regarding the 
diversification of their energy sources: 
Table 26 
Renewable Energy Support Policies in GCC Countries  
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Note: Adapted from Renewables 2013 Global Status Report, by REN21, 2013b, p. 
17 (treated by the author). 
On the front of power generation policies, none of the GCC countries have 
put in place a Feed-in-tariffs (FIT) system, although it is under discussion in Saudi 
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Arabia and the UAE. In Saudi Arabia, the discussion involves introducing FIT in 
small-scale projects, and Abu Dhabi and Dubai are considering introducing green 
tariffs (REN21, 2013a, p. 21). Although there are no indications about when they 
will probably implement a FIT system, there are doubts that it will be introduced 
in the short term due to the fact that it is linked to the pricing of electricity 
domestically, and the actual political environment in the wake of the Arab Spring 
does not favor such policies for the moment. So far, none of the GCC countries 
have implemented minimum price standards (RPS) as a regulatory instrument for 
deploying renewables, as there is yet no electricity market to introduce it. 
In 2012, the emirate of Dubai introduced a regulation regarding new 
buildings with an obligation to meet at least 75% of their hot water from solar 
power, whereas the Authority for Electricity Regulation (AER) in Oman has 
introduced in 2013 an obligation of introducing solar or wind power in every rural 
project--an obligation that could be suspended only if the company is capable of 
providing a technical economic infeasibility of the obligation (REN21, 2013a, p. 
21). 
Fiscal incentives are very poorly used in the GCC region with the 
exception of Oman on a national level, and the UAE at the state level in Dubai 
and Abu Dhabi, in the form of energy payments. 
However, as far as public financing is concerned, it is present in all the 
GCC countries, which is a very good indicator of the central role of the GCC 
states in the political economy of the GCC countries, and of the top-down 
approach that is in force in the region due to the nature of the existing social 
contract and to the actual availability of significant financial revenues. Indeed, as 
we have previously mentioned, the GCC governments have allocated very 
important budgets for deploying renewable energies in the power generation 
sector in the long run, and the sustainability of these investments will greatly 
depend on the continuous flow of substantial revenues from the export of oil and 
gas, which in turn will depend on the future evolution of energy markets. Further, 
a decrease in the prices of oil and gas in the international markets will affect the 
revenues of the GCC governments, which will most probably reduce the level of 
investments for the deployment of RE technologies in the power generation sector. 
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All GCC governments have set long-term renewable energy targets, in 
addition to long-term nuclear projects and targets in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. 
Indeed, as far as RE technologies are concerned, in 2012, Saudi Arabia unveiled 
its long-term renewable energy targets for the power generation sector: 25 GW of 
CSP, 16 GW of solar PV, 9 GW of wind, 3 GW of waste-to-energy, and 1 GW of 
geothermal by 2032. According to the REN 21 report, “by 2030, Saudi Arabia is 
expected to become not only the leader of the MENA countries in terms of 
renewable energy capacity, but also a major player in the world” (2013a, p. 13). 
Table 27 below reviews the overall RE targets in the GCC countries, and 
Table 28 reviews the RE capacity targets by technology in the GCC countries. 
Table 27 
Overall Renewable Energy Share Targets in GCC Countries 
Bahrain 5% by 2020 
Kuwait 5% of electricity generation by 2020; 10% by 2030 
Oman 10% by 2020 
Qatar At least 2% of electricity generation from solar by 2020 
Saudi 
Arabia 
20% of electricity generation from renewables by 2032 
UAE 
Dubai: 5% of electricity by 2030 / Abu Dhabi 7% of electricity 
generation capacity by 2020 
Note: Adapted from MENA Renewables Status Report, by REN21, 2013a, p. 16 
and 18 (treated by the author). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  263 
Table 28 
RE Capacity Targets by Technology in the GCC Countries 
 Solar PV CSP Wind 
Biomass, 
Geothermal 
Total 
Bahrain - - - - - 
Kuwait 
by 2030 
 
3500 MW 
 
1100 MW 
 
3100 MW 
 
7700 
MW 
Oman - - - - - 
Qatar 
by 2020 
 
640 MW 
  
 
640 MW 
Saudi Arabia  
by 2022 
 
 
by 2032 
17350 MW 
6500 MW wind/waste to 
energy/geothermal 
 
9000 MW wind; 3000 
MW waste to energy; 1000 
MW geothermal 
23850 
MW 
 
 
54000 
MW 
 
1600 MW 
 
25000 MW 
UAE - - - - - 
Note: Adapted from MENA Renewables Status Report, by REN21, 2013a, p. 19 
(treated by the author). 
From the first table above, it appears that by early 2013, all GCC countries 
had established renewable energy targets for themselves, even if only the UAE 
has a formal renewable energy strategy or plan at this stage. Almost all GCC 
countries have set a target for electricity production; these range from between 2% 
in Qatar by 2020, and 20% in Saudi Arabia by 2032. Kuwait and Oman 
announced both targets for producing 10% of their electricity from renewables by 
2030 and 2020 respectively (REN21, 2013a, p. 16). From a technological 
perspective, it appears that solar, followed by wind, are the main technological 
choices of the region, with an advantage for CSP over solar PV despite CSP’s 
higher cost. It is also very clear that among the GCC countries Saudi Arabia has 
the most ambitious objectives for deploying renewables in the power generation 
sector. 
The UAE has also been investing in renewable energy domestically and 
internationally through its government-backed privately structured companies 
Masdar and Taqa. Masdar has recently inaugurated Shams 1, a CSP power plant 
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with a 100 MW of installed capacity, in addition to the Noor 1 solar PV plant with 
a 100 MW of installed capacity, and the 30 MW Sir Bani Yas wind farm project. 
Internationally, Masdar has been involved in funding renewable energy projects 
on behalf of the UAE government: in the UK in the London Array, the largest 
offshore wind farm in the world; in Spain in Gemasolar, a CSP power plant 
project, which will be based on the most advanced storage technologies (REN21, 
2013a, p. 33); and in other developing countries such as Afghanistan, the 
Seychelles, and Mauritania. In addition, the Abu Dhabi fund for Development has 
allocated US$ 350 million in the form of soft loans for renewable energy projects 
in developing countries that are members of IRENA (REN21, 2013a, p. 21). In 
this respect, the Kuwaiti Investment Authority has recently announced that it will 
be investing in renewable energy projects (REN21, 2013a, p. 21). Saudi Arabia 
also has been very active on this front, investing in renewable energy projects 
abroad through its project developer ACWA Power International, which will 
invest US$ 1.16 billion in a 160 MW CSP plant at Ouarzazate in Morocco 
(REN21, 2013a, p. 26). Through such investments, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are 
pursuing a diversification of their international investments portfolio, in addition 
to an improved international image, as GCC countries are considered among the 
main blockers of the international climate mitigation negotiations. However, 
economic incentive is the main driver in their economic diversification strategy. 
In order to promote renewable energies, state owned energy companies in 
the GCC have recently created branches dedicated to renewable energies. In 2012, 
in Saudi Arabia, Aramco has created an investment unit for renewable energies. It 
has also funded, entirely or partially, and in partnership with the King Abdullah 
Petroleum Studies and Research Center, three solar PV projects with a total 
installed capacity of 17 MW (REN21, 2013a, p. 26). In Qatar, the General 
Electricity and Water Corporation has declared that it will invest US$ 125 billion 
in alternative and renewable energy projects (REN21, 2013a, p. 21).  
There are also efforts to promote the whole renewable value chain within 
the local economy, with a notable lead for Saudi Arabia due to the size of its 
domestic market. The objective behind this policy is to diversify the economy and 
  265 
to create new job opportunities in highly rewarding professions for young 
university graduate nationals. 
As a concluding note, the GCC countries have, overall, made significant 
progress for the diversification of their energy sources in the power generation 
sector through significant investment plans for the deployment of renewable 
energy sources. They have all established renewable energy targets and allocated 
budgets in that respect; however, this effort is state-driven, and it will take some 
time before it becomes market-driven with regulatory and financial mechanisms 
that will enable and encourage investments from the private sector. 
 
4.4.2. Nuclear Energy in the GCC: An Emerging Role 
 The United Arab Emirates was the first in the GCC region to declare an 
interest in nuclear power and to conceive a nuclear policy. In April 2008, the UAE 
government published a comprehensive national policy on nuclear energy with the 
clearly established objective of building nuclear power plants (Emirates Nuclear 
Energy Corporation, 2011a). According to this policy the objective is to produce 
between 20 and 25% of the UAE’s electricity from nuclear energy by 2020 
(Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation, 2011b). In 2008, the UAE and the USA 
signed a nuclear energy cooperation agreement. In October 2008, the UAE 
established the national nuclear regulatory authority, and at the end of the year, it 
signed an agreement with a South-Korean consortium for building four APR 1400 
reactors. Construction of its first nuclear reactor, Barakah-1, started in July 2012 
with commercial operation planned to start by 2017-2018 for the first two units, 
followed by the two remaining units by 2019-2020. 
In December 2009, the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC) was 
established by decree and charged with implementing the Emirate’s nuclear 
energy program, and accordingly, in charge of the deployment, ownership and 
operation of the nuclear plants (Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation, 2011b). 
According to the national nuclear energy policy, the UAE made the choice 
to deploy nuclear energy for electricity generation in order to cope with the 
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projected electricity demand, because it was the only available option that could 
help achieve a number of objectives simultaneously. Firstly, nuclear power 
technology has the potential to deliver the projected demand on electricity, which 
is projected to grow by 9% annually until 2020 (Policy of the United Arab 
Emirates, 2008, “Background”). Secondly, the available reserves of gas will not 
be sufficient to generate the projected demand on electricity, whereas oil and coal 
will lead to an environmental degradation of the Emirate. And finally, for 
renewable energies, “even aggressive development could only supply 6-7% of 
peak electricity demand by 2020” (Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation, 2011, p. 
1). 
In June 2011, the government of Saudi Arabia declared its plans to 
develop nuclear energy for the generation of electricity in order to meet growing 
domestic demand. Following this, King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable 
Energy (K.A.CARE) was created to undertake the task of building 16 nuclear 
power plants over the next 20 years, with a total investment of around US$ 80 
billion dollars. The first two reactors are planned to come online in 10 years, 
followed by two more each year until 2030 in order to reach the objective of 
generating 20% of the Kingdom’s needs in electricity (World Energy Council, 
2012, p. 32). Saudi Arabia has already signed a number of cooperation 
agreements with several governments and institutions in the fields of training, 
safety, and waste management--including building power plants with South Korea, 
France, Argentina--and is holding talks to explore potential nuclear energy 
cooperation with Russia, China, the UK, the Czech Republic and the U.S. (Knott, 
2012).  
Kuwait had plans to build four 1 GW nuclear power plants before 
abandoning them in the wake of the Fukushima nuclear accident (Knott, 2012).  
The deployment of nuclear energy can bring significant advantages to the 
energy system of the GCC countries, especially as a mature technology with the 
potential to produce high levels of projected electricity demand in the future. 
However, the deployment of nuclear power in the GCC could face some 
constraints. First, it remains unsure that the GCC governments will be financially 
capable of maintaining their declared plans for long-term significant investments 
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for the deployment of nuclear power, given the growing fiscal pressure—as a 
result of growing demand coupled with the impact of the Arab Spring—to 
increase their spending on the social and security fronts. Indeed, the GCC 
governments could postpone or curtail their nuclear power ambitions in the case 
of a decline in their revenues due to a drop in the price of oil, or changes in the 
structure of the global energy market as a result of the duplication of the 
American oil/gas shale revolution in other parts of the world, especially in China 
and India. The fiscal pressure faced by the GCC governments raises the cost issue 
of deploying nuclear power technology, and the extent to which the GCC 
governments can ably sustain the long-term investments needed for developing 
nuclear energy in the power generation sector, given the lack of cost-recovering 
power tariff structure in the GCC (El-Katiri, 2012, p. 2). Indeed, the rentier state 
structure will not allow for a tariff system to recover the initial investments that 
the governments will have to undertake in order to deploy nuclear power, in 
addition to the very high level of expected long-term variable costs inherent to 
nuclear energy technology. Following the Fukushima nuclear accident, concerns 
about the security of nuclear plants have led to a review of the security of existing 
nuclear plants globally and to stronger security measures for existing and future 
power plants, with a resulting increase in the cost of nuclear power. 
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Chapter 5 
THE TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION-NICHES IN 
THE CONTEXT OF THE GCC 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION: THE RATIONAL FOR DEPLOYING 
RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES 
 In order to build future scenarios about the diversification of energy 
resources in the electricity generation sector of the GCC region, it is first 
necessary to establish a comprehensive and detailed review of the available niche 
technologies for the supply of electricity at the micro-level of the MLP. The niche 
technologies are those projected to replace the dominant conventional energy 
sources that are presently an integral part of the regimes level. The niche 
technologies considered in this research are the renewable energy technologies of 
direct solar energy and wind energy, whereas nuclear technology represents an 
alternative source of energy. 
 The choice has been made to limit the scope of this research to these 
renewable energy sources, as they are the most technically and commercially 
mature and also the most relevant to the GCC region, as will be seen in the 
context of this chapter. Moreover, considering all the available commercial 
renewable energy sources would present a task beyond the scope of a Ph.D. thesis.  
 The selected renewable energy sources will also be analyzed regarding 
their climate change mitigation impact, especially as far as carbon dioxide (CO2) 
emissions are concerned. This chapter will be based essentially on the scientific 
findings of the various reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC), in addition to other academic and industry resources when necessary, 
especially when dealing with the specific cases of the GCC countries. The 
decision to rely primarily on the outcomes of the IPCC reports is motivated by 
two reasons: The IPCC reports are based on a literature review encompassing 
most of what has been published by the scientific community, and as a 
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consequence, the data and outcomes of these reports are very widely accepted by 
the world scientific community and thus representative of the actual global 
scientific knowledge about climate change and renewable energy technologies. 
The second reason for this choice is linked to the homogeneity of the data and 
figures in the IPCC reports. Indeed, one of the main problems of dealing with the 
data in the energy industry stems from its diversity and occasional contradictions.  
Even the same subject may entail different calculating methods based on various 
inputs and assumptions. In this respect, IPCC figures allow us to overcome this 
technical problem.  
 The focus of this chapter will be a comparison of the technical and 
commercial aspects of these technologies as far as cost and CO2 emissions are 
concerned, in addition to an analysis of their status and technical potential within 
the context of the GCC region. Finally, the future outlook of each technology will 
be discussed from a technical as well as a cost perspective within the GCC context, 
based on the most current information available in the literature in order to 
determine the long-term trends for building the scenarios. 
 The focus on the CO2 emissions factor is motivated by the fact that the 
largest known source responsible for the increased concentrations of carbon 
dioxide (CO2) in the atmosphere since the pre-industrial period is fossil fuel use, 
as already discussed in detail in chapter 3, in addition to the fact that the power 
generation sector alone  accounts for 41% of global energy-related CO2 emissions, 
as the electricity production sector is highly energy intensive and has reached 
4839 Mtoe in 2010, which represented two-thirds more than the building sector 
and double the transportation sector (IEA, 2012, p. 351). 
 According to the 2012 IEA World Energy Outlook, the global demand
84
 on 
electricity has increased by 40% over the period from 2000 to 2010, despite the 
decline caused by the global financial crisis in 2009, and demand for electricity is 
forecasted to continue growing more than any other form of final energy over the 
                                                          
84
 Per the IEA calculations, “electricity demand is calculated as the total gross 
electricity generated less own use in the production of electricity, less 
transmission and distribution losses” (IEA, 2012, p. 180). 
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projection period of 2010 to 2035. Indeed, in the scenarios conceived by the IEA, 
the annual demand growth on electricity will reach 2.6% per year in the Current 
Policies Scenario, 2.2% in the New Policies Scenario
85
 (the central scenario of the 
WEO), and at only 1.7% in the 450 Scenario
86
 (IEA, 2012, p. 180). 
 Before embarking on the task of surveying the renewable energy 
technologies available and evaluating their market potential for the production of 
electricity, as well as their climate mitigation potential, let us first outline 
“renewable energy” as defined by the IPCC: 
Renewable energy is any form of energy from solar, geophysical or 
biological sources that is replenished by natural processes at a rate that 
equals or exceeds its rate of use. Renewable energy is obtained from the 
continuing or repetitive flows of energy occurring in the natural 
environment and includes low carbon technologies such as solar energy, 
hydropower, wind, tide and waves and ocean thermal energy, as well as 
renewable fuels such as biomass. (IPCC, 2011, p. 958) 
In other words, renewable energy is a naturally occurring and theoretically 
inexhaustible source of energy not derived from fossil or nuclear fuel, and that can 
be produced at equal or higher rates than its actual consumption.  
                                                          
85
 According to the IEA definition: 
The New Policies Scenario––[the] central scenario–– takes into account 
broad policy commitments and plans that have already been implemented 
to address energy-related challenges as well as those that have been 
announced, even where the specific measures to implement these 
commitments have yet to be introduced (IEA, 2012, p. 34). 
 
86
 According to the IEA definition:  
Rather than being a projection based on past trends, modified by known 
policy actions, [the 450 Scenario] deliberately selects a plausible energy 
pathway. The pathway chosen is consistent with actions having around 
50% of chance of meeting the goal of limiting the global increase in 
average temperature to two degrees Celsius (2  C) in the long term, 
compared with pre-industrial levels. According to climate experts, to meet 
this goal the long-term concentration of greenhouse gases in the 
atmosphere needs to be limited to around 450 parts per million of carbon 
dioxide equivalent (ppm CO2 eq)––hence the scenario name. (IEA, 2012, 
pp. 34-35) 
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 All energy sources, including renewable energy sources, flow from 
primary energy through carriers to services and end uses. As far as renewable 
energy sources are concerned, the various renewable energy technologies 
available have the technical capacity to supply the market with the full range of 
energy services needed by a modern economy as shown in Figure 22 below: 
 
Figure 22: Illustrative paths of energy from source to service 
87
 Adapted from 
Renewable Energy Sources and Climate Change Mitigation: Special Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, by IPCC, 2011, p. 38. 
 It can be clearly seen from the figure above that that RE technologies can 
produce the full range of energy services needed for human use; however, as this 
research focuses on the production of electricity in the GCC countries, it will only 
consider the energy pathways that lead to the production of electricity using RE 
technologies relevant to the GCC region. In this regard, the relevant renewable 
energy technologies for the production of electricity in the GCC region are limited 
to solar energy and wind, as will be seen in subsequent sections of this chapter. 
 The deployment of RE sources is popular due to their potential role in 
mitigating climate change; however, they can also have social and economic 
benefits in addition to positive impacts on the environment and health, as 
summarized in the following points:  
                                                          
87
 All connected lines indicate possible energy pathways. 
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 Firstly, RE sources do not suffer from the depletion factor, as they are 
inexhaustible. Indeed, the theoretical potential of RE is much bigger than the 
projected global energy demand, and the challenge for humanity is to be able to 
develop the technologies to capture a significant share of that potential in a 
sustainable way to produce the demanded energy services. From a technical 
perspective, the potential
88
 of RE sources is by far much greater than the projected 
global energy demand (IPCC, 2011, p. 39). 
 Figures regarding the depletion of fossil fuel energy sources range from 
the very optimistic to the very pessimistic, and it is difficult to find any consensus 
among experts about the time range for the depletion of these resources. As such, 
it is not the objective of this research to review and analyze in detail the various 
theories and technical details about this issue. However, consensus ultimately 
agrees that fossil fuels are finite and will reach depletion sometime in the future—
even if significant disagreements remain among the scientific community about 
the time range of this future. 
 In the context of the oil and gas rich countries of the GCC, introducing RE 
into the energy mix of the region, particularly in the power generation sector, will 
have the additional potential advantage of decreasing the domestic consumption 
of fossil fuels, and consequently increase its export capacity of cash earning oil 
and gas. Indeed, the growing domestic consumption of fossil fuel is putting 
pressure on the export capacity of a number of GCC countries and especially 
Saudi Arabia, which is already consuming 25% of its oil production domestically 
and projected to consume 50% of its oil production by 2015, according to the 
latest figures. The domestic consumption of oil and gas is pressuring available 
reserves, and some GCC countries have already begun witnessing a gas shortage. 
 Secondly, when compared to the thermal conversion processes for the 
production of electricity using conventional energy sources, RE sources are more 
environmentally friendly, as they are more efficient and require less primary 
energy conversion, and as a result release much less CO2 in the atmosphere. 
                                                          
88
 According to IPCC usage, “Technical potential is used in the SRREN as the amount of 
RE output obtainable by full implementation of demonstrated technologies or practices. 
No explicit reference to costs barriers or policies is made” (IPCC, 2011, p. 10). 
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Indeed, “the thermal process to produce electricity (including biomass and 
geothermal) suffer losses of approximately 40 to 90%, and losses of about 80% 
occur when supplying the mechanical energy needed for transport based on 
internal combustion engines (IPCC, 2011, p. 38). In other words, the significant 
conversion losses of conventional energy technologies mean that they require 
much more primary energy from fossil fuels for the production of electricity. On 
the other hand, direct energy conversion from RE sources (with the exception of 
biomass and geothermal) to produce electricity does not suffer thermodynamic 
power cycle losses. 
 Thirdly, RE technologies can improve the level of energy access to the 
populations living in remote areas that are not connected to the national grid, 
which will contribute toward meeting the Millennium Development Goals of the 
United Nations as agreed upon following the Millennium Summit in 2000. The 
RE technological solutions for remote areas have the advantage of being cheaper 
and cleaner than the fossil fuel alternatives, such as diesel generators, so long as 
they are used to provide for basic services such as lighting, heating, drinking 
water, and cooking at a local level. 
 Fourthly, economic development has historically been accompanied by 
increasing energy use with consequential growth in the emissions of GHG. The 
deployment of RE will ultimately lead to decoupling that correlation and help 
achieve the goal of sustainable development, thanks to its technical capacity to 
give access to energy services in geographically remote areas. In addition, with its 
very low GHG emissions, it will contribute to climate change mitigation and the 
protection of the environment, with positive health impacts. 
 Fifthly, especially in the context of the GCC region, RE technologies will 
help reduce the stress on water availability, as with few exemptions (e.g. some 
biomass options) they consume much less water than the conventional water-
cooled power plants. 
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5.1.1. The Cost Factor of Renewable Energy Sources  
As stated by the last IPCC report, “the levelized cost of energy89 for many 
RE technologies is currently higher than existing energy prices, though in various 
settings RE is already economically competitive” (IPCC, 2011, p. 40). Certain 
renewable energy technologies can be cost competitive within a given range in 
very specific environments and conditions related to the characteristics of the 
technology, regional cost variations, and performance under different 
environments and climates, as can be seen from Figure 23 below. As a result of 
the technical as well as the commercial developments RE technologies have 
witnessed in the past few decades conventional energy technologies do not 
anymore enjoy an absolute economic advantage over renewable energy 
technologies in every setting. The cost of RE has tended toward decline for the 
past decades, and with its expected technological developments—coupled with 
the economies of scale the future upcoming RE projects worldwide will provide—
there is no doubt that in the long-term, RE will be cost competitive in most 
settings. That goes without mentioning that increases in the price of conventional 
energy sources will further the cost competitiveness of RE. In addition, when 
comparing the cost factor between RE and conventional technologies, the 
externalities and full social cost
90
 of the latter are not taken into consideration; 
                                                          
89
 According to the IPCC report,  
The levelized cost of energy represents the cost of an energy generating system 
over its lifetime; it is calculated as the per-unit price at which energy must be 
generated from a specific source over its lifetime to a break even. It usually 
includes all private costs that accrue upstream in the value chain, but does not 
include the downstream cost of delivery to the final consumer; the cost of 
integration, or external environmental or other costs. Subsidies and tax credits are 
also not included. (IPCC, 2011, p. 13) 
90
 According to IPCC usage,  
Externalities arise from a human activity, when agents responsible for the activity 
do not take full account of the activity’s impact on others’ production and 
consumption possibilities, and no compensation exists for such impacts. When 
the impact is negative, they are called external costs. When positive they are 
referred to as external benefits. (IPCC, 2011, p. 11) 
The energy industry, from extraction to consumption, has had a significant negative 
environmental and social impact—for example, the environment damage caused by fossil 
fuel extraction, production, transport, and consumption; the increased probability of wars 
due to the competition over access and control of energy resources; public health issues 
and chronic disease linked to the pollution of the environment, et cetera. 
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therefore, “monetizing the external costs of energy supply would [significantly] 
improve the relative competitiveness of RE” (IPCC, 2011, p. 13). 
 As can be seen from Figure 23 below in the case of PV and wind 
technologies, the cost of PV modules and wind power plants have experienced a 
declining slope since the end of the seventies, which historically corresponds to 
the first oil shock between 1973 and 1974. 
 
Figure 23: Selected experience curves in logarithmic scale for the price of silicon 
PV modules and onshore wind power plants per unit of capacity. Adapted from 
Renewable Energy Sources and Climate Change Mitigation: Special Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, by IPCC, 2011, p.15. 
 In the electricity production sector, a variety of RE technologies can 
produce electricity at substantially variable costs. Figure 24 below provides a 
comparison of LCOE of RE technologies for the production of electricity. The 
cost ranges of these figures are broad as they are general and do not take into 
account local costs of investment, the quality of RE technology, and the cost of 
operation and maintenance that can vary from one technology to the other and 
from one context to the other.   
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Figure 24: Levelized Cost of Electricity for commercially available RE 
technologies covering a range of different discount rates.
91
 Adapted from 
Renewable Energy Sources and Climate Change Mitigation: Special Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, by IPCC, 2011, p. 188. 
 Calculating the cost of RE takes into consideration the investment cost in 
addition to the operation and maintenance cost (O&M cost), and in the case of RE, 
they are characterized by very high investment costs relative to O&M and fuel 
costs.  
 From a regional perspective, there are substantial variations from one 
region to another. As far as production of solar PV panels is concerned, China is 
now the leading global producer user and exporter, and in 2008, in terms of 
                                                          
91
 The lower bound of the levelized cost range is based on a 3% discount rate 
applied to the low end of the ranges of investment, operations, and maintenance 
(O&M), and (if applicable) feedstock cost and the high ends of the ranges of 
capacity factors and lifetimes as well as (if applicable) the high ends of the ranges 
of conversion efficiencies and by-product revenue. The higher bound of the 
levelized cost range is accordingly based on a 10% discount rate applied to the 
low end of the ranges of investment, operations, and maintenance (O&M), and (if 
applicable) feedstock cost and the high ends of the ranges of capacity factors and 
lifetimes as well as (if applicable) the high ends of the ranges of conversion 
efficiencies and by-product.  
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capacity, it was the largest investor in thermal water heating and third in 
bioethanol production. In the GCC region, however, the picture is entirely 
different, as its energy mix completely depends on fossil fuels and has not yet 
developed any capacity in RE, including the power generation sector. A number 
of ambitious projects of RE electricity production have been announced in the 
past few years but yet to materialize, with the exception of the Masdar project in 
the UAE, which has a 100 MW PV solar plant that has recently been put on line 
and is providing electricity for Masdar City. 
 
5.1.2. Outlook of Renewable Energy Sources up to 2050  
The majority of the reports or studies that have dealt with the future of the 
RE technologies predict, at different levels, an increasing share of RE sources in 
the global energy mix.  
According to the 2011 IPCC report, “A significant increase in the 
deployment of RE by 2030, 2050 and beyond is indicated in the majority of the 
164 scenarios reviewed in this special report” (p. 20). Although there are 
substantial variations between regions, all the scenarios indicate that RE will 
witness a very substantial deployment globally. In the electricity sector, and in the 
mid-term, the scenarios show a larger share of RE in the energy mix, and a more 
rapid deployment than the transport or heating sectors (IPCC, 2011, p. 816). The 
share of RE in the power generation sector varies from one scenario to another in 
the four reference scenarios. Indeed, in the lowest case of RE electricity 
development, the market share potential is 9% above the 2008 level, reaching a 
share of 24% by 2050, whereas the highest share of RE in the power generation 
sector reaches 95%, 72%, and 35% in the two other remaining scenarios (IPCC, 
2011, p. 818). From these figures, it can be confidently assumed that the share of 
RE in the power generation sector will witness a significant deployment in the 
future up to 2050, as shown in Figure 25 below, which details the future 
deployment of RE in the power generation sector and by technology. 
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Figure 25: Projected global renewable power generation development by 
technology
92
. Adapted from Renewable Energy Sources and Climate Change 
Mitigation: Special Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, by 
IPCC, 2011, p. 819. 
 From the figure above, it can be clearly seen that all the projections in the 
four scenarios indicate a growing role for RE technology in the power generation 
sector, especially as far as wind and solar energy are concerned. Indeed, PV is 
expected to witness a very significant increase after 2030 in two scenarios, with a 
share of more than 10% by 2050, whereas the supply of electricity from wind is 
expected to overtake hydropower by 2030 (IPCC, 2011, p. 54). The differences in 
the scenarios can be explained by a number of reasons, but are mainly due to the 
fact that every scenario follows a different strategy and makes different 
projections regarding the future demand on electricity, and whether there will be a 
significant shift towards more electricity in the transport and heating sectors. 
Finally, on the policy front, the report concludes that “a high RE deployment can 
                                                          
92
 Development projections by technology and shares of global power generation 
for the four illustrative scenarios selected by the IPCC report for comparison. 
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only be achieved if system-relevant policy decisions are made many years ahead 
of the intended market penetration” (IPCC, 2011, p. 54). 
As far as future investments in the RE in the power generation sector globally are 
concerned, the total investments are estimated to USD2005 range, depending on the 
scenarios, between USD2005 1.360 and 5.100 billion between 2011 and 2020, and 
between 1.490 and 7.180 billion for the decade 2021 and 2030 (IPCC, 2011, p. 
54)—investments that will ultimately lead to expanding the deployment of RE in 
the power generation sector, in addition to further decreases in the cost of RE. 
From a regional perspective, the scenarios reviewed by the report provide a 
projection about the future deployment of RE in a selected number of regional 
settings that can be summarized in the following Figure 26: 
 
Figure 26: Projected renewable energy deployment in different scenarios by 
region for 2050
93
. Adapted from Renewable Energy Sources and Climate Change 
Mitigation: Special Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, by 
IPCC, 2011, p. 825. 
                                                          
93
 Regional breakdown of possible energy demand and RE potential deployment 
for the selected set of four scenarios in 2050. 
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 From the figure above, it can be clearly seen that the Middle East, which 
includes the GCC region, is the region with the lowest level of RE deployment, as 
less than 4.5% of the available technical potential for RE is exploited, compared 
to 22.1 for India, 17.7% for China, and 15.3% for the OECD region (IPCC, 2011, 
p. 825). 
From a technological perspective, wind technical potential has been better 
exploited to a much larger extent than solar energy. The projected weak 
performance of the Middle East region and the GCC in particular, is mainly due to 
the structural obstacles to a rapid and substantial deployment of RE in the region, 
and which are mainly linked to the fact that they enjoy substantial reserves of oil 
and gas at very low cost. However, according to the 2013 REN21 MENA 
Renewables Status Report:  
There is growing recognition of the opportunity cost of oil and gas used 
for domestic purposes, especially electricity production, desalination, and 
air conditioning, all of which are experiencing rapid increases in demand 
driven by rising GDP, urbanization, and population growth. (REN21, 
2013a, p. 9) 
 Currently in the GCC region, oil and gas are nearly the only energy 
sources used for producing electricity on a large scale, but this situation could 
change in the long-term in light of the renewable energy projects that are in the 
pipeline for the power generation sector. The following tables will illustrate, in 
Table 29, the existing installed renewable energy capacity in the GCC countries, 
and Table 30, the capacity estimates for renewable energy projects in the pipeline, 
by technology, in the GCC countries. 
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Table 29 
Installed Renewable Energy Capacity (MW) in the GCC Countries 
 Solar PV Solar CSP Wind Biomass Total 
Bahrain 5 (Year: 
2011) 
0 0.5 (2012) 0 5.5 
Kuwait 1.8 (2010) 0 0 0 1.8 
Oman 0.7 (2010) 0 0 0 0.7 
Qatar 1.2 (2010) 0 0 40 (2012) 41.2 
Saudi 
Arabia 
7 (2013) 0 0 0 7 
UAE 22.5 (2012) 100 (2013) 0 3 (2012) 125.5 
Total 38.2 100 0.5 43 181.7 
Note: Adapted from MENA Renewables Status Report, by REN21, 2013a, p. 11 
(treated by the author). 
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Table 30  
Capacity (MW) Estimates for Renewable Energy Projects in The Pipeline, by 
Technology (Number of Projects)
94
 
 Solar Wind Biomass Total 
Bahrain 0 0 25 (1) 25 
Kuwait 0 0 0 0 
Oman 407 (2) 0 0 407 
Qatar 0 0 0 0 
Saudi Arabia 125 (4)   125 
UAE 113.8 (3) 30 (1) 101 (2) 244.8 
Total 645.8 30 126 801.8 
Note: Adapted from MENA Renewables Status Report by REN21, 2013a, p. 12 
(treated by the author). 
 From the two tables above, it is very clear that renewable energies are 
nearly absent from the energy landscape of the GCC region, even if the present 
situation remains modest and the installed capacity irrelevant to the existing 
electricity demand. However, the future could be different in the long term 
depending on a number of drivers that this research aims at selecting and 
evaluating for building the long-term scenarios of the power generation sector of 
the GCC countries up to 2050. 
In this respect, the following sections will undertake the task of making a 
detailed technical as well as market analysis of the relevant RE technologies for 
the GCC region.  
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 The table includes only renewable energy projects in the power generation 
sector with a capacity greater than 1 MW.  
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5.2. DIRECT SOLAR ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES 
According to the IPCC, solar energy is defined as: “Energy from the sun 
that is captured either as heat, as light that is converted into chemical energy by 
natural or artificial photosynthesis, or by photovoltaic panels and converted 
directly into electricity” (IPCC, 2011, p. 965). 
  When converted to heat or thermal energy, solar energy can be used to 
heat water (for use in buildings, homes or swimming pools), to heat spaces in 
buildings or homes, and it can be converted into electricity through Photovoltaic 
(PV) cells or Concentrating Solar Plants (CSP) for the production of electricity at 
different scales. 
The concept of solar energy relies on the conversion, directly or indirectly, 
of solar radiation into energy using a variety of technologies. It is this radiation 
that plays a central role in producing electricity in two ways: indirectly, by 
producing heat that powers a mechanical engine which in turn drives an electrical 
generator, or directly by producing electricity through the use of photovoltaic cells. 
The average surface irradiance is evaluated at around 170W/m
2
 which represents 
5.4 GJ per m
2
 and per year, equivalent to the energy that can be extracted from 
one barrel of oil, 200 kg of coal, or 140m
3
 of gas (World Energy Council, 2010, p. 
410). There are, of course, regional variations in solar irradiation
95
, as some 
regions of the world receive much higher solar irradiance than average. 
Solar energy is very abundant, and has a potential that exceeds the 
potential of all other energy sources as “the rate at which solar energy is 
intercepted by the Earth is about 10.000 times greater than the rate at which 
humankind consumes energy”  (IPCC, 2011, p. 337). Converting only 0.1% of 
this energy with an efficiency of only 10% would be equivalent to “four times the 
world’s total generating capacity of about 3000 GW” (World Energy Council, 
2010, p. 408).  
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 According to IPCC usage, solar irradiance is defined as “The rate of solar power 
incidence on a surface (W/m2). Irradiance depends on the orientation of the surface, with 
as special orientations: (a) surfaces perpendicular to the beam solar radiation; (b) surfaces 
horizontal with or on the ground. Full sun is solar irradiance that is approximately 1.000 
W/m2 (IPCC, 2011, p. 965). 
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 From a regional perspective, the Middle East, North Africa, and GCC 
regions have the highest potential for solar energy, as seen from Table 31 below. 
Table 31 
Annual Total Technical Potential of Solar Energy for Various Regions of fhe 
World, Not Differentiated by Conversion Technology 
 
Note: Adapted from “Table 5.19” by Rogner et al., 2000, as cited in Renewable 
Energy Sources and Climate Change Mitigation: Special Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, by IPCC, 2011, p. 342. 
As far as the Arabian Peninsula is concerned, it is ideally located in the 
sunbelt region and enjoys an annual solar radiation of about 2200 kWh/m
2
 
(Hepbasli et al., 2011, p. 5022).  
 Solar technologies are diverse and adapted to different settings, from small 
scale infrastructure for the production of electricity for local use, to large scale 
plants for providing electricity to the national and international grids, as 
exemplified by the Desertec Industrial Intiative (DII)
96
 project to export solar 
electricity from the Middle East and North Africa region to Europe. In the present 
situation, solar energy in the power generation sector represents only a small 
fraction of the global electricity production. However, based on the scenarios 
reviewed by the IPCC, the potential deployment scenarios of solar energy ranges 
“from a marginal role of direct solar energy in 2050 to one of the major sources of 
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 Please see website: http://www.dii-eumena.com/about-us/mission-vision.html 
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energy supply” (IPCC, 2011, p. 337). In another study undertaken by the German 
Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU), solar energy will have a major 
contribution to the global energy needs by 2050, as shown in Figure 27 below. In 
addition, it is worth noting that in the past 30 years, the cost of solar energy has 
significantly decreased thanks to continuous technical developments and to 
supportive public policies at the governmental level.  
 
Figure 27: The evolution of the global energy mix up to 2100. Adapted from 
World in Transition: Towards Sustainable Energy Systems, by Germany Advisory 
Council on Global Change (WGBU), 2003, p. 3.  
According to this future projection, it can be clearly seen from the figure 
above that the inflection point in the energy system is around 2030 when the 
contribution of RE and solar energy in the global energy mix will start becoming 
substantial, before representing about 70% by 2100, while oil gas and coal 
together will only represent around 15% of the global energy mix. According to 
the German Advisory Council on Global Change (WGBU), this scenario will only 
materialize in the case of a combination of energy efficiency and energy intensity 
policies in addition to continuous technological developments in solar energy 
technologies (2003, p. 3). 
As far as electricity generation is concerned, solar energy can produce 
electricity in two ways: by converting solar energy directly into electricity through 
photovoltaic cells (PV), or by using solar thermal energy in a Concentrated Solar 
Power plant (CSP) in order to produce high temperature heat converted into 
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electricity through a heat engine and generator. These are the two actual main 
techniques used for power generation in addition to other secondary techniques 
used to deliver heat and cooling. On the development front, researchers are also 
working on developing solar technologies that will provide for energy carriers 
such as hydrogen or hydrocarbon fuels, known as solar fuels. For the sake of this 
research, the focus will be on the PV and CSP technologies as they are the most 
advanced in the solar technology family and are mainly used in the power 
generation sector. 
The level of maturity of solar technologies varies from one technology to 
another, “and their applicability depends on local conditions and government 
policies to support their adoption (IPCC, 2011, p. 337). Solar thermal technology 
used for comfort heating of buildings, industrial process heat, and domestic hot 
water, is considered a mature technology and is already cost competitive with 
conventional fuels in certain settings. Solar thermal technology is growing at 
annual rate of 16% and has reached an estimated capacity of 180 GWth in 2009 
(IPCC, 2011, p. 337). As far as the cost of solar technologies is concerned, it is 
still higher than the cost of conventional fuels for power generation, with the 
exception of off-grid applications in remote areas, and it faces additional costs 
that are linked to the integration of the solar energy power plants to the national 
grid. 
It is worth mentioning, before starting a review of the solar energy 
technologies for the production of electricity relevant to the GCC region, namely 
PV and CSP technologies, that various and sometimes significantly different data 
regarding the technical characteristics of these technologies exist in the solar 
energy literature, especially regarding their cost and efficiency. This is mainly 
because these figures depend not only on the industrial process for producing 
them but also on the geographical characteristics of the site, in addition to the 
local governmental policies. In this respect, the data used in this research is 
general and does not necessarily reflect regional variations. However, in order to 
have the most accurate data, a limited number of sources accepted by 
governments, industry, and academia for their accuracy will be relied upon. 
  
  287 
5.2.1. Photovoltaic (PV) Solar Technologies 
The process of creating a voltage or electric current following the exposure 
of a material to sunlight is described as the Photovoltaic effect and is the basis of 
the photovoltaic (PV) solar technologies. According to the IPCC definition, PV 
solar technology is based on the process “of converting light energy directly into 
electricity by mobilizing electrons in solid state devices . . .  [that are] specially 
prepared thin sheet semiconductors [that] are called PV cells” (IPCC, 2011, p. 
963). From a historical perspective, the photovoltaic effect was first observed by 
the French physicist Alexandre-Edmond Becquerel in 1839, but the modern 
photovoltaic technology was born in 1954 in the United States when the first 
silicon photovoltaic (PV) cell capable of converting the sun’s energy into 
electricity was developed by the Bell laboratories, with a 6% efficiency (Chapin et 
al., 1954), and had its first application on an orbiting satellite Vanguard 1 in 1958 
(El Chaar, Lamont, & El Zein, 2011, p. 2167). 
PV power generation technology is one of the fastest growing renewable 
energy sources and has witnessed a very substantial expansion in the past years, 
reaching a compound annual growth rate of more than 50% from 2003 to 2009, 
thanks to supportive public pricing policies. In addition, the installed capacity for 
PV power was estimated to be 22 GW in 2009, and an additional 13 GW of 
additional capacity was added in 2010 alone (IPCC, 2011, p. 338).  
The global PV installed capacity reached 22 GW in 2009, capable of 
generating up to 26 TWh/year, with more than 90% of this capacity installed in 
three markets: the EU27 with 16 GW (73%), Japan with 2.6 GW (12%), and the 
USA with 1.7% (8%). As far as 2010 is concerned, the additional installed 
capacity was estimated to be between 9 and 24 GW (Jäger-Waldau, 2010b, as 
cited in IPCC, 2011, pp. 338-339). The PV projects in these markets is essentially 
grid-connected and has benefited from various governmental stimulation 
programs, including feed-in tariffs, various mechanisms such as buy-down 
incentives, investment tax credits, performance-based incentives, and RE quota 
systems. Figure 28 below illustrates the evolution of the cumulative installed 
capacity for PV from 2000 to 2009. 
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Figure 28: Installed PV capacity in eight markets. Adapted from Renewable 
Energy Sources and Climate Change Mitigation: Special Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, by IPCC, 2011, p. 361. 
Despite its significant expansion and huge technical potential, PV solar 
technology is not yet a major energy supplier for primarily economic reasons. 
However, as the price of conventional-powered electricity rises while PV installed 
prices decline, it will not take very long before PV power will reach grid-parity 
with conventional-powered electricity. When mentioning the grid-parity concept, 
it is necessary to define it and to clarify certain points. According to Branker et al.:  
Grid-parity refers to the lifetime generation cost of the electricity from PV 
being comparable with the electricity prices for conventional sources on 
the grid often graphically given as the industry average for solar PV 
electricity generation against the average electricity price for a given 
country. (Branker et al., 2011, p. 4471) 
 While certainly a useful benchmark for the industry, its validity is subject 
to the accuracy of the method used to calculate the lifetime generation-cost of 
solar PV electricity. In addition, “grid parity is a moving target – as renewable 
deployment increase, their value in displacing conventional resources decline” 
(Olson et al., 2012, p. 17). In other words, the value of solar PV, or renewable 
energies in general, should not be based on the cost factor alone but also on the 
other benefits it brings to society. 
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Regarding concentrating PV (CPV), it is still an emerging market that 
represents around 17 MW of installed capacity globally in 2008, with estimates 
ranging between 20 to 40 additional capacity installed in 2009 and 2010 (IPCC, 
2011, p. 361). 
 
5.2.1.1. The cost factor of PV solar technology 
As far as the cost of utility-scale electricity generation is concerned, in the 
context of Europe and the U.S.  with a high solar irradiance, it ranges from 15 to 
40 US cents2005/KWh at a discount rate of 7% (IPCC, 2011, p. 338). However, 
when placed in a historical perspective, the cost of PV solar technologies has 
decreased from 22 USD/Wp in 1980 to 2–5 USD/Wp in 2005 (Margolis, 2003; 
Shaheen et al., 2005, as cited in Bosetti et al., 2012, p. 309), thanks to investments 
in R&D and economies of scale provided by the deployment of the technology, in 
addition to a decrease in the price of silicon.  
According to the results of a study based on three scenarios about the 
long-term possible evolution up to 2050 of the cost of electricity produced using 
the PV and CSP technologies, it will greatly depend on the level of investments 
made in research, development, and deployment (RD&D). Indeed, according to 
the ‘current RD&D’ scenario, the experts who conducted the study concluded that 
the price of electricity will range between 7.5 and 14.5 cUSD/kWh, with an 
average cost of 10.8 cUSD/kWh, and that it will have a 66% probability to be 
lower than the symbolic level of 11 cUSD/kWh
97
, and 10% of probability that it 
will be at 5.55 cUSD/kWh or even less. In the scenario with an increase of 50% in 
RD&D, the cost of PV CSP electricity will reach an average cost of 9.3 
cUSD/kWh, and it has a 78% of probability that it will reach below the 11 
cUSD/kWh by 2030, with a 12% probability that it will reach 5.55 cUSD/kWh. In 
the third scenario with a 100% increase in RD&D, there is a consensus among 
experts that the cost of solar electricity has 90% of probability to be lower than 11 
                                                          
97
 This represents the projected cost of producing electricity from coal with a 30 
USD per ton of CO2. 
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cUSD/kWh, with a 21% probability that it will reach 5.55 cUSD/kWh (Bosetti, 
Catenacci, Fiorese, & Verdolini, 2012, p. 316). 
In order to have a clear idea about the cost of PV solar plants in the GCC 
region, it is worth reviewing the results of two different studies that have analyzed 
the energy as well as the financial profiles of two projects. The first study 
concerns a small-scale 5 MW PV power plant in Saudi Arabia, and the second 
concerns a study undertaken in 2011 for a large-scale PV power plant in the UAE. 
The latter project was actually built and inaugurated in June 2009 and is part of 
the Masdar Project in Abu Dhabi.   
Regarding the first study, it concerns a small-scale 5 MW PV installation 
in Saudi Arabia, where the mean value of the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) of the 
project has been found to be 13.5% at any location in the Kingdom, with the 
highest IRR obtained at Bisha in the south-west region, where the IRR reached a 
maximum of 16.7%, while the Simple Payback Period (SPP) of the project was 
found to vary between 7.6 and 11.8 years depending on the location of the project 
(S. Rehman, Bader, & Al-Moallem, 2007, p. 1852). According to the study, the 
net present value (NPV) of the project is positive and would have a mean value of 
$51.3 million, making it a profitable project (S. Rehman et al. 2007, p. 1855), 
while the cost of energy
98
 (COE) for a 5 MW PV plant in Saudi Arabia would 
range between 20 and 30 cents/kWh, i.e. 25 cents on average (S. Rehman et al. 
2007, p. 1852). 
From these figures, it can be concluded that small-scale solar PV plants in 
Saudi Arabia have a favorable economic profile, especially when they are located 
in areas with a high global radiation (GSR) as it is for the site of Bisha. 
Regarding the second study, in June 2009, a large-scale PV solar power 
plant with a 10 MW capacity was inaugurated in Abu Dhabi in order to produce 
electricity for the project Masdar City. What will follow is an analysis of the main 
financial indicators of the project. The PV power plant is projected to generate 
around 24.4 GWh/year of electricity, which according to 2008 figures, represents 
                                                          
98
 It is defined as the avoided cost of energy required for the project to break-even. 
In the case of this study, it is assumed that all financial parameters other than the 
avoided cost of energy are kept constant (S. Rehman et al., 2007, p. 1854). 
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0.07% of Abu Dhabi’s total power generation of 34.500 GWh—enough to meet 
the demand of 1970 persons based on the UAE’s consumption of 12.375 
kWh/year and per capita (Harder et al., 2006, p. 793). 
Table 32 
Summary of the Financial Indicators of a 10 MW PV Power Plant 
  
Note: Adapted from “The Costs and Benefits of Large Scale Solar Photovoltaic 
Power Production in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates”, by E. Harder and J. M. 
Gibson, 2011, in Renewable Energy, 36, p. 793. 
 The study concluded that large-scale PV power plants were not profitable 
as the NPV had a negative value of around $ -50.8 million (see Table 32 above); 
however, when taking into consideration the negative externalities represented by 
the environmental cost, the picture was quite different with an estimated NPV of 
$ 47.4 million (Harder & Gibson, 2011, p. 795). Here again, this is another 
example of different ways of calculating energy projects and whether externalities 
of a given project are included or not. These results confirm similar findings that 
PV solar power plants projects are not profitable for the moment, and that they 
should be subsidized by governments, as private utilities companies will not take 
into consideration the cost of the negative externalities represented by the damage 
caused to the environment by power plants using conventional fossil fuels. 
The total cost for producing 1kWh, or the energy cost, is estimated to be 
16.18 cents/kWh, whereas the number of years necessary before having a positive 
cash flow are estimated to be around 29.5 years. All these elements illustrate the 
long-term nature of large-scale RE projects in the power generation sector and 
that can only be realized with a strong financial backing from a government. 
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According to Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF), PV solar 
technology is already a viable option for power generation in the Gulf region in 
the case the price of domestic energy is valued at the international market. In other 
words, the financial profile of a PV project in the GCC will depend on whether 
comparisons are based on the price it sold at domestically, or are based on the 
international price of oil. Indeed, when based on the international price of oil, the 
results of an economic modeling for a 100 MW PV power plant show that “there 
is a strong economic rationale for Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states to build 
solar capacity today (BNEF, 2011, p. 1). However, when PV is compared to gas, 
“investment in PV in order to displace gas is still not cost-competitive due to the 
very low price of gas and the higher efficiency of gas-fired power plants 
compared with oil-fired power plants” (BNEF, 2011, p. 6), but could become 
possible in the next 20 years if it is assumed that gas prices will increase and the 
cost of PV technology will continue to decline.  
 
5.2.1.2. The climate mitigation impact of solar PV 
The climate change mitigation potential is the main driver for the 
development of RE, and an evaluation of the environmental burden of different 
technologies from upstream to downstream is a necessary step in order to make 
comparisons between the different energy sources, whether conventional or 
renewable energy. In this respect, the lifecycle assessment (LCA) concept is a 
very helpful concept in order to evaluate the full environmental impact of 
technologies and make comparisons between them. As defined by the IPCC, the 
“LCA allows a detailed investigation into the environmental consequences that 
are associated with manufacture, operation and decommissioning of a specific 
technology evaluated in the context of the current energy system (2012, p. 729). 
In this respect, Figure 29 below compares the life cycle GHG emissions (g of CO2) 
between RE technologies and non-renewable, or conventional, energy 
technologies in the power generation sector. 
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Figure 29: Estimates of lifecycle GHG emissions (g CO2eq/kWh). Adapted from 
Renewable Energy Sources and Climate Change Mitigation: Special Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, by IPCC, 2011, p. 732. 
 The figure above illustrates the environmental advantage of RE 
technologies, especially regarding CO2 emissions, comparatively to the 
conventional energy technologies in the power generation sector. It is worth 
noting that the bulk of CO2 emissions in the RE technologies takes place in the 
upstream stage, during the manufacturing process, whereas the emissions from the 
conventional technologies take place in the downstream phase as a result of the 
combustion of the fossil fuels. 
According to a study undertaken by Kannan et al., which included a life 
cycle assessment (LCA) and life cycle cost analysis for a 2.7 kWp grid connected 
monocrystalline solar PV system in Singapore, the GHG emissions from a PV 
solar power generation plant is “less than one-fourth that of an oil-fired steam 
turbine plant and one-half that a gas fired combined cycle plant (as cited in Parida, 
Iniyan, & Goic, 2011, p. 1630).  
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Based on the results of a study undertaken by S. Rehman et al. for the 
evaluation of the cost of a 5 MW solar PV plant, it has been estimated that 41 
plants with a 5 MW capacity spread in the whole territory of the Kingdom 
contribute in avoiding the emission of 335.455 tons of GHG in the atmosphere per 
year, which represents an average of 914 tons of greenhouse gases (S. Rehman et 
al., 2007, pp. 1854-1855). In the case of a large-scale PV power plant of 10 MW 
capacity in Abu Dhabi, it has been found that it would contribute in avoiding the 
emission in the atmosphere of 10.732 tons of CO2 eq., emitted by 24.4 GWh of 
electricity produced from a conventional thermal power plant (Harder & Gibson, 
2011, p. 795).  
 
5.2.1.3. Future outlook of solar PV  
As a result of the continuous technical improvements and the economies 
of scale provided by the development of PV solar projects worldwide, the cost of 
PV solar technology will continue to decline, and it is expected that by 2020 or 
even before, it will reach the status of a cost-competitive energy supply 
technology (Bagnall et al., 2008, p. 4395), provided with the necessary 
investments in research and new projects globally, which will allow for PV 
technology to be deployed more extensively after 2020 and beyond. 
 
5.2.1.4. Status of PV solar technology in the GCC 
  In the past decade, the UAE has been at the forefront of major solar energy 
developments and is now considered the leading country in solar energy 
investments in the region and worldwide with very ambitious long-term objectives. 
In this respect, the Masdar Project has been the landmark project launched by 
Mubadala Group, and considered the biggest and most ambitious solar energy 
project in the Middle East and North Africa. In addition, the Emirate of Abu 
Dhabi has set the goal to produce 7% of its electricity by 2020. In June 2009, 
Noor 1, a solar PV plant with a 100 MW of installed capacity, was launched 
within the overall Masdar project. This is the largest solar PV plant in the entire 
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Middle East and one of the largest worldwide. The solar PV plant produces 
around 17500 MWh of electricity and annually offsets 15000 tons of CO2 (Masdar, 
n.d.). 
Among the GCC countries, Saudi Arabia has the highest potential, and has 
been engaged in solar energy research since the early sixties, when the first PV 
beacon was built at the airport of Al Madinnah. In the field of scientific research, 
the first small-scale research project was launched in 1969, while the first major 
research and development (R&D) efforts were initiated by the King Abdulaziz 
City for Science and Technology (KACST) in 1977 (Hepbasli et al., 2011, p. 
5022). Following this major step, a significant number of research and pilot 
projects were undertaken by the Energy Research Institute (ERI) within KACST 
with the collaboration of renowned research institutions in the world. Table 33 
below summarizes the solar energy research projects pursued in Saudi Arabia by 
ERI and KACST between 1981 and 2000. Based on this historical background, it 
can be concluded that Saudi Arabia has the longest proven experience in solar 
energy technology, which is why its technical outcomes and policy aspects can be 
relied upon in this research dedicated to the future of solar energy in the GCC 
countries. 
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Table 33 
List of Solar Energy Projects Conducted by the ERI and KACST 1981-2000 
 
Note: Adapted from “Evaluation of Solar Energy Research and its Applications in 
Saudi Arabia: 20 Years of Experience” by S. H. Alawaji, 2001, in Renewable and 
Sustainable Energy Reviews, 5, p. 61. 
On the research front, the scientific capacities of Saudi Arabia have also 
been enhanced by the establishment—six months before the announcement to 
establish KACARE—of King Abdullah University of Science and Technology 
(KAUST), which will be dedicated essentially to research for the diversification 
of the Saudi economy, including the development of renewable energy 
technologies (KAUST, 2014). King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals 
(KFUPM), established in 1963, has recently established a Center of Research 
Excellence in Renewable Energy (CoRE-RE) and a Center for Sustainable Energy 
Technologies (SET) in order to contribute in the national research effort for the 
development of alternative and sustainable energy technologies.  
Saudi Arabia has also conducted a number of research on sea-water 
desalination using solar technology. The first pilot project was conducted in 1984 
within the framework of SOLERAS (Saudi Arabian-United States Program for 
Cooperation in Solar Energy Projects) at Yanbu on the Red Sea coast with a 
capacity of 200m
3
 per day. In April 2010, Saudi Arabia—in collaboration with 
IBM—has launched the first step of a three-phase project for water desalination 
using solar energy technology. In addition, the project includes establishing a 
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research institute dedicated to the development of cost-effective technological 
solutions for sea-water desalination through solar energy (Hepbasli et al., 2011, p. 
5040). 
The establishment of the above mentioned research institutions in Saudi 
Arabia is a clear indication of the Kingdom’s political will to be not only a 
consumer of RE technologies, but also, in the long term, to put the Kingdom on 
the world map of the technological developers and innovators of RE technologies. 
It is still too soon to assess the future outcomes of all these investments in solar 
energy research, and to what extent they will allow Saudi Arabia to become a 
producer of solar energy technologies and know-how, but there is no doubt that all 
these efforts fall within the overall strategy of the Kingdom to transform, in the 
long run, its economy from an oil based rentier economy into a knowledge 
economy. From the Saudi experience in solar energy research and projects, 
Alawaji has reached a number of conclusions, of which the most relevant to our 
research include: 
 Seawater desalination through solar energy is currently not cost-
competitive with conventional energy sources. 
 PV solar technology has proven to be cost-competitive in Saudi Arabia 
on-grid as well as off-grid. The only drawback with PV solar 
technology is the necessity to clean the PV panels regularly due to the 
dusty weather, in order to preserve an acceptable level of efficiency.  
 Solar-thermal dishes with a small diameter have proven to be more 
practical in remote locations due to the maintenance and operational 
problems faced by large-scale solar-thermal dishes, which are not cost-
competitive (Alawaji, 2001, p. 76). 
 Aramco, the Saudi public petroleum company, is also engaged in the 
development of renewable energies; in 2012, it created an investment unit for 
renewable energies, and in partnership with the King Abdullah Petroleum Studies 
and Research Center, it is funding entirely or partially the construction of three 
solar PV projects with a total installed capacity of 17 MW (REN21, 2013a, p. 26). 
  298 
The other GCC countries also have plans for solar PV plants but at a much 
smaller scale than the UAE and Saudi Arabia, and as already reviewed in chapter 
4 in the section dedicated to the energy policies of the GCC countries. 
It should be noted that in the context of the GCC region and its dusty 
weather, that the PV solar panels require periodic cleaning in order to maintain the 
performance which results in a non-negligible consumption of water. 
 
5.2.2. Concentrating Solar Power (CSP) Systems  
Most of the electricity that is produced globally relies on the fossil fuels 
(coal, gas and oil) that are burned in order to create a hot fluid used in a 
downstream process for generating electricity. The CSP technology provides an 
alternative to the fossil fuels for producing heat, and therefore has an interest in 
building on an existent and proven technology. CSP has a number of advantages 
as summarised in the following points: (1) It is suitable for a wide range of 
capacities depending on the conditions and applications, starting from tens of kW 
(dish/Stirling systems), to multiple MW using tower and trough systems; (2) it is 
flexible enough to integrate thermal storage for peaking loads, starting from less 
than an hour to six hours, or use fossil fuels as a back-up to overcome the 
disadvantage of the intermittency of sunlight; (3) it is composed of flexible 
modular and scalable components; (4) the materials used for producing the 
components of a CSP are widely available (IPCC, 2011, p. 355). 
As shown in Figure 30 below, four types of concentrating solar plants 
have been developed worldwide: a) Parabolic trough; b) Central receiver plant; c) 
Linear fresnal; and d) Dish/engine. 
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Figure 30: Schematic diagram of the four types of CSP plants. Adapted from 
Renewable Energy Sources And Climate Change Mitigation: Special Report Of 
The Intergovernmental Panel On Climate Change, by IPCC, 2011, p. 356. 
CSP plants depend on direct beam irradiation as opposed to global 
horizontal irradiation, and accordingly, need to be situated in regions with a high 
level of direct solar radiation in order to be efficient, such as the sun-belt near 
equatorial cloud-free regions, as is the case for the GCC. Figure 31 below shows 
the regions of the world that are appropriate for CSP plants, and it indicates that 
the GCC region is among the most promising areas for CSP projects. 
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Figure 31: Regions of the world appropriate for CSP plants. Adapted from 2010 
Survey of Energy Resources by World Energy Council, 2010, p. 416. 
Globally, CSP electricity generation represented more than 700 MW of 
grid-connected installed capacity in 2009, in addition to another 1.500 MWe under 
construction, with the majority of these plants using the parabolic trough 
technology. However, the Central-receiver technology is expanding as the bulk of 
the announced projects use it, most of them located in Spain and the U.S.  (IPCC, 
2011, p. 361). 
 
5.2.2.1. The cost factor of CSP technology   
The data concerning the cost of CSP technology is currently limited, as it 
strongly depends on the cost of storage technology. According to 2009 figures, the 
levelized costs of energy for large scale plants with a capacity of six hours of 
thermal storage was estimated to be around 20 to 30 US cents2005/KWh (IPCC, 
2011, p. 338). 
The efficiency and cost of a CSP plant is intimately linked to the level of 
solar irradiance, and in this respect, selecting the ideal location is a crucial 
element of any CSP project. In the case of the MENA region, which includes the 
GCC, its higher solar irradiance makes the cost of CSP projects in the MENA 
region lower than in Europe (German Aerospace Center [DLR], 2006, p. 7). 
However, when compared to the cost of PV solar technology, the cost of CSP 
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technology is higher. As for parabolic trough, it ranges between 3.15 and 4.20 
USD/W and rises to 4.90 USD/W when a six hour thermal storage system is 
included (Denholm et al., 2010; Price et al., 2002, as cited in Bosetti et al., 2012, p. 
309). 
 
5.2.2.2. The climate mitigation impact of CSP Systems 
As has been seen already in Figure 29 above, all RE technologies have a 
significant potential for climate change mitigation, including CSP technology that 
is even better classified than the PV solar technologies. The environmental 
mitigation impact of CSP technology is very significant, even if there are minor 
variations from one application to the other. In general terms, each square meter 
of a CSP plan has the potential of avoiding the emission in the atmosphere 
between 0.25 and 04 tons of CO2 per year (IPCC, 2011, pp. 370-371).  
The first environmental impact of CSP plants is not the GHG emissions 
aspect of the problem, but in the land use issue, as building a CSP plant requires a 
large surface of flat land. Indeed, the land requirement of a CSP plant is 
important—around 2 km2 for a 100 MWe plant depending on the technology used 
for the collectors and without any storage facility (IPCC, 2011, p. 355). This 
impact is especially relevant if the plant has to be built on agricultural land or on 
protected natural reserves; however, “sunny deserts close to electricity 
infrastructure are ideal” locations (IPCC, 2011, pp. 370-371), which is exactly the 
case for the GCC region. However, the land requirement aspect of CSP plants 
could become an issue for the small countries of the GCC when taken individually 
(with the notable exception of Saudi Arabia), but not if the GCC region is 
considered as an integrated unit. Therefore, we can assume that the feasibility of 
CSP plants will also depend on the level of integration between the GCC 
countries within the framework of the GCC organization. 
The second environmental concern of CSP technology is water availability 
and consumption, as it needs substantial quantities of water in order to produce 
the steam necessary to make the turbines turn and generate electricity. This 
concern is even more pressing in the case of the GCC region, which already 
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suffers from water scarcity. However, the technology of dry cooling can 
contribute substantially toward decreasing water consumption. 
Finally, the third environmental concern of CSP technology is, as in the 
case of solar PV technology, associated with the visual impact of the plants. 
 
5.2.2.3. The future outlook of CSP 
The future deployment of CSP technology has great potential, even if in 
the present time its cost still exceeds marketed energy prices—as has been seen in 
a previous section of this research—and thus continued cost reductions will be 
necessary for a substantial expansion of CSP technology to become a major 
contributor to the global energy supply in the long term. 
The long-term scenarios concerning the future deployment of CSP 
technology in the power generation sector vary greatly, depending on the 
assumptions they make. Table 34 below summarizes the results of four different 
scenarios concerning the deployment of CSP technology in the mid-term up to 
2020 in terms of cumulative capacity. 
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Table 34 
Evolution of Cumulative CSP Capacity Based on Different Scenarios 
Cumulative installed capacity CSP Electricity (GW) 
2009 2015 2020 
Current value 0.7   
EREC Greenpeace (reference 
scenario) 
 5 12 
EREC Greenpeace (revolution 
scenario) 
 25 105 
EREC Greenpeace (advanced 
scenario) 
 30 225 
IEA Roadmaps  N/A 148 
Note: Adapted from Renewable Energy Sources and Climate Change Mitigation: 
Special Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, by IPCC, 
2011, p. 386.  
As can be seen from the table above, there are large variations between the 
scenarios as they are based on different assumptions regarding the GHG targets. 
 
5.2.2.4. Status of CSP technology in the GCC 
According to a study undertaken by the German Ministry of Environment 
Natural Conservation and Nuclear Safety in 2006, the GCC region has the 
potential to become a major producer and exporter of electricity generated through 
solar energy applications thanks to the region’s significant potential. In this 
respect, and according to the REN21 report about the expected future deployment 
of solar energy technologies in the MENA region, CSP will have an advantage 
over solar PV, despite CSP’s higher cost (REN21, 2013a, p. 19). 
Almost all the GCC countries have declared long-term capacity objectives 
for CSP power; however, so far, the only CSP power plant in operation in the 
region is Shams 1, the world’s largest CSP power plant with a 100 MW of 
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installed capacity, which entered into operation in March 2013 (REN21, 2013a, p. 
10). 
 
5.3. WIND ENERGY TECHNOLOGY 
According to the IPCC, wind energy is defined as: 
 Kinetic energy arising from air currents arising from uneven heating of the 
earth’s surface. A wind turbine is a rotating machine including its support 
structure for converting the kinetic energy to mechanical shaft energy to generate 
electricity [. . .]. A wind farm, wind project or wind power plant is a group of 
wind turbines interconnected to a common utility system through a structure of 
transformers, distribution lines, and (usually) one substation. (IPCC, 2011, p. 967) 
      Wind energy has been part of human history since ancient times, with a 
variety of applications from sailing, to grind grains in windmills, to water 
pumping. From a historical perspective, it is worth noting that windmills were 
introduced in Europe by the crusaders as they returned from their campaigns in 
the Middle East; the Dutch then improved and refined windmills, expanding its 
uses to other applications. However, the industrial revolution led to a temporary 
decline of windmills, and the first attempt to use wind for generating electricity is 
attributed to James Blyth and Charles Bruch in 1887, followed by Poul la Cour in 
1891. However, it is only in the 1970s that wind energy began to be used on a 
commercial level thanks to technical advances and government support, first in 
Denmark, followed by the U.S. in California in the 1980s, and then Germany and 
Spain in the 1990s (IPCC, 2011, p. 542). 
In recent years, wind energy has been expanding at very high rates; global 
installed wind capacity has increased from a cumulative capacity of 14 GW in 
1999 to 160 GW by the end of 2009, representing an increase of 12 fold in 10 
years with most of this addition built onshore. However, offshore capacity is 
catching up quickly, as 2.1 GW of capacity was added in 2009 alone (IPCC, 2011, 
p. 539).  
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It is necessary to note that the figures regarding the assessment of the 
global or regional technical potential for wind energy are not fixed, as they 
essentially depend on the level of development of the technology. According to a 
variety of assessments, the global technical potential for wind energy is much 
higher than the actual world electricity production, and almost all the regions of 
the world enjoy variable levels of wind energy potential, even if it is not evenly 
distributed across all the regions of the globe. According to the latest estimates of 
the IPCC, based on a synthesized figure from a variety of studies, the technical 
potential of onshore wind energy is 180 EJ/year, equivalent to 50.000 TWh/year, 
which represents the double of the global electricity production in 2008 (73 EJ or 
20.200 TWh) (IPCC, 2011, pp. 543-544). 
 As far as the regional onshore wind energy potential is concerned, a 
number of studies have been undertaken by different organizations and have 
produced varying figures as they are based on different key input parameters 
related to the speed of the wind and the performance of the technology. The 
results of these studies are summarized in Table 35 below: 
Table 35 
Regional Allocation of Global Technical Potential for Onshore Wind Energy 
 Note: Adapted from Renewable Energy Sources and Climate Change Mitigation: 
Special Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, by IPCC, 
2011, p. 547). 
The figure of 8% for the Middle East and North Africa, given by the WEC 
(1994) study, would be the closest indicative figure about the technical potential 
of the GCC region, as the other studies include the GCC in much larger 
geographical regions.  
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As far as the global deployment of wind energy is concerned, it has been 
successfully deployed in a number of countries. Since 2006, China has been 
doubling its turbine installations every year, and in 2009, it was ranked second 
worldwide in terms of installed capacity. Indeed, China ranks first in renewable 
power capacity, followed by the U.S., Germany, Spain, and India. India is also 
becoming a major actor in the RE field, as it is now one of the main producers of 
wind turbines in the world and among the top five countries in terms of 
installation (REN21, 2009, 2010). In 2010, wind energy supplied between 10 to 
20% of electricity demand in four countries: Denmark, Portugal, Spain, and 
Ireland (IPCC, 2011, p. 540). 
 
5.3.1. The Cost Factor of Wind Energy   
Since the eighties, the cost of wind energy has significantly declined, 
especially as far as onshore wind technology is concerned, and is cost-competitive 
with existing energy market prices in many parts of the world (IPCC, 2011, p. 
583). However, the cost of a wind energy project will be site dependent, highly 
depending on the wind potential compared to alternative power sources, and has 
to be evaluated individually for each project. In this respect, it is worth noting that 
offshore wind plants investment costs are 50 to 100% higher than for an onshore 
wind plants (IPCC, 2011, p. 584). The cost of offshore wind plants is highly site-
specific and depends on a number of factors, especially the depth at which the 
plant is located. Until the present time, offshore wind plants have been built in 
relatively shallow water near to the coast, which means that higher costs should be 
expected from projects that will be built in deep waters far from the coast (IPCC, 
2011, p. 584). However, offshore wind plants have, generally, the advantage of 
being exposed to a higher wind resource than onshore wind plants, and therefore a 
higher productivity. This issue is relevant to the GCC, as it will mean that 
offshore wind power plants built on the Persian Gulf coast will be much more 
cost-competitive than the wind plants built on the Red Sea or Indian ocean coasts, 
as the latter two are much deeper than the Persian Gulf, which has a maximum 
depth of 90 meters. The increased deployment of wind energy is still in need of a 
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strong public financial backing in addition to a “responsive . . . political 
framework and a wide range of government policies” (IPCC, 2011, p. 559). 
In 2009, the levelized cost of energy for an onshore wind power plant 
varied between US$ cents2005 5 to 15/kWh, depending on the site and the quality 
of wind resource, whereas for an offshore wind plant, the levelized cost of energy 
varied between US$ cents2005 10 to more than 20/kWh for plants built on 
relatively shallow water. However, according to the literature, offshore wind has a 
greater potential for cost reduction than onshore wind, and which could reach 10 
to 40% by 2020 (IPCC, 2011, p. 541). Despite very significant cost reductions in 
wind offshore technology, it is projected that by 2035, “offshore wind costs [will] 
remain well above wholesale electricity prices in most countries” (IEA, 2012, p. 
227). 
 
5.3.2. The Climate Mitigation Impact of CSP Technology 
Especially in the case of onshore wind plants, wind energy can have a 
limited number of impacts on the environment, including bird and bat fatalities as 
a result of collision with wind turbines. The environmental impact of offshore 
wind energy is not yet very well known. In general, the main impact of wind 
energy is visual, represented by the large-scale onshore wind farms. Hoever, as far 
as GHG emissions and in particular CO2, are concerned, wind energy has a very 
strong potential climate mitigation impact for near-and long-term (IPCC, 2011, p. 
541). 
 
5.3.3. The Future Outlook of Wind 
According to the IPCC scenarios, the contribution of wind energy “to 
global electricity supply could rise from 1.8% by the end of 2009 to 13 to 14% by 
2050 in the median scenario” (IPCC, 2011, p. 541). 
In the New Policies Scenario of the IEA, the share of wind energy in 
global power generation increases significantly from 1.6% in 2010 to 7.3% in 
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2035, with the highest increase taking place in the European Union as it will jump 
from 5% in 2010 to one fifth of total electricity generation by 2035 (IEA, 2012, p. 
227). 
From a regional perspective, the potential wind energy deployment by 
region is shown in Table 36 below: 
Table 36 
Installed Onshore and Offshore Wind Power Capacity by Region in the New 
Policies Scenario (GW) 
 
Note: Adapted from World Energy Outlook, by IEA, 2012, p. 227. 
In the Middle East and GCC region, the future deployment of wind energy 
up to 2035 seems to be very modest comparatively to other regions of the world, 
even if the figures for the Middle East are slightly better than those of Africa, 
Latin America, and East Europe/Eurasia. While this projection should be taken 
with care, as it is not specific to the GCC region, the wind potential in the GCC is 
nonetheless not very high, and a significant deployment of wind energy in the 
GCC region should not be expected even up to 2050. 
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 5.3.4. Status of Wind Energy in the GCC  
As has been seen previously in Table 35 above, the technical potential of 
wind power in the GCC region is moderate comparatively to other regions of the 
world or comparatively to other RE sources like solar. Table 37 below illustrates 
the wind technical potential for every GCC country (at a height of 10 meters), and 
compares it to the solar energy technical potential. 
Table 37 
Solar Versus Wind Powers in the GCC Countries 
 Note: Adapted from “The Status of Renewable Energy in the GCC Countries”, 
by W. E. Alnaser and N. W. Alnaser, 2011, in Renewable and Sustainable Energy 
Reviews, 15, p. 3081. 
The figures in the table above indicate that Oman has the highest wind 
potential followed by Qatar and then Kuwait. However, when the wind power 
potential is compared to the sun power potential, there is no doubt that sun power 
overtakes wind power by far, which means that when making future projections 
about the development of RE sources in the GCC region, the share of solar energy 
should be much greater than the share of wind energy but without excluding the 
latter. As far as the onshore wind potential of Oman is concerned, it is mainly 
located on the coastal areas, in addition to the mountains in the north of Salalah. 
The offshore wind energy potential of Oman is located on the coast, which 
stretches over around 1700 km from the Strait of Hormuz in the north to the 
border with Yemen in the south. It is necessary to note that the wind energy 
potential of the whole GCC region has not yet been evaluated in detail and that 
further studies are needed in order to be able to determine with accuracy the most 
favorable locations for potential future wind energy projects. However, the 
following section will present the available data related to wind energy in a 
number of GCC countries. 
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In the case of Qatar, the wind energy potential is suitable enough for small 
wind turbine generators that could be used to pump water or produce electricity in 
remote areas not connected to the national grid (Marafia et. al., 2002, p. 1). From 
a cost perspective, producing electricity from wind power in Qatar has proven to 
be competitive with conventional gas turbines (Marafia et al., 2002, p. 249). 
In Saudi Arabia, the regions with the highest wind potential are located on 
the western, Red Sea coast and the eastern, Persian Gulf coast as can be seen from 
Table 38 below. 
Table 38 
Wind Speed for 20 Locations in Saudi Arabia 
Station  Wind speed (m/s)  
Mean Maximum 
1. Dahran 4.38 11.8 
2. Gizan 3.24 7.7 
3. Guriat 4.22 16.5 
4. Jeddah 3.71 11.3 
5. Turaif 4.33 14.4 
6. Ryadh 3.08 8.8 
7. Yanbu 3.76 10.03 
8. Abha 2.94 14.9 
9. Hail 3.24 10.8 
10. Al-Jouf 4.02 15.9 
11. Al-Wejh 4.43 11.8 
12. Arar 3.61 12.9 
13. Bisha  2.47 10.3 
14. Gassim 2.78 9.3 
15. Khamis 3.14 12.9 
16. Nejran 2.10 8.8 
17. Qaisumah 3.55 11.8 
18. Rafha 3.86 12.4 
19. Tabouk 2.73 15.5 
20. Taif 3.66 10.3 
Note: Adapted from Overview of Energy Storage Systems for Storing Electricity 
from Renewable Energy Sources in Saudi Arabi,a by F. Rahman, S. Rehman, S., 
and M. A. Abdul-Majeed, 2012, p. 276. 
The first two locations with the highest wind speed are located on the 
western and eastern coast (Tabuk and Dahran), followed by one location in central 
Arabia in the Najd province (Turaif), followed by two locations near the 
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Jordanian border (Guriat and Al Jouf), and finally the Yanbu and Taif provinces 
on the Red Sea coast. 
According to a study undertaken at King Fahd University of Petroleum 
and Minerals, the wind potential in four locations of the western coast of the 
kingdom has been evaluated to range between 3 and 4.5 m/s at 10 meters high 
with the highest speed during the summer from May to August (Shaahid et. al., 
2013, p. 591). The western coast of the kingdom is about 1800 km long from the 
Gulf of Aqaba in the north to the Yemeni border in the south, and consists 
essentially of mountains that act as wind deflectors.  
So far, the only declared project for a wind power plant in the region is the 
Sir Bani Yas wind farm project in the UAE with a 30 MW capacity (REN21a, 
2013, p. 33). 
 
5.4. NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY: AN ALTERNATIVE FOR POWER 
GENERATION 
 Nuclear energy is defined as the energy released during a nuclear reaction 
that results from either splitting atoms, also known as fission, or from fusing 
atoms, also known as fusion. Both reactions release nuclear energy; however, as 
of the present time, only fission is used in power plants to generate electricity on a 
large scale, as fusion is still not yet a mature technology and will not be available 
commercially before 2050 (Smith et al., 2006a; Cook et al., 2005 as cited in IPCC, 
2007c, p. 272). Research in fusion nuclear energy is being actively supported by a 
number of countries as it has a long-term, nearly inexhaustible supply of energy, 
with helium as the by-product. 
 Electricity was for the first time generated using a nuclear fission 
technology in the United States of America, near Arco-Idaho in 1951, at the EBR-
1 experimental reactor. The production of nuclear power on a commercial level 
took place initially in the former USSR in 1954 at Obninsk nuclear power plant, 
which marked the beginning of nuclear electricity on a commercial scale. Since 
then, the share of nuclear energy technology in the power generation sector has 
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been gradually increasing, especially after the first oil shock of 1973, which 
triggered efforts among the major oil consuming countries to diversify their 
energy mix away from oil and gas. Despite a number of setbacks in the 
consecutive years that were related to decreases in the price of oil in the 
international markets, or to nuclear accidents like the Three Mile Island accident 
in 1979 in the U.S. , or the Chernobyl accident in 1986 in the former USSR, 
nuclear energy resumed its growth, and with it, its share of electricity in the global 
electricity mix. 
 Fission nuclear power has been very successfully used for power 
generation in a number of countries since the seventies, following the first oil 
crisis and resulting impetus among oil importing countries to seek alternative 
routes to diversify their energy sources away from oil. Nuclear energy was chosen 
as an alternative source of energy by the countries that had developed it for 
military purposes during the Second World War—namely, the United States, the 
ex-Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and France. Significantly and interestingly, 
France has made a successful energy transition in its power generation sector, 
shifting from a dependency on fossil fuels without any nuclear role, to nuclear 
power representing 78% of the electricity supply today, in less than three decades. 
The United States and the United Kingdom have also witnessed significant 
increases in the share of nuclear energy in their respective power generation 
sectors but not to the same extent as the French case.  
 The main constraints for the deployment of nuclear power are related to 
the issues of potential nuclear accidents—Chernobyl and Fukushima as very well-
known examples—the issues of nuclear waste management, the difficulty to 
assess the decommissioning cost that has proven to be much higher than what 
previously estimated, and finally, the proliferation risk posed by nuclear 
technology 
 
 5.4.1. The Cost Factor of Nuclear Power Energy 
When first deployed, nuclear power was not yet cost-competitive with 
conventional energy resources, but thanks to very strong governmental political 
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and financial support, in addition to economies of scale brought about by the 
deployment of the technology, nuclear power has matured as a technology and 
become commercially competitive.  
 Nuclear energy in the power generation sector is cost-competitive with 
other energy resources, except where there is direct access to abundant fossil fuel 
reserves, which is the case of the GCC countries. Nuclear plants are expensive to 
build but relatively cheap to run; indeed, the capital costs are much more 
important than generating costs in a nuclear power project. 
 According to a study undertaken by the Energy Information 
Administration of the US Energy Department, the average levelized cost (2011 
$/megawatt hour) of a nuclear power plant brought on line by 2018, 
comparatively to other 15 technological solutions in the US context, an advanced 
nuclear power plant is classified at the 8
th
 position, slightly cheaper than a 
conventional coal power plant and much cheaper than renewable energy, with the 
exception of hydro and onshore wind. Table 39 below gives the details of the 
comparison of the levelized cost of a number of generation technologies that will 
be brought on line in 2018. 
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Table 39 
Estimated Levelized Cost of New Generation Resources in 2018 
Note: Adapted from Levelized Cost of New Generation Resources, by U.S. EIA, 
2013a, p. 4. 
 The figures in the table above indicate that the cost of a nuclear energy 
power plant is cost-competitive with almost all the other energy sources, with the 
exception of gas for conventional energy sources and wind for renewable energy 
sources, in the US context. However, it must be borne in mind that “as with any 
projection, there is uncertainty about all [the factors used to calculate the cost, and 
that] their values can vary regionally and across time as technologies evolve and 
fuel prices change” (U.S. EIA, 2013b, p. 1). Indeed, in the case of the GCC region, 
the results of such a comparison will be very different with a larger difference at 
the advantage of gas, as it is produced locally and enjoys a significant level of 
energy subsidies. In this respect, the interest of this comparison lies in informing 
us on the relative cost position of nuclear energy and other energy sources. 
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 Nevertheless, the above figures have to be accepted with a high level of 
caution, as the cost issue of nuclear energy is highly debatable and can differ 
depending on how the decommissioning costs are estimated. This is very difficult 
to predict, as proven in the experience of the USA  and the UK
99
. In addition, 
globally, the cost of nuclear energy witnessed very significant increases long 
before the Fukushima nuclear accident; in France and Finland, the cost has 
increased to twice or even three times the original estimates.  Nuclear energy 
projects are mainly funded by substantial governmental funding, as private 
investors have been reluctant to invest in nuclear projects due to the very high 
risks involved (Patterson, 2011). 
 
 5.4.2. The Climate Mitigation Impact of Nuclear Technology: Mixed 
Results 
  According to the 2010 WEC survey of energy resources, the long-term 
mitigation potential of nuclear energy up to 2030 is the highest at the lowest 
average cost in the energy supply sector and especially in the power generation 
sector (WEC, 2012, p. 250). Other studies (Storm Van Leeuwen & Smith, 2005 as 
cited in IPCC, 2007c, p. 269) give much higher levels of GHG emissions, as they 
are based on higher emissions from the mining, processing, and decommissioning. 
However, nuclear power remains a very efficient technology for climate 
mitigation. 
 
 5.4.3. Outlook of Nuclear Energy Technology: The Impact of 
Fukishima 
The Fukushima nuclear incident had a significant impact on the development of 
nuclear energy, in the short-term as well as in the long-term. In the case of Japan, 
it is very doubtful that nuclear energy will ever return to its pre-Fukushima share 
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 Please read Nuclear Energy Statistics, House of Commons Library, 2013, 
and the following article for more details: 
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/ 
2013/jun/23/britain-nuclear-atomic-clean-up-decommissioning 
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of 30% in the electricity mix of the country, let alone achieve the objective of 50% 
by 2030 as previously envisaged. Prior to this nuclear accident, Japan had 54 
nuclear reactors in operation, but now it is considering phasing out from nuclear 
energy and expanding the share of renewables in its energy mix. Germany has 
also lately adopted a new national energy strategy with the objective of phasing 
out from nuclear energy by 2020 and increasing renewable energies in its energy 
mix. It is worth mentioning that before the Fukushima nuclear accident, there 
were 17 nuclear reactors in Germany providing one quarter of the country’s 
electricity mix (Froggatt, Mitchell, & Managi, 2012, p. 2). Investing in renewable 
energies for the past decade, Germany has become a world leader in the field with 
very ambitious long-term objectives. Indeed, according to the German Solar 
Industry Association (DSW), “the share of solar power in the electricity mix will 
increase by 70% over the next four years, to 7%, and rise to 10% by 2020” 
(Froggatt et al., 2012, p. 3). Belgium, Italy, and Switzerland have also decided to 
phase out from nuclear energy, while other countries in Europe have maintained 
their nuclear energy objectives, including France, UK, Czech Republic, and 
Hungary. In Asia, India and Pakistan are moving ahead with their nuclear projects 
and have already ordered two additional nuclear power plants, while China is 
building 26 reactors. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, a 
number of other countries are considering expanding or embarking in building 
new nuclear power plants, including Bangladesh, Belarus, Egypt, Indonesia, 
Lithuania, Malaysia, Nigeria, Poland, the Philippines, Turkey and Vietnam 
(International Atomic Energy Agency, 2013, p. 35), while others have abandoned 
their nuclear projects, like Kuwait and Egypt. 
 The Fukushima nuclear accident has, without doubt, triggered an energy 
shock in Japan as well as in Germany due to the very radical and bold decisions 
taken by both countries in phasing out of nuclear energy. On the policy front, if 
there is one important lesson that can be extracted from these two experiences, it 
is about the importance of the political will for making radical transformations in 
the energy system. Indeed, when the political will is strong enough, rapid change 
can take place in the energy system of a country with significant financial as well 
as environmental gains to be achieved. This is even more evident in the German 
case, which started the transition process of its energy system long before the 
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Fukushima incident reinforced it with additional supporting arguments and 
impulse (Froggatt et al., 2012, p. 10). 
 From the German experience in energy transitions, it can be firstly 
observed that solar and wind technologies are reliable and capable of delivering 
large quantities of electricity. Secondly, the speed and efficiency of deployment 
have greatly contributed to the continuous decreases in the cost of solar and wind 
technologies (Froggatt et al., 2012, p. 11). 
 According to the New Policies Scenario of the IEA 2012 World Energy 
Outlook, as a result of the Fukushima accident, by 2035 the share of nuclear 
power in the global electricity supply will remain almost unchanged 
comparatively to the 2012 share, or 12% of the global supply (IEA, 2012b, p. 53). 
By 2035, the installed capacity is projected to increase by around 200 GW to 
reach around 580 GW, with 94% of the net increase coming from non-OECD 
countries and mainly in China, which will see its installed capacity rise from 12 
GW in 2011 to 128 GW in 2035, followed by South Korea, India, and Russia 
(IEA, 2012b, p. 53). When compared with the 2011 Outlook of the IEA regarding 
the deployment of nuclear power in 2035, it has been revised downward by 6% as 
a result of the Fukushima nuclear accident (IEA, 2012b, p. 67). However, it 
should be noted that despite this projected decrease in nuclear power investments, 
nuclear energy in the power generation sector will continue its presence in the 
global electricity mix and retain its advantage as a mature technology readily 
usable for increasing the power generation capacity of a given country or for 
climate mitigation objectives, thanks to its very low level of CO2 emissions. In 
addition, based on the experience with the Chernobyl nuclear incident in 1986, it 
will not take much time before confidence in nuclear power returns, especially as 
the expected technological improvements regarding the security aspects, as well 
as the management of nuclear waste, are taken into consideration. This could be 
commercially available by 2030 as shown in Figure 32 below. Therefore, in 2050, 
the share of nuclear power in the global electricity mix could be higher than what 
is expected today, unless there is another major nuclear accident on the same scale 
or larger than the Fukushima accident. If materialized, this would certainly have a 
very negative impact on the future deployment of nuclear energy globally. 
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Figure 32: Evolution of nuclear power systems from Generation 1 to the future 
Generation
100
 4. Adapted from GIF, 2002, taken from IPCC, 2007c, p. 270. 
 Regarding the uranium reserve, it should remain largely available for a 
few hundred years at current rates of consumption, depending on the various 
nuclear technologies used as shown in Figure 33 below (IPCC, 2007c, p. 271). 
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 Notes: LWR=light water reactor; PWR=pressurized water reactor; 
BWR=boiling water reactor; ABWR=advanced boiling water reactor; 
CANDU=Canada Deuterium Uranium. 
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Figure 33: Estimated years of uranium resource availability for various nuclear 
technologies at 2004 nuclear power utilization levels. Adapted from OECD, 
2006b OECD, 2006c, taken from WB3 by IPCC, 2007c, p. 271. 
 
 5.4.4. Nuclear Energy Technology in the GCC: A Promising Future  
Until the recent past, the GCC countries made it very clear that they were 
not interested in nuclear energy and even called for a nuclear-free Gulf as a way to 
distance and single out Iran and its declared strategy to deploy nuclear energy 
domestically
101
. However, following the declaration of a joint nuclear initiative by 
the six GCC leaders in December 2006, in which they highlighted their interest in 
developing a nuclear program for peaceful purposes, a number of GCC 
governments have launched nuclear projects for the production of electricity—
both individually and on a national basis. The surprising and radical shift in the 
GCC’s policy for the deployment of nuclear energy could be explained in light of 
geopolitical as well as domestic reasons. From a geopolitical perspective, it has 
been suggested that this shift in policy towards nuclear energy in the GCC is 
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 In 2006, Prince Saud Al Faisal, Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister declared: “We 
are urging Iran to follow our position, the Gulf and the Middle East should be 
nuclear-free” (as cited in El-Katiri, 2012, p. 1)  
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mainly a reaction to the Iranian nuclear program, as stated by Edward Markey, a 
US congressman in 2008: “Saudi Arabia’s interest in nuclear energy can only be 
explained by the dangerous politics of the Middle East [. . .] Saudi Arabia, a 
champion and kingpin of the Sunni Arab world, is deeply threatened by the rise of 
Shiite-ruled Iran” (Markey, 2008). However, it remains unsure whether 
developing nuclear energy in the GCC countries will allow them to master the 
technology and attain the levels Iran has reached in the development of nuclear 
energy and in building indigenous scientific capacities in the field. In addition, the 
UAE and Saudi Arabia—the two countries that have officially declared their 
interest in deploying nuclear power—have renounced developing enrichment 
capacities domestically, which means that they will not have the capacity to 
control the full nuclear fuel cycle and especially the dual-usage (civilian and 
military) stages of nuclear energy technology. When comparing the nuclear 
programs of Iran and the GCC, it must be kept in mind that Iran has been 
developing its nuclear capabilities since the seventies with corresponding human 
potential in that respect, whereas as newcomers, the GCC countries will require 
decades to develop the necessary knowledge and human capacities to match Iran 
in this field. Therefore, it is primarily for domestic reasons that the GCC have 
made this strategic shift regarding developing nuclear power. Indeed, from a 
domestic perspective, it is mainly due to a structural shift in the energy mix—in 
particular, electricity—that the GCC countries have opted for nuclear power, as 
well as the increasing pressure of the domestic consumption of energy on 
available reserves of oil and gas that has pushed a number of GCC countries to 
consider diversifying their energy mix in the power generation sector, which 
represents the highest proportion of their overall energy consumption. In this 
respect, nuclear energy for the generation of electricity has been seriously taken 
into consideration by GCC governments, as it represents an available mature 
technology with a proven track record for power generation. 
 Moreover, deploying nuclear power in the GCC region will have an 
impact on their energy security as they increase their technological dependency, in 
addition to a fuel dependency, to foreign markets and countries, and lose the 
autonomy they now enjoy from their control over oil and gas reserves in their own 
territories. Indeed, resorting to nuclear power will mean that GCC countries will 
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have to import the nuclear fuel necessary to run the nuclear power plants, and 
which is produced and processed abroad. In this respect, the UAE has officially 
“renounced any intention to develop a domestic enrichment and reprocessing 
capability and . . . to source fuel from reliable and responsible foreign suppliers” 
(Policy of the United Arab Emirates, 2008, p. 9).  
 The GCC countries entirely lack R&D capacities and the scientific 
knowledge in nuclear technology. Compared to solar energy, which has been 
extensively researched since the seventies and especially in Saudi Arabia, there is 
no prior nuclear scientific experience throughout the GCC region. Consequently, 
for a long period of time, the GCC countries will have to completely rely on 
foreign expertise and human resources before it can create a local human and 
scientific capacity in the field. This will also be reflected on the overall cost of 
deploying nuclear power technology. 
 In order to evaluate the cost-competitiveness of nuclear power in the 
context of the GCC, it will be interesting to make some comparisons with the cost 
structure of other markets. According to Abu Dhabi Water and Electricity 
Company (ADWEC), the current domestic price of electricity lies between 
US$ 0.008 and 0.041/kWh (equivalent to 3 and 5 fils in Emirati currency) 
(Regulation & Supervision Bureau, 2014), whereas the US levelized cost of 
electricity from an advanced power plant that will enter into service in 2017, is 
expected to range between US$ 0.107 and 0.118/kWh (U.S. EIA, 2012). Given 
the clear and large difference between the two price structures, it is therefore 
legitimate to have serious doubts about the economic viability of nuclear power in 
the GCC region after accounting for the extra cost of starting from scratch, as 
compared to the US market, which has already benefitted from economies of scale 
due to the long history of nuclear power in the US in addition to the large scale of 
the US market. It is also worth mentioning that the budgets the UAE and Saudi 
Arabia have officially declared (US$ 20 and 80 billion respectively) for building 4 
nuclear power plants in the UAE and 16 nuclear power plants in Saudi Arabia will 
have to be reevaluated in light of the Fukushima nuclear accident and the increase 
in the cost of nuclear power technology it has provoked due to additional security 
requirements for future nuclear power plants (Schaps, 2013). 
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 Nuclear energy requires very significant capital investments and is 
considered a risky investment that will yield financial returns only in the long 
term, in addition to a very low or even negative opportunity discount for the GCC 
economies (Hertog & Luciani, 2009, p.15). As a consequence, the main source of 
funding of nuclear energy projects will be local, which will constitute a heavy 
financial burden on the GCC budgets and depend on the revenues generated from 
the export of oil and gas and on their prices in the international markets. 
 All the above points raise the central issue of the cost for deploying 
nuclear power in the GCC countries. There are, indeed, serious doubts about the 
economic interest for the deployment of nuclear power in the GCC region, as 
from a cost issue perspective, it is not certain that nuclear power will be the ideal 
technological solution for contributing significantly to the projected power 
demand in the region. As a consequence, the future of nuclear power in the GCC 
region will greatly depend on the long-term financial capacity of the GCC 
governments to sustain the very significant initial investments necessary for the 
deployment of nuclear power. This will be in addition to the long-term subsidies 
that the governments of the region will have to maintain as long as the rentier 
state structure of the GCC governments is not reformed to allow for putting a 
cost-recovering power tariff structure into place.  
 From a macro-perspective, we cannot understand the actual situation of 
the energy system in the GCC and explore its future if we don’t put it within the 
context of the social contract that sustains the economic and political system of 
the GCC countries, as has already been detailed in chapter 4. In this respect, the 
scenarios will help us see how the future of the electricity mix of the region will 
evolve depending on the future evolution of the political system of the GCC 
countries. 
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Chapter 6 
SCENARIOS OF POSSIBLE ENERGY TRANSITION 
PATHWAYS IN THE GCC COUNTRIES 
 
In this chapter, and at this stage of the research, we can state what are our 
knowledge surrogates, as defined by Coddington (1975), and discussed in chapter 
1, regarding the future of an energy transition in the GCC countries based on our 
knowledge and analysis of the past and present on the whole energy system of 
these countries. In this respect, before we engage in building the future scenarios 
of an energy transition in the power generation sector of the GCC countries, let us 
first briefly revisit the typology of scenarios as proposed by Slaughter (1993a) and 
reviewed in chapter 1, and when relevant, their corresponding transition pathways 
as proposed by Geels and Schot (2007), discussed in detail in chapter 2. 
Simultaneously, we will also select a number of scenario/transition pathways that 
we consider relevant to the GCC countries based on our investigation and findings 
regarding the three levels of the MLP framework of analysis in the context of the 
GCC region. 
In his work about scenarios, Slaughter (1993a), proposed a typology of 
five possible scenarios that could be used to describe future possible 
developments in any given context. In parallel, and in the specific context of 
energy transitions, Geels and Schot (2007) have proposed a typology of energy 
transition pathways that describe possible transitions pathways depending on the 
nature and strength of a combination of developments at the three levels of an 
energy system. 
The first scenario, or the breakdown scenario, describes a situation where 
a major negative, triggering event occurs, such as sudden environmental 
degradation, a nuclear accident, or a chronic rise in political and social conflict 
(Slaughter, 1993a, p. 295). By comparing this scenario with the typology of 
transition pathways elaborated by Geels and Schot (2007), we find that in the 
absence of fully mature technological niche-innovations ready to replace the 
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existing technology, it corresponds to the de-alignment and re-alignment path, 
which takes place when a rapid and sudden pressure emerges from the landscape 
with a resulting disruptive effect on the whole regimes level architecture. 
However, in case a mature technological niche-innovation is available and waiting 
to be adopted by the regimes actors, it corresponds to the technological 
substitution path, which occurs when there is a sudden and disruptive pressure 
from the landscape but with a mature technological niche that is waiting for an 
opportunity to emerge. 
Within the time framework of this research project, which spans from now 
through 2050, and based on our findings in chapters 3-5, it is very unlikely that a 
sudden environmental degradation will take place or that the climate change factor 
will exert such a disruptive pressure on the global energy system in general or the 
GCC energy system in particular. As far as the climate regime negotiations are 
concerned, they have been progressing very slowly in the past decades, and it is 
very unlikely that there will be radical changes in that respect in the short or 
medium terms; however, it is very likely that the climate regime negotiations will 
speed-up and the pressure on the global, including GCC, energy systems will 
increase between 2025 and 2030, as a result of a climate degradation and an 
agreement reached between the major industrial countries and the emerging 
economies regarding a post-Kyoto treaty. At this period of time (between 2025 
and 2030), it is expected that the renewable and alternative energies reviewed in 
the course of this research in chapter 5, solar, wind and nuclear, will be mature 
enough, cost competitive, and capable of replacing the conventional fossil fuel 
energies, which means that the energy transition that will take place could be 
described as a technological substitution pathway.  
According to our analysis of the political economy of the GCC and the 
political stability factor, the only situation that could potentially lead to a 
breakdown scenario in one or more countries of the GCC region—particularly 
Saudi Arabia—would be a sudden rise in political and social conflict as a result of 
a combination of domestic and geopolitical developments, such as a second 
revolutionary wave against the Saudi backed military regime in Egypt in addition 
to an exasperation of the fundamental contradictions in the politics and economics 
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of the region, as explained in chapter 4. Such a development, if it occurs, will 
have very significant implications on the rentier socio-political contract and will 
accelerate the already shifting balance of power towards the larger society at the 
expense of the ruling establishments in the region. It is very difficult to determine 
with precision the possibility of a breakdown scenario in any GCC country; 
however, in case the GCC political regimes evolve towards a repressive or 
managed societies scenario, then the chances of a breakdown scenario will be 
greatly increased.  
The repressive or managed societies scenario, the second scenario in the 
typology, depicts a return of totalitarian and fascist types of political regimes 
which could be triggered by a number of different economic and/or political 
factors. There seems to be no equivalent to this scenario in the typology of 
transition pathways. However, given the existing political situation in a number of 
GCC countries with the noticeable increase in repression policies and practices in 
the wake of the Arab Spring and the region, it is a scenario that could materialize 
in the future with significant consequences on the political stability of the 
concerned regimes and the sustainability of energy diversification policies. The 
increased repression, in addition to the impact and pressure from the regional 
environment represented by the Arab Spring, coupled with an exasperation of the 
structural weaknesses identified in the political economy of the region, could lead 
to a destabilization of the existing rentier socio-political contract, and to a 
breakdown scenario with the similar possible developments as already discussed 
in the previous paragraph. In fact, the repressive or managed societies scenario 
and the breakdown scenario are intimately linked, as the second occurs as a 
logical consequence of the first, and so they will be treated as one general scenario 
that consists of a combination of both. 
Given the fact that such developments could potentially materialize 
between the mid and long-term, we will consider this general scenario (comprised 
of a repressive or managed societies scenario followed by a breakdown scenario) 
as one possibility. The possibility of such developments are also backed by our 
findings in chapter 3 regarding the future outlook of oil prices in the international 
markets that expect a significant decline and maybe a collapse in the price of oil, 
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and as a result, the GCC economies will be put under an additional fiscal pressure. 
What adds to the possibility of at least, a significant decline in the price of oil, is 
the fact that the period when the price of oil is expected to take place, 2030 to 
2035, corresponds also to the period when the international climate regime 
negotiations are expected to speed-up and achieve an international legally binding 
agreement to reduce the GHG emissions, and as a result lead to a decrease in the 
global demand for oil. These assumptions are in fact the basis of a number of 
scenarios discussed in chapter 3, such as the 450 scenario of the IEA (2012), or 
the scenarios reviewed by the IPCC (2011) that are based on a stabilization of the 
atmospheric CO2 concentrations at a level of less than 440 ppm (Parts per million). 
The breakdown scenario, if materialized, could eventually lead to a new 
political equation in the region that would be based on a new socio-political 
contract and power equilibrium in favour of a larger public input in the policy-
making process, and as a result, the possibility to use all the policy instruments 
and tools, including and especially the pricing tool, in order to decrease the energy 
consumption and to facilitate the deployment of new and alternative energy 
sources. This development, if it occurs, could push the GCC economies into a 
succession of de-alignment re-alignment energy transition pathways, or even to a 
technological substitution pathway, depending if it takes place in a moment where 
the renewable energies have reached their maturity or not. 
The third scenario, as proposed by Slaughter’s (1993a) typology, is the 
business as usual scenario, which assumes continuity in the present policies and 
the planned projects, and corresponds to the reproduction transition pathway 
according to Geels and Schot (2007) typology of transitions, and which assumes 
that there is no significant or disrupting pressure emerging from the landscape 
level. In this scenario, the present situation with all its challenges and the 
unsustainable way of managing the resources remains unchanged, and the existing 
socio-political contract is maintained and not threatened by domestic or regional 
geopolitical events This scenario seems to be equivalent to the reproduction 
process transition pathway and could evolve into a technological substitution 
transition pathway, or to a reconfiguration pathway as we will see later in this 
chapter. This scenario is conform to the baseline scenario of the IPCC (2011) and 
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to the current policies scenario of the IEA (2012) reviewed in chapters 3 and 5, as 
they both assume a continuity in the current policies and a materialization of the 
existing officially declared renewable or/and nuclear energy objectives.  
The fourth proposed scenario is the ecological decentralist scenario, which 
assumes a departure from the actual aggressive ideology of economic growth 
towards a new approach to nature, based on decentralized ‘soft energy paths’ and 
a deep commitment to ecological reconstruction (Slaughter, 1993a, p. 296). This 
scenario requires a radical ideological shift with a very significant civilizational 
change; as such, it is highly unlikely that any government would consciously and 
deliberately engage in such a path without significant external pressure, especially 
in the GCC context, as this scenario would necessarily mean a radical change in 
the rentier socio-political contract of the region and a total change in the existing 
regimes architecture. As a consequence, this scenario will not be explored, as it is 
very unlikely that it could materialize globally or in the context of the GCC 
countries; in addition, there is no equivalent to this scenario in the typology of 
energy transition pathways as proposed by Geels and Schot (2007). 
Finally, the fifth scenario in the typology is the transformational societies 
scenario, which could evolve from two main routes: either from a process that 
leads humanity to a new stage of development, or through “the benign operation 
of a new form of technology” (Slaughter, 1993a, p. 296). This scenario is very 
similar to the transformation path transition pathway defined by Geels and Schot 
(2007), where a moderate pressure emerges from the landscape at a moment 
where a niche-innovation is not yet completely mature. In this case, the regime 
actors react belatedly to the landscape pressure but will ultimately manage to 
engage in a reorientation and innovation strategy, leading to changes from within 
the regimes structure. In the present time, it is very difficult to find any indication 
that the global economy is on its way towards a new stage of development or a 
new economy that will witness a departure from the intensive use of fossil fuels, 
as they will still remain essential parts of the global energy mix in the foreseeable 
future. However, as renewable energies have been witnessing noticeable levels of 
growth globally in the past decade, it is possible to expect that the global economy, 
and with it the GCC region, will gradually evolve towards a transformational 
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societies scenario in the long run and beyond the time frame of this research 
project; i.e., after 2050. Therefore, even if the transformational societies scenario 
is very unlikely to become a reality within the time frame of this research project, 
the possibility of such a scenario in the extended future should not be excluded. In 
addition, in regards to GCC countries, it could be argued that the strategic choice 
made by their governments to build knowledge economies and reduce their 
dependency on oil rent is placing the GCC countries on the path of the 
transformational societies scenario; however, as we have seen from our findings 
regarding the subject of knowledge economies in the GCC in chapter 4, this is a 
very farfetched objective that most probably will not be realized between now and 
2050. 
Grounded on Slaughter’s (1993a) and Geels and Schot’s (2007) work, and 
on the findings of this research project, in addition to the selected combinations of 
scenario/transition pathways, the following sections propose to review how the 
most relevant combinations of scenario/transition pathways selected above could 
evolve in the future as far as the power generation sector of the GCC countries is 
concerned. In this respect, only two general scenarios will be considered relevant 
given the actual global context and to the GCC region, with each one consisting of 
a combination of transition pathways. The first general scenario will be called the 
‘Neverland’ scenario, as it represents continuity of  the existing unsustainable 
system and without any change, which is closer to fiction; and the second will be 
called the ‘phoenix’ scenario, as it describes a rebirth process from the ashes of a 
breakdown. 
 
6.1. THE NEVERLAND SCENARIO: FROM THE REPRODUCTION 
TRANSITION PATHWAY TO THE TECHNOLOGICAL SUBSTITUTION 
TRANSITION PATHWAY 
During the whole phase of this transition process—between now and 
2050—it is generally assumed that there will be no domestic, regional or 
geopolitical developments that could affect the existing ruling establishments in 
the GCC countries and the rentier socio-political contract in place.  
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This transition process is divided into two successive periods of transition 
pathways. The first period begins as a reproduction transition pathway according 
to the Geels and Schot (2007) transitions typology, or a business as usual scenario, 
according to Slaughter’s (1993a) typology of scenarios, and will last until the end 
of the officially declared plans for deploying renewable and nuclear energy 
technologies in the GCC countries, i.e., between 2030 and 2035. This time frame 
corresponds also to our conclusion in chapter 3 that climate regime international 
negotiations will not successfully reach a legally binding post-2020 international 
treaty until the time frame between 2030 and 2035; or that even if they do, it will 
be with very minimal objectives that will not lead to a radical restructuring of the 
global economy, such as moving away the fossil fuels from their dominant status 
in the global energy mix. It is therefore only after this period that the pressure 
from the climate change factor at the landscape level will relatively increase on 
the socio-technical regimes level of the GCC countries, which will push them 
towards the second period of energy transition until 2050 and beyond, namely the 
technological substitution pathway according to the Geels and Schot (2007) 
typology of transition pathways. 
The main assumptions of the first period, or business as usual scenario, are 
the following: It is assumed that there are no pressures emerging from the 
landscape level on the regimes level, whether from the climate change issue or the 
price of oil in the international markets. As for the price of oil, it is assumed that 
this will be adequately high and above the fiscal break-even oil price in order for 
GCC governments to be able to maintain their expenditures policies, for keeping 
the internal social peace, and for sustaining their long-term investments and 
achieving their planned renewable and nuclear energy objectives for power 
generation. It is also assumed that during this first period, the actual structure and 
growth of energy demand and supply in the GCC region will be unchanged until 
2030. Regarding the climate change issue, in order for this scenario to materialize 
it is therefore also assumed that the existing stalemate in international climate 
regime negotiations will last until 2030-2035 as a result of a continuing 
disagreement between the major industrial countries and the emerging economies. 
According to this scenario, for the first period, a legally binding emissions 
reduction treaty will not be achieved per the UNFCCC objectives and time table, 
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but instead gradually and in the long-term by building on national and regional 
climate policy developments, which is already currently taking place as discussed 
in chapter 3.  
During the first period, the business as usual scenario or the reproduction 
transition pathway, the regimes actors who represent the ruling establishments 
that control and manage the energy systems of the GCC countries will be able to 
implement the gradual and very slow integration of new and renewable energy 
technologies in their respective power generation sectors according to their 
officially set objectives.  
It should be noted that as far as this first period of reproduction transition 
pathway is concerned, it would be wrong to assume that there are no pressures on 
the socio-technical regimes level in order to diversify their energy sources and 
engage in an energy transition, as the pressure already exists, but is moderate and 
manageable. In addition, there is also another pressure that stems from the 
structural weaknesses and challenges in their political economy and especially in 
regards to energy consumption and electricity consumptions, which are posing a 
real threat to their available oil and gas reserves and to their export capacity of 
their main cash earning resources. We can assume for this scenario that the main 
pressure, for the moment and during this first period, comes not from the climate 
change issue at the landscape level but from within the meso-level itself, or the 
socio-technical regimes level that is shaped by the rentier nature of the GCC 
countries’ political economy, which is a structuring factor found at the landscape 
level. As projected by the energy transitions theory and the MLP framework of 
analysis, it is expected that during this period, the very strong relationship and 
interaction between the landscape, macro-level, and the socio-technical regimes, 
meso- level should play a major role in pushing the energy transition process 
ahead. 
During the second period, after 2030, the international climate regime 
negotiations speed-up and an international legally binding agreement is signed 
and starts to be implemented, which creates an increasing pressure on the GCC 
countries to engage in an energy transition and diversify their energy sources 
away from the hydrocarbons. However, thanks to the investments and efforts 
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made during the first period in deploying renewable and alternative energy 
technologies, and the now mature and cost competitive renewable and alternative 
energy technologies, the GCC countries will be well prepared to respond 
positively to this pressure and maintain or even speed-up their diversification 
efforts towards a technological substitution energy transition pathway. An 
acceleration of the negotiations process that would lead to a legally binding treaty 
after 2030 would only add momentum to their diversification efforts starting from 
now, and encourage their pursuit after 2030. The main impact on the GCC 
countries of an internationally legally binding emissions reduction agreement 
would be on the price of oil in the international markets that could decline as a 
result of a deceased global consumption. Nevertheless, even if a decline in the 
price of oil should occur in the future, as expected to take place between 2030 and 
2035 according to our findings in chapter 3, the reserves accumulated in the SWFs 
should be high enough by that time to help the GCC governments fill the oil 
revenues gap and maintain their investments for more than a decade and without 
compromising the already planned or the future planned renewable and nuclear 
energy projects after 2030. Concerning energy consumption in the GCC region, 
the increasing landscape pressure that could originate from the expected 
international climate regime after 2030 could and should lead to a reduced energy 
and electricity consumption in the GCC countries, but it will be very difficult to 
imagine how this could happen without fiscal and policy tools, and without 
implications on the rentier socio-political contract and the status of the socio-
technical regimes actors. 
Therefore, as a result of the combination of the two successive transition 
processes and periods, and based on a number of assumptions, within the time 
frame from now until 2050, the GCC countries could achieve the following 
objectives in their energy transition towards a more diversified energy mix in their 
respective power generation sectors: 
 Bahrain: 5% of its electricity from renewables by 2020 as already 
planned, which, given its limited financial capacities, should be 
equivalent to an additional 5% every decade, in order to reach 20% of 
its electricity generated from renewables by 2050. As Bahrain has not 
  332 
declared any nuclear energy projects or plans in the time of writing this 
research thesis, in addition to the very high capital cost necessary for 
launching nuclear energy projects comparatively to the limited 
financial capacities of Bahrain, we will assume that nuclear energy 
will not be included in its power generation energy mix between now 
and 2050. 
 Kuwait: As already planned, Kuwait should achieve the objective of 5% 
of electricity generation from renewables by 2020 and 10% by 2030, 
which represents an additional 10% by decade, and consequently 
should be able to produce 30% of its electricity from renewables by 
2050 without any nuclear energy input, similar to Bahrain, even if 
Kuwait could afford the cost of nuclear projects. 
 Oman: With its already planned objective of producing 10% of its 
electricity from renewable energy sources by 2020, we can assume that 
it could be compared to Kuwait, despite its more limited financial 
resources, and assume that it should be able to produce 30% of its 
electricity from renewables by 2050 and without any nuclear energy 
input. 
 Saudi Arabia: According to its planned objectives, 20% of the 
Kingdom’s electricity will be produced from renewable energy sources 
and another 20% produced from nuclear energy by 2032 from the 
planned 16 nuclear power plants to be built in the coming 20 years (the 
plan was declared in 2011), which represents a total of 40% of its 
electricity produced from non-fossil fuel sources by 2032. Assuming 
that the same percentages will be added from nuclear and renewables 
in the next 20 years after 2032, the total electricity produced from 
these two sources could reach around 80% of the Kingdom’s total 
electricity production. In this case, Saudi Arabia would have achieved 
an almost total energy transition in its power generation sector. 
 Qatar: With only 2% of planned electricity generation from 
renewables (only solar) by 2020, Qatar is the country of the GCC 
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region that will see the smallest development of electricity generation 
from renewables, as it should not exceed 10% by 2050, if we assume 
an addition of only 2% by decade and without any nuclear energy 
input. Thanks to its significant gas resources, Qatar will have less 
pressure than the other GCC countries for two reasons: firstly, as a 
result of its small population compared to its very significant gas 
resources, there are no threats on its available reserves and export 
capacity in the long term; secondly, as gas is considered less polluting 
than the other fossil fuels, even during the second period after 2030, 
there will not be a significant pressure on Qatar from the expected 
international climate regime. 
 The UAE: As far as Dubai is concerned, given its planned objective of 
5% of renewable electricity generation by 2030 and its limited 
financial capacities, electricity generation from renewables should not 
exceed 10% by 2050, and without any nuclear energy contribution. 
Whereas in the case of Abu Dhabi, based on its planned objective of 7% 
of renewable electricity generation by 2020, it could reach around 30% 
of electricity generation from renewable energies alone by 2050. It is 
projected that by 2020 the UAE will produce between 20 and 25% of 
its electricity from nuclear energy. By assuming that it will add 20% of 
nuclear energy capacity every decade, the UAE should be able to 
produce 80% of its electricity from nuclear energy by 2050, and as a 
consequence, successfully operate an energy transition in its power 
generation sector. 
It is, of course, understood that according to the MLP framework of 
analysis, the socio-technical regimes actors will not be threatened by the transition 
process, as the new economy that will emerge from the development of renewable 
and nuclear energy technologies will be managed through the same neo-
patrimonial structure that characterizes the socio-technical regimes level in the 
GCC countries, based on the experience of the UAE in this respect as described 
by Davidson (2009), and discussed in chapter 4 in the section dealing with the 
socio-technical regimes of the energy sector of the GCC countries. 
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This scenario is established on a number of status-quo assumptions that 
seem very unlikely to be achieved given the structural challenges facing the GCC 
governments in their respective political economies, in addition to the challenges 
found on the landscape level regarding the international oil market and its many 
uncertainties. This is without mentioning the very unstable regional geopolitical 
environment, which combined with the structural challenges of its political 
economy, will represent the main uncertainties regarding the future course and 
fate of GCC ruling establishments. As a consequence, the probability for such a 
scenario to materialize, even if possible, is still very low.  
 
6.2. THE PHOENIX SCENARIO: FROM A BREAKDOWN SCENARIO TO 
A REBIRTH 
The ‘phoenix’ scenario initially begins with a repressive or managed 
societies scenario that is the consequence of a combined pressure originating 
simultaneously from the landscape level in the form of regional geopolitical 
developments with regards to the Arab Spring wave and the developments in the 
Arab Spring countries and especially in Egypt, in addition to pressure from the 
socio-technical regimes level in the form of an increased political instability as a 
result of growing incapacity of a number of GCC governments, particularly Saudi 
Arabia, to respond to the growing social and economic demands of their societies. 
This scenario develops from the structural deficiencies within the political 
economy of these countries and the weakening of the rentier socio-political 
contract. An additional pressure from the landscape could come from a collapse in 
the price of oil in the international markets, which could take place in the coming 
years as a result of a return of Iraq and Iran to the oil market, or at the latest, 
between 2030 and 2035 as a result of the development of unconventional oil and 
gas resources outside the U.S. as we have seen in chapter 3. 
The possible consequence of a repressive or managed societies scenario 
could lead to a breakdown scenario that will in turn lead after the consolidation of 
the newly emerging political equation in the medium-term to a greater popular 
input in the political and economic decision making process, or to a 
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reconfiguration of the socio-technical regimes level, according to the MLP 
terminology and framework of analysis. It is difficult to predict the exact outcome 
of such a development and whether it will materialize in one or more countries of 
the GCC; however, we will be in the presence of a new political order that will 
definitely have an impact on the future course of the energy transition process. 
Should such a development occur, it should not be expected to lead to a radical 
transformation of the regional political economy; however, the energy transition 
process will face fewer structural obstacles related to the rentier nature of the 
political economy, as it will allow the new regime actors within the new ruling 
establishment to use all the policy tools at their disposal (regulatory policies, such 
as feed-inn tariffs, or fiscal incentives, such as electric utility quota obligations, or 
pricing tools), in order to curb electricity consumption and encourage the 
deployment of renewable and alternative energy sources. 
In case the breakdown scenario occurs within the coming decade, the most 
probable transition pathway followed will be the de-alignment re-alignment 
transition pathway, as according to our findings in chapter 5, it is not expected 
that renewable energy technologies will be mature and cost competitive enough to 
readily replace the fossil fuel based technologies before 2020. In addition, it is 
assumed that during this period (the first decade from now), the pressure from the 
climate change issue at the landscape level will remain moderate, as no legally 
binding international agreement will yet be reached, or even if reached will be a 
minimal agreement with minimal objectives. 
 However, in case the breakdown scenario occurs later, or between 2030 
and 2035, there are enough indications to expect that the most probable energy 
transition pathway will be a technological substitution pathway, according to the 
transition pathway typology proposed by Geels and Schot (2007). Indeed, during 
this period of time, renewable energy technologies will have reached a sufficient 
level of maturity to emerge and fully integrate the socio-technical regimes level 
that will be restructured accordingly. Moreover, during this period, the pressure 
from the climate change issue is expected to increase, as it is very probable that 
the international climate regimes negotiations will gain speed and an 
internationally binding emissions reduction agreement will become a reality. 
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It is true that the immediate consequences of a breakdown scenario in any 
GCC country will lead to a period of political instability that could take a number 
of years before it finally stabilizes; however, it is very probable that the new 
political system emerging from this breakdown will allow for the birth of a new 
GCC region with a much larger input from society in the policy making process. 
In this respect, it is important to note that the breakdown scenario does not 
necessarily mean a fall of the existing regimes in the GCC countries but 
essentially a significant degradation or rupture in the prevailing rentier socio-
political contract that will lead to structural changes in the power equilibrium 
between the existing ruling elites and the society at large. This development is not 
impossible given the fact that the power equilibrium of the region has been 
changing and evolving over the past decades, and that this trend does not favor the 
ruling elites, as we have already seen in chapter 4. 
Within the same scenario, it also very possible that the repressive or 
managed societies scenario will be prolonged over a long period of time without 
necessarily leading to a breakdown scenario but to a situation of long-term 
political instability during which the energy diversification efforts will be greatly 
negatively affected and the process of an energy transition significantly slowed 
down. In this case, the ruling establishments in the GCC countries will be capable 
of maintaining themselves thanks to the oil and SWFs proceeds in addition to a 
support from global allies that will not be in favour of a breakdown in the existing 
political regimes of the region given the centrality of the region in supplying the 
global economy with energy.  
Given the significant uncertainties regarding the outcomes of a breakdown 
scenario, it will be very difficult to make detailed projections regarding the share 
of renewable or nuclear energy in all GCC countries, once the period of instability 
has passed and the GCC economies have embarked on an energy transition path. 
However, it is reasonable to expect that the quantified expectations of the 
‘neverland’ scenario reviewed in the section above will depict the minimum 
achievable objectives, and probably more, and whether they are engaged in a de-
alignment re-alignment transition pathway or in a technological substitution 
pathway, depending on when the breakdown scenario will occur. Whereas in case 
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of a prolonged repressive or managed societies scenario, there are even doubts 
that the GCC countries will be able to achieve even the already planned targets for 
2030 -2035. 
As a concluding note for this chapter, it is interesting to observe four main 
points. The first is that the main factor that will determine the political future of 
the GCC countries and consequently their energy transition pathways may be 
found in the combined future evolution of the rentier structure of the GCC 
political economy and its structural weaknesses, in addition to the regional 
geopolitical factor and its disturbing influence on the internal political dynamics. 
Indeed, the sustainability of the emerging energy diversification policies in the 
GCC countries will depend on their financial capacities as well as their capacities 
to maintain a certain level of political stability in addition to the future possible 
regional developments and how the GCC countries will be impacted by them. A 
situation where the GCC countries will be politically instable and negatively 
impacted by geopolitical regional developments is not a situation that will be in 
favour of  sustained long-term investments for engaging in an energy transition, as 
the priority of GCC ruling establishments will be to maintain and increase their 
social expenditures policies at the expense of investments in restructuring the 
economy. Such a situation will only maintain and exasperate the existing structure 
of the GCC political economy, which is the main obstacle to a successful energy 
transition.  Secondly, and as a consequence of the previous point, the future of an 
energy transition in the GCC countries is intimately linked to the future evolution 
of the power equilibrium between the ruling establishments and the larger society, 
as the more it moves in favour of the latter, the faster and deeper will be the 
energy transition. This concluding point finds its logic in the fact that with a larger 
input from the society in the socio-political contract of the region the capacity of 
the GCC governments to use all the policy and fiscal tools will be enhanced and, 
as a result, the process for the deployment of alternative and renewable energy 
sources will be speeded-up. Moreover, such an evolution will also create the 
conditions for a real electricity market to emerge which will allow for more 
investments from the private sector, and decrease the financial pressure on the 
GCC budgets. Indeed, for the moment, and as long as the existing rentier socio-
political contract will be maintained, all the financial burden for investing in the 
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new energy sources rests essentially on the shoulders of the GCC governments, 
which represents an additional substantial financial pressure on GCC budgets. As 
far as the third point is concerned, it is noteworthy that in both scenarios—the 
‘neverland’ scenario and the ‘phoenix’ scenario—the technological substitution 
pathway is always present half way  of the energy transition process, which is an 
indication that the technological substitution pathway is a necessary phase in the 
overall energy transition process, but also an indication that, in the context of the 
GCC countries, the technological substitution pathway is in need of a preparation 
phase before it can take place. 
Finally, it is in the interest of the existing regimes actors to act proactively 
and to take the initiative to introduce genuine political reforms given the fact that 
an energy transition process is a long-term process that needs stability and a 
continuity in the economic policies in order to achieve two concomitant goals, the 
first is to curb energy consumption, and especially electricity consumption, 
through policy and pricing tools, and the second is to achieve a successful energy 
transition and diversify their energy sources away from the hydrocarbons.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
Despite a general impression that the GCC countries are not concerned 
with the climate change issue and alternative energy sources, there are signs of an 
early awareness. Between 1996 and 2005, all GCC countries signed and ratified 
the United Nations Framework on Climate Change (UNFCC) and joined the 
Kyoto Protocol, and have taken seriously their UNFCCC obligations. Furthermore, 
they have also shown an interest in CDM projects in order to take advantage of 
the technological as well as financial benefits offered by the mechanism.  They 
have moreover already set long term renewable and nuclear energy objectives and 
launched a number of renewable and alternative energy projects. However, these 
steps remain timid, as oil and gas are still the sole energy sources fuelling their 
economies and power generation sectors, and the renewable and nuclear energy 
projects have not yet been conceived within the framework of an overall energy 
policy and/or strategy with the objective of engaging in an energy transition 
process, and in this respect, the GCC governments face much effort ahead for a 
successful qualitative energy transition.  
Indeed, the GCC governments face a number of structural long-term 
challenges. Essentially, these are found in their respective political economies, 
chief among them the diversification of their economy, and within this general 
framework, engaging in a qualitative energy transition to diversify their energy 
sources away from the hydrocarbons that fuel their economies, with a particular 
emphasis on the power generation sector, given its share of energy consumption 
and its contribution to CO2 emissions. According to the MLP framework of 
analysis, as the GCC governments gradually engage in the energy transition 
process, they will face a number of obstacles but could also potentially benefit 
from a number of opportunities as well, which can be summarized in the 
following points: 
Obstacles or barriers are defined by the IPCC as “any obstacle to reaching 
a goal, adaptation or mitigation potential that can be overcome or attenuated by a 
policy or measure” (2011, p. 44). Using the MLP framework of analysis, we will 
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look at the potential obstacles for a successful energy transition; i.e., at the micro-
level first (the technological niche); followed by the meso-level (the socio-
technical regimes); and finally, at the macro-level (the landscape environment). 
On the micro-level, one of the main features of the technological factor in 
the GCC region is its dependency on the international market to import 
technology, as this technology is not home grown. Even in the case of the 
conventional energy technologies fueled by oil and gas already established at the 
regimes level, they have been historically imported from the international markets. 
Indeed, the GCC countries are already consumers of technology in every sector of 
their economies, especially in the oil and gas industry, and will most probably 
need to rely on imported technology in their energy transition process and adapt it 
to the country’s specific regime and geographical context. At this level, we can 
clearly see that there is a structural weakness represented by the strong 
dependency on technologies developed abroad; however, the experience of GCC 
countries with conventional energy sources also shows that thanks to their 
integration within the global economy, they have been successful in developing 
their energy industry by relying on imported technology, and there are no 
objective reasons for not duplicating this experience with alternative and 
renewable energy technologies. Nevertheless, the GCC experience also reveals 
that importing the technology did not necessarily lead to creating a local value 
chain or to embedding the technology locally. Indeed, as far as renewable 
technologies are concerned, their value chain has seen some positive 
developments, but there remain still a number of challenges that must be 
overcome in order to build local industries in the field. The main challenge stems 
from the ownership of intellectual rights by the limited number of companies that 
own the patents, which they are still reluctant to license, as well as to build 
industries locally in the GCC countries (REN21, 2013a, p. 32). Furthermore, the 
local research and scientific capacities are still too weak (or even in some cases, 
nonexistent) to contribute towards localizing the whole value chain of renewable 
technologies, despite some progress made on that front by the Masdar Institute, 
which has recently produced the first clean technology patent of the Middle East 
and North Africa region (REN21, 2013a, p. 33). Deploying nuclear energy 
technology will face even greater difficulties in that respect, as access to its 
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technology in the international markets is greatly limited comparatively to other 
energy technologies, due to its potential military proliferation issue, in addition to 
its very high capital cost.  
To conclude on the micro-level, it is necessary to note that the MLP 
approach when used in the GCC context needs to take into consideration the fact 
that technological niche-innovations do not need necessarily to be home grown, 
that they can be imported from international markets, albeit some difficulties 
attached to the ownership of intellectual rights by a limited number of companies, 
which could be an obstacle to creating local value chains and embedding the 
technology locally. 
As far as the meso-level (or the socio-technical regimes level) is concerned, 
as already defined earlier, it is very clear that it has a central role in any transition 
strategy and often the driving force of the micro- and macro-levels, but also very 
strongly influenced and shaped by them. At this level of the analysis, we can 
identify a number of potential obstacles to a successful energy transition as 
summarized in the following points: 
The rentier nature of the existing socio-political contract and the 
importance of the oil and gas stakeholders with vested interests in the economy 
will mostly likely represent the main obstacles to a qualitative energy transition in 
the GCC region. However, as already seen in the UAE case, the new economy 
that has emerged from the introduction of renewable energy technologies has been 
managed by the same old neo-patrimonial structure, or regime actors according to 
the MLP terminology; therefore, when managed and gradual, and not the result of 
a breakdown scenario, an energy transition process in the context of the GCC does 
not necessarily represent a threat to the already established regime actors. In fact, 
when the regime actors act pro-actively, they can insure that they will preserve 
their interests and position within the socio-technical regimes level.  
Once again, as a result of the rentier political economy of the region, there 
is a near-absence of a civil society with active NGOs and green movements or 
parties due to the social contract in place in the GCC countries, which limits the 
possibility of bottom-up advocated policies. Indeed, “apart from a few 
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organizations serving professional and religious (charity) interests, the 
establishment of functioning civil society by GCC nationals remains 
underdeveloped” (Jill, 2005, as cited in Spiess, 2008, p. 249). Consequently, there 
is almost no input from the larger society in the policy-making process, and the 
rentier nature of the culture of the society has led to the development of wasteful 
energy consumption patterns that have been placing a significant pressure on their 
available oil and gas reserves. 
Moreover, the rentier redistributive political economy has led to the policy 
of minimal taxation, which prevents the internalization of external costs and does 
not allow for using fiscal and policy tools, such as an ecological tax or a feed-in 
tariff system, in order to curb the domestic consumption and encourage 
investments in new and alternative energy sources.  
Energy subsidies on conventional oil and gas sources reduce considerably 
the already weak cost competitiveness of nuclear and renewable energy 
technologies, knowing that the latter will need substantial governmental funding 
and subsidies in order to be introduced into the energy mix, and before they can 
compete with the conventional energy sources. There is here, indeed, a very 
strong structural obstacle, as energy subsidies have allowed for the GCC countries 
to be very attractive for energy intensive industries, as they enjoy a comparative 
cost advantage for highly energy intensive industries (cheap energy plus low cost 
labor), and as a consequence, have contributed to the economic diversification 
efforts of GCC governments. 
On the landscape or macro-level, the main obstacle to a qualitative energy 
transition is to be found, first of all, in the regional geopolitical instability. Indeed, 
as we have seen in chapter 4, the Arab Spring wave has led to a strong return of 
the redistributive practices and policies in order to buy social peace, which 
reinforces the existing rentier structure considered the main obstacle for an energy 
transition. The second potential obstacle, albeit to a lesser extent, is the increase in 
the price of oil in the international market, as the GCC countries have seen their 
dependency on oil revenues increase since 2002, and as a result, the share of oil in 
the GCC economies has risen from 30.8% in 2002 to 40% in 2006 (Saif, 2009, p. 
3). However, this factor comes double-edged, as the latest increase in the price of 
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oil has also led to reducing the cost gap between conventional energy sources and 
renewable energy sources, which has then led to growing investments in the RES. 
Another potential obstacle at the macro-level is the slow pace of progress 
in the negotiation process around compulsory climate change regimes due to the 
conflicting interests between the West in general and the emerging economies 
regarding the principle of shared but unequal responsibility. 
On the other side, there are also a number of opportunities that could 
contribute positively in a qualitative energy transition. According to the 2011 
IPCC report:  
Opportunities can be defined as: 
circumstances of action with the attribute of a chance character. In the 
policy context that could be the anticipation of additional benefits that may 
go along with the deployment of RE but that are not intentionally targeted. 
These include four major opportunity areas: social and economic 
development; energy access; energy security; and climate change 
mitigation and the reduction of environmental and health impacts. (IPCC, 
2011, p. 41) 
Based on the above definition, we have identified the following potential 
opportunities available to the GCC countries for a successful energy transition in 
the power generation sector. 
At the technological niche-innovations level, or micro-level, the GCC 
countries primarily have been importers of technology, and they lack the 
necessary scientific network and capacities for developing technologies locally; 
however, solar technology has been present in the GCC countries since the 
seventies, especially in Saudi Arabia where a number of pilot projects have taken 
place. Solar technology is therefore well known in the region, and there are even 
local if limited scientific capacities in the field, which could be reinforced and 
developed through governmental investments in training, research, and 
development. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are taking the lead in this perspective 
following the creation of King Abdullah City for Nuclear and Renewable Energy, 
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and Masdar Institute, respectively. The technological niche will certainly need 
further development before it becomes imbedded in the region, but the seeds for 
developing the solar technological niche are already available and being actively 
pursued. 
Of the GCC region, Saudi Arabia is the most advanced in pursuing the 
development of local content within its overall strategy for the deployment of 
renewable energy technologies, an objective that potentially only Saudi Arabia 
can pursue because of the size of its manpower and market. This objective is very 
clear in the White Paper released in February 2013, which states that “while 
K.A.CARE is aggressively pursuing the development of the local value chain, 
projects will be expected to escalate their local content inclusion accordingly” 
(K.A.CARE, 2013, as cited by REN21, 2013a, p. 32). Saudi Arabia also requires 
potential partners to make most of their procurement locally, and it introduced a 1% 
tax for investments in training and research in solar energy technologies. Finally, 
they have introduced fiscal incentives for employing local manpower (REN21, 
2013a, p. 32).  
The objective of such an obligation is clearly to encourage joint ventures 
with international companies and push them to build local industrial branches that 
will contribute to training the local manpower and transfer technologies in the 
long run. In this respect, it appears that Saudi Arabia, a latecomer in the 
renewable energy market, will be a major player regionally and possibly globally, 
if the financial effort is sustained in the long term. 
The UAE, which has been the first country in the GCC region to take the 
lead in the development of renewable energies, is also pursuing the objective of 
increasing the local content; however, the size of its population and market will 
have a limiting impact on this strategy. There seems to be an awareness of these 
limitations at the governmental level, and this why the UAE has been more active 
and present than Saudi Arabia in international investments in renewable energy 
projects abroad (REN21, 2013a, p. 33). 
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On the meso-level, or socio-technical regimes level, there are also a 
number of potential opportunities that could contribute positively to the energy 
transition process and which can be summarized in the following points:  
The rentier state enjoys a certain level of autonomy, which grants him the 
“ability to plan and pursue an economic strategy unfettered by special interests” 
(Niblock & Malik, 2007, p. 15). The rentier state theory attributes to the rentier 
state a central role in the economy and a relative level of autonomy—
characteristics that are necessary for conducting a successful energy transition.  
Indeed, the existence of a state capitalist and neo-patrimonial structure is a 
potential advantage that grants the GCC governments the necessary institutional 
and political factors for engaging in an energy transition. Political will is 
determinant in a process that needs a state apparatus for planning and 
implementing the policy. The state capitalist structure, coupled with an inclusive 
approach in energy policy-making towards the neopatrimonial structure and the 
relevant energy stakeholders as represented by the major national energy 
companies, would greatly contribute towards gathering the necessary support for 
engaging in a successful energy transition.  
On the financial front, the GCC governments have at their disposal in the 
present time significant capital resources that will be necessary, especially in the 
initial launching phase, in order to make the needed investments for a gradual 
transition. Following the last increases in the price of oil, the GCC governments 
have been enjoying substantial revenues from the export of oil and gas, and it 
would make sense from an economical perspective to invest the available 
financial wealth in diversifying their energy sources, as it is a long term process 
that requires long term planning and investments. As demonstrated by the Stern 
Review, costly adjustments could be avoided in the future if an incremental 
transformation process was initiated now, rather than radical change later (Stern, 
2007). When looking at the international market and the available alternative 
technologies, such as nuclear technology, or the renewable energy sources, such 
as solar and wind, they all have high initial costs and a long time period of 
depreciation of the investment, and will therefore need strong regulatory and 
financial support from the GCC governments in the initial phases. Regulation and 
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subsidies will be necessary to allow the deployment of the selected technological 
niche and decrease the cost as a result of economies of scale. 
Moreover, investing in RES is an opportunity to diversify the economy 
and create jobs in knowledge-intensive fields. Very significant investments will 
be required for the deployment of new energies in the power generation sector, 
which consequently will need to create fast growing new markets with attending 
opportunities for growth and diversification.  
Engaging in an energy transition process that would lead to an increased 
share of alternative and renewable energy sources in the energy mix of the GCC 
countries will, undoubtedly, reduce the pressure on their limited reserves of 
hydrocarbons, and more oil and gas could be exported with a better financial 
value. 
  On the landscape or macro-level, the potential opportunities can be 
summarized in the following points:  
The existence of the GCC organization through which the member 
countries could potentially coordinate more closely their energy policies and 
avoid duplication of efforts is a potential advantage that has not yet been fully 
exploited until the present time, excepting the experience of the grid 
interconnection. In this respect, it is important to remind that the GCC 
Interconnection Authority (GCCIA) offers a good example of this available 
opportunity, as the 7 billion power grid is expected to cut the need for new 
electricity generation in the GCC countries by 5000 Megawatts (Reiche, 2010, p. 
2400). The European Union experience has been built on steel and coal industries, 
and the GCC countries could use the energy industry as the building block for a 
greater regional integration, which will certainly allow for larger economies of 
scale and a lower level of investments when projects are done collectively It is 
true, however, that the GCC countries have not made significant achievements in 
their cooperation and integration process until now, especially regarding the 
objectives set in the Charter by the member states when the GCC organization 
was created in 1981, but its existence is an asset that could be further developed 
and improved.  
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At the international level, the GCC countries could take advantage of the 
Kyoto Protocol for investments in clean energy projects and benefit from 
technology transfer, training and technical assistance, and energy diversification. 
As seen in chapter 3, the GCC countries have been actively seeking this 
opportunity, and it should be expected that this trend will be reinforced in the 
future.  
While there are a number of structural weaknesses at all levels, in the GCC 
countries, there are also a number of opportunities available to the governments of 
the region to engineer a successful energy transition within three to five decades, 
if the political will is strong enough. Let us not forget that the classical rentier 
state theory initially assumed that a rentier state would not be capable of 
developing an industry, which has since proven wrong, as demonstrated by the 
very significant industrial development in the petrochemical industry. As stated 
by Tim Niblock, the GCC countries have been able to push forward a number of 
industrial projects through the concept of “islands of efficiency” (Niblock & 
Malik, 2007, p. 20). Accordingly, it is not impossible to implement the same 
concept toward a strategy for an energy transition within the framework of the 
multi-level perspective, where all the levels will reinforce each other, with the 
meso-level playing a central role in the process. Indeed, the political will at the 
level of the policy-makers, in addition to the engagement and support of the 
neopatrimonial network, will be key factors for engineering a successful energy 
transition. While the GCC countries lack the efficient and independent 
bureaucratic structure present in a developmental state and are limited in their 
capacity to collect taxes, their societies are not static, as they are undergoing 
gradual political reforms that could in the long run transform the state structure 
and lead to a change in the minimal taxation policy. Indeed, political reforms in 
the GCC countries have already taken place in the past, and we should expect the 
possibility of further reforms in the political equation of the region, especially if 
we consider the regional context of the Arab Spring—which is now only at its 
first stages and in the long run, could potentially reconfigure the whole political 
map of the region. This development, if it should occur, will gradually change the 
society’s role and create a new equilibrium between the top-down and bottom-up 
approaches—an equilibrium that is lacking for the moment. 
  348 
From a policy perspective energy transition processes have to be 
considered within the more general framework of economic diversification 
policies and strategies and the success of both is based on an essential political 
determinant. Indeed, political legitimacy and social consensus constitute 
fundamental pre-requisites for undertaking the necessary disruptive reforms, and a 
successful energy transition will greatly depend on a gradual and simultaneous 
process of phasing out from the unsustainable social-political social contract 
based on oil rent. Moreover, as it has been demonstrated in chapter 4, the Arab 
Spring has only reinforced the existing social contract as GCC governments have 
retracted from the process of economic reforms for political considerations. 
The assumption of the transition theory and the MLP framework of 
analysis that an energy transition will lead to a reconfiguration of the regimes 
actors is proving correct to a certain extent in the GCC countries. There is indeed 
a process of reconfiguration of the regimes actors that is taking place in the power 
structure of the GCC monarchies, and this process is expected to continue and 
increase in intensity as the energy transition accelerates; however, the regimes 
actors in the GCC monarchies have also shown a certain capacity to adapt to the 
process of change in a way that has not undermined their power status in the 
political system. This capacity to adapt has been very well described by Davidson 
in the following terms:  
The hybrid, semi-formal, political system of the oil era that witnessed 
family patriarchs becoming cabinet ministers or other officials at the helm 
of seemingly modern public sector institutions, has evolved once more. 
Impressively reinvigorated for the post-oil era, Abu Dhabi’s elites, still 
forged from centuries-old alliances, have been reconfigured as 
development-focused boardroom executives alongside their roles as tribal 
sheikhs. (Davidson, 2009, p. 2) 
Finally, it is of course recognized that, as for any human endeavor, this 
research project is a limited and imperfect work that will surely need to be 
improved and further developed. The main limitation of this work is most 
probably to be found in the fact that the proposed scenarios are the outcome of 
personal desk research and not the result of a larger participatory effort. There are, 
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of course, no methodological objections for building scenarios through desk 
research; however, there is no doubt that this work would greatly benefit from a 
participatory research work including a sample of relevant policy-makers from the 
region, academics, and members of the public in order to think collectively about 
the future of the energy system of the GCC countries.  
It is hoped that this research thesis will constitute a modest contribution to 
scientific knowledge in general and to the discourse about energy transitions in 
the GCC countries in particular, which will hopefully create an impulse to use the 
transitions theory and the MLP framework of analysis by other researchers 
working on the GCC region and the greater Arab world.  
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